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In recent decades, the international community has made a concerted effort to develop the 
international Anti-Money Laundering Standards (AMLSs) and enhance their implementation 
at a national level. It is submitted that the AMLSs serve various laudable aims and States 
should adequately implement those standards. In fact, most States, including Vietnam, have 
been striving for the highest level of compliance with the AMLSs. This thesis suggests that 
external pressure and State socialization has compelled developing States to implement and 
comply with the international AMLSs, and Vietnam is an obvious case study.  
This thesis examines concisely the development and underlying rationales of a number of 
key categories of international AMLSs, and the difference in national implementation of each 
category. The implementation of such multifaceted standards in a transitional State, like 
Vietnam, requires substantial legal and administrative reform, which often faces numerous 
domestic hurdles. The examination of Vietnamese AML legislation has revealed that while 
significant deficiencies remain, certain categories of AMLSs have been transformed 
wholesale into Vietnamese law. As a part of the objectives of this study, suggestions for law 
reform have been made to close the gaps between the AML laws of Vietnam and the 
international standards. It is likely that Vietnam, within a short time, will revise the laws in 
order to obtain a better degree of compliance. However, given the political, economic and 
legal factors of Vietnam, this thesis argues that the enforcement of the laws in practice will be 
still limited. In other words, in the near future Vietnam can achieve what appears to be a high 
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1.1 Background and the Research Questions 
 
Although coined relatively recently, since the 1980s “money laundering” and “anti-money 
laundering” (AML) have become well-known legal terms and subjects of legal study 
globally. Money laundering across national borders has emerged as a transnational crime, 
which challenges each State and the international community. The United States (US), a 
number of other developed countries (mainly those of Europe) and several international 
institutions have taken vigorous action against money laundering. They have also sponsored 
and developed a range of international anti-money laundering standards (AMLSs). The 
AMLSs involve not only many areas of criminal law (e.g., the criminalization of money 
laundering or mutual legal assistance in AML) but also other branches of law (e.g., banking 
laws). These standards are embodied in international conventions and recommendations (or 
guidelines) formulated by different international institutions.
1
 The primary conventions and 
recommendations are the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs 
and Psychotropic Substances (1988 Vienna Convention),
2
 the United Nations Convention 
against Transnational Organized Crime (Palermo Convention),
3
 the United Nations 
                                                          
1
  See UNODC (2013), “An Overview of the UN Conventions and other International Standards Concerning 
Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of terrorism”, available at: 
http://www.imolin.org/pdf/imolin/Overview%20Update_0107.pdf (accessed 11 March 2014). 
2
  United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 20 
December 1988, 1582 UNTS 95, entered into force 11 November 1990. 
3
  United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime, 15 November 2000, 2225 UNTS 209, 
entered into force 29 September 2003. 
2 
 
Convention against Corruption (UNCAC)
4
 and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 
Recommendations.
5
 Two questions arise: 
i) How have the international AMLSs been developed?  
ii)  What are the international AMLSs? 
It is noteworthy that the international AMLSs have been diffused surprisingly rapidly. 
After only two decades, more than 180 jurisdictions with different backgrounds have 
joined the FATF or a FATF‐style regional body and committed to implementing a similar set 
of AMLSs.
6
 However, many of them, especially developing countries, have been pressured to 
implement the international AMLSs, rather than to simply choose voluntarily whether to 
implement them or not.
7
 In addition, in a number of developing countries, research about 
money laundering and AML has just become a concern and is still in its infancy. This is 
particularly so in Vietnam, the country upon which this thesis focuses. The following 
questions arise:  
iii) How have the international AMLSs been diffused?  
iv) How have the international AMLSs been implemented in different jurisdictions?  
In recent years, Vietnam has responded to the call for international cooperation in fighting 
transnational crime, including money laundering, by joining the most crucial international 
conventions on the suppression of transnational crime, known as the suppression 
conventions. Vietnam has ratified the 1988 Vienna Convention, the UNCAC, and the 
Palermo Convention.
8
 Vietnam is an official member of the Asia/Pacific Group on Money 
Laundering (APG) and has committed itself to the FATF Recommendations. As a result, 
Vietnam has gradually implemented the international AMLSs and strengthened its AML 
legal framework. Nevertheless, substantial inadequacies in Vietnam’s AML legal framework 
                                                          
4
  United Nations Convention against Corruption, 31 October 2003, 2349 UNTS 41, entered into force 14 
December 2005. 
5
  FATF (2012), “International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism & 
Proliferation - the FATF Recommendations”, available at: http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF_Recommendations.pdf (accessed 22 May 
2014). 
6
  FATF, "An introduction to the FATF and its work" at 1, available at: http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/brochuresannualreports/Introduction%20to%20the%20FATF.pdf (accessed 
20 November 2013). 
7
  J.C. Sharman, “Power and Discourse in Policy Diffusion: Anti-Money Laundering in Developing States” 
(2008) 52(3) International Studies Quarterly 635 at 635. 
8
  Vietnam ratified these treaties in 1997, 2009, and 2012 respectively. 
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compared to the international standards still exist.
9
 In 2011, June 2012 and then June 2013, 
the FATF “blacklisted” Vietnam as one of the jurisdictions with strategic AML/CFT 
(Countering Financing of Terrorism) deficiencies in its public statements.
10
 Recently, in 
February 2014, Vietnam was removed from the FATF’s “blacklist”.
11
 This prompts the 
further questions:  
v) Why and how has Vietnam implemented the international AMLSs?  
vi) What are the challenges to the implementation of international AMLSs in 
Vietnam? and  
vii) What are the significant shortfalls in Vietnam’s existing AML legal framework?  
It is clear that the international community has intensified the pressure on Vietnam to 
formulate a comprehensive AML legal framework adhering to the international requirements. 
Compliance with the international AMLSs is important for Vietnam on the way of 
international integration, especially for access to the global financial market.
12
 Nevertheless, 
the implementation of AMLSs will unavoidably result in the revision and development of 
relevant domestic laws of Vietnam.
13
 As the changes of the laws must be compatible with 
Vietnam’s political, legal and economic basis, over which Vietnam has its own sovereignty, 
the law reform process under international obligations is always controversial and 
challenging. In recent years, academics, practitioners and international organizations have 
paid a great deal of attention to the final question:  
viii) How can Vietnam reform its AML legal framework to obtain a greater level of 
compliance with the international standards?  
It is also the central research question of this thesis entitled: “International Anti-Money 
Laundering Standards and their Implementation by Vietnam”. 
                                                          
9
  Until 2009, a comprehensive report on the inadequacies was APG (2009), “VIETNAM ME1 (Mutual 
Evaluation Report on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism)”, available at: 
http://www.apgml.org/documents/docs/17/Vietnam%20ME1.pdf (accessed 20 April 2013). 
10
  See FATF (2011), “High-Risk and Non-Cooperative Jurisdictions: FATF Public Statement - 24 June 2011”, 
available at: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/topics/high-riskandnon-
cooperativejurisdictions/documents/fatfpublicstatement-24june2011.html (accessed 1 January 2014);  
FATF (2012), “High-risk and Non-Cooperative Jurisdictions”, available at: www.fatf-gafi.org/topics/high-
riskandnon-cooperativejurisdictions/ (accessed 2 January 2014); and FATF (2013), “High-Risk and Non-
Cooperative Jurisdictions”, available at: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/topics/high-riskandnon-
cooperativejurisdictions/documents/public-statement-june-2013.html (accessed 2 January 2014). 
11
  See FATF (2014), “High-Risk and Non-Cooperative Jurisdictions: FATF Public Statement - 14 February 
2014”, available at: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/topics/high-riskandnon-
cooperativejurisdictions/documents/public-statement-feb-2014.html (accessed 16 May 2014). 
12
   Chapter 3 will discuss why the compliance is important for Vietnam. 
13
  The status of international law in Vietnamese legislation is explained and commented in chapter 3. 
4 
 
1.2 The Aims of the Thesis 
 
Although this thesis answers all the questions raised above, the focus is on finding a 
comprehensive response to the final and central question. In general, the thesis aims to:  
 
a) Provide a reasonably comprehensive examination of the international AMLSs, set 
out in some detail the main legal obligations that the international community 
imposes on States and highlight the main underlying mechanisms used to diffuse 
the international AMLSs. 
b) Analyse the experience of Vietnam in implementing the AMLSs and offer the most 
feasible suggestions for law reforms to further compliance with the international 
AMLSs. This includes an examination of how Vietnam has implemented the 
AMLSs; a textual analysis of weaknesses and inadequacies in the existing AML 
legal framework; and an examination of the Vietnamese political, legal and 
economic background that challenges the implementation. 
 
Through the examinations, the thesis suggests that Vietnam has not much choice but to 
implement and comply with the AMLSs, and thus engage in law and administrative reforms. 
But the thesis suggests that in doing so Vietnam faces considerable hurdles: i) the reluctance 
of the Vietnamese Communist Party and government to enforce AML measures in practice 
(mostly because of rampant corruption); ii)  the incompatible nature of many aspects of the 
Vietnamese legal system (e.g., with some peculiar or undeveloped concepts and procedures 
in Vietnamese criminal law) with a number of international AMLSs; and iii) the limited 
capacity of Vietnam for AML (e.g., the incompetence of Vietnamese agencies in AML and 
the poor infrastructure of the Vietnamese financial system). Therefore, this thesis argues that 
Vietnam can obtain a strong “paper” implementation of international AMLSs (through legal 
and institutional reforms), but an actual implementation will be feeble. This scenario 
indicates that, in countries like Vietnam, three prerequisite elements for the successful 
implementation of AMLSs are a genuine political will, a proper legal appropriateness and the 
sufficient resources devoted to AML. Without one of them, the implementation of AMLSs in 






1.3 Literature Review and Contributions of the Thesis 
 
The proliferation of international AML standards, their institutionalization and their 
diffusion have become increasingly attractive subjects in the scholarship of law at both the 
national and international level. This thesis makes reference to other works that have already 
been undertaken in the field. It, however, goes beyond the existing studies and fills in the 
gaps in their analyses to some extent. This section summarizes the significant studies of the 
legal aspects of international AMLSs, the diffusion and implementation of AMLSs, and 
Vietnam’s AML legislation. The contribution of this thesis and how it closes the gaps of 
those studies is also explained.       
 
1.3.1 Studies of the International AMLSs 
 
It can be seen that the international AMLSs are multifaceted, and they can be categorized 
as consisting of six groups of standards for: i) the criminalization of money laundering; ii) 
jurisdiction over transnational money laundering; iii) provisional measures and confiscation 
of criminal assets; iv) mutual legal assistance in international AML; v) extradition for money 
laundering offences; and vi)  prevention of the use of financial institutions, designated non-
financial businesses and professions for the purpose of money laundering.
14
 Several 
academics, practitioners and international organizations have already carried out research on 
some categories or on the international AMLSs as a whole. 
One of the early and most comprehensive analyses of the international AMLSs, especially 
regarding international cooperation in AML was conducted by Stessens.
15
 His book provides 
an extensive comparative examination of the AMLSs and their implementation in a number 
of selected States. He suggests that the AML regime is a new international law enforcement 
model. This research, however, was undertaken before the adoption of the Palermo 
Convention and the UNCAC, which are the two crucial international AML-related treaties. In 
addition, Stessens is silent on some issues, such as extradition for money laundering offences 
or the risk-based approach in AML.
16
  
                                                          
14
  See UNODC, above n1. 
15
  Guy Stessens, Money Laundering: A New International Law Enforcement Model (Cambridge University 
Press, 2000). 
16
  The risk-based approach is provided for in Recommendation 1 of the 2012 FATF Recommendations (see 
FATF, above n5). This approach is clarified in Chapter 9. 
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Gilmore details the development and substance of the international AMLSs, but focuses 
very specifically and in great detail on the European region.
17
 Moreover, his book lacks 
specific discussion about the implementation of international AMLSs.  
Boister
18
 deals with the AMLSs as part of transnational criminal law. Most criminal law 
aspects of the international AMLSs are discussed comprehensively. Although there is only 
one chapter about the criminalization of money laundering, other international AMLSs, such 
as retrieving criminal assets or mutual legal assistance in AML, are also examined. 
Nonetheless, an examination of the financial regulations related to AML is not provided by 
this book.  
More recently, Durrieu has updated the discussion of international effort to develop the 
international AMLSs through “hard law” and “soft law” as well as through the institutional 
framework of AML.
19
 He extensively examines the criminalization of money laundering, the 
nexus between the crime of money laundering and its predicate offences, and jurisdiction 
over transnational money laundering, provided for by both international law and a range of 
national laws. He reveals the major discrepancies, gaps and ambiguities among national laws 
as well as in international law on these issues. His research project, nevertheless, misses the 
discussion of other crucial AMLSs, such as confiscation of criminal assets, international 
cooperation in AML and financial regulations on AML. 
Although using the above-mentioned research projects as critical reference points, all of 
these works have shortcomings. This thesis pulls many of the aspects they deal with together 
and, to some extent, goes beyond their coverage.  
 
1.3.2 Research on Theory of the Diffusion and  Implementation of International 
AMLSs 
 
It is noticeable that only a few scholars have researched on how the international AMLSs 
have been diffused; why countries, particularly developing countries, have implemented and 
complied with the international AMLSs; and what factors significantly impact on the 
implementation of AMLSs in these countries. 
                                                          
17
  William C. Gilmore, Dirty Money: The Evolution of International Measures to Counter Money Laundering 
and the Financing of Terrorism (4
th
 ed, Council of Europe, 2011). 
18
  Neil Boister, An Introduction to Transnational Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 2012). 
19
  Roberto Durrieu, Rethinking Money Laundering & Financing of Terrorism in International Law: Towards a 





 analyse the evolution of the international AML regime, its 
components and national implementation of the regime, with the reference to developing 
countries, but only very briefly. 
Basing her work purely on a doctrinal analysis and treaty interpretation, Ping examines 
different aspects of the global and European legal framework on AML.
21
 She also describes 
and comments on the development of the Chinese AML policy and legal framework. Chinese 
AML-related laws are briefly evaluated and compared with the relevant international 
provisions. What she does not discuss is why and how a State, like China, has implemented 
the AMLSs. She also omits the discussion of the factors that impact on the implementation of 
AMLSs. In a similar vein, Orlova outlines a comparative analysis of the Russian AML legal 
framework, but does not discuss comprehensively the rationale behind the development of 
Russia’s AML legislation and the reasons for existing inadequacies.
22
 
Sharman carries out one of the leading research projects on the diffusion of international 
AMLSs.
23
 He points out that “blacklisting”, socialization and competition are the main 
mechanisms for the diffusion of AML policy; and that developing countries implement the 
global AMLSs due to fear of reputational damages and economic losses that result from the 
noncompliance with international AMLSs. However, he concentrates entirely  on the role of 
the FATF, the FATF-style regional bodies and the relevant international financial institutions 
(the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB)) in the diffusion of 
AMLSs. He does not refer to the treaty obligations to implement AMLSs. Employing a 
similar approach, Heilmann and Schulte-Kulkmann engage in a case study of Chinese AML 
policy.
24
 Nevertheless, among various domestic factors that affect the implementation of 
international AMLS in China, these authors only consider the political factors and neglect the 
legal factors.  
                                                          
20
  Peter Reuter and Edwin M. Truman, Chasing Dirty Money: The Fight against Money Laundering (Peterson 
Institute, 2004).  
21
  Ping He, Money Laundering: Suppression and Prevention - The Research on the Legislation Concerning 
Money Laundering (VDM Publishing, 2008). 
22
  Alexandra V. Orlova, “Russia's Anti-Money Laundering Regime: Law Enforcement Tool or Instrument of 
Domestic Control?” (2008) 11(3) Journal of Money Laundering Control 210. 
23
  J.C. Sharman, The Money Laundry: Regulating Criminal Finance in the Global Economy (Cornell 
University Press, 2011).  
24
  Sebastian Heilmann and Nicole Schulte-Kulkmann, “The Limits of Policy Diffusion: Introducing 
International Norms of Anti-Money Laundering into China's Legal System” (2011) 24(4) Governance: An 
International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institution 639 at 13. 
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Machado discusses how Brazil and Argentina have responded to the “transnational AML 
order” (AMLO).
25
 The author is mainly concerned with the interaction between “hard law” 
and “soft law”, and between public and private actors in the AMLO. The author provides a 
descriptive analysis of how Brazil and Argentina, under the FATF’s pressure, have changed 
their laws related to the money laundering offence. However, the desription is very brief and 
provides little explanantion of what the ultimate impact is likely to be, and how and why this 
is so. 
This thesis establishes its own theory of AMLSs diffusion, then applies the theory to the 
discussion of Vietnam’s context as a case study. In addition, the main factors that influence 
the implementaion of AMLSs in Vietnam are identified and scruntinized extensively; of 
which the legal factors are emphasized. 
 
1.3.3 Research on Money Laundering Situation, AML and the Implementation of 
International AMLSs in Vietnam  
 
There are a few research projects on money laundering, AML and the implementation of 
international AMLSs in Vietnam, and all of them have significant limitations. 
Although focusing on the discussion about the implementation of UN drug control 
conventions by Vietnam, Hoa’s doctoral thesis is one of the early projects which offer some 
insights into Vietnamese laws related to the AMLSs and suggest remedies for these 
inadequacies.
26
 This research project, of course, cannot address all of the research questions 
raised above. 
In 2009, the APG released a report on mutual evaluation of the Vietnam’s AML legal 
framework.
27
 This report had been the most comprehensive examination of the Vietnamese 
AML legislation up to 2009. The report revealed numerous inadequacies in the Vietnam’s 
AML legal framework. In addition, from 2007 – 2011, the United Nations Office on Drugs 
and Crime (UNODC Vietnam Country Office) in cooperation with some Vietnamese 
counterpart agencies carried out the project “VNMS65 - Strengthening of the Legal and Law 
Enforcement Institutions in Preventing and Combating Money Laundering in Vietnam”. This 
                                                          
25
  Ma´ıra Rocha Machado, “Similar in Their Differences: Transnational Legal Processes Addressing Money 
Laundering in Brazil and Argentina” in Gregory Shaffer (ed) Transnational Legal Ordering and State 
Change (Cambridge University Press, 2012) at 15. 
26
  Hoa Phuong Thi Nguyen, “Legislative Implementation by Vietnam of its Obligations under the United 
Nations Drug Control Conventions” (Doctoral Thesis, University of Wollongong, 2008). 
27
  APG, above n9. 
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project conducted research on typologies of money laundering in Viet Nam and on the 
vulnerability of a cash-based economy to money laundering.
28
 It also provided a legal 
assessment report on the existing Vietnamese AML/CFT legislation against the international 
standards.
29
 The recommendations in the reports have helped to revise the relevant articles in 
the Penal Code of Vietnam. The reports of the APG and of UNODC were, however, a purely 
descriptive comparison between the Vietnamese AML-related laws and the corresponding 
international standards. Furthermore, the Vietnamese AML legislation has developed 
significantly since 2009 as a result of the ratification of the Palermo Convention and the 
enactment of further specific AML-related laws, especially the  Law on Prevention and 
Suppresion of Money Laundering adopted in 2012.
30
 
This thesis is currently the only comprehensive and updated study of money laundering 
situation and the implementation of international AMLSs in Vietnam. 
 
1.4 Scope of the Thesis 
 
This thesis is confined to examination of the six key above-mentioned categories of 
AMLSs incorporated in the FATF Recommendations, the 1988 Vienna Convention, the 
Palermo Convention, the UNCAC, the European Conventions and Directives on AML/CFT, 
the guidelines on AML/CFT of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the Wolfsberg 
AML Principles and Egmont Principles for Information Exchange and Operational Guidance 
for FIUs.
31
 The thesis, of course, cannot discuss extensively every aspect of six groups of the 
international AMLSs. Rather it focuses on the main issues/problems in each and in their 
articulation with the Vietnamese AML legal framework. 
Selected jurisdictions are used for comparison in the implementation of AMLSs. They are 
the US, the United Kingdom (UK), France, Germany and Russia. The choice of these States 
and specifically their legal provisions for the comparison is based on the principles of 
comparative law research and the practice of using comparative law in law reform (which is 
rationalized below in section 1.6). 
                                                          
28
  UNODC, "Final Evaluation Report: Project Number VNM/S65" at 10, available at: 
http://www.unodc.org/documents/evaluation/ProjEvals-2012/VNMS65_FE_Report_FINAL_rev.pdf 
(accessed 27 May 2013). 
29
  Ibid, at 8. 
30
  Luat Phong, Chong Rua Tien [Law on Prevention and Suppression of Money Laundering] (Vietnam) Law 
No. 07/2012/QH13, 18 June 2012, entered into force 1 January 2013. 
31
  See UNODC, above n1. The recommendations and guidelines are updated regularly. 
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When it comes to the suggestions for law reforms in Vietnam, this thesis is not going to 
make detailed extensively reasoned proposals and a fully worked out programme. The thesis 
only attempts to offer tentative proposals for law reforms.  
 
1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
 
This thesis consists of ten chapters, including an Introduction (chapter 1) and Conclusion 
(chapter 10).  
The examination begins in chapter 2 with the contours of money laundering in general 
and an overview of the money laundering situation within the Vietnamese context. The 
chapter examines the concept of money laundering, the money laundering mechanisms and 
typologies, the trends, and the harms of money laundering. The money laundering situation in 
Vietnam, including the scale and typologies, is assessed based on the analysis of selected 
predicate crimes and facilitators of money laundering.  
Chapter 3 first outlines the evolution of international AMLSs. Then it addresses the 
following questions:  i) How have the international AMLSs been diffused? ii) Why and how 
do States implement the international AMLSs, in particular why and how has Vietnam 
implemented the AMLSs? Attention is also paid to the political and legal factors of Vietnam 
that shape its AML legislation.  
The thesis, then, scrutinizes each category of the international AMLSs and its 
implementation in Vietnam. The first one, criminalization of money laundering, is examined 
in chapter 4. This chapter sketches international standards in regard to the criminalization of 
money laundering (e.g., the justifications for internationalization of the criminalization of 
money laundering and the main constituent elements of money laundering offences) provided 
for in the suppression conventions and the FATF Recommendations. Disparities among the 
criminalization of money laundering by some States are also explored. The next part of this 
chapter considers how Vietnam has criminalized money laundering; what inadequacies exist; 
and how political factors (e.g., the willingness of law enforcement agencies) and legal factors 
(e.g., the criminal law principles) impacts on the criminalization. Relying on the analysis and 
comparison, the chapter suggests what Vietnam should do to remedy its criminalization of 
money laundering. 
Chapter 5 looks at one of the fundamental issues - jurisdiction over transnational money 
laundering. After equipping itself with the concepts of transnational money laundering and 
criminal jurisdiction under international law, the chapter charts the general conditions and 
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principles for the establishment of jurisdiction over the transnational money laundering 
offence. The variations in exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction over money laundering 
offences by different States are also explored. Moving to the Vietnamese context, this chapter 
examines how the existing principles of criminal jurisdiction can be applied to money 
laundering crimes (legal appropriateness) and whether relevant authorities are willing to 
exercise the jurisdiction (political will). Then, a number of suggestions are made to 
strengthen the relevant laws of Vietnam. 
Chapter 6 continues with the examination of the third category of international AMLSs – 
provisional measures and confiscation of criminal assets. Firstly, the concepts of “provisional 
measures”, “confiscation” and “forfeiture” are clarified with reference to its historical 
development in English law and in US law. The chapter then discusses the types and 
procedures of confiscation, including confiscation of the assets involved in money 
laundering, provided for in the international legal instruments and in the laws of some States. 
Forfeiture in the US and conviction-based confiscation in the UK is detailed. Finally, the 
confiscation legislation of Vietnam is criticized (whether the concept and procedures of 
confiscation of criminal proceeds in Vietnam are compatible with the international standards) 
and the suggestions for law reforms are offered. 
Mutual legal assistance (MLA) in AML is scrutinized in chapter 7. The first part of the 
chapter describes the interstate exchange of AML information, which is mainly conducted 
directly through national competent law enforcement agencies (e.g., the police force) or 
Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs). The second part examines treaty-based MLA in AML, 
including legal assistance for the purposes of confiscation of criminal assets, sharing of 
confiscated assets and returning assets. The legal basis and conditions/principles of treaty-
based MLA is fleshed out. Last but not least, the chapter examines the relevant laws of 
Vietnam regulating MLA in criminal matters in general and in AML in particular. 
Furthermore, suggestions are given to enhance Vietnam’s MLA laws and practice. 
Chapter 8 focuses on extradition for money laundering offences. This chapter first charts 
extradition in general, including the legal basis, conditions, exceptions and procedure, with 
the particular attention being paid to extradition for transnational crime. This is followed by 
the discussion on some issues related to extradition for money laundering offences. Finally, 
this chapter investigates the general Vietnamese legislation on extradition and how it can be 
applied to money laundering crimes. The most necessary and feasible suggestions for law 
reforms of Vietnam are then set out. 
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Moving beyond the subjects of criminal law, chapter 9 sets out the obligations imposed on 
financial institutions, designated non-financial businesses and professions to prevent the 
criminal use of these entities for money laundering purposes. The primary obligations, viz. 
customer due diligence, record keeping and reporting obligation are analysed. The interaction 
between these preventive measures and financial privacy and the right to professional secrecy 
is also discussed. In addition, the issues of risk-based approach and financial inclusion are 
illustrated. How these standards have been implemented by Vietnam is then examined. The 
chapter examines whether the preventive measures are appropriate for the Vietnamese 
financial infrastructure, and whether Vietnamese entities are willing to adopt those measures. 
Finally, chapter 10, the Conclusion, draws the separate conclusions of eight chapters 
together and draws some conclusions about the implementation of AMLSs by Vietnam as a 
whole. 
 
1.6 Research Approaches and Methodologies 
 
1.6.1 Approach to Assessing Compliance with the International AMLSs 
 
It is important to note that  the majority of international AMLSs are incorporated in the 
1988 Vienna Convention, the Palermo Convention and the UNCAC; so, for the most part, the 
approach to asessing the implementation of those conventions is applied to assessing the 
implementation of AMLSs. In general, States implement international treaties into domestic 
law based upon the doctrine of “incorporation” or “transformation”.
32
 According to the 
doctrine of “incorporation”, a treaty ratified by the State will become part of the municipal 
law automatically withthout being expressly adopted by the legislature or the courts of that 
State.
33
 While the doctrine of “transformation” postulates that any provision of international 
treaties do not come into effect in a State until it has been specifically enacted into domestic 
law, for example, by the passage of a law.
34
 Although Vietnam does not explicitly adopt 
either the “incorporation” or the “transformation” doctrine;
35
 in general practice, 
                                                          
32
  See Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law (6
th
 ed, Cambridge University Press, 2008) at 139-141. 
33
  Ibid, at 140. 
34
  Ibid, at 139. 
35
  See article 6 of Luat Ban hanh van ban quy pham phap luat [Law on the Promulgation of Legal Documents] 
(Vietnam) Law No. 17/2008/QH12, 30 June 2008, entered into force 1 January 2009. Details of this article 
and further discussion are provided in chapter 3. 
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“transformation” appears to be used.
36
 The implementation of international treaties in 
Vietnam often results in an amendment, supplementment, annulment and enactment of 
relevant domestic laws.
37
 For example, at present, one of the crucial tasks in the process of 
implementing the Palermo Convention in Vietnam is to revise and supplement the Penal 
Code, the Criminal Procedure Code and the Law on Mutual Legal Assitance in compliance 
with the convention.
38
      
It is worth noting that although there are numerous published research projects on how to 
assess compliance of States with international law,
39
 this thesis agrees that “the general level 
of compliance with international agreements cannot be empirically verified”.
40
 In addition, it 
accepts that “questions of compliance are often contestable and complex, subtle, and 
frequently subjective evaluation”.
41
 Jacobson and Weiss suggests that compliance with an 
international agreement refers to whether countries in fact adhere to the provisions of the 
agreement and to the implementing measures that they have instituted.
42
 The FATF assesses 
compliance based on the extent to which national laws and other enforceable means are 
compliant with the FATF Recommendations and whether the institutional AML framework is 
in place.
43
 This thesis uses this approach to evaluate Vietnam’s AML system, because the 
FATF plays a major role in setting up the international AMLSs and compliance with the 
FATF’s criteria is important to Vietnam. 
                                                          
36
  Hoang Phuoc Hiep, et al., “Noi Luat Hoa Cac Dieu Uoc Quoc Te Viet Nam Ky Ket va Tham Gia Phuc Vu 
Qua Trinh Hoi Nhap Kinh Te Quoc Te" [Hoang Phuoc Hiep and others, Implementing International 
Agreements in Vietnam to Intergrate into the Global Economy]  (Vien Nghien Cuu Khoa Hoc Phap Ly 
[Institute of Legal Science]), 2007, part II. 
37
  See ibid. 
38
  See Thu Tuong Chinh Phu, “KE HOACH Trien Khai Thuc Hien Cong Uoc Chong toi Pham Co To Chuc 
Xuyen Quoc Gia va Nghi Dinh Thu ve Phong Ngua, Trung Tri, Tran Ap Toi Buon Ban Nguoi, Dac Biet La 
Phu Nu va Tre Em" [The Prime Minister, Plan on Implementing the Convention on Suppression of 
Transnational Organized Crimes and Protocols on Prevention & Suppression of Trafficking in Persons, 
especially Trafficking of Women and Children], 18 April 2013, para. II(a). Vietnam ratified the Palermo 
Convention in June 2012.  
39
  For example, Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, “On Compliance” (1993) 47(2) International 
Organization 175; and Peter M. Haas, “Choosing to Comply: Theorizing from International Relations and 
Comparative Politics” in Dinah Shelton (ed) Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-Binding Norms 
in the International Legal System (Oxford University Press, 2000). 
40
  Chayes and Chayes, ibid, at 176. 
41
  Ibid, at 198. 
42
  Harold K Jacobson and Edith Brown Weiss, “Strengthening Compliance with International Environmental 
Accords: Preliminary Observations from Collaborative Project” (1995) 1 Global Governance 119 at 123. 
43
  See FATF, "Methodology for Assessing Technical Compliance with the FATF Recommendations and the 
Effectiveness of AML/CFT Systems" (February 2013) at 12, available at: http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/methodology/FATF%20Methodology%2022%20Feb%202013.pdf (accessed 
29 May 2013). 
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It should be noted that effectiveness is the question whether the goals of the standards are 
achieved and may be independent from compliance.
44
 The FATF defines effectiveness as 
“the extent to which the defined outcomes are achieved”.
45
 The FATF also indicates that “the 
goal of an assessment of effectiveness is to provide an appreciation of the whole of the 
country’s AML/CFT system and how well it works. Assessing effectiveness is based on a 
fundamentally different approach to assessing compliance with the Recommendations”.
46
 It 
means that the goal of compliance assessment of AMLSs implementation is distinguished 
from the goal of effectiveness assessment. Thus, this thesis, subject to its aims, excludes the 
examination of effectiveness of the international AMLSs as well as of the Vietnamese AML 
legal framework. 
 
1.6.2 Approach to Suggestions for Legal Reforms in Vietnam 
 
Suggestions for law reform in this project are dependent on comparative law and the 
theory of “legal transplants”. Many scholars have studied the use of comparative law as a tool 
of legal reforms,
47
 and examined the process of legal transplantation/borrowing by which 
international and foreign legal norms are adopted into a particular domestic legal system.
48
 
There has been much debate on the possibility of “legal transplants” and the elements that 
impact on outcomes of the legal transplantation process.
49
 Although it is even argued that 
“legal transplants practically never work”
50
 or “‘legal transplants” are impossible”,
51
 this 
                                                          
44
  Dinah Shelton, “Introduction: Law, Non-Law and the Problem of 'Soft Law'” in Dinah Shelton (ed) 
Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-Binding Norms in the International Legal System (2000).  
45
  FATF, above n43, at 14. 
46
  Ibid. 
47
  Kahn-Freund is one of the first scholars concerned with comparative law as a tool of law reform (see Otto 
Kahn‐Freund, “On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law” (1974) 37(1) The Modern Law Review 1). For 
an analysis of comparative law, particularly in Asia including Vietnam, see Penelope (Pip) Nicholson and 
Sarah Biddulph (eds) Examining Practice, Interrogating Theory: Comparative Legal Studies in Asia 
(Martinus Nijhof, 2008). 
48
  Kahn-Freund clarifies the meaning of “transplant” by taking the example of transferring human organs (see 
Kahn‐Freund, above n47, at 5-6). Gillespie offers a critical analysis of theories of legal transplantation and 
the application to commercial law reform of Vietnam (see John Gillespie, Transplanting Commercial Law 
Reform: Developing a `rule of Law' in Vietnam (Ashgate Publishing Company, 2006)). Nicholson provides 
insights into the development of Vietnam’s court systems through the process of legal transplant/borrowing, 
(see Penelope (Pip) Nicholson, Borrowing Court Systems: The Experience of Socialist Vietnam (Martinus 
Nijhoff, 2008)).  
49
  An extensive literature review of research on “legal transplants” is provided by Cuong Nguyen, “The 
Drafting of Vietnam’s Consumer Protection Law: An Analysis from Legal Transplantation Theories” 
(Doctoral Thesis, University of Victoria (Canada), 2011) at 24-58. 
50
  Robert B. Seidman, The State, Law, and Development (St. Martin's Press, 1978) at 34. 
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thesis accepts that that “borrowing from another legal system is the most common form of 
legal change”
52
 and “legislative drafters borrow institutions, policy or legal solutions and 
legislative texts from foreign jurisdictions (national, EU and international) as a means of 
promoting and developing legislation quickly and effectively”.
53
 That is the case, at least in 
Vietnam - a State which has a long history of legal borrowing, notably from China, France, 
the former Soviet Union, and recently from some Western countries.
54
 It is worthy of note 
that transplanting may result in the import of a whole body of law or parts of laws to a 
country.
55
 Legal borrowing can be made from States with different legal and political 
traditions, even from one at a much higher level of development.
56
 Following this view, the 
thesis suggests Vietnam should consider and borrow different parts, if any, of AML laws 
from a number of States with divergent backgrounds. However, States and legal sources for 
the comparison and borrowing should be, of course, appropriately selected and subject to 
certain principles.       
The legal comparison in this thesis is based upon the principle of “functionality”, which 
determines the choice of law to compare and the scope of the undertaking.
57
 In each chapter, 
suggestions for reform of Vietnam’s laws are given after comparing with the related 
international AMLSs and with the appropriate versions of implementation in the chosen 
foreign jurisdictions. Driven by the “functionality” principle, the chosen foreign States are the 
US, the UK, Russia, France and Germany. The US and the UK have profound influence on 
the development of international AMLSs. Germany and France have advanced national AML 
legal frameworks and provide good examples of how compliance with the FATF can be 
achieved.
58
 In addition, France, Germany and especially Russia share common legal 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
51
  Pierre Legrand, “What "Legal Transplants"?” in David Nelken and Johannes Feest (eds) Adapting Legal 
Cultures (Hart Publishing, 2001) at 57. 
52
  See, e.g., Alan Watson, Legal Origins and Legal Change (Hambleden Press, 1991) at 73; and Alan Watson, 
Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law (University of Georgia Press, 1974) at 16-20. 
53
  Helen Xanthaki, “Legal Transplants in Legal Legislation: Defusing the Trap” (2008) 57 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 659 at 659. 
54
  A brief history of legal transplantation into Vietnam is provided in Gillespie, above n48, at 40-67. He 
highlights some case studies of how Vietnam borrowed law from these countries when drafting new laws 
(other than criminal laws). 
55
  Nicholson, above n48, at 22-23. 
56
  This view is supported by e.g., Alan Watson, “Legal Transplants and Law reform” (1976) 92(JAN) Law 
Quarterly Review 79 at 79; and Nicholson, above n48, at 23. 
57
  The principle of functionality in comparative law and the methods of comparative law in general is discussed 
extensively in Konrad Zweigert and Hein Koetz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (3
rd
 ed, Oxford 
University Press, 1998) at 34-35. 
58
  Their AML laws are evaluated by the FATF to be “largely compliant” with the FATF recommendations (see 
FATF (2010), “Mutual Evaluation Report: Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of 
16 
 
traditions with Vietnam, particularly in terms of criminal laws.
59
 Russia and Vietnam may 
face the same problems when implementing the international AMLSs, which also adds value 
to the comparison. 
Another rationale for the comparison with those States is that when using comparative law 
in making or revising laws, legislators often take into account other States whose legal 
system, language and legal tradition is familiar to their own to assess harmonization of the 
chosen solution with international practice.
60
 This practice is true in the case of Vietnam. It 
should be recognized that many Vietnamese legislators were educated in France, the former 
Soviet Union, and recently in Germany, the US and the UK. 
Furthermore, in transitional countries like Vietnam, lawmakers usually receive support in 
drafting legislation from foreign donors.
61
 As a result, they tend to opt either for “the cost-
saving transplant” or for “the externally-dictated transplant”.
62
 According to “the cost-saving 
transplant” approach, the legislative drafters of the host country simply adopt the approach of 
the donor country for saving time and money.
63
 “The externally-dictated transplant” involves 
a foreign individual, entity or government that indicates the adoption of a foreign legal model 
as a condition for doing business or for receiving other incentives.
64
 Currently, the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC) and EU is vigorously supporting Vietnam in the reform of its criminal laws.
65
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Terrorism (Germany)”, available at: http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer/MER%20Germany%20full.pdf (accessed 19 August 2013); and 
FATF (2011), “Mutual Evaluation of France”, available at: http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer/MER%20France%20ES%20ENG.pdf (accessed 19 August 
2013)). 
59
  The development of Vietnam’s criminal law was influenced substantially by the former Soviet Union. This 
will be highlighted in chapter 4. 
60
  More discussion of this practice can be found in Xanthaki, above n53. This author recommends and 
discusses the principal criteria when opting legal systems as legal sources for legal transplants in developing 
countries. 
61
  This has been examined by Esin Örücü, “Law as Transposition” (2002) 51 International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly 205 at 219. John Gillespie also examined the significant involvement of foreign donors in 
some legislative drafting projects in Vietnam (see Gillespie, above n48, at 235-242). 
62
  These two approaches are coined by Jonathan M Miller, “A Typology of Legal Transplants: Using 
Sociology, Legal History and Argentine Examples to Explain the Transplant Process” (2003) The American 
Journal of Comparative Law 839 at 845 and 847. 
63
  Jonathan M Miller, “A Typology of Legal Transplants: Using Sociology, Legal History and Argentine 
Examples to Explain the Transplant Process” (2003) The American Journal of Comparative Law 839 at 845. 
64
  Miller, above n62, at 847. 
65
  See UNDP (2013), “First Legal Policy Dialogue in 2013: “Criminal Laws of Viet Nam in the Context of 
International Integration””, available at: 
http://www.vn.undp.org/content/vietnam/en/home/presscenter/pressreleases/2013/08/29/first-legal-policy-
dialogue-in-2013-criminal-laws-of-viet-nam-in-the-context-of-international-integration-/ (accessed 3 
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Thus, the US, the UK, France and Germany are the appropriate national criminal law sources 
for the legal comparison in this thesis. 
 
1.6.3 General Methodologies 
 
Generally speaking, the thesis belongs to the category of international and comparative 
legal research.
66
 The thesis adopts a number of methodologies often used in international law 
and comparative law research to deal with the research questions in each chapter.
67
 The 
overarching methodologies are: treaty interpretation rules,
68
 a “black-letter” positivist 
analysis and comparative legal analysis. Most chapters (chapters 4-9) adopt more than one of 
these methodologies in the description of a category of international AMLSs, and in the 
evaluation of its implementation by Vietnam and other selected States.  
Each chapter usually involves the interpretation of provisions of relevant bilateral or 
multilateral treaties. This interpretation is, of course, subject to the rules provided for in 
article 31 of the 1969 Vienna Convention,
69
 which states that the treaty in question is required 
to be “interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning of the terms of the 
treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose”. Vietnam has become a Party 
to the 1969 Vienna Convention since 2001. 
A “black-letter” positivist analysis (or doctrinal analysis) pays attention to detailed 
expositions of the law by clarifying the language of statutes and making reference to 
appropriate cases.
70
 This method is often employed in the thesis (chapters 4-8) to analyse 
provisions of statutes and their rationale in common law States. The same approach, but 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
January 2014); UNODC (2013), “UNODC and VN Collaborate on UNTOC Implementation”, available at: 
http://www.unodc.org/southeastasiaandpacific/en/vietnam/2013/11/untoc/story.html (accessed 3 January 
2014); and “Justice Partnership Programme (Vietnam, EU, Denmark and Sweden)”, available at: 
http://www.jppvietnam.org/ (accessed 20 February 2014). 
66
  According to Michael MacConville and Wing Hong Chui (eds) Research Methods for Law (Edinburgh 
University Press, 2007) at 4-7, basically, there are three types of legal research: i) doctrinal research; ii) 
empirical legal research/socio-legal studies; and iii) international and comparative legal research. 
67
  The author of this thesis agrees that “legal research projects do not always adopt a pure version of just one 
theoretical or methodological perspective”. See Robert Cryer, et al., Research Methodologies in EU and 
International Law (1
st
 ed, Hart Publishing, 2011) at 4.  
68
  More about methodologies for international law research can be found in Stephen Hall, “Researching 
International Law” in Michael MacConville and Wing Hong Chui (eds) Research Methods for law 
(Edinburgh University Press, 2007). 
69
  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331, entered into force 27 January 
1980 (1969 Vienna Convention). 
70
  MacConville and Chui, above n66. 
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mainly based on textual analysis, is used to explain, compare, evaluate and suggest for reform 
(or further development) of Vietnamese laws.  
Comparative legal analysis is conducted to explore the differences in the implementation 
of AMLSs in various jurisdictions, and most importantly to draw a realistic model of the 
implementation for Vietnam. In each chapter, the comparative legal analysis includes a 
critical evaluation of discoveries made, comments and proposals for law reform or new 
interpretations.
71
 The evaluation focuses on whether the law is fair, vague or consistent with 
its application. 
Apart from the dominant aforementioned methodologies, a socio-legal methodology with 
the use of limited empirical research (e.g., case studies, data collection, interviews or 
observations) is also used to conceptualize money laundering and assess the money 
laundering situation of Vietnam (chapter 2), or to identify gaps between “law in the books” 
and “law in action” in some chapters. 
 
1.6.4 Research Difficulties 
 
 It should be noted that very unfortunately there has not yet been any publication of 
official statistics or reported cases of money laundering in Vietnam thus far. There is 
negligible empirical research on crimes associated with money laundering, money laundering 
itself and AML in Vietnam. This has forced the author of this thesis to gather material from 
whatever sources he could find, and when there are none, to engage in comparison with 
similarly placed States, or even to speculate. 
In addition, it is extremely difficult to access the full details of criminal cases in Vietnam. 
Access to cases of transnational crimes or cases related to a “foreign element” (e.g., the crime 
committed by a foreigner) is usually restricted. All criminal cases in Vietnam used in this 
thesis have not been publicly reported in full detail, the author describes these cases mainly 
based on information from the public media. 
Since there has been no official English version of the Vietnamese laws discussed in this 
thesis, the author has had to translate a number of excerpts by himself with reference to some 
previous translation in different sources.
72
 It is worth noting that the difficulty of a legal 
translation does not primarily depend on linguistic differences, but rather on structural 
                                                          
71
  This is also the general objective of a comparative law research project. See Zweigert and Koetz, above n57. 
72
  For example, the translation provided by Terrorism Prevention Branch (UNODC), “Electronic Legal 
Resources on International Terrorism ”, available at: https://www.unodc.org/tldb/; and by APG, above n9. 
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differences between legal systems.
73
 The translator must understand a source text in the 
source legal system (which is to be translated) and a target source in the target legal system 
(which is the result of the actual translation process).
74
 In this thesis, the source legal system 
is Vietnamese law and the target legal system is international law and English law. Where 
there is no equivalent English legal term, the thesis has opted to cite the non-translated term, 








                                                          
73
  Marcus Galdia, “Comparative Law and Legal Translation” (2013) 1 The European Legal Forum 1 at 2. 
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This chapter looks at the general aspects of money laundering itself and the money 
laundering situation in Vietnam. The chapter will first examine briefly: the conception of 
money laundering, the money laundering mechanisms and typologies, the trends, the harms 
and risks of harm caused by money laundering, and methods for measuring the scale of 
money laundering and assessing national money laundering threats. Armed with these 
perceptions of the nature of money laundering, an overview of money laundering within the 
Vietnamese context is then provided. 
In this chapter, it is argued that money laundering activities cause harms or create risks of 
harm thus justifying criminalization, and that money laundering threats in Vietnam is 
significant. Therefore, it is necessary to establish a comprehensive anti-money laundering 






2.2 Money Laundering in General 
 
2.2.1 The Conception  
 
Although the term “money laundering” is relatively new, some authors argue that its 
practice is not.
1
 R.T. Naylor illustrates how processes like money laundering were conducted 
in medieval Europe. These processes aimed at disguising and giving a legal appearance to 
money generated from usury, unreasonably high interest charges on a loan, that was a sin 
rather than a crime prohibited at that time.
2
 The other patterns of early “money laundering” 
activities describe how merchants hid their profits from local authorities, for example, by 
exaggerating exchange rates to cover interest, and how pirates hid a portion of stolen property 
before restoring its legitimacy.
3
 In modern society, diverse and more complex money 
laundering methods have been used to disguise illicit funds and make them appear legitimate.  
The term “money laundering” is considered by some to have been originally used by 
American police in the 1920s in the United States (US) with reference to Al Capone and 
other Chicago gangsters.
4
 It is argued by others to have first appeared in connection with the 
Watergate scandal in the US in 1973.
5
 Whatever is true, there is robust evidence that it was 
first used as a legal term in the 1970s to describe the process of transforming drug trafficking 
proceeds into legitimate capital.
6
 It has been used extensively as a legal term in relevant 
legislation and legal texts ever since. In 1985, a formal definition was given by the American 
President’s Commission on Organized Crime as following: “money laundering is the process 
by which one conceals the existence, illegal source, or illegal application of income, and then 
disguises that income to make it appear legitimate”.
7
 After that, many academics, 
professionals, and organizations have defined and clarified the act of money laundering in 
their own words. For example, “money laundering is the conversion of illicit cash to another 
                                                          
1
  R.T. Naylor, Wages of Crime : Black Markets, Illegal Finance and the Underworld Economy (Cornell 
University Press, 2002) at 342. 
2
  Ibid. 
3
  Ibid. 
4
  Peter Lilley, Dirty Dealing: The Untold Truth about Global Money Laundering, International Crime and 
Terrorism (3
rd
 ed, Kogan Page Limited, 2006) at 5. 
5
  Robinson Jeffrey, The Laundrymen - Inside Money Laundering, The World's Third Largest Business (Arcade 
Publishing, 1997) at 6-9.  
6
  Guy Stessens, Money Laundering: A New International Law Enforcement Model (Cambridge University 
Press, 2000) at 82.  
7
  US President's Commission on Organized Crime, "The Cash Connection: Organised Crime, Financial 
Institutions, and Money Laundering” (Interim Report to the President and the Attorney General, 1984) at 7, 
available at: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/166517NCJRS.pdf (accessed 08 July 2014).  
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asset, the concealment of the true source of ownership of the illegally acquired proceeds, and 
the creation of the perception of legitimacy of source and ownership”,
8
 or money laundering 
is “any act or attempted act to conceal or disguise the identity of illegally obtained proceeds 
so that they appear to have originated from legitimate sources”.
9
 In these definitions, the term 
“proceeds” was used to refer to any properties derived from or obtained, directly or 
indirectly, through the commission of criminal activities. These properties may be purchased 
with and be traceable to criminal profits. The term “proceeds” has been used and 
distinguished from “profit” of crime (proceeds minus costs) in US legislation since the early 
1980s.
10
 It has been internationally defined and used in association with the criminalization of 
money laundering since the adoption of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic 
in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988 Vienna Convention).11 
Though the definitions differ in their terms, it is clear that the main purposes of money 
laundering are to conceal the illicit origin of the proceeds of illegal activities and to acquire 
an apparently legal source for these proceeds. These illegal activities are commonly confined 
to criminal activities, and do not include civil wrongs. Thus, money laundering is generally 
understood as the process of converting the proceeds derived from a wide-range of 
underlying criminal offences (called predicate offences) to legitimate and apparently legal 
property. Criminals engage in money laundering in order to ensure the secure ownership of 
the proceeds and to shield the proceeds from suspicion, investigation and seizure. In order to 
obtain these objectives, highly sophisticated money laundering processes have been 




                                                          
8
  M. E. Beare, et al., Tracing of Illicit Funds : Money Laundering in Canada (Solicitor General Canada, 1990) 
at x, note 1 (as cited in William C. Gilmore (ed) International Efforts to Combat Money Laundering 
(Grotious Publication Ltd, 1992) at x). 
9
  The definition was provided by the International Police Organization (INTERPOL) General Assembly in 
1995. See INTERPOL (2010), “Funds derived from criminal activities”, available at: 
https://secure.interpol.int/Public/FinancialCrime/MoneyLaundering/default.asp (accessed 11 May 2013). 
10
  David J. Fried, “Rationalizing Criminal Forfeiture” (1988) 79(2) Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 
328 at 374-375. 
11
  See United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 20 
December 1988, 1582 UNTS 95, entered into force 11 November 1990, article 1(p). 
12
  See, e.g., William C. Gilmore, Dirty Money: The Evolution of International Measures to Counter Money 
Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism (4
th
 ed, Council of Europe, 2011), at 34. However, Koningsveld 
asserts that money laundering consists of four stages which are placement, layering, justification and 
investment (see Jan van Koningsveld, “Money Laundering - "You Don’t See It, until You Understand It": 
Rethinking the Stages of the Money Laundering Process to Make Enforcement more Effective” in Brigitte 
Unger and Daan Van der Linde (eds) Research Handbook on Money Laundering (Edward Elgar Publishing, 
2013) at 439-441).  
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Placement involves the movement of the proceeds of crime to a secure place, or into a less 
suspicious form. Commonly, launderers introduce the proceeds into the financial system. For 
example, proceeds in the form of cash may be deposited in bank accounts opened under 
different names. 
Layering: Launderers engage in a series of conversions or movements of the proceeds far 
from the point of its origin to obscure its origins and hide its true nature, for example, by 
transacting the funds through several accounts at different banks, or using shell corporations. 
Integration: Launderers re-introduce the proceeds into the legitimate economy, for 
example, by investing in real estate, luxury assets or business ventures. 
In practice, not all money laundering processes involve all three stages; some may involve 
more and some less.
13
 These stages can be separate and distinct, but more often some of them 
are conducted simultaneously or overlap.
14
  
In short, although the precise academic definition of money laundering remains elusive, 
money laundering can be identified and distinguished from other illegal activities by its main 
purpose of disguising the origin of funds derived from criminal activities. 
 
2.2.2 Mechanisms and Typologies of Money Laundering 
 
The proceeds of crime can be laundered through diverse mechanisms using different 
methods (also called typologies or techniques). The mechanisms and typologies of money 
laundering are progressive, and vary from time to time. In general, money laundering can be 
carried out through three categories of mechanisms ranging from very traditional to advanced 
ones: the physical movement of money or monetary instruments; the use of financial 
institutions; and the use of the trade system.
15
 The major money laundering mechanisms are 
identified as follows. 
 
 
                                                          
13
  Petrus C van Duyne and Michael Levi, Drugs and Money: Managing the Drug Trade and Crime Money in 
Europe (Routledge, 2005) at 152-155. 
14
  Doug Hopton, Money Laundering : A Concise Guide for All Business (Gower Publishing Limited, 2006) at 
2. 
15
   The mechanisms and typologies of money laundering are often updated by the Financial Action Task Force 
(FATF) in its reports of typologies, based on the analysis of various typical cases from around the world. 
These reports have been made public since 1995. See all reports (1995-2011) at APG, “FATF Typologies 
Work”, available at: http://www.apgml.org/frameworks/default.aspx?FrameworkID=5 (accessed 15 May 
2013).   
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Currency, gold, precious metals and precious stones smuggling 
This is one of the oldest traditional money laundering mechanisms, but is still in use. By 
this mechanism, the proceeds of crime in the form of cash, gold, precious metals, precious 
stones or monetary instruments are covertly moved across the border, and then deposited in 
banking institutions, invested in legal business, used to purchase real estate and so on.  
Gold, precious metals and precious stones attract money launderers because of their 
distinct advantages: their high intrinsic value, their convertibility and the potential anonymity 
of the parties engaged in transactions.
16
 They themselves may be the proceeds of crime which 
need to be laundered through smuggling or illegal trading. In addition, the gold, precious 
metal or precious stones purchases and sales may be used as a cover for the laundering 
operation. 
 
Money laundering through the banking sector 
Money laundering through banking institutions appears to be the most popular mechanism 
because of its numerous advantages. For instance, banks with their own principles of banking 
secrecy can provide multiple services to dispose of criminal proceeds safely, such as deposits, 
loans, and foreign exchange services. Further, the funds can be transferred promptly by 
various convenient ways through both domestic and overseas banking institutions, such as by 
the use of internet banking, phone banking and automatic teller machines (ATM). The typical 
typologies of this mechanism are the use of accounts in false names, or in the name of person 
operating on behalf of some other beneficiary.
17
 In the layering stage, the transaction may 




Money Laundering through Alternative Remittance Systems (ARSs)  
An “alternative remittance system” is also variously referred to as an “informal funds 
transfer”, “underground banking system”, “informal remittance centre” or “parallel banking 
                                                          
16
  FATF (2003), “Report on Money Laundering Typologies 2002-2003”, available at: http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/2002_2003_ML_Typologies_ENG.pdf (accessed 28 April 2013). 
17
  FATF (1997), “1996-1997 Report on Money Laundering Typologies”, available at: 
http://www.apgml.org/frameworks/docs/5/FATF%20Typologies%20rpt%201996-97.pdf (accessed 28 April 
2013). 
18
  Shell companies usually exist on paper only, without real employees or offices, and with no significant 
assets or operations. They have legitimate uses, normally serving as the vehicles for business transactions. 
These companies also can be used at the placement stage of money laundering to receive deposits of cash 





 In the practice of particular ethnic or migrant groups, these systems are called by 
different names, such as the Indian hawala/hundi system, the Chinese fei chi’en system or the 
Colombian black market peso exchange.
20
 Most ARSs operate in a similar way as 
conventional banks, which are used to transfer funds from one location to another without the 
physical movement of currency. 
Although there is not yet a broad consensus about the definition of an ARS, there is basic 
agreement on its characteristics. The ARS usually operates in secrecy, depending on personal 
contacts and trust, and keeping limited records. Taking the Asian ARSs with the 
hawala/hundi and the fei chi’en systems as examples, money senders do not need to provide 
their names and identity nor that of recipients; instead, they are given codes, which are what 
the recipients have to show the corresponding brokers as proof in order to claim cash.
21
 ARSs 
mostly operate outside national financial regulation, although they are largely composed of 
legitimate operators. ARSs may be effective and efficient. They may save the cost and time 
of transactions in many ways, for example, by circumventing national currency controls or 
requirements. Thus, many people prefer to use ARSs for transferring money to their families 
or for business purposes.  
ARSs obviously offer many advantages for money launderers to transfer and disguise the 
proceeds of crime. For example, ARSs can obscure the audit trail of criminal proceeds 
effectively because of the absence of the bureaucratic procedures in paper work found in 
formal financial transaction systems. In addition, money launderers have developed 
numerous sophisticated typologies to launder the criminal proceeds through ARSs, such as 
using digital currency created as a medium of exchange on the Internet.
22
  
                                                          
19
  A summary of how this system works can be found at FATF (2005), "Money Laundering & Terrorist 
Financing Typologies 2004-2005" at 3-13, available at: http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/2004_2005_ML_Typologies_ENG.pdf (accessed 28 April 2013). 
20
  FATF, "Money Laundering & Terrorist Financing Typologies 2004-2005" (10 June 2005) at 5, available at: 
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/2004_2005_ML_Typologies_ENG.pdf (accessed 28 
April 2013). 
21
  Abdullahi Y. Shehu, “The Asian Alternative Remittance Systems and Money Laundering” (2004) 7(2) 
Journal of Money Laundering Control 175 at 180. 
22
  Some popular typologies are described in FATF, above n19, 14-26. One of the modern methods for money 
laundering through ARSs has been employed in the case United States of America v. Liberty Reverse, et al. 
(see Southern Dictrict Court of New York, "Indictment & Supporting Documents: U.S. v. Liberty Reserve, et 
al. (sealed indictment)" (28 May 2013) at 1-9, available at: 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/May13/LibertyReserveetalDocuments/Liberty%20Reserve,%
20et%20al.%20Indictment%20-%20Redacted.pdf (accessed 19 May 2014). According to the indictment, 
Liberty Reserve, incorporated in Costa Rica in 2006, was believed to be one of the world’s most widely used 
alternative-payment networks using digital currency (from 2006 to May 2013). Through its website, Liberty 
Reserve was alleged to have been created and operated as a criminal business to facilitate criminals all over 
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Money laundering through the securities market 
Criminal funds laundered through the securities sector may be derived from criminal 
activities both inside and outside the sector. In case of the funds obtained within the sector 
itself, the predicate offences that generate these funds, can include embezzlement, insider 
trading, securities fraud, and market manipulation.
23
 
A money launderer can use the securities market for all money laundering stages, but it is 
most commonly used for the layering or integration stage. The common money laundering 
typologies through the securities sector are:
24
 the acceptance of cash payment in the securities 
market by  unscrupulous securities market professionals (placement stage); the purchase of 
securities with criminal funds that have already introduced into the financial system (layering 
stage); and the setting up of legitimate public companies as a front for money laundering 
operations and then using the companies to co-mingle criminal proceeds with legal trade 
activities (integration stage). 
 
Trade-based money laundering 
Trade-based money laundering refers to the mechanism for disguising and legitimizing the 
proceeds of crime through the use of international trade. Normally, international trade 
involves a large quantity and value of goods, and comprises multiple links to freight, to 
insurance, and to foreign currency exchange. Moreover, international trade often involves 
different national legal and financial systems. These characteristics can offer a superior cover 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the world conduct illegal transactions and launder the proceeds of their crimes. Liberty Reserve was assumed 
to have laundered more than US$6 billion of criminal proceeds. Its operation can be summarized as follows. 
A user first was required to open an account with Liberty Reserve via its website, providing them with the 
basic identification, which could be fictitious or anonymous identities. The key characteristic was that 
Liberty Reserve only took deposits in its own digital currency (called “LR”). The user couldn’t deposit 
money directly into the account. Instead, the user had to work through a third-party called “exchangers.” 
These were typically unlicensed money transmitting business, who bought “LR” from Liberty Reserve. The 
user would pay Liberty Reserve in mainstream currency (US$ or whatever currency) for a certain amount of 
LR, which then was deposit into the user’s account. The user could then transfer “LR” to other users, 
including any “merchants” that accepted “LR” as a payment instrument. When the user wanted to withdraw 
money, the process worked in reverse, often with an “exchanger” in a different country. By this way, the 
user can hide all his information. Liberty Reserve had no record of how or from where the user sent the 
money, since the deposits and withdrawals were all done through the “exchangers”. This arrangement 
obviously can be easily used for money laundering.  
23
  Three predicate offences for money laundering linked to securities, namely inside trading, securities fraud 
and market manipulation, are described briefly in FATF, "Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing in the 
Securities Sector" (October 2009) at 48-54, available at: http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/ML%20and%20TF%20in%20the%20Securities%20Sector.pdf 
(accessed 28 April 2013). 
24
  FATF, above n16, at 11-18. 
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to the criminal proceeds, especially in developing countries with limited resources for 
scrutinizing international trade. For example, criminal funds can be laundered through the 
misrepresentation of the price, quantity or quality of imports or exports. The basic typologies 
include: over- or under-invoicing of goods and services; multiple invoicing of goods and 




Furthermore, the globalization of capital markets has presented a great opportunity for 
money launderers. It is evident that foreign direct investment (FDI) facilitates money 
laundering, especially in transitional economies.
26
 For example, the establishment of foreign 
companies constitutes a movement of capital from the home country to the host country that 
may be commingled with criminal assets. Thus, FDI may disguise investor’s illicit assets. 
The typologies of trade-based money laundering can be used when laundering criminal funds 
through FDI. 
In addition to the money laundering typologies described above, the proceeds of crime can 
be laundered through other channels, such as the insurance sector,
27
 the real estate sector,
28
 




2.2.3 Trends in Money Laundering 
 
The increase in transnational money laundering 
Modern technologies, advanced means of transportation and advances in financial 
transaction systems (e.g., the internet banking), have enabled money launderers to transfer 
criminal proceeds abroad more promptly and safely. In addition, the globalization of the 
economy has facilitated cross-border financial transactions and trade among countries. 
Money launderers utilize this context to move the proceeds of crime rapidly through multiple 
                                                          
25
  APG (2012), "APG Typology Report on Trade Based Money Laundering" at 3, available at: http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Trade_Based_ML_APGReport.pdf (accessed 28 April 2013). 
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  M Fabricio Perez, Josef C Brada and Zdenek Drabek, “Illicit money flows as motives for FDI” (2012) 40(1) 
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jurisdictions. The destination countries for the funds are often developing countries with lax 
money laundering controls, including Vietnam.
30
 Law enforcement agencies face numerous 





The tendency towards professionalization of money laundering 
The development of sophisticated AML measures has coincided with a tendency for the 
separation between criminals generating illegal proceeds and others laundering these 
proceeds. The criminals need the aid of professional money launderers or money laundering 
facilitators, who have the competent legal, financial and technological knowledge to avoid 
detection. Hence, there has been an increasing involvement of professions in money 
laundering, such as accountants, lawyers, financial advisors, notaries and other fiduciaries.
32
 
These people have taken advantage of their high social status, their professions and their 
technical competency within their specific services to conduct or support money laundering.  
 
Cyber money laundering 
Cutting-edge technologies, especially the Internet and wireless telecommunications, have 
been utilized effectively in money laundering. The advantages offered by cyber laundering 
include: a potential high degree of anonymity, high speed of transaction, and cross-border 
challenges to law enforcement.
33
 Money launderers can exploit a variety of services available 
on the internet for money laundering, for example, internet payment services, stored value 
cards (known as smart cards), online banking, online gambling, and online auctions.
34
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  In the case United States of America v. Liberty Reserve, et al described above, for example, the “exchangers” 
were found to be located mainly in Malaysia, Russia, Nigeria and Vietnam where unlicensed money transfer 
businesses could operate without significant oversight or regulation (See Southern Dictrict Court of New 
York, above n22, 9). 
31
  The challenges of international cooperation in AML will be discussed in the later chapters. 
32
  FATF, above n16, at 5. 
33
  Wojciech Filipkowski, “Cyber Laundering: An Analysis of Typology and Techniques” (2008) 3(1) 
International Journal of Criminal Justice Sciences 15. 
34
  Description of how these services are used for money laundering can be found in ibid, at 17-24; and FATF 
(2006), "Report on New Payment Methods" at 4-9, available at: http://www.fatf-




Virtual currencies (or digital currencies),
35
 for example Bitcoin or Linden dollar,
36
 offer 
highly anonymous and instant money transfers that make them attractive for criminals, 
especially money launderers, and challenges the current AML system.
37
 The US Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) notes that “Bitcoin will likely continue to attract cyber 
criminals who view it as a means to move or steal funds as well as a means of making 
donations to illicit groups”.
38
   
 
2.2.4 The Harms of Money Laundering 
 
This section examines the harms and risks of harm caused by money laundering. Then it 
argues that money laundering acts cause harms or create risks of harm thus justifying 
criminalization on the basis of the “Harm Principle”. Ashworth interprets this principle as 
follows “the State is justified in criminalizing any conduct that causes harm to others or 
creates an unacceptable risk of harm to others”.
39
 
The FATF has identified the overall harms associated with money laundering and believes 
that these harms are self-explanatory.
40
 It, however, appears that identifying and illustrating 
the harms of money laundering is a difficult and controversial task. Several scholars and 
institutions have employed different approaches to identify the negative effects of money 
                                                          
35
  See its definition in FATF (2014), "Virtual Currencies Key Definitions and Potential AML/CFT Risks" at 4-
7, available at: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Virtual-currency-key-definitions-and-
potential-aml-cft-risks.pdf (accessed 01 July 2014). 
36
  See how these types of currencies can be misused for money laundering in , e.g., Robert Stokes, “Virtual 
Money Laundering: the Case of Bitcoin and the Linden Dollar” (2012) 21(3) Information & 
Communications Technology Law 221 at 223-226; and Clare Chambers-Jones, Virtual Economies and 
Financial Crime: Money Laundering in Cyberspace (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2012) at 104-112. 
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based Approach (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2010) at 8-13; Robert Stokes, “Anti-Money Laundering 
Regulation and Emerging  Payment Technologies” (2013) 32(5) Banking and Financial Services Policy 
Report 1 at 4-6; and Danton Bryans, “Bitcoin and Money Laundering: Mining for an Effective Solution” 
(2014) 89(1) Indiana Law Journal 441 at 455-469. 
38
  Cyber Intelligence Section and Criminal Intelligence Section FBI Directorate of Intelligence, "(U) Bitcoin 
Virtual Currency: Intelligence Unique Features Present Distinct Challenges for Deterring Illicit Activity" at 
2, available at: http://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/2012/05/Bitcoin-FBI.pdf (accessed 19 May 
2014). 
39
  Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (6
th
 ed, Oxford University Press, 2009) at 27. Chapter 4 will 
look at the criminalization of money laundering in detail.  
40
  FATF (2010), "Global Money Laundering & Terrorist Financing Threat Assessment " at 12, available at: 
https://www.imolin.org/pdf/imolin/Global_Threat_assessment.pdf (accessed 19 June 2014). 
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laundering on different aspects of society,
41
 and controversy has arisen surrounding their 
discussions.
42
   
One justification for criminalization relates to the negative economic impact of money 
laundering. But in terms of the economic impact, some authors have expressed doubt about 
the real negative effects of money laundering on economic development within a national 
economy.
43
 In developing countries, it is even claimed that the proceeds of crime provide 
useful funds for economic development, and that their capital may not be spent most 
effectively because of regulation of money laundering.
44
 In fact, these claims may be true in 
the short term (e.g., banks may benefit from increased business through money laundering), 
but in the long run, this thesis accepts that the micro- and macro-economic harm of money 
laundering is obvious.
45
 The primary economic harms can be identified as follows: 
   
Money laundering may undermine the integrity of financial institutions as well as the 
credibility and transparency of the financial market.
46
  
The review of money laundering mechanisms and typologies indicate that money 
launderers frequently make use of financial institutions, including banks and non-banking 
financial institutions, for their operations. The fraudulent activities of money launderers or 
corrupt individuals within these institutions may cause an increase in operational risk or 
                                                          
41
  Durrieu offers an extensive literature review on the discussion of the harms money laundering may cause. 
See Roberto Durrieu, Rethinking Money Laundering & Financing of Terrorism in International Law: 
Towards a New Global Legal Order (Martinus Nijhoff, 2013) at 78-93. 
42
  See, for instance, Hans Geiger and Oliver Wuensch, “The Fight against Money Laundering: An Economic 
Analysis of a Cost-Benefit Paradoxon” (2007) 10(1) Journal of Money Laundering Control 91; and Peter 
Alldridge, Money Laundering Law Forfeiture, Confiscation, Civil Recovery, Criminal Laundering, and 
Taxation of the Proceeds of Crime (Hart Pubishing, 2003) at 29-43. Alldridge has examined the arguments 
presented by economists about the economic harm of money laundering and suggested that “many of the 
minor arguments for the existence of harms are incorrect or inconsequential” (at 42). 
43
  For example, Alldridge argues that in a single jurisdiction, the justification for the regulation of money 
laundering is not strong. See Alldridge, above n42, at 30. 
44
  Peter W. Alldridge, “Money Laundering and Globalization” (2008) 35(4) Journal of Law and Society 437 at 
446. 
45
  In a comprehensive research project on “The Amount and the Effects of Money Laundering” for the Dutch 
Ministry of Finance, the economic effects are the majority among 25 identified different negative effects of 
money laundering. See Brigitte Unger and Elena Madalina Busuioc, The Scale and Impacts of Money 
Laundering (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2007) at 109-173. 
46
  This argument is supported by most scholars and institutions. For example, see P.J. Quirk, "Macroeconomic 
Implications of Money Laundering" WP/96/66, IMF, Wasington D.C., 1996, at 27-28; and Durrieu, above 





 Furthermore, investors and general public will lose their trust in the 
financial system which is contaminated or even controlled by money launderers. 
   
Money laundering may depress productivity and distort fair competition.
48
  
Criminal funds can be integrated into the legitimate economy as legal investment capital in 
business ventures or through buying luxury commodities. However, this investment can be 
“sterile investment”,
49
 which is made for the purpose of laundering criminal proceeds rather 
than maximizing the profit of enterprises, or generating additional productivity for society. 
“Sterile investment” may allow the companies to provide products or services below market 
rates or push the price up. This distorts fair competition in legitimate markets.  
 
Money laundering may result in loss of economic policy control.
50
  
An enormous amount of laundered funds introduced into a small national economy can 
contribute to monetary instability through, for example, the instability of exchange rates, 
interest rates, or inflation. This may derive from inexplicable change in money demand, 
volatility of capital flows, the misallocation of resources, and from artificial distortion in 
commodity prices.
51
 In addition, misleading information about money transactions given to 
policymakers may contribute to inaccurate economic management that may cause 
macroeconomic instability. 
The other negative economic effects of money laundering are: the loss of tax revenue, risk 
to the process of privatization of state-owned enterprises in some countries undertaking 
economic reform, and the facilitation of capital flight.
52
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Development Bank, 2002, at 5. 
48
  This negative effect was also proved by many scholars, e.g., Brigitte Unger, “The Impact of Money 
Laundering” in Donato Masciandaro, Elöd Takáts, and Brigitte Unger (eds) Black Finance: The Economics 
of Money Laundering (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2007); ibid; and Quirk, above n46. 
49
   See Bartlett, above n47. 
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Money laundering facilitates the increase in predicate offences.
53
 
Obviously, there is an inextricable link between money laundering and the underlying 
criminal activities that generate illicit proceeds. Money laundering fuels criminals by 
protecting their proceeds. Successful money laundering helps criminals enjoy their proceeds 
which may encourage them to commit further crimes.
54
 The fact that criminals can easily 
convert, conceal or disguise their illicit proceeds may be one of the stimuli for the increased 
commission of some kinds of predicate crimes, such as drug trafficking and human 
trafficking. This is recognised in the Preamble of the 1988 Vienna Convention, which asserts 
that the State Parties to the convention are “determined to deprive persons engaged in illicit 





Money laundering invites corruption,
56
 erodes the integrity of law enforcement agencies, 
and undermines the rule of law.  
Consolidation of the economic power of criminals enables them to penetrate law 
enforcement agencies and the political system.
57
 The Preamble of the 1988 Vienna 
Convention expressed the recognition by States that illicit drug traffic “generates large 
financial profits and wealth enabling transnational criminal organizations to penetrate, 
contaminate and corrupt the structures of government, legitimate commercial and financial 
business, and society at all its levels”.
58
 Money launderers often use bribery to overcome 
obstruction in critical gateways, such as public officials and law enforcement agencies, in 
order to make money laundering successful. Money laundering also corrupts professionals, 
particularly legal professionals and accountants.
59
 Furthermore, large-scale money laundering 
contributes to the economic and political influence of criminals on the society that threatens 
national security, the sovereignty of states and social well-being.
60
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Based on the above illustration, this thesis argues that the harms and risks of harm caused 
by money laundering activities is the fundamental rationale for the development of 
international AMLSs, including the criminalization of money laundering, and for the 




2.2.5 Measuring the Scale of Money Laundering and Assessing National Money 
Laundering Threats  
   
Measuring the scale of money laundering 
It has been submitted by some scholars that a national estimate of money laundering 
volume appears to serve limited purposes, and is not important for the purpose of making the 
AML policy or for assessing the outcome of AML measures.
62
 The FATF also agrees that the 
statistic of money laundering volume is not necessary to be able to recognise the harms 
caused and the need for global action.
63
 According to those scholars, diverse predicate 
offences contribute different amounts to the total volume of money laundered, and different 
predicate offences cause different levels of harm which may not depend on whether they 
produce significant proceeds.
64
 For example, drug trafficking may generate more proceeds 
than terrorism, but it does not mean that the former is more harmful than the latter. Thus, a 
reduction in the volume of money laundering may indicate a decline in the particular offences 
which usually make huge proceeds in a country, but cannot represent an increase in other 
predicate offences which can cause more serious harm.
65
 As a result, they conclude that the 
reduction of money laundering volume cannot indicate that the associated harm has been 
managed or mitigated.
66
 They may be right in this point. But the estimation of money 
laundering volume in a country does reflect whether money laundering activities increase, 
then helps the country to make an appropriate national AML strategy. This thesis argues that 
knowing the scale of money laundering within the national context and on a global level is 
helpful, for example, in evaluating the economic effect of money laundering. In addition, 
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although the estimation cannot provide a precise guide for making AML policies and laws, it 
contributes to the confirmation of whether the scale of money laundering is sufficient to 
warrant public attention to national AML policies and laws or not. In fact, however, 
quantifying the money laundering turnover is extremely difficult due to the lack of reliable 
methodologies. Some researchers, using their own methodologies, have estimated how much 
money has been actually laundered in some countries and globally. Unfortunately, most of 
the proposed methodologies seem to be flawed.
67
 An obvious difficulty is that measuring 
money laundering implies measuring the incidence of all of the most serious crime that 
produces illicit proceeds. This thesis agrees that it seems impossible to know how much 
money has been laundered at a certain time.
68
 What we can do is to offer a broad speculation 
about the extent of money laundering activities within a country and whether it increases. The 
speculation can be based upon the evaluation of some specific categories of predicate 
offences which are the main sources of criminal proceeds.
69
  
At present, there is only an annual report of the US Department of State that assesses and 
classifies money laundering situation in most countries in the world. Depending mainly on 
the assessment of involvement of national financial institutions in narcotics trafficking, the 
US Department of State’s annual International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INSCR - 
the Money Laundering and Financial Crimes section) provides a classification of national 
money laundering situations.
70
 The report provides an overview of AML/CFT (Countering 
the Financing of Terrorism) legal frameworks of more than 200 jurisdictions and countries. It 
                                                          
67
  In John Walker and Brigitte Unger, “Measuring Global Money Laundering: "The Walker Gravity Model"” 
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volume. See Demetis, above n37. 
69
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US. They named it as the microeconomic approach which focuses on estimating the incomes from different 
types of crime. See Reuter and Truman, above n62, at 19-23.  
70
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sources, such as: the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, the US Treasury 
Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network and Department of Homeland Security Investigations. 
The report also takes account of the mutual evaluation conducted by the FATF or the FATF-style regional 
bodies to which the countries or jurisdictions belong. See US Department of State, "International Narcotics 
Control Strategy Report (INCSR): Volume II Money Laundering and Financial Crimes" (March 2014) at 5-
6, available at: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/222880.pdf (accessed 10 April 2014). 
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also identifies the major money laundering countries. Nevertheless, the report does not 
quantify money laundering on either a national or global scale. The 2014 INCSR classifies 
jurisdictions into three categories: Countries/Jurisdictions of Primary Concern, 
Countries/Jurisdictions of Concern, and Other Countries/Jurisdictions Monitored.
71
 
“Countries/Jurisdictions of Primary Concern” are identified as “major money laundering 
countries”. Identification as “Countries/Jurisdictions of Primary Concern” is based on 
whether the country or jurisdiction’s financial institutions engage in transactions involving a 
significant amount of proceeds from all serious crimes or are vulnerable to such activities. 
“Countries/Jurisdictions of Concern” or “Other Countries/Jurisdictions Monitored” are 
classified upon several factors, such as the significance of financial transactions in the 
countries’ financial institutions involving the proceeds of serious crime, actions taken or not 
taken in AML and each country’s vulnerability to money laundering. According to the US 
Department of State, while the actual money laundering situations of “Countries/Jurisdictions 
of Concern” are not as serious as those of “Countries/Jurisdictions of Primary Concern”, the 
jurisdictions of concern still must develop or enhance their AML strategies.
72
 In addition, 
although “Other Countries/Jurisdictions Monitored” do not pose an immediate concern, it is 
necessary to monitor their money laundering situations.
73
 Because of its approach and 
methods, the INSCR provides a helpful source to access general national money laundering 
situations. More significantly, it has been used to rate Vietnam. In the 2014 INCSR, Vietnam 




Assessing national money laundering threats  
Instead of attempting to quantify the value of money laundering activities, a number of 
countries based on their own approaches have conducted national money laundering 
threats/risks assessment.
75
 In most of these countries, money laundering typologies and 
predicate offences are among the crucial factors which are taken into account the assessment 
of money laundering risks. 
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In 2010, the FATF published the first Global Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing 
Threat Assessment (GTA) and proposed a general framework which can be used to identify 
the overall threats caused by money laundering at a global, regional and national level.
76
 The 
analysis of money laundering typologies and of the major sources of criminal proceeds is one 
of the main bases for the GTA.  
Furthermore, in 2013, in order to support countries in implementing the risk-based 
approach to their AML regimes,
77
 the FATF introduced a more specific guidance paper on 
national money laundering and terrorist financing (ML/TF) risk assessment.
78
 ML/TF risks, 
according to this guidance document, are conceptualized as a combination of threats, 
vulnerabilities and consequences.
79
 This guidance suggests that an understanding of the 
environment in which predicate offences occur and the criminal proceeds are generated (and 
if possible the size) is an important starting point in assessing national ML risks.
80
 The FATF 
recommends a list of predicate offences that may be useful in building an estimate of ML 
threats, which include drug-related crimes, organized crimes and corruption to name a few.
81
 
In practice, the size of these crimes and their proceeds varies from one country to another. 
Therefore, countries have different selected lists of predicate offences used to examine ML 
threats/risks.  
Vietnam, thus far, has not undertaken a comprehensive assessment of ML threats/risks. In 
order to have an initial evaluation of ML threats in Vietnam, the following section provides 
insights into a number of categories of predicate offences. 
 
2.3 Money Laundering within the Vietnamese Context 
 
The thesis does not expect to offer an accurate assessment of the national money 
laundering threats/risks in Vietnam. Rather it attempts to make a broad statement about the 
scale and tendency of ML activities and ML threats within Vietnam. As mentioned above, 
there has been no credible method for estimating the volume of money laundering in a 
country. Nevertheless, it is necessary and possible to give a speculation about the extent of 
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money laundering and the general assessment on money laundering threats through the 
examination of certain predicate offences, ML typologies and other key indicating factors. 
This section first examines the extent of the following selected categories of predicate 
crimes: drug trafficking, corruption and organized crimes (including these crimes committed 
extra territorially but which fall within Vietnam’s jurisdiction); as well as the associated 
money laundering activities. These crimes are chosen because they generate the most 
significant proceeds and are most likely to be associated with money laundering.
82 Some 
particular cases are provided as examples of the link between the predicate crimes and money 
laundering, and of the money laundering methods in Vietnam. Then, the facilitators of money 
laundering and possible typologies used in Vietnam are discussed. 
 
2.3.1 Selected Predicate Crimes and Associated Money Laundering Activities 
 
Drug trafficking 
Vietnam’s geographic location and insufficient law enforcement capacity to  counter drug 
trafficking make it an attractive transit site for drug traffickers to smuggle drugs from the 
Golden Triangle, Cambodia and China to Australia, the US, Canada and to European 
countries.
83
 Meanwhile, Vietnam is a prospective consumption market for drugs with an ever 
growing number of domestic drug users in recent years.
84
 Drug trafficking-related crimes 
have increased at a very high rate recently.
85
 A significant part of the proceeds generated 
from drug trafficking are believed to have been laundered in Vietnam using diverse 
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In January 2007, the People's Court of northern Son La province handed down seven death 
sentences in the case of “Trinh Nguyen Thuy” (these were affirmed on  appeal).
86
 Thuy and 
his accomplices were found guilty of various charges related to the transnational illegal 
trading of heroin and opium, and producing heroin. This case is considered one of the largest 
drug-trafficking related cases ever brought before the Vietnamese courts. The case is 
notorious for the number of death sentences handed down, the huge amount of heroin and 
opium traded (about 250 kg heroin and 200 kg opium),
87
 the bribing of high-ranking public 
officials, and especially for the link to an elaborate money laundering scheme. The 
investigation revealed that after roughly 20 years of involvement in drug trafficking, Thuy 
had earned a tremendous profit which was then invested mainly in real estate. At the time of 
his arrest in 2005, Thuy was the Chairman of the Board of a joint stock company and director 
of a front company. By bribing officials in the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development of Vietnam, his companies were granted permission to engage in a number of 
well-known real estate projects in Hanoi that helped him to cover his underlying criminal 
activities and launder criminal proceeds derived from the predicate crimes. Further, he also 
owned several private real properties and luxurious cars. Nevertheless, due to the inadequate 
legal framework in existence in Vietnam at that time, he and his accomplices were not 
accused of any charge in relation to money laundering.  
 
Organized criminal groups  
Although Vietnam has become a Party to the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime (the Palermo Convention),
88
 neither the term “organized 
criminal group” nor “transnational crime”, terms on which the Convention relies heavily, has 
been defined formally in Vietnamese laws. Nevertheless, Vietnamese analogues to organised 
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crime and its features have been identified by Vietnamese law enforcement authorities and 
experts. Since the early 2000s, following the crackdown on a number of notorious organized 
criminal groups, other terms including “black society-style” (xa hoi den) crime and mafia-
style crime have been widely used to describe serious organized criminal groups in 
Vietnam.
89
 “Black society-style” crime is recognized as a close-knit gang associated with 
armed robbery, racketeering, smuggling, drug trafficking, prostitution, illegal gambling and 
even contract murder. Beyond the characteristics of “black society-style” crime, mafia-style 
crime is well-organized in its structure and operation. Mafia-style crime is increasing in 
Vietnam.
90
 It possesses certain economic strengths gained through illegal activities and 
enjoys protection from public officials through bribery and threat. It causes serious harms to 
the society. Mafia-style criminals often engage with potentially lucrative business to cover 
their crimes, launder their proceeds and make more profits. Criminal proceeds generated by 
“black society-style” (xa hoi den) crimes and mafia-style crimes are normally used to buy 
real property, establish entertainment businesses (e.g., restaurants, hotels and discotheques), 
and invest in front companies. 
 
Case 2 
In 2003, the extraordinary trial of the “Nam Cam” case which involved  155 defendants, 
the biggest case in the history of criminal procedure in Vietnam up to that time, shocked the 
Vietnamese public and seized a great deal of domestic and foreign media attention.
91
 After 
more than 3 months of hearings, the Ho Chi Minh City People’s Court imposed the death 
penalty on southern mafia-style crime boss Truong Van Cam, better known by the nickname 
“Nam Cam”, and five of his associates (one death penalty on an accomplice was altered on 
appeal). “Nam Cam” was found guilty of numerous charges including murder, bribery and 
organizing illegal gambling. Sixteen officials, including two members of the Communist 
Party’s powerful Central Committee and several high-ranking police officers, were punished 
with prison terms. The indictment indicated that “Nam Cam” amassed a fortune during a 
decade at the top of an underground criminal network that consisted of gambling dens, loan 
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sharks, protection rackets and prostitution rings. His criminal web spread from its Ho Chi 
Minh base to other southern provinces and the capital Hanoi, and attracted partners from 
Taiwan and Cambodia. It was suggested at the time of his arrest that “Nam Cam” raked in 
about US$2 million per month from the protection of hundreds of restaurants, discos and 
illegal gambling clubs.
92
 Nonetheless, when the police carried out a thorough search of his 
private houses, only VND750 million (about US$37,000) was found. The investigation 
revealed that huge volumes of the proceeds of crime were primarily invested in several 
famous restaurants and discotheques in Ho Chi Minh City. A part of these proceeds was used 
for buying real estate and for bribery. Through his legal business, he had become a well-
known and successful businessman in Ho Chi Minh City’s entertainment industry. However, 
only a small part of his criminal assets was confiscated after the conviction.  
 
Corruption 
In 2013, Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index ranked Vietnam 116
th
 
out of 177 countries and territories (perceived level of public-sector corruption).
93
 Corruption 
occurs systematically at almost all levels and in most society sectors, including the 
administrative, political, judicial, and economic sectors.
94
 Both Vietnamese political leaders 
and the Vietnamese public have realised that corruption is a major threat to the leadership of 
the Communist Party and to the stability of the society. Corruption is becoming more 
sophisticated and more extensive in scope, and poses a serious threat to the Vietnamese 
economy as well as to Vietnamese society. During the 1990s, the “Tamexco” (1996)
95
 and 
“Tang Minh Phung” (1997) cases,
96
 which both involved several senior public officials and 
caused considerable economic losses, exposed large-scale corruption scandals. In the 2000s, 
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 and “Southern 
Services Flight Company, Petro Vietnam Gas Company, Vietsovpetro Joint Venture, and T 
&T Co. Ltd. / Nexus Technologies” (2010) cases,
99
 were of much greater extent  involving 
huge amounts of money and sophisticated methods of bribery.  
It is evident that the proceeds of corruption are often disguised and laundered by corrupt 
officials to be able to spend or invest such proceeds.
100
 Corrupt officials launder the proceeds 
of corruption by various typologies.
101
 With the massive scale of corruption in Vietnam, there 
is no doubt that money laundering related to the proceeds of corruption is becoming 
increasingly serious.  
 
Case 3 
In May 2008, the Hanoi People’s Court presided over the first hearing of the “Vinapco” 
case. It related to a massive fraud and corruption scandal in the state-owned Viet Nam Air 
Petrol Company (Vinapco) from 1996 to 2003.
102
 Because of the complexity of the case, 
which requires further investigation and cross-examination of hundreds of witnesses, the final 
judgement of this case has not yet been handed down. According to the police investigation, 
prosecutor’s indictment and a preliminary report released by the State Inspector, however, 
Vinapco lost VND243 billion (about US$15.4 million) in fuel trading between 1999 and 
2003.
103
 It is unprecedented for so many top officials to be alleged to be complicit in a scam 
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df (accessed 22 May 2013). 
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to embezzle millions of US$ of public funds. It is noteworthy that the defendants are alleged 
to have conspired to establish their own joint stock company (Nam Vinh Joint Stock 





Crimes committed by people of Vietnamese origin abroad 
A large number of Vietnamese people live, work and study overseas.
105
 They have 
contributed substantially to the economy of Vietnam.
106
 However, a part of the Vietnamese 
community living abroad has engaged in criminal networks, including drug trafficking, 
human trafficking and money laundering.
107
 In Canada and the UK, recent raids on illicit 
cannabis cultivation have revealed the growing dominance of suspects of Vietnamese 
origin.
108
 It is believed that the Vietnamese criminals involved in the illegal cannabis 
cultivation have earned immense profits, and a vast proportion of these profits has been 
remitted back to Vietnam.
109
 Only a limited amount of the illegal money is transferred from 
the UK to Vietnam through the banking system. The preferred mechanism for remittance of 
the illegal funds is the use of ARSs, for example through small businesses in the UK and their 
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  SGGP (2005), “Phat Hien Rua Tien Trong Vu An Tai Cong Ty Xang Dau Hang Khong [Revealing Money 
Laundering in the Case of Air Petrol Company]”, available at: http://tuoitre.vn/Kinh-te/80911/Phat-hien-rua-
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  By 2012, there were about 4.5 million Vietnamese living overseas (see Bich Huyen (2012) "Xay Dung Cong 
Dong Nguoi Viet o Nuoc Ngoai Vung Manh [Towards the Strong Vietnamese Community Living 
Overseas]", Dai Tieng Noi Viet Nam (The Voice of Vietnam), 28 September 2012, available at: 
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about US$7.2 billion (see WB (2011), “Migration and Remittances Factbook”, available at: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAC/Resources/Factbook2011-Ebook.pdf (accessed 28 April 2013)) 
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(2010) 53(3) Crime, Law and Social Change 229 at 252-253. 
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 Some Vietnamese students studying in the UK were also found to 
be involved in money laundering through ARSs.
111
 In Canada, there is also a thriving 
underground remittance system for transferring money from Canada to Vietnam, which may 





In March 2004, more than 130 defendants across the US and Canada were arrested as part 
of a three-year investigation, called “Operation Candy Box”, that targeted an international 
criminal organization involved in drug trafficking and money laundering.
113
 According to the 
outcome of collaborative investigation among several American and Canadian law 
enforcement agencies, the organization was controlled by Ze Wei Wong, a Chinese national, 
and Mai Phuong Le, a Vietnamese immigrant holding Canadian citizen.  Ze Wei Wong was 
alleged to be the leader of a drug distribution ring operating in 18 US cities and Canada, 
while Le was accused of directing a sophisticated money laundering operation through 
money remitters and travel agencies in both the US and Canada. It was proved that up to a 
million Ecstasy tablets were delivered per month and as much as US$ 5 million of illicit 
proceeds was transferred out of North America (including to Vietnam) per month over five 
years. 
In 2009 and 2011, at Dong’s trial in the US,
114
 the evidence demonstrated that Dong (a US 
citizen living in the US) and Mai Le (a Canadian citizen living in Canada) conspired to 
launder money generated from drug trafficking through the US Tours and Remittance (US 
Tours) founded by Dong which did business as both a travel agency and a money remittance 
service to Vietnam. The funds in US Tours’ bank account were transferred a few times a 
week to the account of a business in Vietnam run by Dong’s brother. Dong was found guilty 
of money laundering, conspiracy to commit money laundering, and conspiracy to defraud the 
US by failing to file currency transaction reports. 
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It is worth noting that in January 2004, Mai Le and representatives of Viet-Can Resort & 
Plantation Incorporation (Canada) travelled to Khanh Hoa province and Ho Chi Minh City 
(Vietnam) to seek “investment projects” and business partners.
115
 At a meeting and 
discussion with leaders of Khanh Hoa province, she and her company were recommended as 
a successful Vietnamese business company in Canada which wanted to invest at least US$25 
million in a real estate project (building resort and rented-apartments) in Khanh Hoa. In 
February, one month after arriving in Vietnam, the project that would enable her to launder 
millions of US$ was promptly approved by the Khanh Hoa People’s Provincial Committee.  
Unfortunately for her, with the cooperation of Vietnamese Interpol, she was arrested in 
Canada before she could carry out this project. 
 
2.3.2 Typologies of Money Laundering in Vietnam 
 
The cases described above show that the criminal proceeds have been laundered in 
Vietnam through the purchases of real estate or luxurious commodities, through ARSs, the 
banking sector, as well as through investment in forms of legitimate business. In practice, 
criminal funds can be laundered in Vietnam through other mechanisms and methods. The 
economic background of Vietnam, as highlighted below, may offer excellent potential for 
money laundering, such as through currency smuggling, foreign investment, and the 
securities or insurance markets.  
 
Cash-based economy 
By the end of 2012, with a population of about 86 million people, there were still only 
around 70,000 Point-of-Sale (POS) devices and 12,000 ATMs, mainly installed in big cities; 
roughly 20% of the Vietnamese population had a bank account; and non-cash payment 
accounted for an estimated 14% of the total value of payment.
116
 Moreover, many people still 
maintain the habit of using cash for payment due to fear of banking frauds and banking 
transactions delays, or to avoid the seizure of taxable income. Vietnam’s hyperinflation in the 
1980s and currency depreciation in the 1990s encouraged people to store their wealth in 
                                                          
115
  Pham Thuc (2007), "Rua tien bang du an [Money Laundering through Projects]", Sai Gon Giai Phong, 
available at: http://www.sggp.org.vn/SGGP12h/2007/1/81485/ (accessed 3 May 2013). 
116
  The 15th Banking Vietnam Conference (2012), "Post-Show Report", available at: 
http://www.banking.org.vn/hn2013/ (accessed 20 April 2013). 
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commodities, gold and foreign currency. Thus, criminals can convert their proceeds in form 
of cash or gold to other safer forms of property easily in Vietnam. 
Furthermore, Vietnam is surrounded by other neighbouring cash-based countries 
(Cambodia, Laos and China). Cash is easily exchanged and moved through the lengthy 
Vietnamese border. This facilitates money laundering through currency smuggling. 
 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) and opportunities for money launderers  
The launch of the “Doi Moi” (Renovation) in Vietnam (1986), which abandoned the 
centralized command economy and encouraged the emergence of a “socialist-oriented market 
economy”, has moved the Vietnam economy into a transitional phase. Like other transitional 
countries, Vietnam is in strong need of funds from abroad for economic development. 
Vietnam’s government has adopted various policies and legislation with the aim of attracting 
more overseas investment, facilitating business operations, and integrating with the global 
economy.
117
 Since the early 1990s, Vietnam has witnessed an extraordinary wave of FDI.
118
 
Nonetheless, the AML legal framework has only been developed recently and is insufficient 
to prevent and detect illegal funds transferred from overseas through the channel of FDI.
119
 
This circumstance, undoubtedly, has offered great potential to money launders. Case 4 is an 
obvious example, in which Mai Le took advantage of the foreign investment channel for 
money laundering. 
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Vietnam remained an attractive destination country (see Sajid Anwar and Lan Phi Nguyen, “Foreign direct 
investment and economic growth in Vietnam” (2010) 16(1-2) Asia Pacific Business Review 183 at 183-
184). By February 2013, 25 years after the enactment of the Law on Foreign Investment, approximately 
US$100 billion FDI capital was disbursed (see Anh Minh (2013) "FDI vao Viet Nam: 25 nam và 100 ty 
[FDI Inflows into Vietnam: 25 Years and US$100 billion]", VnEconomy, 27 March 2013, available at: 
http://vneconomy.vn/20130327024814414P0C9920/fdi-vao-viet-nam-25-nam-va-100-ty.htm (accessed 23 
May 2013)). 
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Fast- growing but infant real estate, securities and insurance market 
Vietnam’s real estate market is a young but fast-growing and vibrant market. After 
Vietnam’s accession to the WTO (in 2007), the market has been promoted by a number of 
factors, such as supportive governmental policies, a great demand for high quality offices, 
hotels and apartments, and massive inflows of foreign and domestic capital into real estate 
projects. The market experienced a boom during 2007 and the first half of 2008, with prices 
rocketing to as much as 200% of the level before 2007. Real estate has become the most 
attractive market for both foreign and domestic investors.
120
  
There has been a rapid growth of stock markets and the large-scale privatisation of public 
enterprises in Vietnam.
121
 Vietnam has two stock exchanges: the Ho Chi Minh Stock 
Exchange (HOSE) established in 2000 and the Hanoi Stock Exchange (HNX) opened in 
2006. In the period from 2000 to 2004, the securities market was in a nascent stage, with the 
total capitalization of the listed companies less than 1% of the nation’s GDP. From 2005 to 
2007, the market soared and peaked in 2007, with the total capitalization equivalent to about 
30% of the GDP. Since 2008, due to Vietnam’s economic downturn, the market has suffered 
from various fluctuations, sometimes decreasing sharply. In early 2009, it dropped by about 
80% from its peak in 2007. In addition, there are joint stock public companies which are not 
listed on any of the stock exchanges. Shares of these unlisted public companies are eligible 
for trading on the Over-the-Counter (OTC) market. Buying OTC securities is similar to 
investing in a private company and is perceived as “private equity” investing. Normally, the 
investors, especially foreign investors, negotiate and trade OTC via brokers. Brokers can 
facilitate the OTC trading process and hide the identities of the investors.  
Vietnam’s insurance market has also experienced a sharp development since 2007. The 
Association of Vietnamese Insurers (AVI) estimates that total insurance revenue reached 
US$1.78 billion in 2011, a 21.6% increase compared with 2010.
122
 
The development of these markets has promoted Vietnam’s economy. Nevertheless, these 
markets, which are in their infancy and lack sufficient AML measures, can provide a fertile 
                                                          
120
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(Working Paper). 
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ground for money laundering.
123
 In fact, it does not seem to be difficult to launder criminal 
funds through these markets,
124
 something that Vietnamese authorities have realized.
125
  
To summarize, in spite of the absence of concrete statistics about money laundering 
volumes and money laundering convictions, the extent of the selected predicate crimes and 
the cases reveal that money laundering has undoubtedly been occurring in Vietnam through 
various methods. Additionally, money laundering is expected to increase in Vietnam due to 
many facilitators, such as the cash-based dominant economy, FDI inflows, and the vibrant 
real estate and stock market with weak AML measures. In other words, Vietnam is vulnerable 
to money laundering because of its cash-based economy and weak enforcement of AML 
regulations in numerous sectors of the economy. Furthermore, these factors will challenge the 






Although the practice of money laundering is as old as the practice of crime that produces 
proceeds, it has only been identified comprehensively as a complex illegal phenomenon 
recently. The given definitions of money laundering may vary in their wording. Despite that, 
in its essence, money laundering aims at concealing the criminal sources of funds derived 
from criminal activities, and acquiring a legitimate appearance for those funds. In the modern 
world, money laundering is closely linked to a wide range of predicate offences that normally 
generate huge proceeds needing laundering. 
By exploiting the technological revolution and a variety of available financial services, the 
mechanisms and typologies of money laundering have been developed towards variable and 
more complicated models in order to avoid detection. Cyber money laundering is a new 
trend. In addition, money laundering tends to be transnational and professionalized. 
Money laundering causes both the economic and social harms that justify the formulation 
and development of international AMLSs, including the criminalization of money laundering.   
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  Nguyen Hien (2012) "Chung Khoan va Bat Dong San Tiep Tay Cho Rua Tien o Viet Nam [Securites and 
Real Estate Facilitate Money Laundering in Vietnam]", Dan Tri, available at: http://dantri.com.vn/kinh-
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  Chapter 9 will discuss this in detail. 
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Money laundering is an existing phenomenon in Vietnam which poses a real threat and 
can cause harms to Vietnam’s economy and many social aspects of Vietnam. A number of 
factors have made Vietnam very vulnerable to money laundering, especially to transnational 
money laundering. Having a transitional and fragile economy, Vietnam and its financial 
sector should be vigilant about money laundering. Furthermore, the establishment of a 
comprehensive AML legal framework is necessary. Why and how Vietnam has developed its 
































INTERNATIONAL ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING STANDARDS:  
DEVELOPMENT, DIFFUSION AND VIETNAM’S CHOICE 
 
3.1 Introduction 
3.2 The Development of International AML Standards 
3.2.1 The Emergence of International AML Standards in the 1980s 
3.2.2 The Evolution of International AML Standards since the 1990s  
3.3 The Diffusion of International AML Standards  
3.3.1 Diffusion by Coercion 
3.3.2 Diffusion by State Socialization 
3.4 Vietnam’s Responses to the Diffusion of International AML Standards 
3.4.1  Vietnam under External Coercion 
3.4.2 Vietnam and State Socialization of the AML Standards 
3.5 General Contextual Factors in Vietnam Influencing the Implementation 
of AML Standards 
3.5.1 Political Willingness 
3.5.2 The Legal System 
3.5.3 The Intergration of International Treaties into Domestic Laws 






As noted in chapter 1, the international anti-money laundering standards (AMLSs) have 
been developed and diffused rapidly in the last two decades. States have been encouraged 
and/or pressured to implement these standards, especially after 9/11 when terrorist financing 
came to be believed to be closely linked to money laundering.
1
  
                                                          
1
  The UN Security Council “strongly urges all Member States to implement the comprehensive, international 
standards embodied in the Financial Action Task Force’s (FATF) Forty Recommendations on Money 
Laundering and the FATF Nine Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing”. See Resolution 1617 
(2005), adopted on 29 July 2005, S/RES/1617 (2005), section 7. 
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This chapter will first examine the development of the AMLSs. It will describe how these 
standards are aimed at combating money laundering and contributing to the suppression of 
various predicate offences with the focus on drug offences, corruption, organized crime and 
terrorist financing. The thesis will argue that the AMLSs have been rationally developed to 
serve these purposes.   
The chapter will then discuss how the AMLSs have been diffused and why States should 
implement and comply with the AMLSs. In particular, the chapter will look at how Vietnam 
is being pressured to implement the AMLSs and what are the incentives for Vietnam to do so. 
It will argue that for political and economic reasons, Vietnam does not have much choice but 
to implement and comply with the international AML requirements. It will imply that the 
main source of pressure is the FATF; and that according to the FATF’s approach to the 
assessment of compliance (mentioned in chapter 1), compliance with the international 
AMLSs requires Vietnam to enact laws and establishment enforcement means compliant with 
the FATF Recommendations and to ensure the rest of the international institutional AML 
framework is in place.
2
  
The last section of the chapter will set out the general political, legal and institutional 
context of Vietnam in which the implementation of the AMLSs is carried out. This chapter 
suggests that external pressure can compel Vietnam to implement adequately the AMLSs, but 





3.2 The Development of International AMLSs 
 
As pointed out in chapter 2 (about trends in money laundering and the harms of money 
laundering), money laundering across national borders is increasing and is believed to cause 
trans-boundary harms or risk of such harms. For example, it may harm the integrity of 
transnational financial institutions and facilitate the rise of transnational crime.  Thus, money 
laundering has become a matter of international concern. 
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  FATF (2013), "Methodology for Assessing Technical Compliance with the FATF Recommendations and the 
Effectiveness of AML/CFT Systems" at 12, available at: http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/methodology/FATF%20Methodology%2022%20Feb%202013.pdf (accessed 
29 May 2013). The following chapters will suggest how Vietnam can comply with each category of AMLSs. 
3




The increase in transnational money laundering obviously requires both national and 
international responses. Money laundering cannot be addressed effectively on a unilateral or 
bilateral basis.
4
 The international AMLSs have been developed to serve as bases for a global 
response to money laundering. This section examines the historical development of AMLSs. 
It shows that the AMLSs are derived from various international treaties (“hard law”), 
resolutions, guidance or recommendations (“soft law”), developed by different international 
institutions. These institutions formulate specific AMLSs relevant to their expertise (and their 
jurisdictions) and cross reference each other. The system is highly complex and for reasons of 
space, only the primary institutions and those related to Vietnam are mentioned in the 
examination hereafter.  
 
3.2.1 The Emergence of International AML Standards in the 1980s  
 
The first money laundering countermeasures were set out in US legislation.
5
 In the 1970s, 
the US government and the US lawmakers recognized that money laundering was 
widespread, and the immense wealth obtained by drug traffickers was being laundered 
through financial institutions.
6
 They believed that money laundering was intimately 
connected with the increasing use of illegal drugs and with drug trafficking, and that the 
integrity of the financial system was threatened by launderers.
7
 Hence, steps were first taken 
to control money laundering in the US by the enactment of the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 
(BSA).
8
 Furthermore, in the 1980s, the US found that a huge amount of drugs were being 
trafficked into it. The enormous profits generated from drug trafficking were often transferred 
out of the country and laundered by sophisticated typologies to avoid seizure by the US 
                                                          
4
  See more about this argument in Beth Simmons, “International Efforts against  Money Laundering” in Dinah 
Shelton (ed) Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-Binding Norms in the International Legal 
System (Oxford University Press, 2000) at 246-247. 
5
  See more details in Peter Reuter and Edwin M. Truman, Chasing Dirty Money: The Fight against Money 
Laundering (Peterson Institute, 2004) at 50. 
6
  Scott Sultzer, “Money Laundering: The Scope of the Problem and Attempts to Combat It” (1995) 63 
Tennessee Law Review 143 at 145-148. 
7
  Ibid, at 151-155. 
8
   Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-508, 84 Stat. 114 (1970) (codified at 
31 USC. §§ 5311-5314, 5316-5324) [Bank Secrecy Act of 1970]. This Act obliges US financial institutions 
to assist the US government agencies in combating money laundering. The financial institutions are required 
to keep records of cash purchases of negotiable instruments, to file reports of cash transactions exceeding 
US$10,000 (daily aggregate amount), and to report suspicious activities that might be the signs of money 
laundering, or other criminal activities. The BSA is sometimes referred to as an AML law or jointly as 
“BSA/AML”. Several AML-related acts have been enacted to amend the BSA. See more in FinCEN, “Bank 





 In response, the US and other States affected by illegal drug-related activities 
realized that without international cooperation traffickers could avoid the forfeiture of their 
illicit proceeds simply by removing those proceeds from the jurisdiction in which they were 
generated.
10
 Thus, the US has actively negotiated and signed several bilateral and multilateral 
treaties to foster international cooperation in the forfeiture of illegal drug trafficking proceeds 
as well as in fighting drug-related crimes.
11
 In addition, in order to protect the integrity of 
financial institutions and to detect money laundering, the US has also motivated international 
AML initiatives and encouraged the development of similar AML law models in other 
countries. It has done so mainly through use of its “soft power”.
12
  
One of the early international initiatives in AML was the Statement on Preventing 
Criminal Use of the Banking System for the Purpose of Money Laundering adopted by the 
Basel Committee on Banking Regulation in 1988.
13
 It is worthy noting that “the US Federal 
                                                          
9
  Jimmy Gurule, “The 1988 UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances - A Ten Year Perspective: Is International Cooperation Merely Illusory” (1998) 22(1) Fordham 
International Law Journal 74 at 75. 
10
  William J. Snider, “International Cooperation in the Forfeiture of Illegal Drug Proceeds” (1995) 6(3) 
Criminal Law Forum 377 at 378. 
11
  Ibid, at 383. 
12
  “Soft power”, first identified in the 1990s, is as an emerging resource of power derived from, for example 
the capacity for effective communication or for developing and using multilateral institutions. The “soft 
power” of a country is the ability to construct a situation so that other countries develop their interests in 
ways consistent with its own interests. This power primarily arises from cultural and ideological attraction, 
political value, foreign policies as well as rules and institutions of international regime (see Joseph S. Nye, 
“Soft Power” (1990)(80) Foreign Policy 153 at 164; and Joseph S. Nye, “Think again: Soft Power” (2006) 1 
Foreign Policy at 1)). In the 1980s, the US economy was seen as the centre of the global economy and had 
significant influences on other national economies. It had more “soft power” than other States in terms of 
economic operations and the related fields (see Susan Strange, States and Markets (2
nd
 ed, Continuum 
International Publishing Group, 1998)). It is also argued that “international regime tends to reflect the 
economic and political interests of dominant members of international society”, notably those of the US and 
European States (see Peter Andreas and Ethan Nadelmann, Policing the Globe: Criminalization and Crime 
Control in International Relations (Oxford University Press, 2006) at 17-18. For more reference to the US 
influence on international AML initiatives, see Simmons, above n4, at 248-249. 
13
  See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, "Prevention of Criminal Use of the Banking System for the 
Purpose of Money Laundering " at 3-4, available at: http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc137.pdf (accessed 22 July 
2013). The Basel Committee on Banking Regulation was established in 1974 by the central-bank Governors 
of the Group of Ten countries made up of eleven industrial countries (Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, 
Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States). The 
Committee's members come from Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, 
Hong Kong SAR (Special Administrative Region), India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, 
Mexico, the Netherlands, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. It provides a forum for regular cooperation between its 
member countries on banking supervisory matters with the aim of improving supervisory understanding and 
the quality of banking supervision worldwide (see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, "History of the 
Basel Committee and its Membership" (August 2009) at 1, available at: http://www.bis.org/bcbs/history.pdf 
(accessed 21 November 2013)). 
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Reserve brought the issue of money laundering to the initially unenthusiastic G-10 banking 
supervisor”.
14 The Statement encouraged banks to know their customers and to cooperate 
with law enforcement agencies in AML. These requirements have been applied to banks in 
Vietnam since 2005.
15
     
The United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances (1988 Vienna Convention)
16
, which was signed by forty-three States, was a major 
breakthrough in the effort of the US and the United Nations (UN) to urge international 
cooperation in addressing more effectively many aspects of illicit drug trafficking. Vietnam 
became a Party to this convention in 1997. What is more relevant to our purposes, however, 
is that this convention was the first comprehensive international legal instrument imposing a 
binding obligation on its Parties to criminalize the act of laundering the proceeds of drug-
related crimes
17
 and to adopt confiscation measures.
18
 Many provisions of this convention 
reflect legal approaches already found in US law.
19
 Many provisions of the 1988 Vienna 
Convention became the cornerstones of the international AMLSs. 
 
3.2.2 The Evolution of International AML Standards since the 1990s  
 
The international AMLSs have evolved comprehensively and rapidly since the 1990s with 
the participation of both public and private actors. What follows is a summary of the major 
features of these developments illustrating how one development fed into another. 
 
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF)’s Recommendations and Guidance 
The FATF was established by the G-7 meeting in Paris in 1989,
20
 with the aim of 
responding to the increasing problem of drug abuse and the financial power of drug 
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  See Simmons, above n4, at 249. 
15
  See Chinh Phu, “Nghi Dinh cua Chinh Phu ve Phong, Chong Rua Tien" [Government, Government Decree 
on Prevention and Suppression of Money Laudering] No. 74/2005/ND-CP (Vietnam), 7 June 2005 
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  David P. Stewart, “Internationalizing the War on Drugs: The UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in 
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances” (1989) 18 Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 387 
at 388. 
20
  FATF, “History of the FATF”, available at: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/aboutus/historyofthefatf/ 





 The FATF, an ad hoc inter-governmental institution as it has no treaty basis, has 
an on-going and profound impact on the development of multidimensional AMLSs. In 1990, 
the FATF designed its first set of 40 recommendations on AML which relied heavily on 
several provisions of the 1988 Vienna Convention.
22
 The FATF Recommendations have been 






 and most recently in 2012.
26
 The FATF has 
also set out the basic framework to detect, prevent and suppress the financing of terrorism 
and terrorist acts in its IX Special Recommendations.
27
 The 40+9 recommendations have 
provided the most comprehensive approaches to and frameworks for the national and 
international AML/CFT (Countering Financing of Terrorism) strategy. Although the 
recommendations, considered to be “soft law”, are not legally binding, the FATF can suspend 
member countries which fail to comply with its recommendations, and take countermeasures 
against non-compliant non-members.
28
 The FATF Recommendations consolidate the “hard 
law” of the treaty obligations and arguably in actual impact are “harder” because of the 
attachment of sanctions.  
Recently, the FATF has worked vigorously with the private sector on the risk-based 
approach (RBA) to combating money laundering and terrorist financing. This approach aims 
at identifying the existence of risks, evaluating the risks and developing strategies to manage 
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th
 ed, Council of Europe, 2011) at 91. 
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  FATF (1990), “The Forty Recommendations of the FATF”, available at: http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF%20Recommendations%201990.pdf (accessed 
24 May 2013). 
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  FATF (1996), “The Forty Recommendations”, available at: http://www.fatf-
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24
  FATF (2003), “The Forty Recommendations”, available at: http://www.fatf-
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24 May 2013). 
25
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available at: http://www.fatf-
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26
  FATF (2012), “International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism & 
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2014). 
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  FATF (2001, incorporating all subsequent amendments until February 2008) , "FATF IX Special 
Recommendations" available at: http://www.fatf-
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%20IX%20Special%20Recommendations%20and%20IN%20rc.pdf (accessed 24 May 2013). 
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and mitigate the identified risks in the private sector.
29
 Since 2007, the FATF has formulated 
guidance on implementing the RBA in a number of specific private sectors.
30
 This approach 
will be detailed in chapter 9.  
Being a member of the Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG) since 2007 
which is a FATF-style regional body (FSRB), Vietnam has committed to the effective 




The Council of Europe Conventions and European Union (EU) Directives on AML 
The Council of Europe, the European Union and their member States have formulated 
various regional money laundering countermeasures, and participated actively in and 
contributed significantly to the evolution of international AMLSs.
32
 
The Council of Europe has adopted two important conventions on AML which are known 
as the 1990 Strasbourg Convention
33
 and the 2005 Warsaw Convention.
34
 In addition, in 
1991, the Directive on Prevention of Use of the Financial System for the Purpose of Money 
Laundering was introduced by the European Council (1991 EU Money Laundering 
Directive).
35
 The major further development in the 1990 Strasbourg Convention and the 1991 
EU Money Laundering Directive beyond the 1988 Vienna Convention is that money 
laundering is no longer exclusively associated with only drug-related crimes. Moving beyond 
the 1990 FATF Recommendations, the 1991 EU Money Laundering Directive introduced a 
mandatory reporting obligation to credit and financial institutions, including suspicious 
transaction reporting.
36
 This mandatory reporting obligation was in turn taken up in the 
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  FATF (2007), "Guidance on the Risk-Based Approach to Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist 
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gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/High%20Level%20Principles%20and%20Procedures.pdf (accessed 
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30
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  See Gilmore, above n21, at 173-250. 
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  Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime, 8 November 
1990, CETS No. 141 (entered into force 1 September 1993) [1990 Strasbourg Convention]. 
34
  Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the 
Financing of Terrorism 16 May 2005, CETS No. 198, entered into force 01 May 2008. 
35
  Council Directive on Prevention of the Use of the Financial System for the Purpose of Money Laundering, 
10 June 1991, 91/308/EEC, [1991 EU Money Laundering Directive]. 
36
  See more in Valsamis Mitsilegas and Bill Gilmore, “The EU legislative Framework against Money 
Laundering and Terrorist Finance: A Critical Analysis in the Light of Evolving Global Standards” (2007) 
56(01) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 119 at 120. 
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revised FATF Recommendations (1996). In turn, again, further developments in the 1996 and 
2003 FATF Recommendations were taken up in the second EU Money Laundering Directive 
which was adopted in December 2001,
37
 and in the third Directive which was published in 
November 2005,
38




International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) Resolutions  
INTERPOL is one of the most proactive international bodies in AML.
40
 INTERPOL has 
passed several resolutions calling on its member countries to cooperate in AML, such as the 
resolution on “measures to deal firmly and effectively with the system of illegal international 
financial transactions: underground and parallel banking” (1991), which was then followed 
by other resolutions on money laundering legislation, money laundering investigations and 
international police cooperation in 1997.
41
 The police of member countries can communicate 
with each other through the Interpol Global Communication System and access a 
comprehensive criminal database system.
42
 INTERPOL has examined the major 
characteristics of money laundering in Asia, and comprehensively analysed alternative 
remittance systems - the traditional and possibly most popular money laundering method in 
the Asia Pacific region.
43
 This examination has served as a useful reference for law 
enforcement authorities to respond to money laundering offences committed in the region.  
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The police of Vietnam have actively participated in international and regional police 
organisations with a high sense of cooperative responsibility. The Vietnamese police became 
a member of INTERPOL in 1991. 
 
The Wolfsberg Group 
The Wolfsberg Group was established in 2000 as an association of eleven global private 
banks.
44
 Many of these banks have their branches in Vietnam. One of its key functions is to 
work on global AML guidelines for private banking. The Wolfsberg Anti-Money Laundering 
Principles for Private Banking, which were subsequently published in October 2000, revised 
in May 2002 and most recently in June 2012, provides the core guidelines on the due 









The Palermo Convention represents the attempt of the international community to address 
transnational organized crime, including money laundering, on a global level. The signatory 
States made commitments to criminalize the activities committed by organized criminal 
groups, including  laundering of the criminal proceeds of these activities;
47
 to adopt money 
laundering countermeasures;
48
 to adopt measures to enable confiscation and seizure of the 
criminal proceeds of organised crime at both the national and international level;
49
 to 
accelerate and extend the scope of extradition;
50
 to strengthen international cooperation in the 
investigation and prosecution of organized crime;
51
 and to develop a series of protocols 
containing measures to combat specific forms of transnational crime.
52
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45
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This convention is believed to be a powerful global weapon to fight transnational 
organized crime by tackling its lifeblood - the proceeds. The Palermo Convention provides 
legal tools to allow law enforcement agencies to confiscate criminal assets and crack down on 
money laundering globally. Vietnam ratified the Palermo Convention in 2012, and is 




The United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC)
 54
 
The UNCAC is the first binding treaty to provide for a range of anti-corruption measures 




The nexus between corruption and money laundering is obvious, with the presence of one 
reinforcing the other.
56
 As recognized by the World Bank: “corruption proceeds are disguised 
and laundered by corrupt officials to be able to spend or invest such proceeds. At the same 
time, corruption in a country's AML institutions (including financial institutions regulators, 
Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs), police, prosecutors, and courts) can render its AML 
regime of a country ineffective”.
57
 In practice, money launderers can bribe both public 
officials and private sector employees to facilitate their activities. For instance, employees in 
banks may be corrupted to support the opening or operating of accounts in a false name, or to 
ignore requirements to do customer due diligence or report suspicious transactions.  
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Measures to prevent money laundering are set out in article 14 of the UNCAC. The 
UNCAC also entails other international AML standards, such as the criminalization of money 
laundering,
58
 freezing, seizure and confiscation of the proceeds of crime.
59
 Vietnam ratified 
the UNCAC in 2009.  
 
ASEAN’s Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters  
Since 1996–1997, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
60
 has 
acknowledged the diverse nature of transnational crime beyond drug trafficking and taken 
note with concern of the expansion of transnational crime into Southeast Asia.
61
 The growing 
problem of transnational crimes, such as terrorism, arms smuggling, money laundering and 
piracy, has been perceived as a serious threat to State security and regional stability. This 
threat attracts political attention at the highest diplomatic level. In 2004, the ASEAN Treaty 
on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, signed by like-minded ASEAN Member 
States including Vietnam, was a crucial step for cooperation among ASEAN nations in 
response to transnational crime.
62
 This is a major regional treaty providing most of the 
objectives of mutual assistance in prevention, investigation and prosecution of transnational 
crime including money laundering.  
In order to move towards a prosperous and peaceful ASEAN Community in 2015,
63
 
ASEAN has called for the intensification of cooperation among its members, and of 
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cooperation between ASEAN with extra-regional bodies in the fight against transnational 
crime. In October 2011, the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC), 
with the involvement of all ASEAN Member States,
64
 prioritised the fight against eight types 
of transnational crime, viz. terrorism, trafficking in persons, drug trafficking, money 
laundering, sea piracy, arms smuggling, international economic crime and cyber-crime,
65
 and 
noted that money laundering is the backbone of most transnational criminal activities.
66
 
 In summary, the international AMLSs were initially formulated in the 1980s by the US to 
combat drug crimes and to protect financial institutions from drug traffickers. Since the 
1990s, international organizations and institutions, mainly the UN and in particular the 
FATF, have largely been in charge of the development of AMLSs. Different institutions have 
adopted provisions developed by other organizations, and then in turn have their own ideas 
adopted by other organizations. Western dominance of these organizations is undeniable. 
The AMLSs have evolved rapidly beyond their initial purposes. It is rational to argue that 
the AMLSs now serve as one of the crucial bases for protecting the financial system from 
criminals and various crimes. This argument provides a solid ground for convincing States to 
engage in the development, diffusion and implementation of AMLSs.  
 
3.3 The Diffusion of International AML Standards  
 
It is clear that an effective regime against money laundering requires the global 
implementation of international AMLSs.
67
 The IMF revealed that money launderers exploit 
the differences between national AML laws to move their funds easily and are especially 
attracted to jurisdictions with weak or ineffective AML systems.
68
 However, despite the 
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sound ground for convincing States of the aims of the AMLSs, it is very challenging to 
achieve implementation of these standards in all States. Many academics and practitioners 
have argued that the implementation of AMLSs in developing countries in compliance with 
international requirements is very expensive, while the benefits are unclear.
69
 So, how have 
the AMLSs been diffused? And why should States implement these standards? 
The mechanisms, by which norms and policies are disseminated and shared in a given 
community or transferred from one party to another, have drawn increasing attention from 
social science researchers. A number of scholars have discussed the mechanisms of what they 




 global diffusion of public policy,
72
 
norm diffusion in globalization of combating transnational crime,
73
 consensus and 
compliance,
74
 and diffusion of international AML policy or regime.
75
 In the discussion that 
follows, the theory of diffusion, an important social science construct conceptualized by a 
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 is employed to explain the process of dissemination or dispersion of the 
international AMLSs and the results of that process. It will be argued that AMLSs have been 
diffused, particularly in developing countries, through two major mechanisms: coercion and 
State socialization.  
 
3.3.1 Diffusion by Coercion 
 
Coercion occurs when one State is intentionally forced to implement the regimes, policies 
and norms favoured by other States, international organizations and private actors through 
physical force and the manipulation of economic costs or benefits.
77
 It can be seen from the 
foregoing discussions that the development of AMLSs has been driven largely by the US in 
alliance with some European States in order to minimize potential harms caused by money 
laundering on their financial systems and economies. These States are active actors in 
developing the AMLSs,
78
 establishing crucial international AML institutions
79
 and supporting 
other States in AML.
80
  
Under treaty obligations, the UN urges the Parties to AML-related conventions to 
implement the embodied AMLSs. International institutions, such as the FATF, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB), encourage and attempt to 
pressure States, mainly upon economic incentives, to accept and implement the AMLSs.  
 
Treaty obligations 
Since 1988, the UN has called for political effort in combating transnational crime, 
including the crime of money laundering. A large number of States have become Parties to 
the UN conventions against transnational crime.
81
  States sign and ratify these conventions in 
order to show their commitment to counter transnational crime. In turn, the conventions 
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oblige their State Parties to legislate for new crimes and to cooperate in the suppression of 
these crimes.
82
 The treaty obligations push States to harmonize their domestic criminal laws 
with the provisions set out in the conventions in order to remove frictions caused by the 
differences between national criminal laws in inter-state cooperation against transnational 
crime. Because the violation of treaty obligations often results in serious reputational 
damage,
83
 so most State Parties steadily adjust their AML laws in line with the international 
provisions by, for example, criminalizing money laundering, expanding the category of 





The FATF sets global AML/CFT standards and puts multilateral political pressure on 
countries, especially developing countries, to secure the full implementation of these 
standards.
85
 Although the FATF frames its Recommendations as legally non-binding 
standards and uses “should” rather than “shall”, it has established strong mechanisms to 
ensure compliance from both its members and non-members. The FATF has developed three 
processes to measure the compliance of countries with its Recommendations:
86
 i) annual self-
assessment, in which each member provides information about the implementation of specific 
recommendations for the FATF, then the FATF compiles and analyses the information to 
evaluate the extent of compliance; ii) periodical mutual evaluation, in which each member’s 
legislative and regulatory AML standards are subject to an on-site examination by a FATF 
team and then assessed by the full membership; and iii) the process of publicly identifying 
“high-risk and non-cooperative jurisdictions” (known as “blacklisting” or “naming and 
shaming” campaign). The mutual evaluation reports aim to provide an accurate technical 
assessment of the extent to which the evaluated country has implemented a comprehensive 
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The “blacklisting” campaign has been promoted since 2000. In 2000 and 2001, in 
addition to supervision of its membership, the FATF took the further step of identifying Non-
Cooperative Countries and Territories (NCCTs) that had deficiencies in their AML/CFT legal 
frameworks.
89
 In two rounds of reviews, 47 countries and territories were examined based on 
the 25 NCCT criteria,
90
 and 23 of them were listed in a “blacklist” as NCCTs. Between 2000 
and 2006, the FATF issued an annual report on the progress in the AML/CFT frameworks of 
these jurisdictions.
91
 All of the 23 jurisdictions subsequently made significant progress in 
their AML legislation. The launch of process for NCCTs was highly successful in coercing 
non-FATF members to comply with the FATF recommendations. The last country was 
removed from the list in October 2006.  
Since 2007, the FATF, through the work of the International Co-operation Review Group 
(ICRG), has analysed and identified high-risk jurisdictions, then proposed specific 
rectification action.
92
 The FATF also provides technical assistance and explicitly encourages 
non-members to implement its Recommendations. Countries which retain certain strategic 
AML/CFT deficiencies and have not made sufficient progress in implementing the FATF 
standards are added to a “blacklist” in the annual FATF’s public statements.
93
 In addition, 
economic sanctions can be imposed against any identified non-cooperative non-members by 
requiring other countries to apply specific countermeasures on financial institutions of 
countries concerned with the aim of mitigating risks.
94
 
It is a fact that “blacklisting” can damage the reputation of listed countries and their 
financial intermediaries in the global financial market, and then may cause substantial 
                                                          
87
  The methodology of the assessment has been updated at FATF, above n2. 
88
  FATF (2009), “Memorandum by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Secretariat (2009)”, available at: 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200809/ldselect/ldeucom/132/132we08.htm (accessed 15 
October 2012). 
89
  FATF (2012), “About the Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories (NCCT) Initiative”, available at: 
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/topics/high-riskandnon-cooperativejurisdictions/more/aboutthenon-
cooperativecountriesandterritoriesncctinitiative.html (accessed 12 March 2014). 
90
  See these criteria in FATF, "Report on Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories " at 1-6, available at: 
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Initial%20Report%20on%20NCCTs%2002_2000.pdf 
(accessed 12 March 2014). 
91
  See the reports at FATF, above n89. 
92
  See FATF (2012), “More about the International Co-operation Review Group (ICRG)”, available at: 
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/topics/high-riskandnon-cooperativejurisdictions/more/moreabouttheinternationalco-
operationreviewgroupicrg.html (accessed 12 March 2014). 
93
  See the FATF’s public statements at ibid. 
94
  See FATF, above n26, R19 and INR 19. 
65 
 
economic losses to both government and private sectors.
95
 For instance, “blacklisting” may 
constrict foreign investment, trigger capital flight, and affect the ability to access private 
financial sectors.
96
 Foreign financial institutions may withdraw their business from 
“blacklisted” States or cut ties with their counterparts in “blacklisted” countries rather than 
suffer the taint of involvement with “high-risk” partners.
97
 Despite being criticized,
98
 the 
“blacklisting” regime has worked effectively. Driven by the threat of being “blacklisted”, a 





Other forms of external coercion 
FATF efforts are supplemented by a number of FATF-style regional bodies (such as APG, 
the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force
100
 and the like) and by other international 
organizations (e.g., the IMF and the WB).  
The FATF - style regional bodies (FSRBs) are established from both FATF members and 
non-FATF members. The FATF and FSRBs are free-standing organizations. There is no 
organizational hierarchy between them.
101
 A country may be a member of the FATF and 
member of more than one FSRB.
102
 FSRBs interpret and promote the FATF 
Recommendations that suit their regional characteristics. The FATF-style regional bodies 
also conduct periodical mutual evaluation or review of every member to assess compliance 
with the FATF Recommendations. They apply the FATF assessment criteria and approach to 
their own mutual evaluations on AML systems of the member countries. Normally, the 
periodic mutual evaluation of FSRB-member countries is conducted mainly by the FSRB or 
the FATF (sometimes the WB or the IMF) with the joint participation of or consultation with 
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the other bodies. The FATF and FSRBs can provide, by invitation or request, qualified 
appropriate assessors to participate in each other’s mutual evaluation.
103
 The APG is the 
largest FSRB in the region. Based in Australia, it consists of 41 members (as of May 2014) 
including Vietnam. One of the key functions of the APG is to assess compliance of APG 
members with the AMLSs through a mutual evaluation programme.
104
 
In addition, the FATF has also induced the IMF and the WB to spread the AMLSs.
105
 
These organizations, of which most countries are members, have devoted increasing attention 
to AML as its part of their work on financial integrity. They apply similar assessment 
processes and means used by the FATF in examining the implementation of AMLSs in 
national financial systems. A high degree of compliance with the international AMLSs may 
be a condition for the granting of loans and aid to many countries reliant on those 
organizations.
106
 Thus, coercion is combined with incentives for the compliance of these 
countries. 
 
3.3.2 Diffusion by State Socialization 
 
State socialization or similar concepts (e.g., transnational channels of communication
107
) 
appears to be one of the most accepted mechanisms for the international diffusion of norms. 
Although the concept of State socialization may vary when being applied to different 
contexts,
108
 it usually works in a similar way. To illustrate how the AMLSs are diffused by 
State socialization, this thesis adheres to the concept of State socialization “as a process of 
inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community. Its outcome is sustained 
compliance based on the internalization of these new norms”.
109
 The diffusion of AMLSs 
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Normative persuasion often takes place through dynamic communication in international 
institutions when agents present arguments and try to convince each other of the rightness of 
the norms. Then, agents actively and reflectively internalize the new understanding of 
appropriateness.
111
 This process can occur in sites of mutual evaluation, at the plenary 
meetings of the FATF and the FSRBs, and at conferences, workshop and training sessions.
 112
  
The procedure of mutual evaluation the FATF and its regional affiliations use can be 
described as follows.
113
 It begins with a questionnaire sent to the country reviewed, which is 
to be completed and returned to the assessment team. The assessment team, in their on-site 
visit, carries out interviews with a variety of public officials and private sector representatives 
about AML policy, legislation and statistics. A draft report, that reflects both the achievement 
and inadequacies accompanied with specific suggestions, is presented to the host 
government. The draft report is then discussed in a general session of the plenary meeting. 
After the discussion, the country in question can get feedback about the extent to which it 
satisfies the assessment. The country is expected to provide regular progress reports 
indicating what it has done to fulfil the inadequacies identified. It can be seen that through 
this procedure, the officials of the host country are engaged in the discussion, meetings and 
assessment of the AMLSs. They can then be persuaded to pass and update their AML laws 
after each mutual evaluation review.  
In addition, transnational learning via other channels facilitates normative persuasion. For 
example, governmental officials and employees of private sectors are invited and encouraged 
to participate in AML conferences, seminars and training courses organized by various 
countries, international organizations or private actors. At these events, the participants can 
learn and “draw lessons”
114
 from experts, their counterparts and other countries. They can 
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develop a better understanding about the harms of money laundering, the AMLSs and the 
need for active implementation and conformity with these standards. 
It should be recognized that the boundary of coercion and State socialization is blurred, 
and they may be mingled. In practice, they complement each other. However, the 
combination of coercion and incentive may lead to a superficial compliance with 
international norms, and is insufficient to guarantee a successful legal change at the national 
level.
115
 Society’s acceptance of legal norms is an indispensable precondition for the success 
of national legal change.
116
 This precondition cannot be firmly established by external 
coercion. They must rather be adopted mainly by socialization.
117
     
In brief, the rapid diffusion of AMLSs has resulted from the application of both 
mechanisms. The fear of reputational damage and sanctions and the State socialization 
pushes countries to implement and comply with the international AMLSs. Nonetheless, to the 
extent to which a State complies with the AMLSs is a matter of State choice,
118
 and depends 
on how compatible the standards are with national particularities, for instance the political, 
economic and legal structure.
119
 Further, the persuasiveness of the AMLSs and public 




3.4 Vietnam’s Responses to the Diffusion of International AMLSs 
 
The thesis now looks at how Vietnam has been coerced and persuaded to implement and 
comply with the international AMLSs and asks what choice does Vietnam have? It will point 
out that under external coercion and State socialization, Vietnam does not have much choice, 
but rather is compelled to gradually implement and comply with the international AMLSs. 
This is unlikely to lead to implementation in fact rather than just in “books”. 
 
                                                          
115
  Michael Kubiciel, “International Legal Development and National Legal Change in the Fight against 
Corruption” in David K. Linnan (ed) Legitimacy Legal Development and Change: Law and Modernization 
Reconsidered (Ashgate Publishing Limited, Farnham, 2012) at 427. 
116
  Ibid. 
117
  Kubiciel, above n115. 
118
  Peter M. Haas, “Choosing to Comply: Theorizing from International Relations and Comparative Politics” in 
Dinah Shelton (ed) Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-Binding Norms in the International 
Legal System (Oxford University Press, 2000) at 64. 
119
  Simmons, above n83, at 279. 
120
  In Kubiciel, above n115, the author argues that national legal change, especially in criminal law, cannot be 
enforced. Law must have a connection with the morality and the ethical consensus of a society. The legal 




3.4.1 Vietnam under External Coercion  
 
As a State Party to the 1988 Vienna Convention, UNCAC, the Palermo Convention and the 
2004 ASEAN Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance on Criminal Matters, and a member of the 
APG, Vietnam is legally obliged to adopt numerous international standards against 




An on-site evaluation of Vietnam by the APG in 2008 revealed substantial inadequacies in 
Vietnam’s AML legal framework.
122
 APG’s mutual evaluation and the FATF’s “blacklisting” 
of Vietnam in 2011, 2012 and 2013 have intensified the pressure on Vietnam to implement 
fully the international AMLSs.  
Furthermore, in order to promote economic expansion, Vietnam has strengthened the 
relationship with various international financial organizations, including the IMF and the 
WB. Vietnam’s financial institutions are aware that they should meet the international 
regulatory standards, including AMLSs, in order to receive international support and to 
integrate into the global financial market. For instance, the IMF and the WB have worked 
closely with the Vietnamese government not only to provide loans and financial aid but also 
to establish a strong policy and a legal framework in the financial sector.
123
 They are among 
the international organizations which have urged Vietnam to formulate comprehensive AML 
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 In fact, the lack of competent AML laws may prevent Vietnam from 




3.4.2 Vietnam and State Socialization of the AML Standards 
 
Vietnam’s government and Vietnam’s legal enforcement agencies have been active 
members at different ASEAN’s forums, such as the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on 
Transnational Crime (AMMTC) and ASEANPOL meetings. In addition, Vietnam is a 
member country of the APG. Socialization of the AMLSs has occurred through 
communication at various sites, such as at APG plenary meetings, annual APG Typology 
Workshops, AMMTC, INTERPOL or ASEANPOL meetings,
126




It is noteworthy, for example, that from 2007 – 2011, the project “VNMS65 - 
Strengthening of the Legal and Law Enforcement Institutions in Preventing and Combating 
Money Laundering in Viet Nam”, funded and managed by the United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime (UNODC Vietnam Country Office) in cooperation with the Vietnamese 
counterpart agencies, was undertaken.
128
 This project significantly strengthened the capacity 
of Vietnam’s law enforcement agencies, prosecutorial agencies and other criminal justice 
institutions as well as civil society in response to money laundering.
129
 The project organized 
various international study visits to the key countries and regions in the global AML regime, 
including the UK, the US, Philippines and Hong Kong.
130
 Vietnamese officials also 
participated in regional meetings, such as APG’s typologies workshops, APG annual 
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meetings and regional training courses. Two thousand public officials participated in sixty 
training courses about AML which were delivered by both international and domestic 
experts.
131
 In addition, several other public officials were invited to participate in different 
regional and international AML-related workshops and conferences. The participants gained 
a better understanding of money laundering typologies, the AMLSs and their implementation 
in some particular developed countries. Lessons drawn from these events are believed to be 
beneficial to Vietnam’s AML system.  
To sum up, the fact that Vietnam has gradually implemented the AMLSs suggests the 
successful culmination of external coercive imposition and State socialization. As a result, 
Vietnam has been removed from the FATF’s “blacklist” since February 2014.
132
 
Nevertheless, deficiencies in the Vietnamese AML legal framework still exist and Vietnam 
needs to do much more work to attain a high level of compliance with the AMLSs. The 
following chapters will reveal these deficiencies in detail and suggest the remedies to the 
current situation of Vietnam.  
 
3.5 General Contextual Factors of Vietnam Influencing the Implementation of 
AMLSs 
 
Among various factors affecting the implementation and compliance with international 
agreements within a country, the internal factors of the country itself are the central ones.
133
  
The fundamental internal factors include the political institutions, economy, legal system, and 
administrative capacity.
134
 It is argued that “while States may wish to comply, not all are 
capable. Technical and political factors intervene in the choice to comply”.
135
 This section 
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will briefly examine the political factors (the political willingness in AML), the legal 
characters and institutional AML structures of Vietnam that have profound influence on the 
implementation and compliance with the AMLSs. It will argue that in Vietnam, one of the 
determining factors is the political willingness of the Communist Party in fighting money 
laundering. 
 
3.5.1 Political Willingness 
 
The Socialist Republic of Vietnam is a highly centralized State. Since the reunification of 
Vietnam in 1975, the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) has held a tight grip on most 
aspects of economic and political life in Vietnam. Supreme policy-making power resides in 
the CPV, more particularly, its Politburo and Central Committee. Despite the demise of the 
Soviet Union and the collapse of the socialist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe, 
Vietnam insists on retaining its socialist political regime headed exclusively by the 
Communist Party. The role of the CPV is stipulated, in the Constitution of the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam136 and the Statue of the Vietnamese Communist Party, as the leadership 
of the State and society.
137
 
The process of making, interpreting and adopting crucial policies has to comply strictly 
with the CPV’s initiatives, and is supervised closely by the CPV’s bodies. In terms of the 
fight against crime, the CPV usually, based on the actual and potential crimes in a certain 
period, updates and issues its directives on preventing and combating crimes.
138
 In particular, 
the CPV has a prerogative to oversee the anti-corruption regime.
139
 Hence, political 
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willingness is undoubtedly one of the determining factors in the establishment and the 
implementation of AMLSs. The establishment of a National Anti-Money Laundering 
Steering Committee (2009) chaired by a Deputy Prime Minister, which assists the Prime 
Minister to instruct, enhance and supervise the coordination of relevant ministerial agencies 
in AML, has shown a political commitment to the fight against AML.
140
 In fact, the 
government might be persuaded to make the commitment, but it remains to be seen whether 
the commitment is genuine and whether the country is sufficiently convinced to ensure an 
effective implementation. 
It appears that Vietnam still lacks a genuine political will in regard to AML, which results 
in a reluctance to implement and adopt AMLSs in practice. One of the main reasons for this 
could be that corruption in Vietnam is massive in both the public and private sector.
141
 As 
noted earlier, corruption and money laundering are related and self-reinforcing phenomena.
142
 
Corrupt officials certainly do not want to implement and enforce AML countermeasures. 
Corruption undermines the political willingness to fight money laundering illustrated by the 
adoption of AML laws. Corruption in AML institutions, for example in institutional financial 
regulators, policy makers and law enforcement agencies, may hinder the actual 




3.5.2 The Legal System 
 
Vietnam’s legal system has developed primarily under a process of legal borrowing and 
adaptation of foreign laws derived from China, France, the former Soviet Union, and recently 
from some Western countries.
144
 Under the expansion of “Doi moi” in the last 20 years, 
Vietnam has undertaken a vigorous process of legal reform in response to the emerging 
economic, political and social phenomena. Nonetheless, thousands of legal documents, 
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pragmatically enacted in such a short time, have created a complex and interwoven web of 
laws which is notorious for its vagueness, disorder and inconsistency.  
Similar to other civil law systems, e.g., French civil law,
145
 the main source of Vietnam’s 
contemporary laws is written legislation. The hierarchy of legal norms (known as “legal 
documents”) is “Hien phap” (constitutional laws), “luat” (laws), “phap lenh” (ordinances), 
“nghi dinh” (decrees or government regulations) and “thong tu” (circulars). The hierarchy of 
legal documents parallels the administrative hierarchy of issuing bodies in the structure of the 
political system (see Table 1). Stare decisis does not apply in Vietnam. The general principles 
of the application of laws are: a specific law overrules a general law and a higher legal source 
overrules a lower one.  Normally, while higher ranking legal documents set out more general 
norms, lower ones provide details or instructions for implementing the higher ones. For 
example, “thong tu” (circulars) provide instructions, issued by relevant ministerial bodies, on 
how to interpret, apply and enforce new laws.  
The disparate pieces of Vietnamese written legislation have an insufficient unity, and 
cannot be regarded as coherent bodies of codified law like those in France or Germany. 
Further, the influence of socialist law makes the contemporary Vietnamese legal system 
distinct from the civil law tradition.
146
 In essence, the contemporary Vietnamese legal system, 
especially criminal law, still exhibits several persistent fundamentals of “socialist legality”
147
 
which originated from the former Soviet Union, for example, the supremacy of the CPV over 
the process of making and enforcing laws. Vietnam adopts the unitary State under the Soviet 
principle of democratic centralism (“tap trung dan chu”),
148
 in which legislative, executive 
and judicial functions are not separate.  All State power is centralized in one supreme State 
organ - the unicameral National Assembly, which then delegates power to lower organs.
149
 
The Government, supported by local People’s Committees, performs executive functions but 
is accountable to the National Assembly.
150
 The Supreme People's Court, the local People's 
Courts, the Military Tribunals and the other tribunals established by law are the judicial 
organs.
151
 The People’s Procuracy supervises the obedience to the law, exercises the right of 
                                                          
145
  See Eva Steiner, French Law: A Comparative Approach (1
st
 ed, Oxford University Press, 2010) at 3-14. 
146
  John Quigley, “Socialist Law and the Civil Law Tradition” (1989) 37 The American Journal of Comparative 
Law 781. 
147
  Gillespie, above n144, at 75–77. 
148
  Ibid. 
149
  Constitution of Socialist Republic of Vietnam, above n136, article 69. 
150
  Ibid, article 94. 
151
  Ibid, article 102. 
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public prosecution and ensures a consistent implementation of laws.
152
 Both the Supreme 




Enacting Body Type of Legal Document  
National Assembly 
 
The Constitution, Laws (including Codes) 
and Resolutions 
Standing Committee of the National 
Assembly 
Ordinances and Resolutions 
The Government Decrees, Regulations and Resolutions 
The Prime Minister Decisions and Directives 
Ministerial Bodies Circulars 
Ministers Decisions 




These general characteristics of the Vietnamese legal system show that the Vietnamese 
legal framework for AML is likely to consist of scattered legal documents provided for by 
different authorized agencies. In addition, AML-related laws enacted by the National 
Assembly can be adopted fully only if the relevant sub-laws (e.g., Government Decrees or 
Circulars) are produced.  
 
3.5.3 The Integration of International Treaties into Domestic Laws 
 
The status of international treaties in Vietnam’s domestic laws is as follows:
155
 i) when it 
comes to regulations on the same matter, if there is a difference between the relevant 
domestic legal documents and related treaty provisions to which Vietnam is a Party, the 
treaty provisions shall prevail; ii) the promulgation of national legal documents must ensure 
that they shall not obstruct the implementation of relevant treaties to which Vietnam is a 
Party; and iii) the authorized bodies, when deciding ratification (the National Assembly or the 
                                                          
152
  Ibid, article 107. 
153
 Ibid, article 70. 
154
 See Luat Ban hanh van ban quy pham phap luat [Law on the Promulgation of Legal Documents] (Vietnam) 
Law No. 17/2008/QH12, 30 June 2008, entered into force 1 January 2009, article 2. 
155
  Luat Ky Ket, Gia nhap va Thuc Hien Dieu Uoc Quoc Te [Law on the Conclusion, Accession to and 
Implementation of International Treaties] (Vietnam) Law No. 41/2005/QH11, 14 June 2005, entered into 
force 1 January 2006, article 6. 
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State President) or approval (the Government) of a treaty, shall decide the extent of treaty 
implementation (wholly or partly) based on its compatibility with domestic legislation. These 
bodies also decide or propose to amend and supplement domestic laws to facilitate the 
implementation of the treaty. Thus, while at a first glance transformation of the international 
standards looks strong, in fact the formal ratification of the AML-related treaties does not 
ensure that adequate implementation and effective enforcement follows, because of the 
confused structure of the implementing laws and the potentially diluting effect of poor 
interpretation (or failure to interpret) by authorised bodies.  
 
3.5.4 Institutional Structure in AML 
 
Under the current structure of the political system, various governmental institutions have 
responsibility for and authority over AML.
156
 The pivotal ones are: the SBV, to which the 
Anti-Money Laundering Department (AMLD, which functions as a FIU) is affiliated;
157
 and 
the Ministry of Public Security (MPS). Other related ministries, ministerial agencies and local 
People’s Committees are obliged to cooperate with these institutions in combating money 
laundering. 
The SBV acts as the leading agency in cooperation with other relevant agencies against 
money laundering. It is responsible for reviewing the effectiveness of the AML system in 
Vietnam and making proposals to the Government for strategic resolutions for AML.
158
 The 
AMLD has the function of receiving, processing and disseminating information concerning 
money laundering. The AMLD has the right to request concerned agencies to provide 
information and records of suspicious transactions.  
The MPS, to which the police belong, is a powerful law enforcement agency which has an 
overarching responsibility for combating money laundering.
159
 The MPS’s main 
responsibilities for AML are to organize the investigation of money laundering-related crimes 
and to cooperate with other agencies in conducting the investigations of such crimes.
160
 It 
also works closely with the People’s Procuracy and the People’s Court in investigating, 
                                                          
156
  Luat Phong, Chong Rua Tien [Law on Prevention and Suppression of Money Laundering] (Vietnam) Law 
No. 07/2012/QH13, 18 June 2012, entered into force 1 January 2013, chapter III. 
157
  Chinh Phu, “Nghi Dinh Quy Dinh Chuc Nang, Nhiem Vu, Quyen Han va Co Cau To Chuc Cua Ngan Hang 
Nha Nuoc Viet Nam" [Goverment, Decree on  Defining the Functions, Tasks, Authorities and Structure of 
the State Bank of Vietnam] No. 156/2013/NĐ-CP (Viet Nam), 11 November 2013 , article 2. 
158
  Law on Prevention and Suppression of Money Laundering, above n156, article 37. 
159
  Ibid, article 38. 
160
  Ibid. 
77 
 
prosecuting and sentencing money laundering-related crimes. The MPS has a complex 
structure consisting of a number of general departments and departments responsible for 
various missions. Under the current arrangements, there is no specialized department in 
charge of investigating money laundering crimes. Most of the departments involved in 
preventing and combating crimes can undertake the investigation of money laundering 
crimes. The major ones are: the Department of Economic Crimes Investigation, the 
Department of Drug Crimes Investigation, the Department of Cyber Crimes Investigation and 
some other security departments. Unfortunately, these Departments all lack staff skilled in 
investigating money laundering.
161
 The absence of a specialized authority in investigating 




The international AMLSs have been developed and diffused rapidly in the last two 
decades. The diffusion of the AMLSs and States’ choice of the implementation and 
compliance with these standards is the outcome of two key mechanisms: coercion (from the 
powerful economies and international institutions) and State socialization (through tactical 
communication). Developing countries, like Vietnam, have implemented the international 
AMLSs under pressure from other States and international organizations rather than on a 
voluntary basis.
162
 Under the mechanisms of coercion and State socialization, Vietnam has 
gradually transformed the AMLSs into its domestic laws in order to avoid economic 
sanctions and reputational damages. Although Vietnam has been removed from the FATF’s 
“blacklist”, significant deficiencies remain in its AML legal framework. Legal reform needs 
to be continued to enhance the compliance with the international AMLSs.  
Vietnam has its own political, ecomnomic and legislative and other internal factors that 
shape the implementation of the AMLSs. These contextual factors are argued to dilute the 
implementation in fact of the AMLSs. In addition, proposals for legal changes in the 
following chapters must take these factors into account.  
 
                                                          
161
  A large number of the authorized police and law enforcement staff have not been provided with any formal 
courses in the investigation and prosecution of money laundering crimes. A small number of them have been 
trained in short courses sponsored by international organizations (e.g., the United Nations Office on Drugs 
and Crime (UNODC)) and foreign States. 
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  This argument is also supported by J.C. Sharman, “Power and Discourse in Policy Diffusion: Anti-Money 
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In theory, States criminalize certain conduct by setting out, preferably in advance and in 
clear terms, a catalogue of specified actions or omissions (the actus reus) that are prohibited, 
accompanied by ranges of sanctions for violation.
1
 In general, conduct is deemed to be 
criminalized when i) it is morally wrongful, and ii) it satisfies a properly defined “Harm 
                                                          
1
  A P Simester and Andreas von Hirsch, Crimes, Harms and Wrongs: On the Principles of Criminalisation 
(Hart Publishing Ltd, 2011) at 3. 
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Principle” or “Offence Principle”.
2
 The specification of prohibition should include 
appropriate culpability elements (the mens rea), high standards of proof and proportionate 
sanction.
3
 The discussion in chapter 2 has revealed that the harms of money laundering 
clearly justify its criminalization in all States, including Vietnam. 
Money laundering was first made a criminal offence in the United States (US) in 1986.
4
 
The criminalization of money laundering was believed to be the necessary legal basis for US 
law enforcement agencies to deter, detect and prosecute launderers directly; to forfeit the 
property involved in money laundering;
5




Most States have now criminalized money laundering.
7
 What is more, the international 
community is encouraging and/or pushing States to criminalize money laundering in a similar 
way (i.e. with a similar set of constituent elements) in order to promote international 
cooperation in preventing, detecting and prosecuting transnational money laundering 
offences. The global criminalization of money laundering is considered to be a fundamental 
basis for other aspects of international cooperation in AML, such as mutual legal assistance 
and extradition for transnational money laundering offences.
8
 In response, the international 
                                                          
2
   In ibid, at 92, it is argued that under the Offence Principle, the offensive conduct also involves some form of 
harm.  
3
  Ibid, at 3. 
4
  The criminalization of a category of activities, known as money laundering, was first provided for in the 
Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 (MLCA). Section 1352 of the MLCA referred to “New offense for 
laundering of money instruments”, which was codified at 18 USC § 1956 (“Laundering of monetary 
instruments”) and § 1957 (“Engaging in monetary transactions in property derived from specified unlawful 
activity”). See Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, Pub L No 99-570, §§ 1351-1367, 1986 (United 
States), 100 Stat. 3207 (this Act was Subtitle H of Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub L No 99-570, 1986 
(The United States), 100 Stat. 3207).  
5
  Forfeiture of the property involved in money laundering under US law will be illustrated in chapter 6. 
6
  As noted in chapter 3, the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act of 1970, Pub L No 91-508, 
1970 (The United States), 84 Stat. 1118 (BSA) marked the first action taken by the US against money 
laundering. However, the US authorities realized that the BSA was insufficient to prevent criminals from 
laundering the proceeds of their crimes. The law enforcement agencies needed other more powerful legal 
instruments to prevent, detect and prosecute launderers. As a result, the MLCA was enacted to strengthen the 
BSA by imposing a more coercive reporting duty on individuals. This Act filled the shortcomings of the 
BSA by providing, for example, in section 1354 about “Structuring transaction to evade reporting 
requirements prohibited” (codified at 31 USC § 5324), and section 1358 about “Money transaction reporting 
amendments” (codified as amended at 31 USC§ 5316). See more in Mark R. Irvine and Daniel R. King, 
“The Money Laundering Control Act of 1986: Tainted Money and the Criminal Defense Lawyer” (1987) 19 
Pacific Law Journal 171 at 172-173; and U.S. v. Anzalone, 766 F.2d 676 (1st Cir. 1985). 
7
  See the “Comparative Table” in United States Department of State, "International Narcotics Control 
Strategy Report (INCSR): Volume II Money Laundering and Financial Crimes" (March 2014) at 40-50, 
available at: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/222880.pdf (accessed 10 April 2014). 
8
  These issues will be discussed in chapter 7 and 8. 
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community has set up the international standards regarding the criminalization of money 
laundering, and required States to implement those standards. This prompts a number of 
questions: how have different States criminalized money laundering? Particularly, how has 
Vietnam implemented the criminalization of money laundering? Are the legal adjustments it 
has made sufficient? And has Vietnam criminalized money laundering in a way that is 
consistent with its basic criminal law principles or in a way that suggests that it seeks only to 
please the international community? These questions will be answered in this chapter. 
As there is no money laundering offence without predicate offences, so the criminalization 
of money laundering is associated with the category of predicate offences. The chapter will 
first examine the classification of predicate offences provided for in international law and 
national laws. It will then explore the international provisions of the main constituent 
elements of money laundering offences, and disparities among national criminalization of 
money laundering. Finally, it will scrutinize how Vietnam, subject to its own fundamental 
criminal law principles, has criminalized money laundering, and will suggest how Vietnam 
should remedy the obvious loopholes and weaknesses in its criminalisation. 
 
4.2 Predicate offences 
 
The scope of predicate offences has been extended since money laundering was first 
criminalized. The 1988 Vienna Convention was the first international convention binding its 
State Parties to criminalize forms of conduct that are, in essence, money laundering activities 
(the term “money laundering” or “laundering” was not used). The predicate offences 
designated in this convention cover solely drug supply-related offences.
9
 After that, in 1996, 
the FATF recommended that each country should extend the scope of predicate offences for 
money laundering to serious offences, and that each country should determine which serious 
crimes are to be categorized as predicate offences.
10
 However, the 1996 FATF 
Recommendations did not provide any specific guidance about categories of serious offences. 
In 2000, the Palermo Convention also required its State Parties to include a range of offences 
                                                          
9
  United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 20 
December 1988, 1582 UNTS 95, entered into force 11 November 199023, article 3(1)(b). 
10
  FATF (1996), “The Forty Recommendations”, available at: http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF%20Recommendations%201996.pdf (accessed 
24 May 2013), Recommendation 4 (R4). 
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associated with organized criminal groups and all serious crimes as predicate offences.
11
 The 
Convention defines a serious offence as an offence punishable by a maximum deprivation of 
liberty of at least four years or a more serious penalty.
12
 In even greater detail and with more 
flexibility, the 2012 FATF Recommendations encourage countries to apply the predicate 
offences to all serious offences, or to a threshold linked either to a category of serious 
offences, or to the penalty of imprisonment, or to a list of predicate offences, or combination 
of these approaches.
13
 The “designated categories of offences” are recommended by the 
FATF as a minimum range of offences that should be included in the category of predicate 
offences of each country. They are: participation in an organized criminal group and 
racketeering, terrorism (including terrorist financing), trafficking human beings and migrant 
smuggling, illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, corruption and 
bribery, to name a few.
14
 
Furthermore, the scope of predicate offences has been extended beyond the domestic 
jurisdiction to fulfil the global dimension of the AMLSs. The Palermo Convention and the 
UNCAC stipulate that “predicate offences shall include offences committed both within and 
outside the jurisdiction of the State Party in question”.
15
 The FATF also recommends that 
predicate offences should include offences committed in another country.
16
 The US has 




By examining the designation of the categories of predicate offences in different States 
with different legal systems, we can see that it appears to follow one of four distinct models. 
The first model encompasses all criminal offences as predicate offences, the so-called “all 
                                                          
11
  United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime, 15 November 2000, 2225 UNTS 209, 
entered into force 29 September 200324, article 6(2)(b). 
12
  Ibid, article 2(b). 
13
  FATF (2012), “International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism & 
Proliferation - the FATF Recommendations”, available at: http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF_Recommendations.pdf (accessed 22 May 
2014), Interpretive Note to Recommendation 3 (INR 3). 
14
  Designated categories of offences are defined and listed by the FATF. See FATF, "The FATF 
Recommendations - Glossary" at 112-113, available at: http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF_Recommendations.pdf (accessed 21 July 
2013). 
15
  Palermo Convention, above n11, article 6(2)(c); and 1988 Vienna Convention, above n9, article 23(2)(c). 
16
  See Recommendation (R) 3 of FATF, above n13; and the definition of “designated categories of offences” in 
FATF, above n14. 
17
  18 USC § 1956(c)(7)(B)(iv). 
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crimes” approach, adopted, for example, by Russia and the UK.
18
 All crimes listed in the 
Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (2003), with the exception of six trivial crimes, are 
predicate crimes for money laundering.
19
 The second model covers the offences with a 
threshold of specified certain standards (such as the degree of sanction or the size of 
proceeds). For example, in Australia, predicate offences are all indictable offences.
20
 Under 
Australian law, an indictable offence is one with a penalty of a minimum of 12 months 
imprisonment. The third model refers to a specific list of predicate offences, the model used, 
for instance, in the US.
21
 The last one is the mixture of the second and the third model used, 
for example, in Germany. The predicate offences for money laundering in Germany cover all 




4.3 International Standards of the Criminalization of Money Laundering and the 
Differences in National Implementation 
 
The suppression conventions, such as the 1988 Vienna Convention,
23
 the Palermo 
Convention
24
 and the UNCAC,
25
 and the FATF Recommendations provide international 
standards for the criminalization of money laundering. It should be noted that these 
                                                          
18
  See Proceeds of Crimes Act 2002 (the United Kingdom), section 340(2). 
19
  Article 174(1) of the Criminal Code of the Russian Criminal Code provides that “[t]he conduct of financial 
operations and other transactions with monetary assets or other property known to have been acquired by 
other persons by criminal means (with the exception of the crimes envisioned in Articles 193, 194, 198, 199, 
199.1, and 199.2 of this Code), for the purpose of giving a legitimate appearance to the possession, use, and 
disposition of the stated monetary assets or other property shall be punished by a fine in the amount of up to 
120,000 Rubles or in the amount of the salary or other income of the convicted person for a period of up to 
one year”. See English translation of the Criminal Code of Russian Federation (amended by the end of 2003) 
in Sarah J. Reynolds, “The "New" Criminal Code of the Russian Federation” (2003) 39(4) Statutes & 
Decisions: The Laws of the USSR and Its Successor States 20 at 35-36. 
20
  Criminal Code Act 1995 (consolidated as of 31 October 2012)  (Australia), Division 400.1(1) 
21
  Predicate offences for money laundering cover the designated federal, state and foreign crimes. Around 250 
predicate offences are listed in 18 USC § 1956(c)(7) and include all of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organization (RICO) predicate offences listed in 18 USC § 1961(1). 
22
  Section 261(1) of the German Criminal Code (2009) states that “[w]hosoever hides an object which is a 
proceed of an unlawful act listed in the 2
nd
 sentence below, conceals its origin or obstructs or endangers the 
investigation of its origin, its being found, its confiscation, its deprivation or its being officially secured shall 
be liable to imprisonment from three months to five years. Unlawful acts within the meaning of the 1st 
sentence shall be 1) felonies; 2) misdemeanours under…”. See “German Criminal Code (English Translation 
by Prof. Dr. Michael Bohlander)” (2009), available at: http://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/englisch_stgb/german_criminal_code.pdf (accessed 12 December 2012). 
23
  1988 Vienna Convention, above n9, article 3(1)(b). 
24
  Palermo Convention, above n11, article 6. 
25
  United Nations Convention against Corruption, 31 October 2003, 2349 UNTS 41, entered into force 14 
December 2005, article 23. 
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conventions and recommendations mesh with each other to set up the elements of money 
laundering offences. This suggests a concerted effort by different international organizations 
to ensure that they do not produce conflicting obligations to criminalize money laundering. 
The conventions and the FATF Recommendations call for their States Parties and member 
countries, subject to their own legal systems, to criminalize money laundering in compliance 
with the international standards.
26
  
Although each State is obliged to criminalize the conduct provided for in the conventions, 
its criminalization “rests upon an assumption about the legitimate political, social and 
economic interests, and assertions about the harm caused to these interests by the conduct 
criminalized”.
27
 Furthermore, basic principles of national criminal law will shape the detailed 
elements of the criminalization, such as the actus reus, the mens rea and punishment. How 
the international conventions provide these elements and how States have criminalized 
money laundering in their own ways is examined hereafter. 
 
4.3.1 The Actus Reus/Physical Element  
 
At the international level, the first description of the conduct elements of money 
laundering offences was spelled out in the 1988 Vienna Convention.
28
 The conduct elements 
of money laundering offences are also set out in identical terms in article 6(1) of the Palermo 
Convention and in article 23(1) of UNCAC as follows: 
 
(a) (i) The conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property is the proceeds of crime, for the 
purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the property or of helping any person who is 
involved in the commission of the predicate offence to evade the legal consequences of his or her action; 
(ii) The concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, disposition movement or ownership 
of or rights with respect to property, knowing that such property is the proceeds of crime; 
     (b) Subject to the basic concept of its legal system: 
(i) The acquisition, possession or use of property, knowing, at the time of receipt, that such property is 
the proceeds of crime. 
(ii) Participation in, association with or conspiracy to commit, attempts to commit and aiding, abetting, 
facilitating and counselling the commission of any of the offences established in accordance with this 
article. 
                                                          
26
  See R3 and INR 3 of FATF, above n13. 
27
  Neil Boister, “‘Transnational Criminal Law’?” (2003) 14(5) European Journal of International Law 953 at 
957. 
28
  1988 Vienna Convention, above n9, article 3(1)(b). 
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In general, these conventions call for their States Parties to criminalize the four listed 
categories of activities in accordance with their domestic law.  
 
Conversion or transfer of the proceeds of crime for the purpose of concealing or 
disguising these proceeds  
These acts include instances in which properties are converted from one form to another, 
for example, by using illegally generated cash to purchase real estate or the sale of illegally 
acquired real estate; or instances in which the same properties are moved from one person to 
another, from one jurisdiction to another or from one bank account to another.
29
 
There are differences in the ways States have made these acts criminal offences. The UK 
uses the same wording as the international provisions - “convert” and “transfer” - to 
criminalize this act in the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002.
30
 The US includes these acts in the 
broad concept of “financial transaction” which may involve the transfer of title to any real 
property, vehicle, vessel, or aircraft; involve the use of financial institutions; or involve the 
physical transportation of funds.
31
 “Transaction” refers to “a purchase, sale, loan, pledge, gift, 
transfer, delivery, or other disposition”; and, if involving a financial institution, refers to “a 
deposit, withdrawal, transfer between accounts, exchange of currency, loan, extension of 
credit, purchase or sale of any stock, bond, certificate of deposit, or other monetary 
instrument, use of a safe deposit box, or any other payment, transfer, or delivery by, through, 
or to a financial institution”.
32
 It should be stressed that in order for a transaction to constitute 
the actus reus of the money laundering offence, it must be intended to conceal or disguise the 
nature, the location, the source, the ownership or the control of criminal proceeds; or to avoid 
a transaction reporting requirement.
33
 
Germany does not explicitly criminalize the “conversion or transfer” of criminal proceeds. 
Section 261(1) of the German Criminal Code provides the act of “hiding” an object which is 
derived from a predicate offence.
34
 In the Russian Criminal Code, “conversion or transfer” is 
                                                          
29
  UNODC (2004), "Legislative Guides for the Implementation of the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols thereto" at 44, available at: 
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/legislative_guides/Legislative%20guides_Full%20version.pdf (accessed 21 
April 2013). 
30
  POCA, above n18, section 327(1)(c) and (d). 
31
  Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, above n4, section 1956(c)(4). 
32
  Ibid, section 1956(c)(3). 
33
  Ibid, section 1956(a)(1)(B). In US v. Regalado Cuellar, 128 S. Ct. 1994 (2008), the court’s decision caused a 
great deal of controversy, since it was based on the mere fact that Mr Cuellar was transporting the money 
earned from the illegal drug business across border as evidence of money laundering.  
34
  German Criminal Code (English Translation by Prof. Dr. Michael Bohlander), above n22. 
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covered by the phrase: “accomplishment of financial operations and other deals in monetary 
funds or other property”.
35
 “Financial operation” is defined as an action to set up, change or 




Concealment or disguise of the proceeds of crime 
This type of money laundering acts includes the concealment or disguise of almost any 
aspect of or information about property.
37
 In addition, the terms “concealing or disguising” 
and “concealment or disguise” should be understood to include preventing the discovery of 
the illicit origins of property.
38
 It is clear that the purposes of “concealment or disguise” and 
“conversion or transfer” overlap to a certain extent.
39
 Both of them may have the effect of 
concealing and disguising the origins of property. The other purpose of “conversion or 
transfer” is helping “any person who is involved in the commission of the predicate offence 
to evade the legal consequences of his or her action”. The text uses the term “any person” 
instead of “any other person”, thus “any person” is apt to include the offender himself.
40
 
Nevertheless, in many cases, the act of “concealment or disguise” serves both purposes. For 
example, the criminal origin of the property would be disguised to reduce the possibilities of 
its confiscation and the offender’s conviction.
41
  
Some States, such as the UK and Germany,
42
 follow the same language when 
criminalizing such acts. Others have adopted these money laundering offences with a 
different wording. The phrase used by Russia, which includes “concealment or disguise”, is 
“for purpose of giving a legitimate appearance to criminal proceeds”.
43
 
                                                          
35
  Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (English translation)  (2003), article 174(1). 
36
  FATF, "Mutual Evaluation Report Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism: 
Russian Federation " at 33, available at: http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer/MER%20Russia%20ful.pdf (accessed 17 March 2014). 
37
  UNODC, above n29. 
38
  United Nations (2000), "Interpretative Notes for the Official Records (travaux préparatoires) of the 
Negotiation of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols 
thereto" at par. 11,  available at: http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/final_instruments/383a1e.pdf (accessed 30 
April 2013). 
39
  United Nations (1998), "Commentary on the United Nations Convention Agaist Illicit Traffic in Narcotic 
Drugs and Psychotrophic Sustances 1988" at pars. 3.47 and 3.50,  available at: 
http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/organized_crime/Drug%20Convention/Commentary_on_the_unite
d_nations_convention_1988_E.pdf (accessed 28 April 2013). 
40
  Ibid, par 3.49. 
41
  Ibid. 
42
  See POCA, above n18, section 327(1)(a)(b); and German Criminal Code (English Translation by Prof. Dr. 
Michael Bohlander), above n22, section 261(1). 
43
  Russian Criminal Code, above n35, section 174(1). 
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Acquisition, possession or use of the proceeds of crime 
This category of conduct is the mirror image of the acts of “conversion or transfer”. The 
former is an act of recipients who acquire, possess or use property, while the latter is an act of 
the providers of property.
44
 According to Black’s Law Dictionary, “acquisition” means “the 
gaining of possession or control over something”,
45
 and “possession” means “the fact of 
having or holding property in one’s power; the exercise of dominion over property”.
46
 
Acquisition of property refers to the process of obtaining anything by any means, such as 
purchase or donation.  
Noticeably, the suppression conventions provide that the implementation of these acts in 
each State Party is subject to the basic concept of its legal system.
47
 It means that State 
Parties can criminalize these acts in their own ways adhering to their legal principles. The 
UK, in article 329 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, uses the same language as the 
international convention. Article 175 of the Russian Criminal Code makes the “acquisition or 
sale” of property obtained by criminal means a criminal offence. Article 261(2) of the 
German Criminal Code states that whoever “procures”, “keeps” or “use” an object derived 
from a criminal activity shall be liable to imprisonment.  
 
Participation in, association with or conspiracy to commit, attempt to commit and aiding, 
abetting, facilitating and counselling the commission of any of the foregoing acts.  
These terms are not defined in any convention. It means that State Parties are given certain 
flexibility, subject to the basic concepts of their legal systems, to adopt such inchoate 
offences in a way they consider appropriate to their domestic law. In fact, different national 
criminal laws may conceptualize inchoate offences differently.
48
 For example, the inchoate 
crime of conspiracy defined by the UK’s criminal law differs from that defined by the 
German criminal law,
49
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4.3.2 The Mens Rea/Mental Element 
 
Article 3(3) of the 1988 Vienna Convention, article 6(2)(f) of the Palermo Convention and 
the INR 3 of the 2012 FATF Recommendations have provided the mens rea of money 
laundering offences with two central elements: the intent to commit the conduct elements of 
money laundering offences (the “intent” element), and knowing that the property is derived 
from the predicate offences or from an act of participating in such activities (known as the 
“knowledge” element). These elements are stipulated in the international texts by using the 
adverb “intentionally” and “knowing that”. The “knowledge” or “intent” element may be 
proven by direct evidence, or inferred from the surrounding circumstances and objective 
factual circumstances, such as the time and place of the offence and motive of the culprit.  
In many jurisdictions, however, the burden of proving these elements in money laundering 
trials has become onerous and has caused a great deal of controversy. In the circumstances, 
when defendants are third parties (i.e. the criminal proceeds are laundered by persons who are 
not involved in the commission of the predicate offence), proving “intent” and “knowledge” 
is a great challenge for prosecutors. For example, if  advanced and complicated money 
laundering typologies, such as the extensive use of shell companies or cyber laundering, are 
used to hide the trails of criminal proceeds, it is very difficult for a prosecutor to prove the 
illicit root of property as well as the “knowledge” of the defendant (as a third party) about 
this illicit root. This also leads to difficulties in proving the degree of “intent” because most 
defendants will try to deny “knowledge” and “intent”.  
In practice, a number of States have facilitated the prosecution of money laundering 
offences by simplifying what the prosecution is required to prove. They have softened the 
requirement of “knowledge” in various ways. For example, in the US, the prosecutors have 
only to prove that the defendant knew that the property represents the proceeds of “some 
form of unlawful activity”. They need not prove that the defendant knew what “specified 
unlawful activity” generated the proceeds.
50
 Additionally, the burden on the prosecution has 
also been simplified by the provision that the “actual knowledge” requirement can be met by 
proving “wilful blindness”.
51
 “Wilful blindness” can be understood as “an awareness of a 
high probability of the existence of a fact and an absence of an actual belief that the fact does 
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 For instance, a defendant will be liable if he/she had a “reasonable suspicion” 
that the property is derived from illegal acts based upon, for example his/her professional 
knowledge, and life experience, but he/she harboured this suspicion and paid no further 
attention to it.  
In Germany, the Criminal Code allows the conviction of the perpetrator of money 
laundering even if he/she, through gross negligence, is unaware of the fact that the object is 
the proceeds of an unlawful act.
53
 This regulation aids the prosecution of money laundering, 
and makes the German AML legislation much stricter.  
In some other countries, a very high level of culpability is still required to establish the 
mens rea required for third party laundering. In the Russian Federation, for example, the 
court must prove that the intent of defendant to “give a legitimate appearance to criminal 
proceeds”, and that the perpetrator of money laundering knew (as opposed to should have 
known) that money or other property was derived from criminal means.
54
 Thus, in practice, 
someone who simply disposes of criminal proceeds or makes purchases with money derived 
from criminal activities without attempting to give legal appearance to these proceeds cannot 
be convicted of money laundering. 
 
4.3.3 The Liability and Sanctions for Money Laundering Offences 
 
Liability for legal persons 
The Palermo Convention (article 10), the UNCAC (article 26) and the 2012 FATF 
Recommendations (INR 3, par. 7(c) and R24) call for their States Parties and member 
countries to impose liability on both natural and legal persons. Legal persons are any entities 
other than natural persons that can establish a permanent customer relationship with a 
financial institution or otherwise own property.
55
 This can include companies, bodies 
corporate, foundations, anstalt (institutions), partnerships, or associations and other relevantly 
similar entities.
56
 Subject to domestic legal principles, liability can be criminal, civil or 
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administrative. Further, the imposition of liability on legal persons shall not affect the 
liability of natural persons who committed the offence.
57
 The provision of corporate liability 
for money laundering offences is obviously necessary to deter the involvement of financial 
intermediaries in money laundering operations.  
In those States which are traditionally disinclined to apply criminal liability to legal 
persons, for example Germany or the Russian Federation, administrative or civil liability is 
imposed on legal persons who engage in money laundering offences. Under Russian criminal 
law, for example, only a sane natural person, who has reached the certain age, can be subject 
to criminal liability.
58
 Nevertheless, Russian law imposes civil or administrative liability on a 
legal person involved in money laundering offences. For example, the authorities can revoke 
its license, and ultimately subject it to liquidation. Furthermore, natural persons operating on 
behalf of a legal person can also be prosecuted.  
 
Liability for self-launderers 
Another issue worth mentioning is whether those individuals who have committed the 
predicate offence may also be held liable for laundering the proceeds of such offence (so-
called self-laundering). The Palermo Convention  (article 6(2)(e)) and UNCAC (article 
23(2)(e)) stipulate that “if required by fundamental principles of the domestic law of a State 
Party, it may be provided that the offences set forth in paragraph 1 of this article do not apply 
to the persons who committed the predicate offence”. The reason for this provision is that in 
some State Parties, the perpetrator of a money laundering offence who also commits the 
predicate offence cannot be convicted of a money laundering offence. This is the case, for 
example, in Germany.
59
 In other States, the predicate offence perpetrator can be convicted of 
money laundering. This difference derives mainly from the fundamentals of domestic 
criminal laws.  
According to the principles of German criminal law, whosoever is liable as an accomplice 
to the act shall not be liable for assistance after the fact.
60
 In other words, an offender who has 
committed the predicate offence cannot be additionally and separately penalized for an “after-
act behaviour” that relates to the proceeds of his/her own crime. Further, section 261(9) of the 
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German Criminal Code provides that a person who is liable for participating in the predicate 
offence may not be liable for money laundering as well.
61
 Accordingly, a perpetrator cannot 
be convicted of both the predicate offence and laundering its proceeds. In contrast, Russian 
legislation allows the conviction of predicate crime perpetrator for laundering the proceeds of 
his/her crime. Articles 174 and 174(1) of Russian Criminal Code (2003) regulate both third-




Punishment for money laundering offences 
The suppression conventions set out very broad standards of punishment for their 
offences. State Parties are obliged to make each of these offences subject to sanctions that 
take into account the gravity of that offence.
63
 Similarly, the FATF recommends that all 
sanctions against money laundering offences should be effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive.
64
   
In most States which have criminalized money laundering, both natural and legal persons 
who commit money laundering offences are liable to criminal punishment or civil and 
administrative sanctions. Criminal punishment may include a fixed-term imprisonment, a 
fine, and confiscation of illegal gains. Civil and administrative sanctions may include a 
monetary fine, confiscation, or withdrawal of business licenses from legal persons.  
In many States, the maximum punishment for money laundering offences is quite harsh, 
and is not limited to fiscal punishment but include custodial punishment. This suggests that 
the offence is considered as a serious offence by several States. Under the US Money 
Laundering Control Act of 1986, for example, criminal punishment for violating section 1956 
of this Act are imprisonment for not more than 20 years, or a fine of not more than 
US$500,000 or twice the value of the property laundered (whichever is greater), or both.
65
 A 
violation of section 1957 triggers a fine and/or imprisonment for not more than 10 years, or 
both.
66
 If a financial institution or any officer, director or employee of a financial institution 
is found guilty of a money laundering offense pursuant to sections 1956 or 1957, the Attorney 
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But maximum penalties vary. According to the German Criminal Code, natural persons 
convicted of money laundering under section 261 shall be liable to imprisonment for up to 5 
years or a fine.
68
 The punishment for money launderings offences under article 174 and 174.1 
of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation may be:
69
 i) a fine of the amount of money, 
or the amount of salary (or other income) of convicted person in a certain time; ii) 
imprisonment for up to 10 years; or iii) including both (i) and (ii).  
These variations in what States consider to be sufficiently dissuasive (deterrence seems to 
be the underlying principle here), depend ultimately on the scheme of punishment that 
prevails domestically rather than some global criterion of effective suppression.   
 
4.4 Interim Conclusion 
 
In summary, although States have strived to comply with the international standards, 
States still vary in their autonomous criminalization of money laundering. This is because the 
criminal law of a State is usually underpinned by that State’s particular moral and political 
philosophy. Of all branches of law, criminal law is traditionally the most parochial legal 
discipline because it is closely associated with the national cultural, economic and political 
background.
70
 A State has sovereignty over the criminalization of certain conduct by 
labelling that conduct as wrongful and by convicting as culpable wrongdoers. This 
unavoidably generates differences in criminalization and punishment between States. 
The next sections will examine the basic principles of Vietnamese criminal law, and how 
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4.5 Basic Principles of Vietnamese Criminal Law 
 
4.5.1 The Sources of Criminal Law 
 
Vietnamese criminal law has developed substantially since 1985 - the historic moment 
when the first Penal Code (the 1985 Penal Code) was enacted.
71
 The development of 
Vietnamese criminal law can be traced following its major sources: the Penal Code and 
amendments to the Penal Code. The 1985 Penal Code, which showed the profound influence 
of the criminal law of socialist States, was amended and supplemented in 1989, 1991, 1992 
and 1997 as a result of the enormous changes in political, economic and social background in 
Vietnam after the launch of “Doi Moi” (renovation). Several wrongdoings that surfaced in 
the economic transitional period, such as illegal economic or drug-related activities, were 
criminalized. Additionally, driven mainly by the changes in the nature of certain crimes, such 
as the growing extent and sophistication of economic crimes and drug-related crimes, the 
contemporary Penal Code (the 1999 Penal Code)
72
 was promulgated in 1999 to replace the 
1985 Penal Code. Furthermore, a number of emergent crimes were provided for in the Law 
Amending and Supplementing to a Number of Articles of the Penal Code
73
 - hereafter 
referred to as the Amendment to the 1999 Penal Code (2009). In Vietnam, criminal law 
enjoys the pivotal role in maintaining and protecting the socialist regime, the people’s 
interests and interests of the State. Thus, although a number of significant revisions have 
occurred, the contemporary Penal Code still consists of several persistent principles of former 
Soviet Criminal law which were exhibited in the 1985 Penal Code.
74
  
The primary sources of contemporary Vietnamese criminal law are the 1999 Penal Code 
and the Amendments to 1999 Penal Code. Legal interpretation of the Penal Code that consists 
of legislative, judicial and executive interpretations is another important source of 
Vietnamese criminal law. The power of these interpretations is vested in the legislature (the 
Standing Committee of the National Assembly), judiciary (the Supreme People’s Court and 
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its Judicial Council), and governmental ministries (the Ministry of Public Security).
75
 Judicial 
interpretation can be jointly issued by the Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s 
Procuracy (SPP). The SPP is empowered to not only prosecute criminals but also oversee a 
number of stages in criminal procedure, including the stages of investigation and trial. Legal 
interpretation is helpful when certain provisions of the Penal Code are vague or too abstract.  
 
4.5.2 The Doctrine of Crime  
 
Vietnamese criminal law defines a crime as a socially dangerous act (positive act or 
omission) that is proscribed in the Penal Code, is committed intentionally or negligently by a 
person who has the capacity of taking criminal liability, and violates the interests of the 
people and the society.
76
 This definition is similar to the definition of crime in the Russian 
criminal law - the so-called “material” definition of crime.
77
 The definition encompasses both 
a substantive element (social danger), which is absent from criminal law of continental law 
States (e.g., Germany),
78
 and a formal normative element (the prohibition of act by the Penal 
Code - nullum crimen sine lege).
79





From the theoretical point of view, such an approach points out a relationship between crime and societal 
life, but societal life understood according to the principles of historical materialism on the class structure 
of society and the dynamics of societal life... The idea of material content of crime represents a bridge 
between the conceptual network of criminal law and the principles of historical materialism. By defining 
a crime as a socially dangerous act, legal theory of socialist States denies metaphysical concepts which 
define crime as a violation of the laws of nature, as conduct violating God's will, eternal norms of ethics, 
etc. History shows that at various times and in various societies different acts were considered crimes. 
Therefore, crime is a societal and historically changing phenomenon. Marxist-Leninist theory of criminal 
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law analyses crime as a changing phenomenon, related to a socio-economic system. Consistent with the 
premises of historical materialism, the theory considers the gist of the crime to be the fact that it is 
dangerous to social conditions favourable to the interests of the ruling class. The ruling class through its 
State apparatus determines which acts are socially dangerous and how they should be prosecuted and 
punished. In this sense, one says that crime is a class phenomenon. 
 
It can be seen that the adoption of this approach is a commitment to Marxist social theory 
and has less of theoretical than an ideological function.
81
 
Crimes are categorized in four types based on their characters and degree of “social 
danger” they causes: extremely serious crime (“toi pham dac biet nghiem trong”), very 
serious crime (“toi pham rat nghiem trong”), serious crime (“toi pham nghiem trong”) and 
less serious crime (“toi pham it nghiem trong”).
82
 A wrongful act that presents insignificant 
“social danger” can be qualified as an “administrative violation”, which is “non-crime”. 
“Non-crimes” regulated by administrative procedure were spelled out in the constantly 
updated Ordinances on Handling Administrative Violations (“Phap Lenh Xu Ly Vi Pham 
Hanh Chinh”),
83




In some ways, Vietnamese administrative violations are equivalent to misdemeanors or 
summary offences in common law States. For instance, they are handled by using a less 
formal administrative procedure, they usually involve a less harmful act and they are usually 
punished by less severe penalties. Nonetheless, in essence, the dichotomy between crimes 
and administrative violations (or “non-crimes”) in Vietnam’s legislation is different from the 
felonies/misdemeanors or indictable/summary classification. Vietnamese administrative 
violators are not labeled as criminals. Their wrongful acts are not shown in their criminal 
record. The penalties that may be imposed include a warning, a fine, the revocation of 
business license or professional practice certificate, confiscation of the objects related to or 
the means used for the commission of administrative violations, and deportation.
85
 Certain 
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At first glance, the requirement of “social danger” seems similar to the principle of harm 
in the criminal law of common law States. However, it actually varies according to its 
application. Because the competent authorities (the National Assembly, the Standing 
Committee of the National Assembly, the Supreme People’s Court, or the Supreme People’s 
Procuracy) do not provide explicit direction in assessing “social danger”, the requirement of 
“social danger” has sometimes caused problems in both the criminalization of a wrongful act 
and the prosecution of a crime. The distinction between crimes and administrative violations 
(“non-crimes”) is vague.  The category of administrative violations may overlap the category 
of crimes. In practice, some wrongful acts, such as petty theft (often determined simply by 
the amount of money involved) or petty fraud in the sale of goods can be either subject to 
criminal punishment according to the Penal Code or penalty under the Ordinances on 
Handing Administrative Violations. In order to prosecute a defendant, the prosecutor must 
prove that the act has caused a significant “social danger”. Even given a culpable state of 
mind, if the defendant’s act proscribed in the Penal Code harms an individual, but causes an 
insignificant “social danger”, then the defendant is not subject to criminal punishment.
87
 The 
nature and extent of “social danger” of a certain act is determined by the legislature when 
criminalizing that act. In trial, in order to impose the appropriate punishment, the court must 
consider the nature and degree of “social danger” caused by the defendant, based upon the 
assessment of numerous relevant factors, such as: the purposes and motivations of the 
defendant, the criminal instruments used, time and place of the crime, the interests violated 
by the crime, the consequences caused by the crime, including  material damages (e.g., 
damage to people’s health or property) and non-material damages (e.g., undermining the 
implementation of the policies and directives of the Communist Party as well as of the 
State).
88
 It is clear that theses instructions in determining the nature and extent of “social 
danger” of each crime are vague and broad. In many trials, if the defendants are found guilty 
and sentenced, the court usually asserts generally that the crime has caused a significant 
“social danger”, but does not produce an explicit analysis in its judgment about the nature and 
degree of “social danger” of the crime. The concept of “social danger” raises an interesting 
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question what kind of “social danger” money laundering actually causes if it is criminalized. 
This question will be discussed later in this chapter. 
 
4.5.3 The Principles of Criminal Liability 
 
According to Vietnamese criminal law, four compulsory factors are required to establish 
criminal liability:
89
 the objective aspect (“mat khach quan”) that is equivalent to the actus 
reus; the object (“mat khach the”) that refers to the social or people’s interest violated by the 
crime; the subjective aspect (“mat chu quan” or “loi”)
90
 that is very similar to the mens rea; 
and the subject of crime that is a natural person who has reached a certain age (14 years old) 
and has the capacity to take criminal liability.
91
 In some particular cases, the additional 
requirements may be the actual causing of “social danger”, causation, motivation or purposes 
of the crime. These requirements of criminal liability are similar to those in the former Soviet 
criminal law and current Chinese criminal law.
92
 
Inchoate crimes in Vietnamese criminal law relate to preparation for, attempt or voluntary 
termination of the commission of a crime.
93
 The inchoate offence of conspiracy in common 
law States (e.g., the UK)
 94
 or continental law States (e.g., the similar German concept)
95
 does 
not exist in Vietnamese criminal law. 
Preparation for a crime refers to an act of obtaining the instrument and creating the 
conditions for the commission of a crime (e.g., planning and removing obstacles). Only a 
person who is preparing an extremely serious crime (“toi dac biet nghiem trong”) or very 
serious crime (“toi rat nghiem trong”) is subject to criminal liability.
96
 This act is different 
from “conspiracy” in that an individual’s act of “preparation” alone can result in their 
liability. This act is also different from the common law doctrine of “attempt” in that attempt 
is the act of a more than merely preparation with evidence of the firmness of the intent. 
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Preparation for a crime in Vietnam includes conduct considered only preparatory in common 
law States. 
Voluntary termination of the commission of a crime refers to the situation when a person 
refuses at his own will to carry out a crime to the end though nothing stands in the way. 
Vietnamese criminal law does not impose criminal liability on the person who voluntarily 
terminates the commission of the substantive crime before causing any social danger. 
The issue of complicity in Vietnamese criminal law includes the case when two or more 
persons have jointly and intentionally committed a crime. This provision is generally 
equivalent to the doctrine of complicity in common law States.
97
 When imposing criminal 
liability in cases of complicity, Vietnamese criminal law differentiates between those who are 
principals (e.g., organizers, leaders or masterminds) and those who play a secondary role 
(e.g., aids, abets or counsels the principal). Principals should receive a more severe sentence 
than their accomplices. Each accomplice shall be subject to separate criminal liability upon 
the assessment of the “social danger” he causes and his degree of involvement in the 
commission of the crime. In addition, Vietnamese criminal law categorizes an organized 
criminal group (or criminal organization) as a form of complicity that has a close-knit and 
hierarchical structure.
98
 In sentencing, the fact that the crime was committed by an 
organization is an aggravating circumstance because of the increased “social danger” 
involved. 
It is clear that in regard to above-mentioned general principles, Vietnam’s criminal law is 
significantly different from those of the Western legal systems that served as the model for 
the criminalization of money laundering. Inevitably, this will make the implementation in 
Vietnam more difficult.   
  
4.5.4 The Doctrine of Punishment 
 
Vietnamese criminal law states that punishment is the most severe coercive sanction 
imposed by the State on a criminal with the purposes of depriving or restricting his or her 
rights and interests.
99
 Punishment aims at not only punishing and condemning the criminal, 
but also educating him or her to become a person useful for the society and to obey the law, 
and preventing him or her from committing other crimes. Further, punishment aims at 
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Vietnamese criminal law divides criminal punishment into two groups:
101
 i) primary 
punishment that may entail a warning, a monetary fine, a non-custodial reform, deportation, a 
fixed-term of imprisonment, life imprisonment, or the death penalty; and ii) complementary 
punishment that may entail one or more of a range of sanctions, such as prohibition from 
performing certain jobs, depriving certain citizen’s rights, or confiscating property.  
  
4.6 Criminalization of Money Laundering in Vietnamese Criminal Law 
 
It is worthy of note here that detailed records of the nature of the criminal conduct 
involved in convictions for money laundering in Vietnam have not been systematized by the 
competent Vietnamese agencies. Thus, the examination of the criminalization of money 
laundering is limited to a critical and comparative analysis of the AML-relevant legal 
provisions and their development. 
 
4.6.1 The Objective Aspect (Actus Reus – “Mat Khach Quan”) 
 
The provisions before 2009 
Prior to 2009, although the term “money laundering” was not used, some types of the 
conduct involved in what was understood elsewhere as money laundering acts were first 
criminalized in the 1999 Penal Code (articles 250 and 251).  
Article 250 of the 1999 Penal Code, which is still valid, criminalizes the act of 
“harbouring or consuming property derived from criminal activities committed by other 
persons”: 
 
Those who without prior promise, harbour or consume property, with the full knowledge that it was 
derived from  the commission of a crime by other persons, shall be sentenced to a fine of between five 
million dong and fifty million dong, non-custodial reform of up to three years or a prison term of 
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In this article, “without prior promise” means that a person who harbours or consumes 
property must not have any prior agreement with the person who committed the predicate 
crime.
103
 Where a person has made such an agreement, he would be charged with the 
predicate crime itself as an accomplice.  
The two forms of conduct, “harbouring” and “consuming”, were not formally defined in 
any legal documents at this time. In addition, the “intent” element was not provided for in this 
article. However, the Ministry of Justice of Vietnam advised that the act of “harbouring” 
includes concealing, acquiring and possessing property; and that “consuming” means to 
“use”.
104
 It appears that “harbouring” and “consuming” do not cover “conversion or transfer” 
of property, the terms used in the international conventions and both common in Western 
legal usage. In addition, article 250 does not apply to self-laundering activity. It is confined to 
property derived from the commission of a crime by other persons - third party launderers.  
With regard to convictions under article 250 when the defendant is a third party, 80 per 
cent of convictions have been based on confessions.
105
 In the rest of the cases, convictions 
have been based on proving possession only and not concealment or acquiring.
106
 The reason 
for this fact could be that it was onerous to prove the high standard of the “knowledge” 
element (“with the full knowledge”). The fact also may suggest that weak investigative 
techniques (which rely on the person to give themselves up by confessing rather than 
sophisticated methods of e.g., forensic accounting) influence the choice by investigators and 
prosecutors of forms of the offence that are easier to prove such as those based only on 
possession. 
Article 251 of the 1999 Penal Code, which has been amended, provided more specifically 
for the criminalization of the act of “legalizing money and/or property derived from criminal 
activities” as follows: 
 
Any person using financial and/or banking operations or other transactions, to legalize money and/or 
property derived from criminal activities or use such money and/or property to conduct business 
activities or other economic activities, shall be sentenced to between one and five years of imprisonment. 
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Financing of Terrorism)” at 41, available at: 
http://www.apgml.org/documents/docs/17/Vietnam%20ME1.pdf (accessed 20 April 2013). 
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The APG’s mutual evaluation of Vietnam’s AML laws revealed numerous deficiencies in 
this article in comparison with the international standards.
107
 The use of term “legalize” 
without given definitions is ambiguous. It is not clear to what extent the act of “legalizing” 
covers the conduct elements of money laundering offences provided by the Palermo 
Convention,
108
 and whether it includes the “intent” element of money laundering offences. 
The act “legalizing” associated with the typologies of “using financial and/or banking 
operations or other transactions” appears to cover the acts of “conversion or transfer”. The act 
“using”, which was proscribed clearly, appears to overlap the act of “consuming” provided 
for in article 250. It is noted that both articles 250 and 251 of the 1999 Penal Code do not 
mention the detailed purposes of the foregoing acts. The “knowledge” element was not stated 
in article 251. In practice, Vietnamese law enforcement agencies were loath to lay charges 
under article 251.
109
 Although article 251 could apply to self-laundering, a person who had 
obtained property through a predicate crime and had “legalized” or “used” it was usually 
charged only with that predicate crime.
110
 One of the reasons was that article 251 was 
ambiguous and there was no sub-law document to interpret this article in more detail.  
 
The newer AML provisions adopted in Vietnamese law between 2009 and 2011 
The inadequacies of articles 250 and 251 necessitated the introduction of a new crime of 
money laundering. After the APG’s mutual evaluation of Vietnam, the crime of money 
laundering (“toi rua tien”) was criminalized formally quite recently in the amended article 
251 of the 1999 Penal Code (2009) (hereafter termed the amended article 251). In an effort to 





a) Participating, directly or indirectly, in financial transactions, banking or other transactions that 
involve money and/or property derived from criminal activities, with the full knowledge that such 
money and/or property was derived from criminal activities, for the purpose of concealing the illicit 
origin of such money and/or property;  
b) Using such money and/or property, with the full knowledge that such money and/or property was 
derived from criminal activities, to conduct business activities or other activities; 
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c) Concealing the information about the origin, true nature, location, movement, or ownership of money 
and/or property derived from criminal activities or impeding the examination of such information; 
d) Commiting one of the acts prescribed in a), b) and c) involving money and/or property, with the full 
knowledge that such money and/or property was derived from the process of transferring, assigning 
and conversion of  the money and/or property generated from criminal activities.     
 
Under the current Vietnamese criminal law, the criminalization of money laundering is 
provided for in article 250 of the 1999 Penal Code and the amended article 251. For the 
purposes of these articles, all crimes in the 1999 Penal Code and in the Amendments to the 
1999 Penal Code can serve as the predicate crimes for money laundering. 
It can be seen that in spite of different wording, the forms of conduct proscribed in the 









. Nevertheless, there 
are still a number of inadequacies, ambiguous terms and insufficiently detailed definitions. 
The purpose set out in the conventions of “helping any person who is involved in the 
commission of the predicate offence to evade the legal consequences of his or her action”
116
 





 in the amended article 251 mean. The definition of “property” that is 
clarified in the Palermo Convention is not provided for in the Penal Code.
119
 The use of 
money/property suggests that there is a distinction between them. Thus, it is not clear what 
types of laundered property fall within the scope of this crime. Further, because of the use of 
the unclear terms “harbour” and “consume” in article 250, it seems that there is an overlap 
between article 250 and the amended article 251 in regard to the conduct elements committed 
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The complementary provisions from 2011 
Two years after the provision of the amended article 251, an inter-agency Circular on 
guiding the adoption of article 250 and of the amended article 251 was issued.
120
 This 
Circular was one of the outputs of the project “VNMS65 - Strengthening of the Legal and 
Law Enforcement Institutions in Preventing and Combating Money Laundering in Viet Nam” 
(described in chapter 1).
121
 The Circular interprets in detail some of the elements of article 
250 as well as the amended article 251 and patches up most of the shortcomings of these 
articles. In investigating and prosecuting money laundering offences, the authorities will use 
both the amended article 251 and the Circular. 
The “financial transactions, banking or other transactions” referred to in the amended 
article 251(1)(a) are interpreted to include a list of specific activities.
122
 The “business 
activities or other activities” mentioned in the amended article 251(1)(b) include “business 
activities, service activities, activities of incorporating companies, building schools or 
hospitals, purchasing properties, economic aids, or doing charities”.
123
 “Property” is defined 
using a similar wording of the definition provided for by article 2(d) of the Palermo 
Convention.
124
 The acts of “harbouring” and “consuming” are also specified.
125
 It is 
noticeable that a category of activities listed as “consuming” overlap a set of activities 
prescribed by the amended article 251(1)(a). It can be seen that generally Vietnam has 
transformed the international standards of the actus reus into its domestic law.    
 
4.6.2 The Subjective Aspect (Mens Rea – “Mat Chu Quan”) 
 
Both article 250 and the amended article 251 provide that a person must have carried out 
the prohibited actions “with the full knowledge” about the criminal origin of laundered 
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money/property. Although officials from the Supreme People’s Procuracy advised that the 
mens rea elements (“knowledge” and “intent”) can be proved by objective factual 
circumstances,
126
 there has been no provision to clarify the requirement of the “intent” 
element and how to prove it in practice. As noted earlier in this chapter, the burden of 
proving these elements has always caused controversies and challenges to prosecutors. It 
becomes more challenging in the case of a very high level of proof of mens rea - “with the 
full knowledge” - in Vietnamese criminal law which, while compliant with international 
obligations, is arguably out of step with the trend towards a lower threshold of mens rea for 
money laundering offences in other States’ practice.  
 
4.6.3 The Object and Subject of Money Laundering Crimes 
 
The money laundering crime falls into the chapter XIX of the Penal Code which denotes 
to a category of crimes violating the “public security or public order” (“an toan cong cong, 
trat tu cong cong”). Thus, the object of crime (“mat khach the”), which denotes the society 
or people’s interest violated by money laundering crimes, is considered to be the “public 
security or public order”. More specifically, it would be the State management of the property 
derived from the commission of a crime.  
It appears that both the public and relevant authorities are not clear about the “social 
danger” of money laundering crimes, though money laundering may cause significant harms 
(as discussed in chapter 2). They do not yet have an idea of how to properly weigh the harms 
caused by money laundering.
127
 This may lead to the lack of an authentic commitment to the 
criminalization of money laundering in Vietnam. 
This thesis argues that the concept of “social danger” actually makes quite a suitable 
general term for the kinds of non-individual specific harms caused by money laundering. As 
shown in chapter 2, money laundering may cause a significant danger to various aspects of 
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and the benefits of AML countermeasures are debatable.  
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4.6.4 The Liability and Sanctions for Money Laundering Crimes 
 
Liability for legal persons and for self-launderers 
Similarly to Russian criminal law, legal persons are not subject to criminal liability under 
Vietnamese criminal law. In accordance with the general principles of Vietnamese criminal 
law, only natural persons are subject to criminal liability for the commission of crimes 
provided for in article 250 and the amended article 251. Nonetheless, they shall be subject to 
administrative penalties if they fail to meet responsibilities set out by AML laws.
128
 These 
penalties include a warning, a fine, revocation of a practicing license or certificate, or 
confiscation of the means used in the violations. 
When it comes to liability for self-launderers, it can be seen that the amended article 251 
can apply to self-laundering activity. 
 
Punishment 
Apart from the primary punishments of a fine, non-custodial reform and a fixed-term 
imprisonment, both article 250 and the amended article 251 provide a complementary penalty 
of a fine, confiscation of property and a ban from holding certain posts or practicing certain 
occupations. The maximum punishment under the both articles is imprisonment for up to 15 
years. This maximum punishment tariff is relatively high on the range when compared to 
other States. Money laundering crimes are categorized as various serious crimes under 
Vietnamese criminal law. The range of sanctions available in Vietnam is sufficiently broad to 
meet the obligation in the AMLSs.  
 
4.7 Comments and Suggestions for Reform 
 
In general, the criminalization of money laundering by Vietnam has basically complied 
with the international standards. Nevertheless, a number of inadequacies remain. In addition, 
the non-existence of convictions under the amended article 251 and insignificant number of 
convictions under the older article 250 have highlighted the ineffective enforcement of these 
articles in practice. There are apparently various reasons for this situation, including:  i) the 
unwillingness of the law enforcement agencies to engage in investigating and prosecuting 
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money launderers; ii) the unwieldy nature of the legal provisions themselves (e.g., the high 
level of proof of “knowledge”); and iii) insufficient capacity for investigating money 
laundering (e.g., the lack of experienced investigator as shown in chapter 3).  
The lack of a strong and genuine commitment to the criminalization of money laundering 
in Vietnam as a social necessity has contributed to a substantial gap between the “law in the 
books” and “law in action”. It seems that Vietnam has criminalized money laundering under 
the influence of external coercion and socialization rather than based on the indigenous 
perception of the “social danger” of money laundering itself. The Vietnamese public and 
even the relevant authorities may question whether money laundering poses a significant 
“social danger” or harm or simply be ignorant as to its dangers. This doubt or ignorance may 
result in a reluctance to both implement and enforce the criminalization of money laundering. 
However, the unclear determination of “social danger” of money laundering could be used as 
an excuse for the handing down by courts of insignificant convictions for money laundering 
in Vietnam. 
The “all crimes” approach to the predicate crimes for money laundering seems 
unreasonable and unpersuasive. Can laundering the proceeds produced by “less serious” 
predicate crimes cause a significant “social danger” or harm? In fact, most “less serious” 
crimes do not generate substantial criminal proceeds that can cause a significant “social 
danger”. Thus, is it really necessary to include all “less serious” crimes in the category of 
predicate crimes for money laundering? Practically, are Vietnamese law enforcement bodies’ 
resources sufficient to investigate and prosecute money laundering as a separate charge in all 
or even most cases of the commission of predicate crimes (including less serious crimes) that 
produce criminal proceeds?  The answer to both these questions seems to be no. It appears 
that by providing an extremely broad scope of predicate crimes, Vietnam has attempted to 
appease international pressure, rather than taking a pragmatic approach in categorizing 
predicate crimes.  
In order to comply with the international standards and be more practical, the 
criminalization of money laundering in Vietnam should be complemented by the following 
law reforms: i) using consistently the term and definition of “property” in the amended article 
251, which includes money as defined by the Circular 09/2011/TTLT-BCA-BQP-BTP-





  instead of using money/property; ii) simplifying the “knowledge” element, 
for example, by adopting the above-mentioned model of the US or of Germany, or simply by 
using the wording “knowing” as in the international conventions instead of “with the full 
knowledge”; iii) providing the details of the “intent” element; and iv) applying another model 
of categorization of the predicate crimes (e.g., a specific list of predicate crimes). In addition, 
the general potential “social danger” caused by money laundering in Vietnam should be 
interpreted clearly. Depending on that, Vietnamese courts can then specify, articulate and 
assess “social danger” in individual cases. Vietnamese courts can interpret the potential 
“social danger” following the same approach to the harms of money laundering, which can 
be: the erosion of the integrity of financial institutions, the increase in a number of predicate 
crimes (e.g., drug trafficking and corruption), distortion of fair competition, the loss of tax 




States are being encouraged and/or pressured to make money laundering a criminal 
offence on the basis of the constituent elements set out in a number of international legal 
instruments. Nevertheless, because States are sovereign over the criminalization of certain 
conduct, the criminalization of money laundering varies from State to State. The differences 
mainly lie in the scope of predicate offences and the mens rea element. There are four models 
of the categories of predicate offences: i) all criminal offences as predicate offences; ii) the 
offences with a threshold of specified certain standards; iii) a specific list of offences; and iv) 
the mixture of model (ii) and (iii). Some States have simplified the burden of proof regarding 
the “knowledge” and the “intent” element in money laundering trials (e.g., the US and 
Germany), whereas others apply a very high level of proof (e.g., the Russian Federation). 
Vietnamese criminal law has a number of unique principles that originated from the 
former Soviet criminal law. For instance, the “material” definition of crime, that requires a 
significant “social danger”, distinguishes a crime from an administrative offence. The 
requisite factors for criminal liability consist of the objective aspect, the object, the subjective 
aspect and the subject of crime. Money laundering has been criminalized in the Penal Code of 
                                                          
129
  The definition of “property” in the Circular 09/2011/TTLT-BCA-BQP-BTP-NHNNVN-VKSNDTC-TANDTC, 
above n120 (article 1(3)) is similar to that in the Luat Phong, Chong Rua Tien [Law on Prevention and 
Suppression of Money Laundering] (Vietnam) Law No. 07/2012/QH13, 18 June 2012, entered into force 1 
January 2013 (article 4(2)). 
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Vietnam. Nevertheless, the criminalization does not seem to be based on the core principle of 
“social danger”. Vietnam has criminalized money laundering and is trying to adjust the 
constituent elements of money laundering crimes in a way which pleases the international 
community, regardless of the resulting level of effectiveness. The textual analysis of article 
250, the amended article 251 and the relevant legal documents has revealed that the 
criminalization of money laundering has closely complied with the international standards. 
This fact has reflected that under the mechanisms of the AMLSs diffusion (coercion and State 
socialization), Vietnam can criminalize money laundering in the “books” according to the 
international standards. However, when enforcing the criminalization in practice Vietnam has 
faced various difficulties generated from the lack of political will, the incompatible nature of 
its own criminal law with the global standards and limited investigative capacity. The 
investigation and prosecution of money laundering has been hampered by a number of both 
political and legal factors. Among the suggestions, some should be prioritized which include: 
i) encouraging the law enforcement agencies to engage in investigating and prosecuting 
money laundering; ii) applying an appropriate standard of the “knowledge” element and 
providing the guidance for proving the “intent” element; and iii) applying a pragmatic 
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In the last chapter, we examined the international AMLSs on the criminalization of money 
laundering. That examination actually focused on one aspect of criminal jurisdiction over 
money laundering, known as prescriptive jurisdiction, within a national territory. What 
concerns the international community more is the emergence of transnational money 
laundering offences that necessitates the extension of criminal jurisdiction beyond national 
boundaries. States need to establish adequate extraterritorial jurisdiction over transnational 
money laundering, which include the investigation, prosecution, adjudication, punishment for 
transnational money laundering offences and confiscation of criminal assets. The 
establishment of adequate extraterritorial jurisdiction over transnational money laundering 
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offences aims at eliminating “havens” for the launderers as well as for the laundered 
property. A State which lacks extraterritorial jurisdiction over money laundering offences 
cannot prosecute the launderers who have committed money laundering in its territory but are 
staying abroad, and cannot confiscate the laundered property located overseas.   
This chapter is concerned with the international standards, particularly the conditions and 
principles, for the establishment of national jurisdiction over transnational money laundering 
offences and the practice of some States. The jurisdictional standards discussed in this 
chapter are fundamental for other crucial aspects of international cooperation in AML 
including the cooperation in confiscation of criminal assets, mutual legal assistance and 
extradition for money laundering offences, which will be examined in the following chapters. 
The chapter begins with the concept of transnational money laundering and the general 
perception of criminal jurisdiction under international law. It then charts the international 
standards for establishing jurisdiction over transnational money laundering, and their 
application in some States. Finally, the chapter examines whether Vietnam has implemented 
adequately those standards and how the current jurisdictional principles provided for in 
Vietnamese criminal law can be applied to transnational money laundering. In addition, a 
number of suggestions are made to strengthen the implementation of the AMLSs on 
jurisdiction in Vietnam. 
 
5.2 Fundamental Concepts 
 
5.2.1 Transnational money laundering 
 
The term “transnational crime” was first used by the United Nation (UN) Crime 
Prevention and Criminal Justice Branch at the Fifth UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime 
and Treatment of Offenders (1975) “in order to identify certain criminal phenomena 
transcending international borders, transgressing the laws of several States or having an 
impact on any countries”.
1
 Nevertheless, “defining transnational crime is difficult. 
Transnational crime by its very nature is problematic as it transcends national jurisdictions, as 
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  Gerhard O.W. Mueller, “Transantional Crime: Definition and Concepts” in Phil Williams and Dimitri 




well as parameters of information system and law enforcement agencies”.
2
 For the purposes 
of the Fourth UN Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice System (1995), 
transnational crimes were described as “offences whose inception, perpetration and/or direct 
or indirect effect involved more than one country”.
3
 Following this tendency, article 3(2) of 
the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (Palermo Convention) provides 




a) it is committed in more than one State;  
b) it is committed in one State but a substantial part of its preparation, planning, direction or control takes 
place in another State;  
c) it is committed in one State but involves an organized criminal group that engages in criminal activities 
in more than one State; or  
d) it is committed in one State but has substantial effects in another State.  
 
It should be noted that the adjective “transnational” usually implies cross-frontier 
activities, however, an entirely intra-national crime may be justified as a “transnational” 
crime, for example if it belongs to category (d) of the Palermo Convention provision.5 
For the discussion of jurisdiction in this chapter, a money laundering offence is considered 
to be “transnational” if: i) it has one of the alternative features of transnational offences 
provided for in article 3(2) of the Palermo Convention; or ii) when the predicate crime was 
committed abroad. It is noticeable that case (i) and (ii) may overlap. Under case (ii), in the 
circumstance when the predicate crime occurred and generated the proceeds abroad, the 
money laundering activity would be actually trans-boundary in nature, because the proceeds 
have been transferred out of the original country. In other circumstances, the nature of the 
money laundering activity itself may be not transnational, but the investigation and 
prosecution for such activity may require interstate cooperation. This would be the case, for 
example, if the cross-border predicate crime was committed in State A and involved State B, 
and the proceeds were produced and purely laundered in State B. Then if State B wishes to 
establish its jurisdiction over the money laundering activity, it usually must ensure that the 
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  Results of the supplement to the Fourth United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal 
Justice System, on Transnational Crime (4 April 1995), A/CONF.169/15/Add.1, par. 9. 
3
  Ibid. 
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  United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime, 15 November 2000, 2225 UNTS 209, 
entered into force 29 September 2003. 
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  This category seems very broad and controversial, because it is difficult to justify how and to what extent an 
offence committed in one State affects another State. 
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predicate activity constitutes a crime under its law (double criminality of the predicate 
crime).
6
 For doing so, State B needs cooperation from State A, such as exchanging 
information or evidence about the predicate activity. Furthermore, if State A also claims its 
jurisdiction over that money laundering activity, concurrent jurisdiction may arise which will 
require cooperation to deal with.
7
 Many of these problems are explored further below. But 
first the thesis will deal briefly with general principles of jurisdiction. 
 
5.2.2 Criminal Jurisdiction under International Law 
 
Jurisdiction is not a unitary concept. It can be defined as “the power of a sovereign to 
affect the rights of persons, whether by legislation, by executive decrees, or by the judgment 
of a court”
8
, or “the authority to affect legal interests”.
9
 The definition, nature and scope of 
jurisdiction vary depending on the applied contexts, which can be civil or criminal, domestic 
or international. In the domestic context, it usually refers to the right of a competent authority 
to do certain legal acts. Under international law, it can be conceived of as a State’s right to 
regulate conduct in matters not exclusively of domestic concern.
10
 In the international 
context, jurisdiction becomes a concern when a State, in its effort to promote its sovereign 
interests overseas, adopts laws that regulate matters not of purely domestic concern.
11
 
Jurisdiction in international law is usually either legislative, judicial or executive, also known 
as the powers to prescribe, adjudicate and enforce respectively.
12
 In terms of criminal 
jurisdiction, first, prescriptive (or legislative) jurisdiction, which denotes the authority of a 
State to criminalize a given act, is established. Then, this jurisdiction is enforced through law 
enforcement agencies (known as enforcement jurisdiction in the narrow sense, such as to 




Driven by the principle of sovereign equality and territorial integrity of States, in general, 
criminal jurisdiction is facultative rather than mandatory. The establishment and exercise of 
                                                          
6
  This issue will be discussed further later. 
7
  Section 5.3.4 of this chapter will discuss more about this matter. 
8
  Joseph H Beale, “The Jurisdiction of a Sovereign State” (1923) 36(3) Harvard Law Review 241 at 241. 
9
  Christopher L. Blakesley, “United States Jurisdiction over Extraterritorial Crime” (1982) 73(3) The Journal 
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112 
 
criminal jurisdiction allowed by international law is ultimately a matter for individual States. 
Nevertheless, the gravity of transnational crime has forced States to sign the suppression 
conventions in order to establish certain common jurisdictional frameworks over the given 
offences including money laundering offences.
14
 These frameworks provide both binding and 
permissive jurisdiction. Accordingly, a State Party “shall” assert its jurisdiction over the 
given offences based upon the principle of strict territoriality or “quasi- territoriality” (the 
“quasi- territoriality” principle binds the States to establish jurisdiction over specific crimes 
committed in their flag-vessels and registered aircraft),
15
 and “may” extend its jurisdiction 
over such offences in several ways, beyond their territory.
16
 Although the establishment of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction over these offences is necessary to prevent the offenders from 
utilizing national borders for the avoidance of prosecution, it is optional. The general 
principles for the extension of jurisdiction provided for in the suppression conventions 
include: territoriality and its variations, nationality, passive personality, protective principle, 
and universality.
17
 In addition, the exercise of jurisdiction over transnational crime should 
have to satisfy certain further conditions and principles, of which the double/dual criminality 
and the principle of non bis in idem (or prohibition of double jeopardy in common law States) 
are most important. The thesis now charts these fundamental conditions/principles before 
discussing other jurisdictional matters. 
 
5.2.3 The Condition of Double/Dual Criminality 
 
General 
The condition of dual/double criminality is traditionally bound up with the basic areas of 
international criminal law: extradition, the transfer of criminal proceedings and the execution 
of foreign sentences.
18
 With the development of international cooperation in the fight against 
                                                          
14
  See United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 20 
December 1988, 1582 UNTS 95, entered into force 11 November 1990 (1988 Vienna Convention), article 4; 
Palermo Convention, above n4, article 15; and United Nations Convention against Corruption, 31 October 
2003, 2349 UNTS 41, entered into force 14 December 2005 (UNCAC), article 42.  
15
  Palermo Convention, above n4, article 15(1). This binding provision will be described later. 
16
  Ibid, article 15(2), (3) and (4). 
17
  These principles and their application to transnational money laundering will be discussed in section 5.3. 
18
  Lech  Gardocki, “Double Criminality in Extradition Law” (1993)(27) Israel Law Review 288 at 288. 
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transnational crime, this condition has been perceived as one of the most crucial conditions 
which can be applied to jurisdiction, extradition and mutual legal assistance (MLA).
19
 
It is worth noting that the double criminality condition is not a rule of customary 
international law. States are not automatically obliged to apply this condition in their mutual 
relations unless it is provided for in their treaties or domestic laws.
20
 In general, this 
condition, in both cases of MLA and jurisdiction, is fulfilled when the act is punishable under 
the criminal laws of both States. Nonetheless, double criminality as a condition to jurisdiction 
is to be distinguished from double criminality as a condition to MLA and extradition.  
The requirement of double criminality as a condition to jurisdiction, which is common in 
civil law States,
21
 relates to the question of whether the act is punishable under the law of the 
place of commission (lex loci delicti). The rationales behind this condition are derived 
primarily from State sovereignty, international solidarity and the legality principle.
22
 When a 
crime is committed in State A and prosecuted in State B, the court in State B would, if 
applying the condition, raise a central question whether the act is punishable not only under 
the law of State B but also under the law of State A. An exception is in the case of universal 
jurisdiction applicable to jus cogens international crimes,
23
 in which jurisdiction is conferred 




Double criminality can be justified in abstracto or in concreto. Generally speaking, double 
criminality in abstracto is fulfilled when there is merely the existence of criminalization of 
the act under the criminal laws of both States concerned. In a further consideration, some 
scholars suggest that double criminality in abstracto should comprise three cumulative 
components:
25
 i) the existence of a legal norm prohibiting the act in both States; ii) the act is 
                                                          
19
  The extended scope of MLA in the fight against transnational crime, including money laundering, will be 
provided in chapter 7. 
20
  A.H.J. Swart, “Human Rights and the Abolition of Tranditional Principles” in John Dugard and Christine 
van den Wyngaert (eds) International Criminal Law and Procedure (Dartmouth, 1996) at 520. 
21
  C Wyngaert, “Double Criminality as a Requirement to Jurisdiction” in John Dugard and Christine van den 
Wyngaert (eds) International Criminal Law and Procedure (Dartmouth Publishing Co Limited, 1996) at 
138. 
22
  Ibid, at 140-142. 
23
  These crimes include, e.g., genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, 
“Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes: Historical Perspectives and Contemporary Practice” (2002) 
42(4) Virginia Journal of International Law 81 at 96-108.  
24
  Donnedieu de Vabres, “The System of Universal Jurisdiction: Historical Origins and Contemporary Forms” 
(2011) 9(4) Journal of International Criminal Justice 905 at 909-913. 
25
  S. Z Feller, “Significance of the Requirement of Double Criminality in the Law of Extradition ” (1975) 10 
Israel Law Review 51 at 70. 
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punishable in both States, in respect of the law applicable at the time the act was committed 
as compared with the law applicable at the time of the legal proceedings; and iii) the act is 
punishable under the laws of both States in respect of the place where the act was committed. 
Double criminality in concreto goes beyond the fulfillment of double criminality in 
abstracto. It includes the elements of double criminality in abstracto illustrated above, and 
takes into account the concrete circumstances of the act from the point of view of criminality 





Double criminality of the predicate crime  
The concern about double criminality of the predicate crime as a requirement for 
jurisdiction over money laundering will arise when the jurisdiction asserted by a State over 
the money laundering offence requires a link to the specific predicate crime, and this 
predicate crime was not committed in that State. Specifically, when State A asserts 
jurisdiction over a money laundering act that involves the proceeds from the predicate crime 
committed in State B, whether State A should require double criminality of the predicate 
crime.  
According to the concept of money laundering, one of the elements that have to be proved 
when asserting jurisdiction over a money laundering act, is that the property laundered must 
originally be criminal proceeds. In the above hypothetical case, under the criminal law of 
State B, the proceeds are criminally generated from the predicate criminal activity which 
occurred in State B. It seems irrational when State A establishes jurisdiction over the money 
laundering act that it may do so without requiring that this predicate activity must also 
constitute a criminal offence under its law. State A should require double criminality in 
respect of the predicate crime to secure the legality principle. For example, the Palermo 
Convention states that “offences committed outside the jurisdiction of the State Party shall 
constitute predicate offences only when the relevant conduct is a criminal offence under the 
domestic law of the State where it is committed and would be a criminal offence in the 
domestic law of the State Party implementing or applying this article had it been committed 
there”.
27
 In practice, States, like Germany, require this condition.
28
 
                                                          
26
  Ibid, at 71. 
27
  See  Palermo Convention, above n4, article 6(c) 
28
  Guy Stessens, Money Laundering: A New International Law Enforcement Model (Cambridge University 
Press, 2000) at 228-229. 
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Another issue is whether States should require double criminality of the predicate crime in 
abstracto or in concreto. In the practice of prosecution for money laundering offences, it is 
burdensome to prove the precise criminal origin of proceeds generated from a predicate crime 
in concreto, especially when the predicate crime was committed abroad. Hence, most States, 
in the same situation as State A (where the money laundering offence occurs), only require 
double criminality of the predicate crime in abstracto for the prosecution of the money 
laundering offence under its law.
29
 However, of course, for the purpose of prosecution for the 
predicate crime under the criminal law of State B (where the predicate offence occurs), State 




5.2.4 The Principle of Ne Bis in Idem in a Transnational Context 
 
The recognition of multiple principles for the exercise of jurisdiction over transnational 
crime may lead to the situation in which the conduct in question is subject to the concurrent 
criminal jurisdiction of two or more States. In this situation, the transnational application of 
the ne bis in idem
31
 principle, a continental equivalent of the common law principle against 
double jeopardy,
32
 functions as a bar to new prosecution or enforcement of penalties for the 
same offence (enforcement jurisdiction). 
The application of the ne bis in idem principle at a national level is provided for in the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as follows: “no one shall be liable to be 
tried or punished again in criminal proceedings under the jurisdiction of the same State for an 
offence for which he has already been finally acquitted or convicted in accordance with the 
law and penal procedure of that State”.
33
 Recognized by almost every State,
34
 the principle is 
                                                          
29
  Ibid, at 230. 
30
  Ibid, at 231. 
31
  This phrase is interpreted differently into English by numerous authors. In general, this principle prevents a 
person from being subject to multiple trials and punishment for the same criminal offence by courts of same 
State. 
32
  The term “double jeopardy” was generated from the wording of the Fifth Amendment of the US 
Constitution, which stipulates, inter alia, that “[n]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to be 
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb”. See general about the history of the principle against double jeopardy 
in Jay A Sigler, “A History of Double Jeopardy” (1963) 7(4) The American Journal of Legal History 283. 
33
  See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171, entry into 
force 23 March 1976, article 14(7). It has been suggested to be a principle of transnational criminal law: on 
See John A.E Vervaele, “Ne Bis in Idem: Towards a Constitutional Principle in Transnational Criminal 
Law?” in (2013) 9 Utrecht Law Review 211 at 226. 
34
  This principle is stated as a fundamental constitutional right in numerous States. For example, article 103(3) 
of German Constitution (also known as Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany) states that “no 
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traditionally applied to purely domestic justice as a fundamental procedural safeguard for 
defendants facing criminal proceedings. 
The principle is emphasized in the case law of many different States. Once a case has been 
disposed of, it should not be reopened; and, the final outcome of a judicial proceeding should 
be respected and accepted by other courts (the doctrine of res judicata).
35
 The principle is 
derived from the following basic rationales: i) protection of the legal interests of the 
defendant and avoidance of the increased responsibility of the defendant through further 
prosecution for the same offence; and ii) respect for the final judgment in order to prevent the 
risk of conflicting judgments.
36
 It should be noted here that many States consider that the 
combination of criminal sanctions with administrative sanctions or out-of-court settlements 
for the same offence, does not violate this principle. Thus, civil confiscation of criminal 
assets, which will be discussed in chapter 6, does not violate the principle ne bis in idem. 
The application of the ne bis in idem principle to a transnational context is supported by 
most the same rationales as at the national level. The transnational application of the ne bis in 
idem principle was initiated by member States of the European Communities in 1987.
37
 
Article 54 of the Schengen Implementation Agreement (1990) provides that “a person who 
has been finally judged by a Contracting Party may not be prosecuted by another Contracting 
Party for the same offences provided that, where he is sentenced, the sentence has been 
served or is currently being served or can no longer be carried out under the sentencing laws 




 also implies the ne bis in idem principle in its guidance 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
person may be punished for the same act more than once under the general criminal law”. See “Basic Law 
for the Federal Republic of Germany (Translated by Professor Christian Tomuschat and Professor David P. 
Currie)” (2010), available at: https://www.btg-bestellservice.de/pdf/80201000.pdf (accessed 13 June 2013). 
35
  Christine Van Den Wyngaert and Guy Stessens, “The International Non Bis In Idem Principle: Resolving 
Some of the Unanswered Questions” (1999) 48(4) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 779 at 781. 
36
  Ibid, at 780-782. 
37
  Convention between the Member States of the European Communities on Double Jeopardy, 25 May 1987, 
entry into force 6 April 1994. Article 1 of the convention states that “a person whose trial has finally been 
disposed of in a Member State may not be prosecuted in another Member State in respect of the same facts, 
provided that if a sanction was imposed, it has been enforced, is actually in the process of being enforced or 
can no longer be enforced under the laws of the sentencing State”. 
38
  Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the Governments of the States 
of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic, on the Gradual 
Abolition of Checks at their Common Borders ("Schengen Implementation Agreement"), signed on 19 June 
1990 at Schengen, entry into force 1 September 1993. This convention was adopted by the Kingdom of 
Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, the French Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg and the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands (referred to as Contracting Parties). 
39
  Eurojust, established in 2002, aims at strengthening coordination and cooperation between national 
investigating and prosecuting authorities in relation to serious crimes affecting two or more the EU Member 
States. Eurojust consists of 27 national members who are judges, prosecutors or police officers of equivalent 
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to deal with the jurisdictional concurrence in cross-border cases.
40
 Nevertheless, many 
continental law States (and many others) do not recognize the res judicata effect of foreign 
criminal judgments.  
The cross-border application of the ne bis in idem principle is controversial and limited. 
Controversy surrounding the recognition of foreign judgment on transnational crime is a 
primary hindrance to its application. Specifically, if authorities of one State take judicial steps 
against the alleged perpetrator of a transnational crime, will the outcomes of this procedure 
be recognized as binding on the concerned judicial bodies of the other States which also 
assert jurisdiction over the transnational crime? In addition, some States tend to apply the ne 
bis in idem principle in abstracto, whereas others prefer the in concreto application.
41
 In 
practice, because there is no concrete provision of international law that makes the principle 
of non bis in idem mandatory at the international level,
42
 States are often unwilling to 
recognize the validity of a foreign criminal judgment on the crime that happened in their 
territory. The recognition is normally based on bilateral or multilateral treaties dealing with 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters.  
 
5.3 Jurisdiction over Transnational Money Laundering 
 
It was pointed out above that State Parties to the suppression conventions either “shall” or 
“may” establish their jurisdiction over the certain offences criminalized by these conventions, 
including money laundering offences, on different basic principles: territoriality and its 
variations, nationality, passive personality, protective principle, and universality. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
competence (see Eurojust, “History of Eurojust”, available at: 
http://eurojust.europa.eu/about/background/Pages/History.aspx (accessed 19 June 2013)). More about the 
history, functions and practice of Eurojust in Annika Souminen, “The Past, Present and the Future of 
Eurojust” (2008) 15 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 217 at 217-228.  
40
  Eurojust (2003), "Annual Report 2003 (Annex), Guidelines for Deciding 'Which Jurisdiction Should 
Prosecute?’ " at 61, available at: 
http://eurojust.europa.eu/doclibrary/corporate/eurojust%20Annual%20Reports/Annual%20Report%202003/
Annual-Report-2003-EN.pdf (accessed 15 June 2013). 
41
  Gerard Conway, “Ne Bis in Idem in International Law” (2003) 3(3) International Criminal Law Review 217 
at 227-228. 
42
  Article 15(5) of the Palermo Convention only suggests that “if a State Party exercising its jurisdiction under 
paragraph 1 or 2 of this article has been notified, or has otherwise learned, that one or more other States 
Parties are conducting an investigation, prosecution or judicial proceeding in respect of the same conduct, 
the competent authorities of those States Parties shall, as appropriate, consult one another with a view to 
coordinating their actions”. 
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Nevertheless, not all these principles are applicable to the establishment of jurisdiction over 
transnational money laundering.  
The passive personality principle, which grants jurisdiction to the State of which the 
victim is a national, does not work in case of money laundering offences since victims of 
money laundering offences are hardly individualized.  
It is controversial whether a money laundering offence committed abroad by aliens injures 
vital protected national interests. The harms or risks of harm, as identified in chapter 2, are 
caused by territorial money laundering offences rather than extraterritorial ones. Thus, the 
protective principle, which gives a State criminal jurisdiction over exterritorial conduct of 
aliens that violates the vital protected national interests of that State, seems not to be 
applicable to money laundering offences.  
When it comes to the absolute universality principle, this principle grants every State 
jurisdiction over an offender founded in the territory of that State, provided that the offence 
committed by the offender must belong to the category of jus cogens international crimes,
43
 
regardless of where the offence is committed. The money laundering offence is not among 
these offences, thus this principle is of no use in respect of the money laundering offence. 
How can the other jurisdictional principles be applied to transnational money laundering? 
The thesis will focus mainly on the jurisdictional principles described in the 1988 Vienna 
Convention, the Palermo Convention and the UNCAC, since these suppression conventions 
all contain obligations to the jurisdictional aspects of money laundering and Vietnam is a 
Party to them all. 
 
5.3.1  The Principle of Territoriality and its Variations 
 
General 
Criminal jurisdiction is primarily territorial or, in other words, based upon the principle of 
territoriality. This principle is accepted as the most substantial basis for a State to claim 
criminal jurisdiction over an offence committed within its own territory. The 1988 Vienna 
Convention,
44
 the Palermo Convention and the UNCAC
45
 all require that each State Party to 
establish jurisdiction over given offences, including money laundering offences, upon the 
                                                          
43
  Bassiouni, above n23. 
44
   1988 Vienna Convention, above n14. 
45
  UNCAC, above n14. 
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strict territorial or “quasi-territorial” basis. Specifically, article 15(1) of the Palermo 
Convention states as follows: 
 
Each State Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the 
offences established in accordance with articles 5, 6, 8 and 23 of this Convention when: 
(a) The offence is committed in the territory of that State Party; or 
(b) The offence is committed on board a vessel that is flying the flag of that State Party or an aircraft that 
is registered under the laws of that State Party at the time that the offence is committed. 
 
Crimes that occur only within a State are unquestionably territorial. But in practice, 
transnational crime often occurs in more than one State, therefore, questions in regard to 
which State’s territory the crime is considered to have been committed, and thus which State 
may exercise territorial jurisdiction over the crime arise. State Parties have employed various 
approaches to extend their territorial jurisdiction, of which the ubiquity and subjective and 
objective territoriality theories are dominant.   
The theory of ubiquity is widely used in continental law States. Under this theory, an 
offence is deemed to have occurred on the territory of a State as soon as any constituent 
element of this offence has occurred on that territory; hence, the State has its jurisdiction over 
such offence. The German Criminal Code interprets place of an offence, including in respect 




(1) An offence is deemed to have been committed in every place where the offender acted or, in the case 
of an omission, should have acted, or in which the result if it is an element of the offence occurs or 
should have occurred according to the intention of the offender. 
(2) Acts of secondary participation are committed not only in the place where the offence was 
committed, but also in every place where the secondary participant acted or, in the case of an 
omission, should have acted or where, according to his intention, the offence should have been 
committed. If the secondary participant to an offence committed abroad acted within the territory of 
the Federal Republic of Germany, German criminal law shall apply to the secondary participation 
even though the act is not a criminal offence according to the law of the locality of its commission. 
 
The theories of subjective and objective territoriality are used in the US. The subjective 
territoriality theory grants US courts’ jurisdiction over an offence when a constituent element 
of the offence occurred within its territory, even though the offence was consummated 
                                                          
46
  “German Criminal Code (English Translation by Prof. Dr. Michael Bohlander)” (2009), available at: 
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/german_criminal_code.pdf (accessed 12 December 2012). 
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outside the US territory.
47
 In accordance with the objective territorial theory (also known as 
the “effects” theory), a harmful effect of an offence within national territory suffices to grant 
that State jurisdiction over that offence, regardless of whether the effect is a constituent 
element of the offence. US courts have jurisdiction over conduct committed abroad that 
results in detrimental effects within the US.
48
 Further, there is an expansion of the objective 
territorial theory of jurisdiction over thwarted cross-border drug conspiracies, where the 
conspiracies took place entirely abroad (no overt acts within the US) and was thwarted before 
any drug was imported (no actual harmful effect occurred).
49
 In these cases, the “intended 
effects” suffices to assert jurisdiction. Nevertheless, this application does not fit the notion of 
the objective territorial jurisdiction which requires an actual harmful effect within national 
territory. In some thwarted cross-border drug conspiracies cases, the courts could not explain 
clearly which precise theoretical base had been employed for their assertion of jurisdiction. 
Thus, a hybrid theory, that is a combination of the objective territorial and protective 




In fact, both the theories of ubiquity and of subjective and objective territoriality are 
problematic when applying to the transnational context, as domestic law rather than 
international law determines the constituent elements of a particular offence. In addition, 
States vary in their conceptualization of inchoate offences and in exercising their territorial 
jurisdiction over cross-border inchoate offences.
51
 For example, many States do not 
criminalize conspiracy (e.g., Russia and, importantly for the purposes of this thesis, 
Vietnam), or if they do, their criminalization often differs significantly from each other in 
scope and nature. 
                                                          
47
  In U.S. v. Inco Bank & Trust Corp., the court held that “member of conspiracy, that took place both in the 
United States and in foreign country could be convicted of engaging in conspiracy, even though member 
performed no overt act within the United States”, and that “a conspiracy occurring partly within the United 
States is prosecutable without resort to any theory of extraterritorial jurisdiction”. See U.S. v. Inco Bank & 
Trust Corp., 845 F.2d 919 (11th Cir. 1988) 919, 920. 
48
  In Rivard v. U.S., the “effect” theory supported the US prosecution of Canadian nationals for conspiracy to 
smuggle heroin into the US. Although the conspiracy was formed abroad, several overt acts, which were 
committed by a co-operator within the US in the furtherance of the conspiracy, imposed harmful effect on 
the US. See Rivard v. U.S., 375 F.2d 882 (5th Cir. 1967).  
49
  In United States v. Ricardo, the court held that “when the statute itself does not require proof of an overt act, 
jurisdiction attaches upon a mere showing of intended territorial effects”. See United States v. Ricardo, 619 
F.2d 1124 (5th Cir. 1980) 1129. 
50
  Blakesley, above n9, 1113.  
51
  Cedric Ryngaert, “Territorial Jurisdiction Over Cross-frontier Offences: Revisiting a Classic Problem of 
International Criminal Law” (2009) 9 International Criminal Law Review 187, 202-208. 
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Territorial jurisdiction over transnational money laundering  
In the law of most States, money laundering is invariably conceived of as a “conduct 
offence” and not as a “result offence”. The harmful effect of money laundering offences is 
usually not a constituent element of the offences. Hence, only the subjective territoriality 
theory can be applied to establishing jurisdiction over transnational money laundering. Due to 
the broad category of different types of money laundering conduct, if being applied the 
subjective territoriality theory is therefore likely to result in a multiplication of jurisdiction 
over the same money laundering scheme. A money laundering scheme often consists of many 
single acts, and each of them may constitute a separate money laundering offence. States may 
consider money laundering as made up of different kinds of conduct (the “separated” 
approach) or amalgamate it (the “collective” approach). In some States, which take the 
“collective approach”, all money laundering offences stemming from conducts involving the 
same money laundering scheme are amalgamated in one “collective” offence. This is the 
approach adopted in Vietnam. In other States, for example in the US, each money laundering 
act, which can be separately identified under the extensive definition provided for by the 
Money Laundering Control Act of 1986,
52
 can result in a separate indictment (the “separated” 
approach).
53
 The US exercises territorial jurisdiction over anyone who “transports, transmits, 
or transfers, or attempts to transport, transmit, or transfer a monetary instrument or funds 
from a place in the US to or through a place outside the US or to a place in the US from or 
through a place outside the US”.
54
 In addition, under section 1956(f) of 18 USC, there is 
extraterritorial jurisdiction over the money laundering offence committed by a non-US citizen 
which occurs in part in the US and involves funds or monetary instruments of a value 
exceeding US$10,000, even if the defendant has not been physically present in the US during 
the commission of the offence.
55
 This seems to be by far the most popular approach for States 
to establishing extraterritorial jurisdiction over money laundering. 
Furthermore, the subjective territorial principle can give rise to jurisdictional concurrence, 
because every State, on whose territory a constituent element of the money laundering 
                                                          
52
  Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, Pub L No 99-570, §§ 1351-1367, 1986 (The United States), 100 
Stat. 3207. 
53
  Aileen Chang and Andrew M. Herscowitz, “Money Laundering” (1994) 32 American Criminal Law Review 
499 at 513-514. 
54
  18 USC § 1956(a)(2). 
55
  In United States v. Stein, the court found that a foreign citizen, who makes a wire transfer of funds from or to 
the US while being abroad, is deemed to have acted “in part” in the US. In this case, a defendant, who 
initiated a transfer of funds from a place within the US to a place abroad without the physical presence in 




offence occurred, can claim jurisdiction over the entire money laundering offence. The 
question of how to address the jurisdictional concurrence and protect a person who has 
already been (or is being) prosecuted/or tried abroad for the same money laundering scheme, 
will be discussed later in this chapter.  
The objective territorial theory is strictly applied to the offences enumerated in article 
15(2)(ii) of the Palermo Convention which are actually the fourth type of conduct falling 
under money laundering offences - “participation in, association with, conspiracy,…”.
56
 A 
Party may establish jurisdiction over any of these offences committed outside its territory 
with a view to the commission of money laundering offences within its territory.
57
 The use of 
“with a view” indicates that the theory may extend to “intended effects” within a State’s 




5.3.2 The Nationality Principle 
 
Under the nationality (or active personality) principle, a State can assert criminal 
jurisdiction over its nationals, even when they are found outside their territory, and even 
when the perpetrator is no longer a national or has only become a national after committing 
the crime.
59
 From the perspective of international law, this principle is underpinned by the 
rationale that a State retains its sovereignty internationally over each national, even though 
traveling or residing abroad.
60
 As a result, the State can, based on allegiance, assert criminal 
jurisdiction over the acts of one of its nationals deemed criminal under that State’s laws.
61
  
In accordance with the jurisdictional provisions provided for in the 1988 Vienna 
Convention, the Palermo Convention and the UNCAC, State Parties may establish 
extraterritorial jurisdiction over money laundering offences committed abroad by their own 
                                                          
56
  Palermo Convention, above n4, article 6(1)(b)(ii). Four types of conduct of money laundering offences are 
described in chapter 4. 
57
  Ibid, article 15(2)(ii). 
58
  UNODC (2004), "Legislative Guides for the Implementation of the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols thereto" at 111, available at: 
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/legislative_guides/Legislative%20guides_Full%20version.pdf (accessed 21 
April 2013). 
59
  Ryngaert, above n11, at 88. 
60
  Christopher L. Blakesley and Otto Lagodny, “Finding Harmony Amidst Disagreement Over Extradition, 
Jurisdiction, the Role of Human Rights, and Issues of Extraterritoriality Under International Criminal Law” 
(1991) 24(1) Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 1 at 25. 
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 Under these provisions, unlike the strict territoriality principle, the nationality 
principle is optional rather than mandatory. In addition, an extended application of the 
nationality principle is the permissive jurisdiction over habitual residents. Article 15(2)(b) of 
the Palermo Convention and article 42(2)(b) of the UNCAC provide that a State Party may 
establish jurisdiction when “the offence is committed by a national of that State Party or a 
stateless person who has his or her habitual residence in its territory”. 
Although the nationality principle is universally recognized, its application varies 
significantly from State to State. Continental law European States, such as France and 
Germany, apply this principle in a substantially expansive manner. Article 113-6 of the 
French Penal Code, for instance, allows assertion of jurisdiction over almost every crime in 
French law, including money laundering, committed by French nationals outside French 
territory, provided that the conduct is punishable under the law of the country in which it was 
committed. The German Criminal Code states that “German criminal law shall apply to other 
offences committed abroad if the act is a criminal offence at the locality of its commission or 
if that locality is not subject to any criminal law jurisdiction, and if the offender was German 
at the time of the offence or became German after the commission”.
63
 
On the other hand, common law States have traditionally been reluctant to apply this 
jurisdictional principle. States often limit the application of nationality principle to given 
offences because of numerous reasons. One of the reasons is that the territoriality and 
nationality principles and the incidence of dual nationality create parallel jurisdictions and 
possible double jeopardy.
64
 The US exercises its jurisdiction on this principle over a 




It is worth mentioning that the application of the nationality principle to foreign corporate 
crime, which may include money laundering, relates to a series of debatable issues, such as 
the issue of determining nationality and legal status (whether corporation is recognized) of 
corporation. Other issues include whether the State involved accepts corporate criminality 
and how the condition of double criminality is applied if required. In fact, because there is no 
international unification of rules for the award of nationality of a corporation, the same 
                                                          
62
  Palermo Convention, above n4, article 15(2)(b); and UNCAC, above n14, article 42(2)(b). 
63
  German Criminal Code (English Translation by Prof. Dr. Michael Bohlander), above n46, section 7(2)1. 
64
  Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (7 ed, Oxford University Press, 2008) at 304. 
65
  18 USC § 1956(f) implies extraterritorial jurisdiction over the money laundering offence committed by a US 
citizen which involves funds or monetary instruments of values exceeding US$10,000. See more about the 
nationality principle in Bassiouni, above n61, 25-27; and Blakesley and Lagodny, above n60, at 25-32.  
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corporation may have different nationalities. Common law States usually adhere to the rule 
that a corporation is granted the nationality of the State under whose law it has been 
incorporated. Other States (e.g., France and Germany) determine a corporate entity’s 




5.3.3 The Aut Dedere Aut Judicare Principle 
 
The aut dedere aut judicare (extradite or prosecute) principle refers to the alternative 
obligation to extradite or prosecute, which is often contained in multilateral treaties to secure 
the prosecution for crimes of international concern.
67
 It generally obliges a State Party, in 
whose territory an alleged offender is found, either to extradite the offender (if it does not 
prosecute) to another State Party which is prepared to try him, or to prosecute him (if it does 
not extradite because of certain grounds).
 
In order to do so, this principle imposes two legal 
obligations on State Parties: i) to set up their law that if they refuse/fail to extradite, they must 
establish their own jurisdiction; and ii) to exercise that jurisdiction in a particular case if they 
refuse/fail to extradite. This principle is sometimes known as “subsidiary” universality.
68
  
Included in most suppression conventions,
69
 the aut dedere aut judicare principle can 
operate in a case of exercising enforcement jurisdiction over transnational money laundering 
as follows. Assuming that an alleged offender, who is a national living in State B, committed 
a money laundering offence involving State A. State A has established its jurisdiction over 
that money laundering offence on the basis, for example, of the principle of subjective 
territoriality. State B, aware of State A’s jurisdiction, has found the alleged offender in its 
territory. State A makes an extradition request to State B. If State B refuses to extradite, for 
example on the ground that the alleged offender is its national, State B must “submit the case 
to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution”, given that State B has law which 
enables it to exercise jurisdiction in such a situation. 
The operation of this principle is usually conditional. The requested State is often bound to 
initiate the prosecution over the offences in the suppression conventions (including money 
laundering) if the extradition is refused only on the grounds listed in article 4(2)(a) of the 
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1988 Vienna Convention (when the offence has been committed in its territory or on board a 
vessel flying its flag or an aircraft which was registered under its law at the time the offence 
was committed; or when the offence has been committed by one of its nationals), or listed in 
article 16(10) of the Palermo Convention (only when an alleged offender is one of its 
nationals). Usually, if the grounds upon which the extradition is refused are other than these, 
the requested State is under no mandatory obligation to initiate the prosecution. 
According to the wording of “submit” in article 6(9) of the 1988 Vienna Convention and 
article 16(10) of the Palermo Convention, once the requested State establishes the 
jurisdiction, there is no mandatory obligation to prosecute. The requested State remains free 
to exercise its criminal jurisdiction subject to its domestic law. It is only required to “take 
their decision and conduct their proceedings in the same manner as in the case of any other 




5.3.4 Concurrent Jurisdiction 
 
General 
In the case of transnational crime, the States concerned can assume their jurisdiction over 
the crime based upon the different aforementioned principles, and competing jurisdiction may 
occur. Nevertheless, neither general international law nor the suppression conventions 
provide a hierarchical application of jurisdictional principles.
71
 Thus, States normally do not 
have to struggle with the question of whether their own law permits them to establish 
jurisdiction over the crime, but rather which of the competing States has the most appropriate 
jurisdiction. In practice, although it is difficult to give detailed concrete guidelines or 
mechanisms for prioritizing concurrent criminal jurisdiction claims at the international level, 
some general suggestions have been given. The suppression conventions suggests that “States 
Parties shall consider the possibility of transferring to one another proceedings for the 
prosecution of an offence established in accordance with this Convention in cases where such 
transfer is considered to be in the interests of the proper administration of justice, in particular 
in cases where several jurisdictions are involved, with a view to concentrating the 
prosecution”.
72
 In another approach, Eurojust suggests that the prosecution should take place 
in the State “where the majority of the criminality occurred or where the majority of the loss 
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was sustained”, and that a number of factors should be taken into account in deciding which 
State is the most appropriate forum for the prosecution.
73
 In addition, the UN’s report on 
economic fraud also recommends elaborate criteria which should be considered to decide the 
most convenient forum for the prosecution for transnational frauds, when more than one State 
has jurisdiction and wants to prosecute.
74
 These criteria are:  
(a) The State which has suffered from the greatest direct and indirect harm. Harm 
provides incentive and justification for the prosecution. This State also usually has 
available evidence;  
(b) The State in which most of the elements of the offence were committed; 
(c) The State that has the greatest investment for investigative efforts in the case. 
This State usually has the commitment of resources and more evidence for prosecution; 
(d) The location of witnesses and evidence. Transferring evidence may cost 
significantly, and may affect the legal admissibility of the evidence; 
(e) The State that has the strongest case;  
(f) The State with the best capacity. States with extensive experience and 
resources may take prosecution, if that is legally feasible, or assist another State that has a 
claim but less capacity; 
(g) The nationality of the offender and whether he or she can be extradited;  
(h) Other offences involved or which may be prosecuted;  
(i) Other offenders that are involved or may be prosecuted; 
(j) The respective sentencing regimes. States are normally willing to cede 
jurisdiction to other States with similar punishment for the crime committed. 
The UN’s recommendation can be used when dealing with the jurisdictional concurrence 
over other transnational crimes, such as money laundering. The above suggestion and 
recommendation appears to indicate a tendency towards the application of the conflict of 
laws approach, such as the “centre of gravity” principle
75
 and the forum non conveniens 
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 to resolving instances of competing jurisdiction over transnational crime. The 
above-listed factors should be considered as criteria for determining the “centre of gravity” or 
the most convenient forum for prosecution of money laundering offences.  
In practice, whatever factors are ultimately employed to justify the States’ interests in the 
prosecution, negotiation and cooperation between the States involved is essential for 
evaluating and balancing those factors, then to reach a decision where to prosecute. The 
requirement of consultation and coordination is also provided for in the suppression 
conventions.
77
 The relevant State authorities should also consult with each other about the 
substance and procedure of prosecution, such as the application of any procedural defences or 
the allocation of cases.  
 
Concurrent jurisdiction over transnational money laundering 
In the case of transnational money laundering, the potential for concurrent jurisdiction 
claims will be the norm. Let us assume that Mr X who is a national of State A has 
participated in the transnational money laundering offence involving conduct in State B and 
State C. He travels to State B to commit an act of money laundering. In State B, he deposits 
illegal funds in banks (placement), and then he transfers these funds through accounts at 
various banks or by using shell corporations in State B (layering). Finally, the funds are 
transferred and integrated in State C, for example, by investing them in real estate, luxury 
assets or business ventures (integration). The fund transactions are mainly carried out by 
internet banking. It appears that States A, B and C each have jurisdiction over the “same” 
conduct of “transferring illegal fund knowing that such fund is the proceeds of crime” which 
results in the “same” money laundering offence. States B and C may each establish 
jurisdiction to adjudicate over Mr X for the “same” money laundering offence upon the 
subjective territoriality principle. In addition, State A may impose jurisdiction to adjudicate 
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on Mr X based upon the principle of nationality. In this hypothetical case, there is a potential 
concurrent jurisdiction which can be a negative or positive concurrence. Negative concurrent 
jurisdiction is the situation, in which no State claims jurisdiction over the offender or offence. 
Positive concurrent jurisdiction happens when more than one State claims jurisdiction over 
the same offender or offence. The case of positive jurisdictional concurrence, in which State 
A, B and C each seeks to prosecute Mr X for the “same” offence upon the principle of 
territoriality or nationality, will be discussed hereinafter.  
In practice, Mr X should not be prosecuted for the “same” offence sequentially by 
different States. Thus, the principle of ne bis in idem should be applied to this transnational 
context. It is also necessary to address the issue of prioritizing the claims of competing 
jurisdiction over the same money laundering offender or offence. More specifically, how and 
which factors should be considered to determine the most appropriate State for prosecution? 
In this case, subject to the UN’s suggestion,
78
 custody of the offender and nationality of the 
offender can be factors that are in favour of awarding jurisdictional priority. Assuming that 
Mr X is apprehended in State C; logically, on the basis that there is evidence indicating he 
has committed money laundering in State C, State C should be given the first opportunity to 
prosecute Mr X. If other States are satisfied with the outcome of prosecution conducted by 
State C, they should not pursue their own prosecutions. But what if Mr X travels to State C, 
commits the money laundering offence, and then returns to State A? In such a situation, both 
State A and State C have jurisdiction over the conduct in question and can prosecute Mr X. 
Both State A and C may want to prosecute Mr X. Under the aut dedere aut judicare 
principle, State A shall either extradite Mr X to State C for prosecution or prosecute him 
itself. Traditionally, Mr X’s nationality weighs heavily in favour of granting prosecution to 
State A. Another significant factor which should be taken into account is the place of 
prosecution of the predicate offence. The State which prosecutes both the money laundering 
offence and its predicate offence may arguably have a weightier claim to go first. In the 
situation where a State with a weaker legal basis has invested more resources into the 
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5.4 Interim Conclusion 
  
In brief, in practice, the principle of subjective territoriality is the predominant principle 
for the assertion of jurisdiction over transnational money laundering. This principle is given 
priority over other bases, such as the objective territoriality, “intended effects”, nationality 
and aut dedere aut judicare principles. While the application of the subjective territoriality 
principle is often mandatory, the application of other principles is optional, limited or 
discretionary.  
The nature of transnational money laundering offences potentially leads to problems of 
concurrent jurisdiction over the “same” money laundering offence. The priority of a 
jurisdictional claim depends on the combination of convincing grounds in particular cases. In 
some circumstances, a State which combines territorial jurisdiction with custody of the 
offenders should have the better claim. In others, the combination of nationality principle and 
custody of offender should have the priority. In addition, in some cases, the State where the 
predicate crime was committed or prosecuted should be favoured. However, in general, 
States traditionally first proceed with consultation and negotiation in dealing with instances 
of jurisdictional concurrence.  
 
 
5.5 Criminal Jurisdiction under Vietnamese Laws and its Application to 
Transnational Money Laundering  
 
The main purposes of this section are to examine the general criminal jurisdiction 
principles of Vietnam over transnational crime and how they can be applied to transnational 
money laundering. Because there has not yet been a recorded case of transnational money 
laundering over which Vietnam has asserted its criminal jurisdiction, the jurisdictional 
application and suggestions are limited to the “law in the books”. The section begins with a 
snapshot of how Vietnamese competent authorities exercise their jurisdiction (enforcement 
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5.5.1 Ordinary Criminal Jurisdiction 
 
The Penal Code provides for jurisdiction over all crimes, including money laundering, 
committed within the territory of Vietnam.
80
 The ordinary enforcement and adjudicative 
jurisdiction over a purely territorial criminal case are reflected mainly in the criminal 
proceedings against such criminal case, which are provided for in the law of criminal 
procedure. The sources of contemporary Vietnamese criminal procedure consist primarily of 
the Criminal Procedure Code,
81
 its legal interpretation, and the Ordinance on Criminal 
Investigation.
82
 Contemporary Vietnamese criminal procedure shares many characteristics of 
Russian criminal procedure
83
 and the criminal procedures of continental legal countries (e.g., 
France or Germany).
84
 It takes an inquisitorial approach and is dominated by a formal pre-
trial investigation.  
There are four basic stages in the criminal proceedings of a territorial criminal case in 
Vietnam. Further issues may arise when, for example, the crime is transnational.
85
 The first 
stage is “initiation of a criminal case” based on suspicion of any crime committed by 
anybody. A criminal case is usually initiated by the investigative bodies,
86
 or sometimes by 
the People’s Court or People’s Procuracy based on certain grounds.
87
 This stage normally 
works as follows. As soon as the competent investigative body obtains knowledge of a 
suspected crime, it is obliged to commence a “preliminary investigation” to decide whether 
there is evidence indicative of the potential crime. Within no more than two months, the 
investigative body must decide whether to formally initiate a criminal case. A criminal case 
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has to be formally initiated for further investigation when the investigative body discovers 
sufficient grounds for justifying a high degree of suspicion that the crime may have occurred. 
The investigative body is obliged to make a formal written decision of initiation of the 
criminal case. If this decision is made by someone other than procurator, it must be sent to 
the proper People’s Procuracy for approval before coming into effect.
88
 The Procuracy will 
also decide whether Vietnam has jurisdiction over a case with some extraterritorial aspects 
(e.g., the crime committed by foreigners or transnational crimes). It is noteworthy that the 
“preliminary investigation” may not relate to a specific person, it may be opened into the 
circumstances of a crime allegedly committed where no suspect has yet been identified. 
However, in the preliminary investigation, if the investigative body has sufficient evidence to 
charge a person with a specific crime, it shall issue a written order charging such person as an 
accused. This order must also be sent to the People’s Procuracy for approval. Thus, the 
decision to initiate a criminal case and the order charging a person can be made at the same 
time; but normally the former happens before the latter. The charges are usually laid at the 
stage of investigation.  
At the second stage, the stage of investigation, the criminal investigators (mainly police 
officials) are appointed to carry out the investigation into the criminal case under the 
supervision of a prosecutor. In practice, prosecutors have a relatively passive role, the 
investigators enjoy the dominant role in investigative activities. The investigators compile the 
investigative case file, start the process of collecting evidence and look for the suspects.  
When there is sufficient evidence to accuse the suspect, the charge is laid. In the process of 
investigation, if it is believed that the accused can obstruct the criminal proceedings, or can 
continue to commit crimes, the competent agencies (normally the police) can impose 
restraining measures on the accused, for example arrest, holding and detention.
89
 The 
investigative body can search relevant persons and/or premises, and seize anything found that 
may serve as evidence.
90
 The stage of investigation ends with its outcome including the 
investigative case file which contains evidence and records of the investigative actions (e.g., 
interrogation of the accused and testimony of witnesses, searches of persons and premises, 
and seizures of objects or money related to the crime); and a more important product - the 
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investigative conclusion report. If there is sufficient evidence to prove that the accused has 
committed the crime, the investigative conclusion report will propose the prosecution of the 
accused.  
Investigation is followed by the prosecution stage. Once the investigation is completed and 
the investigative conclusion report is issued, the case file and the report must be conveyed to 
the People’s Procuracy. Depending on its evaluation of the evidence, the People’s Procuracy 
then decides on one of three outcomes:
91
 i) prosecuting the accused before court by an 
indictment following the proposal of the investigative body; ii) returning the case file to the 
investigative body for further investigation; or iii) ceasing or suspending the criminal 
proceedings. If the decision to prosecute is made, the People’s Procuracy shall file the 
indictment and send it enclosed with the complete case file to the trial court. 
The final stage is trial. After receiving the case file including the indictment, the judges 
assigned to preside over the court sessions must examine the case file and settle other duties 
for the trial.
92
 Then, the judges shall make one of the following decisions: i) to bring the case 
to trial; ii) to return the case file for further investigation; or iii) to cease or suspend the 
criminal proceedings. If the judges decide to bring the case for trial, and the trial court shall 
prepare the hearings. The trial proceedings at first instance are quite similar to an adult trial at 
first instance in Germany.
93
 The standard court at first instance constitutes a judge and two 
“people’s assessors” (“hoi tham nhan dan”).
94
 In serious and complicated cases, it constitutes 
two judges and three assessors. The trial ends when the judgement is pronounced. The 
judgement shall decide whether the defendants are guilty, the punishment on convicted 
person, and other judicial measures.
95
 Relevant civil matters (e.g., compensation for the 
victim) can be settled through the bringing of a civil suit collateral to criminal proceedings (at 
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5.5.2 Criminal Jurisdiction over Transnational Crime 
 
Concept of transnational crime in Vietnamese legislation 
It should be noted that the general concept of transnational crime has not yet been 
provided for in any formal legal documents by Vietnam, although Vietnam has ratified the 
Palermo Convention. Nonetheless, the Vietnamese equivalent term (“toi pham xuyen quoc 
gia”) is used widely by both the authorities and the public and most categories of 
transnational crime have been provided for in the Penal Code.
96
 Besides there are specific 






 and money 
laundering.
100
 In practice, transnational crime is popularly referred to as cross-border crime.  
 
Legal provisions of criminal jurisdiction 
The general principles of criminal jurisdiction of Vietnam are provided for in articles 5 
and 6 of the Penal Code
101
 as follows: 
 
Article 5: The effect of the Penal Code on crimes committed on the territory of the Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam 
1. The Penal Code shall apply to all crimes committed on the territory of the Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam. 
2. The criminal liability of foreigners who commit crimes on the territory of the Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam but are entitled to diplomatic immunities or consular privileges and immunities under 
Vietnamese laws, under international treaties which the Socialist Republic of Vietnam has signed or 
acceded to, or under  international custom, shall be addressed by the diplomatic channels.  
Article 6: The effect of the Penal Code on crimes committed outside the territory of the Socialist Republic 
of Vietnam 
1. Vietnamese citizens who commit crimes outside the territory of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam may 
be examined for criminal liability in Vietnam according to this Code. 
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This provision shall also apply to stateless persons who permanently reside in the Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam. 
2. Foreigners who commit crimes outside the territory of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam may be 
examined for criminal liability according to the Penal Code of Vietnam in circumstances provided for in 
the international treaties which the Socialist Republic of Vietnam has signed or acceded to. 
 
It should be noted that these articles have been unchanged since they were provided for in 
the first Vietnam’s Penal Code in 1985. In addition, Vietnam has not introduced any formal 
legal interpretation of the articles, even after the ratification of the 1988 Vienna Convention, 
the UNCAC and the Palermo Convention in 1997, 2009 and 2012. 
 
Subjective territoriality jurisdiction 
It can be seen that, similarly to most States, Vietnam establishes its jurisdiction over all 
crimes committed on its territory. Although the Vietnamese criminal law does not formally 
provide any specific principle for determining when a crime is considered as having been 
committed on the territory of Vietnam, it is assumed that the principle of subjective 
territoriality is applied predominantly.
102
 Subjective territoriality has been applied firmly to 
numerous transnational drug trafficking cases. A number of foreign nationals who committed 
the crime of cross-border trade or transportation of narcotics between Vietnam and foreign 
countries were prosecuted, convicted and sentenced severely (even subject to the death 
penalty) in Vietnam.
103
 All of these accused were apprehended in the territory of Vietnam at 
the time the crime was committed.  
If at least one of the acts proscribed in article 250 or the amended article 251 of the 1999 
Penal Code occurs on the territory of Vietnam, Vietnam has jurisdiction over it. As Vietnam 
takes the “collective approach”, all the acts the perpetrator carries out can constitute only one 
of two offences under article 250 or amended article 251. 
 
“Quasi-territoriality” jurisdiction 
The principle of “quasi- territoriality” jurisdiction is not mentioned in any formal legal 
documents, although Vietnam customarily exercises its jurisdiction over crimes committed 
on its flag-vessels or registered aircraft.  
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Article 12(3) of the Maritime Code of Vietnam (2005) states that only vessels which have 
Vietnamese nationality can fly the Vietnamese flag.
104
 Vessels registered abroad are not 
allowed to fly the flag of Vietnam, unless the other registration has been temporarily 
terminated or eliminated.
105
 Hence, vessels flying the Vietnamese flag have only one 
nationality that is Vietnamese nationality. In a same vein, article 13(2) of the Law on Civil 
Aviation of Vietnam allows aircrafts to be registered as of Vietnamese nationality if, at the 
time of registering, they have not yet been registered elsewhere or their previous registrations 
have been terminated.
106
 These provisions prevent the potential for competing criminal 
jurisdiction over crimes committed on Vietnamese flag-vessels or on its registered aircraft. 
 
Nationality jurisdiction 
Nationality jurisdiction is optional for the establishment of extraterritorial criminal 
jurisdiction under article 6(1) of the Penal Code. This provision corresponds to the standards 
provided for in the suppression conventions. In practice, Vietnam has exercised this 
jurisdiction in a number of cases.
107
 It is assumed that nationality jurisdiction can be applied 
to transnational money laundering crimes committed abroad by Vietnamese nationals and 
may prove to be a useful tool in this regard. As Vietnam accepts dual nationality,
108
 
concurrent national jurisdiction is possible. 
 
Objective territoriality jurisdiction and the aut dedere aut judicare principle 
It can be seen that the article 6(2) of the 1999 Penal Code is very broad and it does not 
spell out the substance of any jurisdictional principle. This provision appears to be designed 
to cover other possible forms of jurisdiction, such as objective territoriality, “subsidiary” 
universality and universality jurisdiction. The general perception is that Vietnam may 
exercise these jurisdictions “in circumstances provided for in the international treaties”. 
These circumstances have not been specified in any sub-laws, so it is not clear in which exact 
circumstances the provision is to be applied. This vagueness is, of course, a hindrance to the 
implementation of article 6(2). Nevertheless, as Vietnam is a Party to the 1988 Vienna 
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Convention, the Palermo Convention and the UNCA, Vietnam can assert objective 
territoriality jurisdiction over some acts which fall under the fourth type of conduct of money 
laundering offences (participation in, association with and so on),
109
 excluding conspiracy 
(Vietnam does not criminalize conspiracy). Similarly, Vietnam can apply the aut dedere aut 
judicare principle to the offences criminalized by those Conventions, including money 




Double criminality condition 
Article 6 does not suggest that Vietnam expressly applied double criminality to exercising 
extraterritorial jurisdiction. Instead, it provides that the application of double criminality 
relies heavily on international treaties to which Vietnam is a Party. Since the suppression 
conventions oblige their State Parties to criminalize money laundering, so other State Parties 
will in fact have criminalized money laundering and the requirement of double criminality 
will be met. 
Vietnam’s law does not state clearly whether the predicate crimes for money laundering 
include crimes committed abroad. This inadequacy may preclude Vietnam from claiming 
jurisdiction over a money laundering activity which occurred in Vietnam, but its predicate 
crime was committed outside Vietnam and double criminality of the predicate crime is 
required. 
 
Ne bis in idem   
Vietnam became a Party the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1982. 
In 2003, the principle of ne bis in idem was first incorporated into article 107(4) of Vietnam’s 
Criminal Procedure Code, which provides that criminal proceedings shall be not instituted 
against a person for the offence for which he has already been subject to a legally valid 
judgment or a decision to cease his case.
111
 The principle is restated in article 31(4) of the 
Constitution of Vietnam as follows “no one shall be punished twice for the same crime”.
112
 
These provisions reflect Vietnam’s strong commitment to protecting human rights and civil 
rights of defendants in criminal proceedings.  
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How Vietnam applies this principle in a transnational context will be examined in chapters 
7 and 8.  
 
Dealing with jurisdictional concurrence 
Vietnam has not provided explicit guidance on resolving concurrence of criminal 
jurisdiction. There is only one relevant provision that is article 345(1) of the Criminal 
Procedure Code, which reads as follows: 
                   
For cases involving foreigners who have committed crimes on the territory of the Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam, if the criminal proceedings cannot be conducted because such persons have left the country, the 
competent agencies authorized conducting the criminal proceedings may send the case files to the 
Supreme People’s Procuracy in order to carry out the procedures for transferring them to the 
corresponding foreign authorities. 
 
Although this article provides for a simple procedure of transfer of proceedings against 
foreigners to foreign jurisdictions where the accused has left Vietnam is found, it can be used 
to address jurisdictional concurrence. For example, X, after committing a transnational 
money laundering offence in Vietnam which was involved in State A, fled to State A. 
Vietnam certainly can assert its jurisdiction and file the case and State A may also do. 
According to article 345(1) of the Vietnamese Criminal Procedure Code, Vietnam may 
transfer the case file to State A for the proceedings against X.     
 
5.5.3 Comments and Suggestions 
 
We can see that Vietnam has not transformed the general jurisdictional principles provided 
for in the suppression conventions into its criminal law. The legal provisions of jurisdictional 
principles of Vietnam remains unchanged under the diffusion of the international AMLSs. 
Vietnam can interpret broadly the existing legal provisions and rely on them to establish its 
extraterritorial jurisdiction over transnational money laundering. Nevertheless, the lack of 
formal legal provisions, such as the rules for localizing the conduct of transnational crime and 
the rules for establishing the “quasi- territoriality” jurisdiction, will disadvantage Vietnam’s 
authorities when dealing with transnational money laundering, especially in competing for 
jurisdiction over such crime. These inadequacies and the vagueness of article 6 of the Penal 
Code may lead to the authorities having a lack of confidence when using them. It also may 
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lead to successful challenges by the defendants, particularly by defendants who are resident 
abroad on view that Vietnam does not have clear jurisdictional principles over extraterritorial 
offences. 
An adequate legal framework for jurisdiction is necessary to guarantee the legitimacy of 
jurisdictional claims. In addition, Vietnam is a Party to the suppression conventions. Thus, 
Vietnam needs to remedy the shortcomings in articles 5 and 6 of the Penal Code by providing 
much greater detail about the principles of criminal jurisdiction that it applies in order to meet 
its international obligations under these conventions. The provisions of criminal jurisdiction 
in the French Penal Code and the German Criminal Code provide useful reference points for 
Vietnam in this regard.
113
 Article 113-2 of the French Penal Code (1994) reads that “an 
offence is deemed to have been committed within the territory of the French Republic where 
one of its constituent elements was committed within that territory”. The French courts have 
construed “constituent elements” expansively to include: preparatory acts, “preliminary 
condition” necessary for the commission of the offence, and the effects.
114
 Articles 113-3 and 
113-4 provide “quasi- territoriality” jurisdiction. Articles from 113-6 to 113-12 stipulate 
French jurisdiction over offences committed outside France. Vietnam should adopt this kind 
of specific language into its law. In addition, Vietnam should extend the coverage of the 
predicate crimes for money laundering to include certain crimes committed overseas. Section 
261(8) of the German Criminal Code states that objects which are proceeds from a predicate 
offence committed abroad are equal to those derived from a predicate offence in Germany if 
the offence is also punishable at the country where it occurred. Therefore, conduct that occurs 
abroad can constitute a predicate offense for money laundering under German law, provided 
that double criminality is met. Vietnam should introduce a similar provision into its law in 
order to maintain legality at a transnational level. 
The legitimacy of a criminal jurisdiction claim is fundamental, but is insufficient for 
success in exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction. The capacity of law enforcement agencies 
and reciprocity are other additional crucial requirements. The willingness of Vietnam’s law 
enforcement authorities to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction depends on their capacity, 
their interests in competing with other jurisdictions and the cooperation of their foreign 
counterparts. Prosecution of extraterritorial crimes usually requires significant resources, and 
would be very challenging for Vietnam in the absence of the willingness to cooperate of the 
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114
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other countries affected. Countries often cautiously weigh the costs, the difficulties and the 
interests in competing extraterritorial jurisdiction over a transnational crime. Vietnam’s 
authorities appear hesitant to claim and execute extraterritorial jurisdiction, especially in case 
of transnational money laundering, because of lack of both the legal basis and resources.
115
 
However, Vietnam should be ready for the circumstances of competing criminal jurisdiction 
over transnational money laundering. Vietnam needs to work out a policy to decide when it 
will claim jurisdiction in a situation of competing extraterritorial jurisdiction, particularly 
over money laundering that has taken place outside Vietnam. The “centre of gravity” 
approach to making that decision could be used effectively by Vietnam. Vietnam should take 
the list of factors that the UN set out in its report on economic fraud as a guide in this regard. 
For example, if it has suffered the “greatest direct or indirect harm” through a case of money 
laundering, then arguably there is a great “social danger” which suggests that, adhering to its 
own principles of material criminality, it should take jurisdiction and enforce that jurisdiction. 
This may be the case even when other competing States have much greater investigative 




The establishment by States of adequate criminal jurisdiction over transnational money 
laundering is fundamental to many aspects of the international response to money laundering. 
In order to avoid controversial unilateral assertion of jurisdiction, States have agreed on a 
number of reasonable principles on which to establish their exterritorial jurisdiction over the 
money laundering offence. By adopting the AML-related conventions, State Parties have 
been provided with both mandatory and optional principles for asserting jurisdiction over 
transnational money laundering offences. The principles of territoriality, nationality and aut 
dedere aut judicare are the best possible bases for the establishment of exterritorial 
jurisdiction over money laundering offences. Due to some weaknesses of the nationality and 
aut dedere aut judicare principle, such as the problems of dual nationality or nationality of 
corporations, the principle of subjective territoriality enjoys the predominant role. States 
often apply these jurisdictional principles in combination rather than alone. In addition, the 
assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction over money laundering offences should take account 
of double criminality of the predicate offences and the ne bis in idem principle. When 
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jurisdictional concurrence occurs, the involved countries should consult one another taking 
into account of a number of relevant factors and take the “centre of gravity” approach to 
deciding which State or forum eventually prosecutes.  
States less able to establish jurisdiction over money laundering are often those which have 
a weak legal basis and/or insufficient resources. Vietnam is one of these. Vietnam can utilize 
the existing jurisdictional provisions as the legal bases for claiming jurisdiction over 
transnational money laundering. However, in order to succeed in establishing jurisdiction, 
Vietnam should first and foremost provide: i) detailed rules for determining when a crime is 
considered to be committed in the territory of Vietnam; ii) clear guidance on how to localize 
the conduct of transnational money laundering offences; iii) “quasi- territoriality” 
jurisdiction; iv) guidance on the specific circumstances for asserting jurisdiction over 
Vietnamese citizens or foreigners who have allegedly committed crimes abroad; iv)  extended 
coverage of the predicate crimes including the crimes committed outside Vietnam; and v) 
how Vietnam exercises its own criminal jurisdiction over transnational crime if it refuses to 
extradite on the ground of territoriality or nationality. By providing these, Vietnam can 
implement adequately the international AMLSs on extraterritorial jurisdiction. However, this 
thesis argues that this just consitutes compliant implementation on paper; the implementation 
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Since the 1990s, it has been argued that the traditional responses to crimes, which focus on 
the punishment of offenders, such as imprisonment and fines, are insufficient for combating 
crimes generating huge proceeds (e.g., drug trafficking).
116
 Measures for the retrieval of 
criminal assets which entail the tracing, freezing or seizure and confiscation of criminal 
proceeds and instrumentalities have been developed as supplementary tools to international 
law and national law against these crimes. It is argued that the attack on proceeds and 
instrumentalities of crime will: i) deprive criminals of their illegal proceeds, thus reducing the 
motive of crime; and ii) eliminate the essential resources for committing future crimes, 
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including money laundering, and prevent criminals from infiltrating and corrupting the 
legitimate economy.
117
 In addition, confiscation is an effective means for recovering property 
that may be used to compensate the innocent victims of crime,
118
 and can make law 
enforcement pay for itself.
119
 Furthermore, the proceeds-following measures can provide a 
wide range of benefits for investigating bodies. For instance, tracing the money trail enables 
investigators to gather further information and evidence about the identification, financial 
background or property of suspects and criminals.
120
 As a result, provisional measures and 
confiscation of criminal assets have become indispensable components of the international 
AMLSs. 
Provisional measures and confiscation of criminal assets were first initiated internationally 
in the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances (1988 Vienna Convention),
121
 which concerns only drug-related crimes. Since 
then, they have been emphasized in the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organised Crime (Palermo Convention),
122
 the United Convention against Corruption 
(UNCAC)
123
 and the FATF Recommendations.
124
 These conventions and recommendations 
call for State Parties and member countries to adopt the necessary measures to enable the 
identification, tracing, freezing or seizure and eventually the confiscation of the criminal 
proceeds of various crimes. 
This chapter will first conceptualize “provisional measures”, “confiscation” and 
“forfeiture” as parts of national criminal jurisdiction (enforcement jurisdiction). It will then 
discuss the obligations and rules on confiscation of criminal assets, including the assets 
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involved in money laundering, provided for in international legal instruments and in the laws 
of some States. Last, but not least, the chapter will assess the compliance of Vietnamese 
confiscation legislation with the international standards and make suggestions for law reform.  
 
6.2 General Concepts 
 
6.2.1 The Concept of Provisional Measures 
 
Identifying, tracing, freezing or seizing the criminal proceeds or instrumentalities, known 
as “provisional measures”, aim at locating and preserving criminal assets for the eventual 
purposes of being able to execute a confiscation or forfeiture order. Freezing or seizure of the 
proceeds or alleged proceeds of crimes being investigated ensures that this property is not 
laundered or disposed of. Whilst freezing usually applies to intangible property (e.g., freezing 
money held in bank account), seizure applies to tangible property (e.g., seizure of cash, cars 
or houses). It should be noted that freezing or seizure, as a provisional measure for 
confiscation or forfeiture orders, is distinguishable from the traditional concept of seizure as 
an investigative measure used to preserve elements of proof. The suppression conventions 
define freezing or seizure as “temporarily prohibiting the transfer, conversion, disposition or 
movement of property or temporarily assuming custody or control of property on the basis of 
an order issued by a court or a competent authority”.
125
 Article 12(2) of the Palermo 
Convention provides that “States Parties shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to 
enable the identification, tracing, freezing or seizure of any item referred to in paragraph 1 of 
this article for the purpose of eventual confiscation”. 
The definition of “tracing” is not provided for in the suppression conventions. It seems 
that the meaning of “tracing”, as a provisional measure in the context of criminal law, is 
similar in some ways to the civil law (in the sense of private law) concept of “tracing”. In the 
civil law, “tracing”, which was first employed by English courts sitting in equity hundreds of 
years ago, is a well-established doctrine in English common law. “Tracing”, or “common law 
tracing”, is originally referred to as a tool used primarily in equitable claims.
126
 It indicates a 
set of rules for identifying property to which, or to a share in or a charge over which, a claim 
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 In this context, “property” is used in the following broad senses: i) to describe a 
physical object which belongs to you, or which you have the right to possess – often called 
tangible or corporeal property; ii) your legal rights in a physical thing to possess or use or 
control or benefit from that thing; iii) legal right or rights that a person do something, or 
refrain from doing something (e.g., copyright) - known as intangible or incorporeal 
property.
128
 The concept of “tracing” is continually evolving in the modern legal system as a 
relevant legal concept applied widely. In the criminal law context, normally most States 
provide their enforcement law agencies with the power to identify, trace, and locate criminal 
assets in the investigative stage.  
 
6.2.2 The Concepts of Forfeiture and Confiscation 
 
It is necessary to differentiate between “confiscation” and “forfeiture”, which are 
sometimes used interchangeably and are thus somewhat confusing, by exploring their 
evolution in English law and in US law. Among common law States, the UK and the US are 
the forerunners in developing legislation on confiscation and forfeiture. In English law, 
“forfeiture”, known as “object confiscation”, is an age-old term denoting the removal of the 
objects and impedimenta of crime or of instrumentalities used or intended for use in the 
commission of the crime. “These are things with which, or in which, or by possession of 
which, crime is committed”.
129





 The limitation on forfeiture in English law is the inability to 
forfeit the whole of criminal proceeds (normally beyond criminal profit) once transformed or 
hidden in other types of property.
132 
Thus, confiscation of the proceeds of crime was 
introduced in 1986 to remedy the deficiencies of forfeiture, with the principal aims of 
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preventing a criminal making profit from crime and of recovering the criminal revenue.
133
 By 
contrast, in US legislation, “forfeiture” has a much wider coverage, including models of the 
UK forfeiture and the UK confiscation of the proceeds of crime.
134
 
Many countries have followed the US provision of forfeiture or the UK legislation on 
confiscation. In some national legal systems, “confiscation” and “forfeiture” can be used 
interchangeably with a broad coverage. In others, “forfeiture” mainly relates to the 
instrumentalities of crime, and “confiscation” normally applies to the proceeds of crime. 
Nonetheless, in most States, forfeiture is a part of the traditional instruments of criminal law, 
although the terminology and its focus may be different.
135
  
The suppression conventions define “confiscation”, which includes “forfeiture” where 
applicable, as the permanent deprivation of property by order of a court or other competent 
authority.
136
 Because there is no international consistency in the use of the terms 
“confiscation” and “forfeiture”, the above definition has been used in many international 
instruments in order to prevent any dispute regarding terminology from obstructing the 
application of the provision.
137
 Further, this definition is used as the basis of international 
cooperation for purposes of confiscation. This definition does not reflect a specific legal 
provision as a stringent binding rule. Rather, it ensures the most efficient and faithful 
application of confiscation legislation.
138
 Apparently, the definition of “confiscation” which 
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includes “forfeiture” where applicable prevents the requested State from refusing cooperation 
on the ground that its national law only provides for “forfeiture” in the case under question.  
Responding to international initiatives calling for the adoption of provisional measures and 
confiscation “to the greatest extent possible within their domestic legal systems”,
139
 the terms 
“confiscation” and “confiscation of proceeds of crime” have been adopted widely with a 
more comprehensive scope in national legislation. States have strived to comply with the 
international standards of provisional measures and confiscation. In most national legislation, 
confiscation of the criminal proceeds refers to the permanent deprivation, by order of a court 
or other competent authorities, of any property derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, 
through the commission of an offence.
140
 In order to avoid confusion about wording, 
hereafter, the term “confiscation” is used in its broadest sense to include what the US calls 
“forfeiture”. 
 
6.2.3 “Property Confiscation” and “Value Confiscation” 
 
“Property Confiscation” 
The suppression conventions categorize the assets subject to confiscation as follows: i) the 
proceeds of crime or property the value of which corresponds to such proceeds; and ii) 
property, equipment or other instrumentalities used in or intended (or destined) for use in 
offences.
141
 The confiscation of these types of asset can be called “property confiscation”.
142
 
In the first category, the proceeds of crime includes the property obtained directly through 
commission of the crime, like the money paid for a consignment of drugs; and the property 
indirectly derived from an offence, for example, the property purchased with criminal profit. 
The confiscation of “property the value of which corresponds to such proceeds” can satisfy 
the claim on confiscation of property legally acquired. It enables confiscation of the property 
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with which criminal proceeds have been intermingled, based upon the assessed value of the 
intermingled proceeds by competent authorities.
143
  
In terms of the second category, the term “instrumentalities” is not defined in either the 
1988 Vienna Convention or the Palermo Convention. However, article 1(c) of the 1990 
Strasbourg Convention defined this term to mean “any property used or intended to be used, 
in any manner, wholly or in part, to commit a criminal offence or criminal offences”.
144
 This 
definition would cover property or equipment used to facilitate or intended for use in the 
commission of offences.  
In a more detailed interpretation related to money laundering offences, the FATF calls for 
the adoption of measures to enable countries to confiscate property laundered, proceeds from 
money laundering or predicate offences, instrumentalities used in or intended for use in the 
commission of these offences, or property of corresponding value, without prejudicing the 
rights of bona fide third parties.
145
 The property laundered is actually included in the 
coverage of the above-categorized proceeds and instrumentalities.  
 
“Value confiscation” 
Article 12(4) of the Palermo convention stipulates that “[i]f proceeds of crime have been 
intermingled with property acquired from legitimate sources, such property shall, without 
prejudice to any powers relating to freezing or seizure, be liable to confiscation up to the 
assessed value of the intermingled proceeds”. In addition, income or other benefits generated 
from the proceeds of crime shall be also subject to confiscation.
146
 This is known as “value 
confiscation”. This type of confiscation is helpful in circumstances where the criminal 
proceeds cannot be located, or have been transferred to a third party, or have been removed 
from the jurisdiction, or have been rendered worthless.
147
 
Some countries (e.g., the US, the UK, Germany and France) apply “value confiscation” to 
their model of conviction-based confiscation.
148
 According to this approach, a convicted 
person is ordered to pay an amount of money equivalent to the value of the benefit he 
obtained through his criminal conduct. The court, competent authority or jury calculates that 
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benefit. Article 131-21 of the French Criminal Code, for example, provides inter alia that 
“[w]here the thing confiscated has not been seized or cannot be produced, confiscation in 
value is imposed. For the recovery of the sum representing the value of the thing confiscated, 
the provisions governing judicial enforcement of public debts apply”. Section 73a of the 




To the extent that the confiscation of a particular object is impossible due to the nature of what was 
obtained or for some other reason or because confiscation of a surrogate object pursuant to section 73(2) 
2
nd
 sentence has not been ordered, the court shall order the confiscation of a sum of money which 
corresponds to the value of what was obtained. The court shall also make such an order in addition to the 
confiscation of an object to the extent that its value falls short of the value of what was originally 
obtained. 
 
One of the common challenges of applying “value confiscation” is to assess the amount of 
money that represents the benefit derived from a criminal conduct. The practice of the UK 
illustrated below will show the nature of that challenge. 
 
6.3 International Standards on Procedures for Retrieving Criminal Assets and 
Variations in National Implementation 
 
This section discusses two dominant models of confiscation provided for in both national 
legislation (the US and the UK) and the international legal instruments (the suppression 
conventions and the FATF Recommendations), namely conviction-based confiscation and 
non-conviction based confiscation. The discussion focuses on the procedure as well as the 
burden of proof of each model and its variations in the national practice. 
 
6.3.1 Conviction-based Confiscation  
 
General 
Conviction-based confiscation is the classic model of the confiscation order imposed 
normally as a part of the sentence directly and personally on the convicted person. It is also 
known as in personam confiscation (confiscation against the person). In some countries, such 
as the US and the UK, conviction-based confiscation is regulated by specific statutes. In 
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others, it is generally perceived as a traditional punitive and preventive legal instrument 
provided for in their criminal laws or criminal procedure laws (e.g., France and Germany
150
).  
In most States, an order confiscating criminal assets is a part of the sentencing proceedings 
against the accused. In addition to sentencing the accused, the sentencing court may order 
confiscation of the proceeds of the accused’s crime or the instrumentalities used or intended 
for use in the crime. A conviction-based confiscation order is issued following the criminal 
conviction of the holder of the asset, based upon the proof of a link between that asset and the 
crime for which the holder was convicted. Regarding the burden of proving that the 
defendant obtained proceeds from his crime, some countries adopt the criminal standard, 
others apply the civil standard.
151
 It is evident that the criminal standard of such proof will be 
difficult to satisfy in some cases. A common difficulty will arise when confiscating the 
proceeds of crimes which have no direct victim of identifying who can supply evidence on 
the nature of crime and its proceeds. Drug trafficking is an example of an offence which has 
no direct victim who can be available to identify the profits derived from the criminal 
conduct.
152
 Similarly, in the case of money laundering, there is no direct victim. In a case 
where a defendant is convicted of self- money laundering, States may wish to strip the 
defendant of all the proceeds obtained from both his predicate offence and from the money 
laundering offence for which defendant is immediately convicted. If so, and if the predicate 
offence is committed abroad without a direct victim, it will often be onerous for the 
prosecutor (or other competent authorities) to satisfy the criminal standard of proof (if 
applied) that certain proceeds have been derived from such predicate offence.  
States have questioned whether and if so how the standard of proof of a link between the 
alleged assets subject to confiscation and the crime for which the holder was convicted can be 
eased. In fact, many States allow a reversal of the burden of proof to the defendants in certain 
circumstances (e.g., the US and the UK). This is also provided for as an option in article 5(7) 
of the 1988 Vienna Convention and article 12(7) of the Palermo Convention. In the cases 
mentioned above, for the purposes of more effective confiscation, the burden of proof may be 
reversed. It should be stressed that this reversal of the burden of proof is applicable only for 
the purpose of confiscation, and normally occurs after the conviction. This reversal of the 
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burden of proof, however, has raised controversies about a violation of the fundamental 
aspects of fair trial, namely the presumption of innocence until proven guilty.153 
 
Conviction-based forfeiture (or criminal forfeiture) in the US 
US criminal forfeiture includes both “property forfeiture” and “value forfeiture”. The 
criminal forfeiture is governed by various statues, for example title 18 USC § 1963 (criminal 
forfeiture of assets involved in offences under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act (RICO)), 18 USC § 982 (money laundering criminal forfeiture) and 21 
USC § 853 (drug offence criminal forfeiture), and Rule 32.2 of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure.
154
 The general criminal forfeiture process is as follows: i) the prosecutor must 
give the defendant notice of the government’s intent to forfeit their assets as part of any 
sentence by including a forfeiture allegation in the indictment;
155
 ii) at trial, as soon as the 
defendant is convicted, the court must determine what assets are subject to forfeiture under 
the applicable statutes, based on evidence that the government has established the requisite 
nexus between the assets and the offence.
156
 The asset may be in form of money judgement, 
directly forfeitable property or substitute assets;
157
 and iii) once the court finds the assets 
subject to forfeiture, it must make a preliminary forfeiture order.
158
  
Regarding the forfeiture of assets involved in money laundering, title 18 USC § 982(a)(1) 
states that “the court, in imposing sentence on a person convicted of an offense in violation of 
section 1956, 1957, or 1960 of this title, shall order that the person forfeit to the United States 
any property, real or personal, involved in such offense, or any property traceable to such 
property”. It should be noted that while the government's burden of proof in RICO criminal 
forfeiture is the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard (criminal standard),
159
 the 
“preponderance” standard (civil standard) governs the forfeiture in case of drug offences 
(under 21 USC § 853)
160
 and money laundering offences (under 18 USC § 982(a)(1)).
161
 
                                                          
153
  Article 6(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights, 4 November 1950, and article 14(2) of 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171, entry into force 23 
March 1976,  which provides that “everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent 
until proved guilty according to law”. 
154
  Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure  (the United States), as amended in 1 December 2012. 
155
  Ibid, rule 32.2(a). 
156
  Ibid, rule 32.2(b)(1)(A). 
157
  Ibid, rule 32.2(b)(2)(A). See U.S. v. Candelaria-Silva, 166 F.3d 19 (1st Cir. 1999) 42. 
158
  Ibid. 
159
  See U.S. v. Pelullo, 14 F.3d 881 (3rd Cir. 1994). 
160
  See U.S v. Sandini, 816 F.2d 869 (3rd Cir. 1987). 
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Section 18 USC § 982(a)(1) provides that the court, in imposing sentence on a person 
convicted of money laundering offences, shall order that the person forfeit to the US any 
property, real or personal, involved in such offense, or any property traceable to such 
property. Under this provision, the government can forfeiture the property being laundered, 
other property that is commingled with it or obtained from the money laundering offence, and 
other property that facilitates the money laundering offence.
162
 Thus, the property subject to 
forfeiture may include, for example, clean property the defendant used to conceal or disguise 
laundered funds, such as real property, securities, and luxury items in which he invested the 
laundered funds to hide them. 
 
Conviction-based confiscation in the UK 
Conviction-based confiscation in the UK is provided for in the Proceeds of Crimes Act 
2002 (POCA 2002).
163
 Accordingly, after a defendant (D) is convicted, the prosecutor asks 
the court to consider confiscation (or the court believes it is appropriate to do so).
164
 The 
court may then make a confiscation order requiring D to pay a sum of money in addition to 
any sentence that the court may impose on D. The sum of money represents the benefit 
obtained through D’s criminal conduct. This confiscation order is referred to as “value 
confiscation” which is distinguished from UK forfeiture categorized as “property 
confiscation”.
165
 Before making a confiscation order, the court is required to address three 
questions:
166
 i) whether D has a criminal lifestyle (as explained below this becomes relevant 
to what can be confiscated);
167
 ii) if he has, whether he has benefited from his general 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
161
  The term “traceable to” in 18 USC § 982 has been held to mean that “government must prove by 
preponderance of the evidence that the property it seeks in satisfaction of the amount of criminal forfeiture to 
which it is entitled has some nexus to the property involved in the money laundering offense”. See U.S. v. 
Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050 (3rd Cir. 1996) 1084. 
162
  See U.S. v. Hawkey, 148 F.3d 920 (8th Cir. 1998) 927. 
163
  The POCA 2002 is the comprehensive statue on confiscation of the proceeds of crime in the UK which was 
previously contained in the Drug Trafficking Act of 1994 (as regards the proceeds of drug trafficking) and in 
part VI of the Criminal Justice Act of 1988 (as regards the proceeds of indictable offences and certain 
summary offences). 
164
  POCA 2002, s6(3). 
165
  Forfeiture in English law is described in 6.2.2 of this chapter. 
166
  POCA 2002, s6(4). 
167
  See POCA 2002, s75. Section 75(2) of POCA 2002 details the conditions to satisfy a criminal lifestyle. 
POCA 2002 (Schedules 2 & 4) provides for certain criminal offences which are regarded themself to be 





 and iii) if he does not have a criminal lifestyle, then whether he has 
benefited from his particular criminal conduct.
169
 If the court decides that D has benefited 
from the conduct referred, it must decide the “recoverable amount”,
170
 and then make a 
confiscation order requiring D to pay that amount.
171
 The court must answer to the questions 
and make the decisions based on a “balance of probabilities”.
172
 It means that the burden of 
proof in the process of making a confiscation order is the civil burden.  
One of the controversial issues is determining the “recoverable amount”. If the defendant 
can satisfy the court that the amount available for recovery (“available amount”) is less than 
the “recoverable amount”, then the court may only make a confiscation order of that lower 
amount.
173
 In addition, according to section 10 of POCA 2002, if the court decides that the 
defendant has a criminal lifestyle and has benefited from his general criminal conduct, the 
court is entitled to assume that any expenditure incurred by the defendant over the six years 
before he was convicted was the property obtained by him through his criminal conduct, 
unless the defendant can prove the expenditure was not the proceeds of crime.
174
 It is 
noticeable that the assumptions under section 10 of POCA 2002 do not violate article 6(2) of 
the European Convention on Human Rights, because the confiscation proceedings is not part 







                                                          
168
  General criminal conduct is all of the defendant's criminal conduct. It is immaterial whether the conduct 
occurred before or after the passing of the Act or whether property constituting a benefit was obtained before 
or after the passing of the Act (POCA 2002, s 76(2)). 
169
  Section 76(3) of POCA 2002 sets out the definition of particular criminal conduct.  
170
  It is an amount equal to the defendant’s benefit from the conduct concerned. See POCA 2002, s7(2). 
171
  POCA 2002, s6(5). In R v May, the House of Lords noted that there were three questions the court must ask 
itself and answer: i) has the defendant (D) benefited from the relevant criminal conduct? If the answer to this 
question is negative, the inquiry ends; otherwise, the second question is: ii) what is the value of the benefit D 
has so obtained; and iii) what sum is recoverable from D? See R v May, [2008] 1 A.C. 1028, 1034. 
172
  POCA 2002, s6(7). 
173
  See R. v Comiskey (1991) 93 Cr. App. R. 227. 
174
  In R v Levin, the court noted that “there had been a sea change in the conduct of confiscation proceedings, 
which were now to be viewed through the prism of the amendments. First, the burden of proof was the civil 
burden. Secondly, the court might make far-reaching assumptions. Thirdly, the court might require the 
defendant to provide information, and might draw inferences from his failure to do so. Fourthly, the court 
might rely both on evidence at trial and on any relevant information, properly obtained both before trial and 
thereafter, in order to determine a defendant's benefit and the amount to be recovered”. See R v Levin [2004] 
2 Cr. App. R. (S) 61, 325. 
175
  See Philips v The United Kingdom [2001] Crim L.R. 817. 
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6.3.2 Non-conviction based Confiscation 
 
Non-conviction based confiscation, also known as in rem confiscation (against the 
property, not against the owner), is defined by the FATF as confiscation through judicial 
procedures related to a criminal offence for which a criminal conviction is not required.
176
 
Although having the same objective as conviction-based confiscation, that is to confiscate 
criminal proceeds, non-conviction based confiscation works differently. An in rem 
confiscation order may be either (i) not part of criminal proceedings or (ii) made within the 
context of criminal proceedings but without the necessity of having to establish the criminal 
guilt of the property holders. In rem confiscation is used widely in the US (civil forfeiture or 
administrative forfeiture), and is now deployed effectively in many other countries (e.g., the 
UK,
177
 South Africa and Australia).
178
  
In the US, procedurally, in rem forfeiture (or civil forfeiture
179
) case is much like a civil 
action (entirely outside criminal proceedings). It is based on the legal fiction that the 
government is the plaintiff, the property is the “defendant”, and the persons objecting to the 
forfeiture are “claimants”.
180
 The government files a forfeiture complaint alleging that the 
property in question is subject to forfeiture under the applicable forfeiture statute, and then 
proves on a preponderance of the evidence that the property was the proceeds or 
instrumentalities of crime. “Claimants” with an interest in the property are required to file 
claims to the property, and to respond to the forfeiture complaint within a certain period of 
time. If the government is successful, and no one files a claim or no “claimant” succeeds in 
proving that they are the innocent property owner, the court will issue judgment in favor of 
                                                          
176
  FATF (2012), "The FATF Recommendations - Glossary" at 119, available at: http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF_Recommendations.pdf (accessed 21 July 
2013). 
177
  Under POCA 2002 (s294-300), the UK has four different schemes for confiscation and recovery measures 
with regard to proceeds of crime: 1) confiscation following a criminal conviction; 2) civil recovery; 3) 
taxation; and 4) forfeiture of cash. Civil recovery and the forfeiture of cash scheme are forms of in rem 
confiscation in the UK. Part 5 of POCA 2002 includes a civil recovery scheme which empowers the 
enforcement authority to recover through civil proceedings property that is, or represents the proceeds of 
unlawful conduct whether or not criminal proceedings have been brought (s240(2) of POCA 2002). This part 
also provides forfeiture of cash scheme which enables cash that is, or represents the proceeds of unlawful 
conduct, or that is intended to be used in unlawful conduct to be forfeited in civil proceedings. 
178
  Stefan D. Cassella, “The case for civil forfeiture: Why in rem proceedings are an essential tool for 
recovering the proceeds of crime” (2008) 11(1) Journal of Money Laundering Control 8 at 10. 
179
  General about property subject to civil forfeiture and the provisional measures is mainly provided for in title 
18 USC § 981. 
180
  Stefan D. Cassella, “Overview of Asset Forfeiture Law in the United States” (2004) 17(3) South African 
Journal of Criminal Justice 347 at 357-359. 
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the government, and the property will be forfeited directly to the State. This procedure can, at 
the same time, provide opportunities for protection of innocent owners, and resolve the third 
party claims involved in the property.
181
 The forfeiture complaint can be filed before or after 
indictment, or even when there is no indictment. Under title 18 USC § 981(a)(1), assets 
involved in money laundering subject to civil forfeiture include any property, real or 
personal, involved in a transaction or attempted transaction in violation of title 18 USC § 
1956, 1957 and 1960, or any property traceable to such property.
182
  
As there is no need for a criminal conviction, in rem confiscation can be used in certain 
cases to which in personam confiscation is not applicable. These include, for example, when 
the defendant has died, the wrongdoer is unknown,
183
 the property belongs to a third party,
184
 
the wrongdoer is a fugitive,
185
 or when the accused has already been prosecuted in a foreign 
country but the property related to crime is located in the State seeking to forfeit it.
186
 
However, in rem confiscation may not be used to confiscate the property traceable to offence 
in certain circumstances, for example the criminal proceeds commingled with other legal 
funds. This case can be dealt with by applying in personam confiscation in the form of “value 




6.3.3 Variations in National Confiscation Legislation 
 
In the various national legal systems, although driven by the same goals, confiscation 
legislation is quite diverse and has its own characteristics. Even the confiscation legislation of 
States which are Parties to the suppression conventions or members of the FATF, and thus 
                                                          
181
  See U.S. v. All Funds in Account Nos. 747.034/278, 747.009/278, & 747.714/278 in Banco Espanol de 
Credito, Spain, 295 F.3d 23 (C.A.D.Cir. 2002) 24, the court noted that “civil forfeiture actions are brought 
against property, not people. The owner of the property may intervene to protect his interest”. 
182
  In U.S. v. $15,270,885.69 on Deposit in Account No. 8900261137, 2000 WL 1234593 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) 4, 
the court ruled that money in a bank account can be forfeited as property involved in an attempted 
transaction of a money laundering scheme. 
183
  In U.S. v. $252,300.00 in U.S. Currency, 484 F.3d 1271 (10th Cir. 2007), the court held that money found in 
a truck, which was proved (by preponderance of evidence) to be substantially connected to illegal drug 
trafficking, was forfeited to the government. 
184
  See U.S. v. Real Property and Premises known as 464 Myrtle Ave., 2003 WL 21056786 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) 
185
  See U.S. v. $6,976,934.65 Plus Interest, 478 F.Supp.2d 30 (D.D.C. 2007). 
186
  See U.S. v. Union Bank For Savings & Investment (Jordan), 487 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2007). 
187
  In U.S. v. Voigt, above n161, at 1084, 1088, the court held that a defendant convicted of laundering US$1.6 
million was required to forfeit that amount as a money judgment, and that if the government could not 
directly trace any forfeitable proceeds to the defendant's current assets, the government could satisfy the 
US$1.6 million judgment by seeking forfeiture of the defendant's assets as substitute assets. 
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are subject to the general mandatory provisions of these instruments, still differ in one or 
another of the following respects.  
According to the FATF’s mutual evaluation reports, whilst many States have both 
“property confiscation” and “value confiscation”, some have only a “property confiscation” 
system (e.g., China
188
). However, the FATF does not recommend its member countries adopt 
“value confiscation”. 
With regard to the scope of application, while originally applied only to the proceeds of 
drug trafficking, confiscation legislation in most States has now been applied to various 
categories of crime. Some States have specific confiscation legislation applied to all serious 
offences, such as the UK (as examined above). Others apply their confiscation legislation to 
only a list of more serious offences, for example the US (as described above). 
Confiscating the property of a third party is another complicated issue in national 
confiscation legislation. Most States allow the confiscation of the property or equivalent 
value (where “value confiscation” is applicable) from third parties who are not defendants. 
For example, they allow confiscation from the persons who are holding property that they 
know to be of criminal origin (a fairly common situation). This property may be a direct or 
indirect gift from a defendant, or may be still subject to the control of defendant. This 
confiscation procedure must protect the rights of bona fide third parties as stated in article 
5(8) of the 1988 Vienna Convention and article 12(8) of the Palermo Convention. States can 
protect the rights of bona fide third parties by granting, for instance:  the right of all interested 
parties to be informed about a possible confiscation order; the right to intervene in the 
procedure for determining a confiscation order including the right to hear and present 
evidence or testimony at the trial stage; and the right to challenge the confiscation order when 
already ordered.  
 
6.4 Interim Conclusion 
 
In summary, subject to the fundamental principles of their national legal systems, most 
States have developed their own confiscation legislation. The broad application of 
confiscation of criminal assets, flexible procedures for confiscation and an easier standard of 
proof applicable to confiscation order are notable trends in a number of States.  “Property 
                                                          
188
  FATF (2007), "First Mutual Evaluation Report on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of 
Terrorism  " at 37, available at: http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer/MER%20China%20full.pdf (accessed 20 March 2014). 
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confiscation” and “value confiscation”, “conviction-based confiscation” and “non-conviction 
based confiscation” have been applied to the proceeds of a broad range of serious crimes, not 
just drug trafficking as originally provided for. The standard of proof for a confiscation order 
has been eased by the use of the civil standard in some jurisdictions. A reversal of the burden 
of proof in relation to the criminal origin of alleged proceeds of crime is also used in some 
jurisdictions to facilitate the confiscation order.  
In addition, the legal framework for international cooperation in provisional measures and 
confiscation has made these provisions a “new” aspect of mutual legal assistance in criminal 
matters. This will be discussed in chapter 7. 
 
6.5 Vietnamese Legislation on Confiscation of Criminal Assets 
 
The Vietnamese legal framework for confiscation of criminal assets consists of several 
scattered provisions, found mainly in the 1999 Penal Code,
189
 the Criminal Procedure Code
190
 
and the Law on Prevention and Suppression of Money Laundering.
191
 It is noticeable that in 
Vietnam, confiscation of criminal assets is conceptualized as a part of criminal proceedings 
(i.e. conviction-based conviction). Non-conviction based confiscation of criminal assets is 
unknown in Vietnam. This section will undertake a comparative analysis of the current 
Vietnamese legislation on confiscation of criminal assets. Comments and suggestion will also 
be given. 
 
6.5.1 Relevant Concepts and Terminologies 
 
The rules relating to the control of evidence are relevant to provisional and final measures 
for the lawful removal of the proceeds of crime, in fact these rules substitute for separate 
procedures in this regard. It is noteworthy that there is no separate law of evidence in 
Vietnam. All rules governing the presentation of facts and proof at criminal trial, the 
admissibility of evidence and the exclusionary rules are provided for in the Criminal 
                                                          
189
  Bo Luat Hinh Su [Penal Code] (Vietnam) Law No. 15/1999/QH10, 21 December 1999, entered into force 1 
July 2000, article 41. 
190
  Bo Luat To Tung Hinh Su [Criminal Procedure Code] (Vietnam) Law No. 19/2003/QH11, 26 Novemeber 
2003, entered into force 1 July 2004, article 74 and 76. 
191
  Luat Phong, Chong Rua Tien [Law on Prevention and Suppression of Money Laundering] (Vietnam) Law 
No. 07/2012/QH13, 18 June 2012, entered into force 1 January 2013, articles 33 and 34 
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Procedure Code. Evidence is classified into four types:
192
 i) material evidence; ii) testimony 
of witness, statements of parties (including statements of victim, defendants or persons who 
have interests or obligations involved); iv) expert opinions; and v) records of the investigative 
activities and documentary evidence. Evidence is admissible in court only when: i) it is 
objective fact; ii) the collation is subject to procedural rules provided for in the Criminal 
Procedure Code; and iii) it is probative.  
Material evidence includes things used as instruments and means for the commission of 
crime, things having any trace of the criminal (e.g., blood or fingerprints of the offenders), 
things serving as subjects of the crime, money and other things having evidentiary value.
193
 
Thus, material evidence overlaps with the concept of the “proceeds of crime” defined by the 
suppression conventions. Instrumentalities for the commission of crime are material 
evidence. 
There is no Vietnamese term equivalent to the term “proceeds of crime”. The definition of 
property is provided in the Civil Code
194
 and the Law on Prevention and Suppression of 
Money Laundering.
195
 However, the terms “objects” (vat) and “property” (tai san) used in 
several provisions in the Penal Code and Criminal Procedure Code, which are relevant to 
provisional measures or confiscation, are not consistent with this definition.
196
 They indicate 
only tangible things and differ from money and other forms of incorporeal property. 
 
6.5.2 Provisional Measures 
 
“Tracing” laws like those involved in “common law tracing” do not exist in Vietnam. In 
addition, Vietnamese law does not provide for any particular legal provision permitting the 
imposition of provisional measures on property that is or may become subject to confiscation 
or is suspected of being the proceeds of crime. However, a number of provisions, which are 
obviously drafted for the main purpose of collecting and preserving evidence, allow 
investigative bodies to impose something like provisional measures for the eventual purpose 
of confiscation of criminal assets.  
                                                          
192
  Criminal Procedure Code, above n190, article 64(2). 
193
  Ibid, article 74. 
194
  Bo Luat Dan Su [Civil Code] (Vietnam) Law No.  33/2005/QH11, 14 June 2005, entered into force 1 
January 2006, article 163 provides for “property comprises objects, money, valuable papers and property 
rights”. 
195
  Law on Prevention and Suppression of Money Laundering, above n191, article 4(2). 
196
  This problem has been mentioned in section 4.4.1 of chapter 4. 
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Criminal assets can be identified and traced through the process of “Collation of 
Evidence” and “Evaluation of Evidence” provided for respectively in articles 65 and 66 of the 
Criminal Procedure Code, which state as follows: 
 
Article 65: 
1. Investigative bodies, the procuracy and the courts, in order to collate evidence, have the right to: 
summon those persons who have knowledge of the case to ask them for and hear their statements on 
the facts concerning the case; request expert examination; conduct searches, scene screening, and 
other investigative activities prescribed by this Code; require institutions and individuals involved to 
provide documents, objects, statements for proving the true circumstances of the case. 
2. Persons participating in criminal proceedings, institutions, organizations or any individuals may 
present documents, objects and statements on the facts related to the case. 
 
Article 66: 
1. Every piece of evidence shall be evaluated to examine its legality, reality and probative value. The 
examination of collated evidence shall be ensured to handle a criminal case. 
2. Investigators, procurators, judges and assessors, after thoroughly and objectively considering the 
circumstances of the case with the full spirit of responsibility, shall evaluate and examine all 
evidence of the case. 
 
In addition, criminal assets can be seized pursuant to articles 144 and 145 of the Criminal 
Procedure Code. Article 144 allows for the seizure of correspondence, telegrams and postal 
parcels from the post office by warrant. Article 145 authorizes investigators to seize material 
evidence during a search.  
A further power is provided for in article 33 of the Law on Prevention and Suppression of 
Money Laundering (Law on PSML), which provides that “reporting entities” shall suspend a 
“suspicious transaction” or the transaction that is believed to relate to criminal activities.
197
 
“Reporting entities” are defined by this law as institutions and individuals who are financial 
institutions, designated-non financial businesses and professions according to the FATF’s 
definition.
198
 The following article 34 states that “reporting entities” shall freeze an account 
and temporarily seize or hold the assets of persons or organizations under the request of a 
competent State’s authority. However, these articles are applied to only certain institutions 
and individuals, and neither of them indicates what the purposes of the imposed provisional 
measures are. Therefore, under the present powers, Vietnamese authorities cannot impose 
                                                          
197
  Law on Prevention and Suppression of Money Laundering, above n191, article 33(1). 
198
  See ibid, article 4(3) and (4); and FATF, above n176, at 113, 116. 
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provisional measures on “non-reporting entities” who involve the transaction of a property 
which is subject to confiscation but does not carry any evidential value. Consequently, they 




Assets subject to confiscation  
Article 41 of the 1999 Penal Code provides for “Confiscation of Objects and Money 
directly related to Crimes” as follows: 
 
1. The following property shall be confiscated and turned over to the State treasury: 
a) Tools and means used for the commission of a crime; 
b) Objects or money obtained through the commission of a crime or the trading or exchange of 
such things or money; and 
c) Objects banned from circulation by the State. 
2. Objects and/or money illegally held or used by offenders shall not be confiscated but returned to 
their lawful owners or managers. 
3. Objects and/money of other persons, if these persons are at fault in letting offenders use them in the 
commission of a crime, may be confiscated and turned over to the State treasury. 
 
Under this article, the first group of assets (article 41(1)) subject to confiscation are objects 
(tangible things) and money acquired through the commission of a crime or the trading or 
exchange of such things. Although the wording of “or the trading or exchange of such things” 
can be considered to describe the property derived indirectly from the commission of a crime, 
this category partly covers the “proceeds of crime” (as defined by the suppression 
conventions).  For example, objects are distinguished from intangible property, such as the 
legal right to use a tangible thing. “Value confiscation” is not provided for in Vietnam.  
The second group of assets subject to confiscation are instrumentalities used for the 
commission of a crime. As noted about the criminal proceedings in Vietnam,
199
 most 
instrumentalities used for the commission of a crime are seized by investigative bodies in the 
stage of investigation. Pursuant to article 41(1)(a) of the 1999 Penal Code, they are 
confiscated after the criminal proceedings have finished.  
In addition, article 76 of the Criminal Procedure Code provides for the confiscation of 
material evidence. 
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Article 76: Dealings with material evidence 
1. Where a case is ceased at the stage of investigation, the dealing with material evidence shall be 
decided by Head or Deputy Head of the Investigative Body; where a case is ceased at the stage of 
prosecution, the matter shall be decided by Chief Procurator or Deputy Chief Procurator of Procuracy; at 
the stage of trial, the matter shall be decided by Court. The execution of a decision on dealing with the 
material evidence must be presented in a record. 
2. Material evidence shall be dealt with as follows: 
a) Material evidence which consists of tools, means of a crime or prohibited goods shall be confiscated, 
put into the State treasury or destroyed. 
b) Material evidence which consists of objects/money belonging to the State, to organizations, or to 
individuals appropriated by the offender or to be used as means of the crime, shall be returned to the 
owners or their legal administrator; should the owners or their legal administrator cannot be found, those 
assets and money shall be declared to become State property. 
c) Material evidence which is money or properties derived from criminal activities shall be turned over to 
the State treasury. 
d) Material evidence which is easy to be destroyed or difficult to preserve shall be sold in conformity 
with law. 
e) Unvalued and useless material evidence shall be confiscated and destroyed. 
3. In the stage of investigation, prosecution or trial, competent bodies referred to in item 1 of this article 
shall have the right to decide the return of the material evidences mentioned in point b, item 2 of this 
article to the owners or their legal administrator provided that such return would not adversely influence 
the addressing of the case. 
4. In case there is any dispute upon ownership of material evidences, such dispute shall be settled 
according to the civil proceedings. 
 
Confiscation under this article should be distinguished from the confiscation provided for 
by article 41 of the 1999 Penal Code. While the former is applied only to material evidence, 
the latter is imposed on any criminal instrumentalities and objects or money acquired through 
the commission of a crime or the trading or exchange of such things. Nonetheless, as 
mentioned in the definition of material evidence, assets may be subject to confiscation using 
these two different powers. For example, money subject to seizure and eventually to 
confiscation may be obtained from the commission of a crime and may also be material 
evidence subject to confiscation as such. 
 
Burden of proof and protection of bona fide third parties 
In practice, for instance in case 1 (drug-related crime) and case 2 (organized crime) 
(described in chapter 2), the Vietnamese authorities usually can confiscate only a part of the 
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proceeds of crime in the form of money (cash). Normally, money found at the site where a 
criminal conduct has been occurring (e.g., an on-going monetary transaction at the scene of 
illegal drug trading) is seized by the investigative body, then it is confiscated after conviction. 
Money found in other circumstances (e.g., after arrest) or objects (e.g., houses or cars), which 
were purchased by money generated from the criminal activity, is hardly ever confiscated 
unless there is a confession of the holders. This is because of the difficulty of establishing the 
burden of proof (criminal standard) that there must be a link between the money or objects 
and the criminal activity. It is too onerous for the law enforcement authorities to discharge. 
This burden of proof is equally difficult or even more difficult to discharge in cases, such as 
when illegal money is intermingled with legal money, or when the money that is used in the 
purchase is recorded as much lower in value than the actual amount paid in order to, for 
example, avoid tax.  
At the trial stage, third parties can intervene in the procedure if they have interests 
involved. The court can protect and settle their interests, which include the rights of bona fide 
third parties, if it is related to the confiscation order. Article 54 of the Criminal Procedure 
Code states that: 
 
1. Persons having interests and obligations related to a criminal case or their lawful representatives 
have the right: 
a) To present documents, objects and claims; 
b) To participate in court sessions; to present their opinions and arguments at court sessions 
in order to protect their lawful rights and interests; 
c) To appeal against court judgments and decisions regarding matters directly related to their 
interests and obligations; 
d) To complain about decisions and proceedings activities of the agencies and people 
authorized to conduct the criminal proceedings. 
2. Persons having interests and obligations related to a criminal case must be present in response to the 
summonses of investigating bodies, procuracies or subpoenas of courts, and present honestly details 
directly involved in their interests and obligations. 
 
Further, disputes about the ownership of material evidence shall be settled in separate civil 
proceedings.
200
 The “right” in article 54(1) includes the right to property and is enforceable in 
practice. So this provision adheres to the international standards on protecting the right of   
                                                          
200
  Criminal Procedure Code, above n190, article 76(4). 
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bona fide third parties to property subject to confiscation. However, the laws are silent on the 
protections to bona fide third parties whose property is subject to provisional measures.  
Finally, it should be noted that in Vietnamese criminal law, confiscation of the above-
grouped assets is applied in regard to all crimes. This type of confiscation should be 
distinguished from the confiscation of property provided for in article 40 of the 1999 Penal 
Code. Article 40 of the 1999 Penal Code provides confiscation of a convicted person’s 
properties as an additional penalty in some certain cases. Thus, this article is not relevant to 
confiscation of the proceeds of crime. What is more, the seizure of property for purpose of 
confiscation of criminal assets differs from the seizure of property stated in article 146 of the 
Criminal Procedure Code. The latter allows the seizure of an accused’s or a defendant’s 
property with the aim of ensuring the payment of a pecuniary penalty or securing the 
compensation for victims and third parties. 
 
6.5.4 Criticism and Suggestions for Reform 
 
Overall, Vietnam does not yet have a specific legal framework for provisional measures 
with the aim of confiscating the proceeds of crime and criminal instrumentalities. For the 
most part, the provisional measures available are applied for the purposes of investigating 
crime and collecting evidence rather than for the eventual purpose of confiscation the 
property derived from a criminal activity. Vietnamese authorities can utilize the existing 
provisions as a legal framework for imposing the provisional measures for the eventual 
purpose of confiscation of criminal assets. Nevertheless, this utilization does not comply with 
the obligation of establishing the provisional measures set out by the suppression conventions 
to which Vietnam is a Party.
201
 Thus, Vietnam is currently “partly compliant” with the FATF 
Recommendations in this regard.
202
 Further, the rules of evidence are designed to secure 
material that will assist in the conviction of defendant and the disposal of that material once 
convicted. The provisional measures in the AMLSs have different purposes that are to locate 
and preserve criminal assets with the aim eventually of confiscating them. The difference in 
purposes inevitably means that rules for the one purpose are not fit for the other, although 
they may serve as a stopgap measure while awaiting new laws. Articles 33 and 34 of the Law 
                                                          
201
  See Palermo Convention, above n122, article 12(2). 
202
  APG (2009), “VIETNAM ME1 (Mutual Evaluation Report on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the 
Financing of Terrorism)”, at 60, available at: 
http://www.apgml.org/documents/docs/17/Vietnam%20ME1.pdf (accessed 20 April 2013). 
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on PSML has reflected a move of Vietnam ahead the implementation of international 
standards on retrieving criminal assets, but that is still not adequate. Under the current legal 
provisions, Vietnamese authorities may fail to confiscate certain types of property, for 
example, a property does not have any evidential value and is not involved in any “reporting 
entities”. Thus, Vietnam should, apart from the existing provisional measures for evidential 
purposes, provide for specific interim measures facilitating confiscation of criminal assets in 
its Criminal Procedure Code. This approach is also chosen by, for example, Germany.
203 
Although a broad interpretation of the coverage of material evidence and “objects” and 
money (as provided for in article 41 of the 1999 Penal Code) can cover most of the criminal 
assets subject to confiscation (under the suppression conventions); Vietnam does not yet 
allow the confiscation of intangible property and property of corresponding value, and does 
not apply “value confiscation”. This not only leads to non-compliance with the international 
standards but also hinders confiscation of criminal assets in practice. For example, it is 
believed that those legal inadequacies are the key hindrances to the effectiveness of asset 
recovery in corruption cases in Vietnam.
204
 An estimated value of actual confiscated assets 
accounts for only roughly 10 per cent of the value of assets involved in corruption which 
should be recovered.
205
 The majority of property obtained by offenders through their crimes 
has been transferred to a third party and converted into different forms.
206
 Under the current 
laws, this has prevented Vietnamese authorities from retrieving the property. 
The thesis suggests that article 41 of the 1999 Penal Code should be amended as follows: 
 
Article 41(amended): Confiscation of Property Related to Crimes 
1. The following property shall be confiscated and turned over to the State treasury: 
a) Property used or intended to be used for the commission of a crime; 
b) Property obtained, directly or indirectly, through the commission of a crime; and 
c) Objects banned from circulation by the State. 
2. Property illegally held or used by offenders shall be returned to their lawful owners. 
3. Property of other persons, if these persons are at fault in letting offenders use it in the commission of 
a crime, may be confiscated and turned over to the State treasury. 
                                                          
203
  See section 94, 111b and 111e of the Criminal Procedure Code of Germany. 
204
  Pham Anh Tuan (2014), “Co So Chinh Tri, Phap Luat Trong Thu Hoi Tai San Tham Nhung o Viet Nam 
[Political and Legal Basis for Asset Recovery in Corruption Cases in Vietnam]”, available at: 
http://noichinh.vn/nghien-cuu-trao-doi/201405/co-so-chinh-tri-phap-ly-trong-thu-hoi-tai-san-tham-nhung-o-
viet-nam-294521/ (accessed 12 June 2014) 
205
  Chinh Phu, “Bao Cao Cong Tac Phong, Chong Tham Nhung nam 2013" [Government, Report on the 
Prevention and Suppresion of Corruption (2013) ] No. 391/BC-CP, 10 October 2013  
206




By using the term “property” instead of objects/money, which has already defined by 
article 4(2) of the Law on PSML, the categories of assets subject to confiscation listed by this 
article will be compliant with the international provisions (illustrated in section 6.2.3 of this 
chapter).  
In addition, “value confiscation” should be provided for in the Criminal Procedure Code 
of Vietnam to deal with some circumstances, e.g., where the criminal property cannot be 
located or has been transferred to a third party. Vietnam may take into account the wording 
used in the French and German model of “value confiscation” when making its own 
provisions. In the meantime, Vietnam should foresee the difficulties when implementing this 
approach and how to address them. Vietnam can draw some lessons from the practices of the 
US and of the UK described above. 
Vietnam should consider the possibility of providing for the reversal of burden of proof in 
proceedings involving confiscation of the assets allegedly involved in certain crimes, 
including money laundering, such as the US forfeiture model applicable to money laundering 
offences. Under such an arrangement, the competent authorities may require the offender to 
demonstrate the lawful origin of the alleged proceeds of crime or other property liable to 
confiscation. By doing this, the standard of proof of a link between the alleged assets subject 
to confiscation and the crime for which the holder was convicted can be alleviated. 
In Vietnam’s law, the presumption of innocence is expressed in articles 9 and 10 of the 
Criminal Procedure Code. Article 9 stipulates that “nobody shall be considered guilty and be 
punished until the guilty judgment of a Court takes effect”. Article 10 states that: 
 
An Investigating Body, Procuracy, Court shall adopt all lawful measures to determine the fact of a 
criminal case impartially, comprehensively and fully, to clarify evidence of guilt and evidence of 
innocence, and circumstances tending to aggravate and/or mitigate criminal liability of the accused or 
defendant. 
The burden of proof shall be placed on the bodies conducting criminal proceedings. The accused or 
defendant shall be entitled but not bound to prove their innocence. 
 
These provisions are not breached if an offender is required to satisfy that property was 
legally acquired to avoid being confiscated.  
Vietnam also should consider the possibility of adopting “non-conviction based 
confiscation”, which is obviously very powerful in confiscating criminal assets.  
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We can see that if Vietnam makes the legal changes as suggested above, it can comply 
with the international obligations, at least on paper. What challenges Vietnam is how to 
implement the legal changes in practice effectively. It will take time for Vietnam to be 
familiar with the new legal concepts and procedures, for example confiscation of intangible 




Identification, tracing, freezing or seizure and eventually confiscation of the proceeds of 
crime and instrumentalities used in or intended for use in the commission of a crime are 
important legal tools of the AML regime. The money laundering offence is an autonomous 
offence closely linked to the predicate crime. The AML regime, on the one hand is a regime 
directly suppressing the money laundering offence, and on the other hand is a part of the 
regimes suppressing predicate crimes. The inadequate or ineffective adoption of these 
measures against the proceeds and instrumentalities of crime definitely hampers the AML 
regime. Specifically, the inadequacy of tracing rules will result in a failure to locate the 
proceeds of crime and its roots or to identify predicate offences. The inadequacy of 
provisional measures and of confiscation of the property suspected of being laundered 
facilitates the transaction and other manipulation of funds, as well as the money laundering 
process. These, likewise, may obstruct the investigation, prosecution and trial of money 
laundering offences.   
The international AML regime provides for the standards of provisional measures and 
confiscation of criminal assets. States are encouraged to apply this type of confiscation to a 
broad range of crimes, and to simplify the burden of proof by adopting non-conviction based 
confiscation, while protecting the right of bona fide third parties. However, national 
legislation on confiscation inevitably varies in regard to: the scope of application (the 
proceeds of all crime or of limited number of crimes); assets subject to confiscation (property 
derived from criminal activities, property the value of which corresponds to the proceeds of 
crime, an amount of money equivalent to the criminal benefit, and criminal instrumentalities); 
the procedures of confiscation (conviction-based or non-conviction based confiscation); and 
the burden of proof for confiscation order (criminal or civil standard, acceptance of the 
reversal of the burden of proof).  
The examination of Vietnamese legislation on confiscation of criminal assets reveals 
significant deficiencies, notably: i) the type of the assets subject to confiscation does not 
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cover intangible property and property of corresponding value; ii) the provisional measures 
for the purposes of confiscation are not provided for; iii) the burden of proof of confiscation 
order is onerous; and iv) “non-conviction based confiscation” and “value confiscation” is not 
applicable. These deficiencies have to be remedied.  
Some complements to the provisional measures provided for in the Law on PSML show 
that Vietnam has implemented certain international AMLSs on confiscation of criminal 
assets. However, this is insufficient and Vietnam is still far being in compliance with 
international obligations. The fundamental legal concepts and procedures related to the 
retrieval of criminal assets, provided for in Vietnam’s Criminal Procedure Code, have been 
unchanged since 2003 when they were first introduced. This thesis argues that Vietnam 
should and can remedy the current situation, then obtain a better level of “paper” compliance 
with the international AMLSs; nevertheless, because of a number of domestic factors (e.g., an 
unfamiliarity with the new legal concept of and procedures for confiscation of criminal 
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States often face a range of barriers in the investigation, prosecution and trial of 
transnational money laundering offences. They include the gathering of evidence, the service 
of legal documents, or the recovery of assets from other jurisdictions. These barriers can be 
only resolved by cooperation from other involved States, through so-called mutual legal 
assistance (MLA). As a result, the international community calls for the most effective and 
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MLA in combating money laundering has its own scope and methods that serve broad 
purposes. For example, the international exchange of information relating to suspicious 
financial transactions is beyond the traditional scope of treaty-based MLA in criminal 
matters. Legal assistance for the purposes of tracing, freezing or seizing, and confiscating the 
proceeds of crime is another “new” type of MLA. The FATF recommends that, if consistent 
with domestic law, countries should respond expeditiously to requests from foreign States to 
execute provisional measures and to confiscate laundered property, the proceeds from money 
laundering and from the predicate offences.
2
 If Vietnam is to engage effectively against 
money laundering, it too will have to develop this capacity. 
This chapter will begin by examining the international standards on MLA in combating 
transnational money laundering which includes the international exchange of AML-related 
information and treaty-based MLA. It then will examine what and how these standards have 
been implemented in domestic laws of Vietnam; whether Vietnamese laws on MLA in AML 
is compliant with the international standards; if not, what the inadequacies are. The chapter 
also will discuss the main factors influencing Vietnam’s practices of MLA in AML. Finally, 
suggestions for law reform will be made. 
 
7.2 General Perception 
 
Traditionally, MLA in criminal matters is a process by which States seek and provide 
assistance in gathering evidence for use in criminal cases, and is carried out through 
diplomatic channels upon the receipt of letters rogatory.
3
 In the second half of the 20
th
 
century, with the rise of transnational crime and the growing demand for legal assistance, the 
need for a wide range of assistance beyond evidence gathering was apparent. Hence, MLA in 
criminal matters has been developed as “the process whereby one State provides assistance to 
                                                          
1
  FATF (2012), “International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism & 
Proliferation - the FATF Recommendations”, available at: http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF_Recommendations.pdf (accessed 22 May 
2014), Recommmendation 37 (R37). 
2
  See, e.g., ibid, R38. 
3
  Robert J. Currie, “Human Rights and International Mutual Legal Assistance: Resolving the Tension ” (2000) 
11(2) Criminal Law Forum 143 at 145-146. 
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another in the investigation and prosecution of criminal offences”.
4
 Various forms of MLA in 
criminal matters have been established to satisfy the scope and efficiency of assistance 
required. The key forms of MLA in criminal matters can be undertaken upon letters rogatory, 
MLA treaties and interstate “police-to-police” assistance or interstate “agency-to-agency” 
assistance.
5
 The mechanisms for processing MLA can be informal or formal.  
Under the informal mechanisms, governmental agencies, in particular the police and other 
competent agencies, can seek assistance directly from their foreign counterparts through their 
own channels. Informal MLA in criminal matters is usually used for administrative 
information exchange on an ad hoc basis.
6
 It is often carried out between competent interstate 
agencies or individuals through nonbinding agreements (e.g., Memoranda of Understanding 
(MOUs)) or individual contacts. These informal means are usually employed to share 
intelligence and information obtained voluntarily (such as the statement of a witness) or 
information from publicly available sources to support law enforcement agencies in 
investigation or prosecution of criminal cases.
7
 Informal communication, for example 
“police-to-police”, is normally faster, more flexible and economical than formal 
communication.
8
 Nonetheless, confidential information may not be easily obtained by this 
mechanism from foreign counterparts; and the information exchanged may not serve as 
evidence against someone because of failure to meet due-process requirements.  
Under the most formal mechanisms, normally based upon bilateral or multilateral MLA 
treaties, an MLA request issued by the requesting State’s Central Authority is first received 
by the Central Authority of the requested State (e.g., the Ministry of Justice), then is 
forwarded to the “competent agency” for execution (if the Central Authority is not the 
executing authority) and returned to the Central Authority for dispatch to its counterpart in 
the requesting State. When States have treaties on MLA in criminal matters, States often 
appoint their Central Authorities and authorize them to make or receive MLA requests 
                                                          
4
  William C. Gilmore (ed) Mutual Assistance in Criminal and Business Regulatory Matters (Cambridge 
University Press, 1995) at xii. 
5
   John E. Harris, "International Cooperation in Fighting Transnational Organized Crime: Special Emphasis 
on Mutual Legal Assistance and Extradition," United Nations Asia and Far East Institute for the Prevention 
of Crime and Treatment of Offenders, Tokyo, 2000, at 137-139. 
6
  IMF (2007), "Working Together: Improving Regulatory Cooperation and Information Exchange Monetary 
and Financial Systems" at 7, available at: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/books/2007/working/0607.pdf 
(accessed 10 April 2014). 
7
  Ibid. 
8
  See ibid; and Harris, above n5, at 137. 
170 
 
subject to their treaties.
9
 Interstate Central Authorities normally communicate directly with 
one another, but an MLA request may be steered through diplomatic channels. After 
receiving an MLA request, the Central Authority will be responsible for reviewing such 
request for initial approval; such as, examining whether the request meets the requirement of 
any applicable treaty and complies with the domestic laws. Depending on the legal system of 
the requested State, the “competent agency” for execution can be the police, prosecutors or 




It can be seen that, in general, the legal basis for MLA in criminal matters consists of 
national legislation, treaties, MOUs (signed between States or interstate competent agencies), 
and the customary principle of reciprocity (when there is no existing agreement between the 
countries). A State can rely on one or more of these bases to process MLA. In practice, 
informal assistance can lay the foundation for subsequent formal MLA. Treaty-based MLA 
often occurs after direct interstate “agency-to-agency” cooperation. Formal treaty-based 
MLA and informal interstate “agency-to-agency” assistance, however, can occur at the same 
time. 
Obviously, in any mechanism of MLA, the interstate competent agencies processing the 
MLA request play the most important role. They include the Central Authority responsible 
for making and receiving MLA requests; the authorized agencies responsible for executing 
the MLA requests, normally the police, procuracy or judiciary; and other related agencies, 
such as Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs), financial institutions (e.g., banks), and 
professionals (e.g., lawyer, notary or accountant). In practice, the executive agencies can 
receive and render MLA via the Central Authority or directly to foreign counterparts. Some 
bodies, such as FIUs and banks can share information about money laundering directly with 
each other.  
 
 
                                                          
9
  For example, in ASEAN Member States, such as Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, 
Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, their central authorities are the Attorney General, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Law and Human Rights, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Attorney 
General’s Chambers, the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Department of Justice, the Attorney General’s 
Chambers, and the Attorney General respectively. 
10
  For example, in Singapore, after approving a request for assistance in taking evidence or confiscation of 
criminal proceeds,  the Attorney-General (Central Authority) or a person appointed by him has to apply to 
the court for the relevant orders and then to gather the evidence or confiscate the proceeds. See section 22 
and 29 of the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act of Singapore (chapter 190A, as amended in April 
2006); and case of Re section 22 of the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act [2008] SGCA 41. 
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A wide range of information is shared by the competent authorities of cooperating States 
in the fight against money laundering. It may be evidentiary information (e.g., bank records 
and the identities of individual), exchanged by law enforcement agencies through the vehicle 
of MLA, that can be used in formal criminal proceedings; or it may be Suspicious 
Transaction Reports (STRs) shared by FIUs with no evidentiary weight. According to the 
suppression conventions, most competent national agencies dedicated to AML should be able 
to cooperate and exchange information at the national and international level within the 
conditions of their domestic law.
11
 These agencies can be administrative, regulatory, 
adjudicative, or law enforcement authorities. In practice, the police are one of the crucial 
traditional law enforcement agencies involved in MLA in criminal matters. There are other 
typical interstate agencies responsible for the exchange of information relevant to AML. 
Among them, FIUs have an increasingly integral role in international information exchange 
for the purposes of AML. FIUs will be discussed later as the most significant governmental 
agencies engaged in international information exchange against money laundering. 
 
7.3.2  Police Information Exchange  
 
In most States, the police are the most important law enforcement agency in combating 
crimes and in enforcing laws to maintain social order. Specifically, their responsibilities 
normally relate to many stages of investigation and prosecution of crimes, such as locating 
and arresting suspects, gathering evidence, identifying witnesses, and deposing witnesses in 
court. International police cooperation beyond the political barrier commenced at an early 
stage.
12
 The increasing prevalence of transnational crime has meant that this cooperation has 
become more necessary and it can usually be based upon mutual respect, shared interest and 
good will in combating crime rather than political or economic coercion. In practice, most of 
the MLA requests for fighting transnational crime are ultimately executed by police. Further, 
                                                          
11
  United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime, 15 November 2000, 2225 UNTS 209, 
entered into force 29 September 2003, article 7(1)(b); and United Nations Convention against Corruption, 
31 October 2003, 2349 UNTS 41, entered into force 14 December 2005, article 14(1)(b). 
12
  Mathieu Deflem, Policing World Society: Historical Foundations of International Police Cooperation 
(Oxford University Press, 2002) at 10. 
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the exchange of information about crime is usually conducted by direct assistance between 
national police through the liaison police network or “hot lines”.
13
 This channel seems to be 
the quickest means of criminal information exchange.  
Police cooperation has been fostered not only by the fraternal agreements and obligations 
of multinational treaties but also by the strong commitment of international and regional 
police organizations, such as the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) 
and the ASEANPOL.
14
 Interstate police forces can exchange and share information related to 
the investigation of money laundering. These types of information include i) general 
information, such as the criminal records of an individual and the identity  of an individual 
and a corporation, already held in the databases of each State; and ii) specific information 
relating to a particular case, such as bank or brokerage account details, banking transaction 
records, tax and business records, documents disclosing purchase, sale and ownership. The 
suppression conventions also highlight the role of INTERPOL in MLA by suggesting that in 
urgent circumstances, if possible, States should communicate and address MLA requests 




7.3.3 The Development of FIUs 
 
An integral part of the investigation and prosecution of money laundering offences is to 
have access to relevant financial information in order to identify and trace the movement of 
funds. In addition, the implementation of the reporting obligation creates the need for central 
governmental specialized agencies to process the disclosure of suspicious information to 
combat money laundering at both the national and international level. These agencies must be 
able to provide the rapid exchange of information between financial institutions and law 
enforcement agencies as well as between jurisdictions, while still ensuring the security and 
confidentiality of information. They must have adequate capacity to analyse and cross-check 
such information with other sources of information easily and systematically.
16
 FIUs have 
                                                          
13
  In R. v. Hape, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 292, Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) officers cooperated with 
police officers of the Turks and Caicos Island to conduct parts of the investigation of the accused, a 
Canadian businessmen, for suspected money laundering. In the Islands, where the investment company of 
the accused was located, the RCMP officers conducted searches of the accused’s office and gathered 
documentary evidence with the cooperation from the Turks and Caicos Island force. 
14
  General about these police organizations was provided in chapter 3.  
15
  See article 18(13) of the Palermo Convention. 
16
  J. F. Thony, “Processing Financial Information in Money Laundering Matters: The Financial Intelligence 
Units” (1996) 4 European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 257 at 264. 
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been established in most countries to in order undertake these functions. It should be noted 
that intelligence is an elastic notion. It may relate to the receipt and analysis of STRs, or be 
more strictly defined as the receipt of information by means of “undercover operations”, such 
as infiltration of laundering networks or use of secret informants.
17
 
The first few FIUs were established in the late 1980s.
18
 Following this establishment, a 
number of international legal instruments formally mentioned about the establishment and 
functions of FIUS: the 1990 FATF Recommendations, the Palermo Convention, and the 
UNCAC.
19
 In 2003, for the first time, the FATF set out an explicit recommendation on the 
establishment and functioning of FIUs.
20
 
Recognizing the importance of FIUs and of the global network of FIUs, in 1995, a group 
of FIUs gathered at the Egmont Arenberg Palace in Brussels and established the Egmont 
Group of Financial Intelligence Units (called the Egmont Group) for the stimulation of 
international cooperation.
21
 These FIUs meet regularly to find ways to enhance mutual 
administrative cooperation, especially in the areas of exchanging information, training and 
the sharing of expertise for the purposes of AML, and more recently, the suppression of 
terrorism financing.
22
 In response to the need for developing effective and practical means of 
exchanging information, the Egmont Group has devised a functional definition of FIUs. The 
first definition of FIUs was approved in 1996, consequently amended in 2004,
23
 and recently 





                                                          
17
  J. F. Thony, “Processing Financial Information in Money Laundering Matters: The Financial Intelligence 
Units” (1996) 4 European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 257 at 274. 
18
  Milind Sathye and Chris Patel, “Developing Financial Intelligence: An Assessment of the FIUs in Australia 
and India” (2007) 10(4) Journal of Money Laundering Control 391 at 391. 
19
 FATF (1990), “The Forty Recommendations of the FATF”, available at: http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF%20Recommendations%201990.pdf (accessed 
24 May 2013) R14 & 15; Palermo Convention, above n11, article 7(1)(b); and UNCAC, above n11, article 
58. 
20
  FATF (2003), “The Forty Recommendations”, available at: http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF%20Recommendations%202003.pdf (accessed 
24 May 2013), R26. 
21
  Egmont Group, “About the Egmont Group”, available at: http://www.egmontgroup.org/ (accessed 24 May 
2013). 
22
  Ibid. 
23
  Egmont Group, "FIU Definition Interpretive Note" (2004) at 1-2, available at: 
http://www.egmontgroup.org/library/egmont-documents (accessed 23 April 2013). 
24
  Egmont Group (2013), "Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units Charter" at 5. 
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Countries should establish a financial intelligence unit (FIU) that serves as a national centre for the 
receipt and analysis of: (a) suspicious transaction reports; and (b) other information relevant to money 
laundering, associated predicate offences and terrorist financing, and for the dissemination of the results 
of that analysis. The FIU should be able to obtain additional information from reporting entities, and 
should have access on a timely basis to the financial, administrative and law enforcement information 
that it requires to undertake its functions properly. 
 
Other international organizations, such as the IMF and the World Bank, as well as their 
Member States, have provided assistance to a number of other States in the establishment and 




Although FIUs have the same core functions of receiving, analysing, and disseminating 
financing information (additional functions may include the investigation and supervision of 
the financial institution’s compliance with AML regulations, and training or advisory roles)
26
, 
they vary considerably from State to State in their models and functions.  
In the administrative/intermediary model, an FIU (e.g., in France or the US) is usually part 
of the structure, or under the supervision of a regulatory or supervisory agency other than a 
law enforcement or judicial authority; or is an independent and centralized administrative 
authority.
27
 In the law enforcement model, an FIU is attached to a general or specialized 
police agency, which is normally designed as a police department responsible for combating 
financial crime, for example, in Germany and the United Kingdom.
28
 Following the judicial 
or prosecutorial model, an FIU is affiliated to a judicial authority and most commonly falls 
under the prosecutor’s jurisdiction.
29
 This model is commonly used in continental law States 
where public prosecutors have control over criminal proceedings and investigatory bodies, 
such as in Switzerland. In the hybrid model, an FIU is established by a combination of at 






                                                          
25
  The Egmont Group (2014), “2012-2013 Annual Report”, available at: http://www.egmontgroup.org/news-
and-events/news/2014/01/23/2012-2013-egmont-group-annual-report (accessed 20 March 2014). 
26
  Thony, above n16, at 274-279. 
27
  IMF, "Financial Intelligence Units: An Overview" at 10-13, available at: 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/FIU/index.htm (accessed 20 December 2012). 
28
  Ibid, at 13-15. 
29
  Ibid, at 16. 
30
  Ibid, at 17. 
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7.3.4  Information Exchange through the FIU Network 
 
The information available to FIUs may be of interest to non-FIU authorities, for example, 
law enforcement agencies in charge of the investigation or prosecution of money laundering. 
Both FIUs and other authorities may desire the exchange of financial information. FIUs 
themselves can benefit from exchanging information with authorities other than FIUs.
31
  
The Egmont Group is a unique network employed for the exchange of financial 
information, primarily of STRs. The FIU to FIU channel is recognized as an expeditious 
conduit for exchanging information with, or on behalf of each jurisdiction’s respective law 
enforcement and other competent AML authorities.
32
 This channel of information exchange 
is normally not subject to the more burdensome requirements of other forms of information 
exchange, such as treaty-based MLA.  
Most States authorize their FIUs to exchange information with other FIUs of any type in 
accordance with domestic legislation and the international principles of FIUs information 
exchange. The Egmont Group has adopted principles and best practice guidelines for FIU 
members to exchange information in money laundering and terrorism cases.
33
 The principles 
encourage international cooperation among FIUs on the basis of reciprocity or mutual 




i) Free exchange of information for purposes of analysis at FIU level. 
ii) No dissemination or use of the information for any other purpose without prior consent of the 
providing FIU. 
iii) Protection of the confidentiality of the information.  
 
Nevertheless, the obstacles to information exchange between FIUs are unavoidable, 
because FIUs are each subject to a diverse set of national legal, political and economic 
constraints. 
                                                          
31
  The Egmont Group (2011), "Resolution of the Heads of FIUs of the Egmont Group: Enhancing International 
AML/CFT information Exchange through Strengthening FIU Channels in “diagonal” Cooperation" at 1. 
32
  Ibid. 
33
  See The Egmont Group (2013), “Principles for Information Exchange between Financial Intelligence Units”, 
available at: http://www.egmontgroup.org/about (accessed 21 March 2014); and Egmont Group (2013), 
“Operational Guidance for FIU Activities and the Exchange of Information”, available at: 
http://www.egmontgroup.org/about (accessed 21 March 2014). 
34
  See Egmont Group (2013), above n24.  
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Some States empower their FIUs to exchange information with their counterparts without 
the need for a formal agreement between them, other States require their FIUs to enter a 
model MOU designed by the Egmont Group.
35
 A typical MOU set out the terms and 
conditions for sharing information, such as identification of the Parties, the type of 
information eligible for sharing, and restrictions on dissemination of the shared information.
36
  
To sum up, in accordance with international standards, FIUs have been uniquely created 
and empowered in numerous States to perform their core functions of transnational exchange 
of financial information in order to combat money laundering and financing terrorism. It is 
recognized that the best way to promote the sharing of information for AML/CFT purposes in 




7.4 Treaty-based Mutual Legal Assistance 
 
7.4.1 The Legal Basis and Types of Mutual Legal Assistance 
 
The legal basis  
Treaty-based MLA in the fight against money laundering is usually governed by 
international, regional or bilateral legally binding treaties. Some treaties focus only on the 
MLA provisions applied generally to a wide range of criminal matters, such as the Treaty on 
Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters signed among like-minded ASEAN member 
countries (2004).
38
 In other treaties, for instance the suppression conventions, MLA is 
mentioned as a part of them.
39
 Pursuant to these provisions and the FATF Recommendations, 
State Parties and member countries “shall afford one another the widest measure of mutual 
legal assistance in investigations, prosecutions and judicial proceedings” in relation to money 
laundering offences.
40
 A number of typical aspects of MLA in money laundering cases 
                                                          
35
 The Egmont Group (2013), "Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units Principles for Information 
Exchange between Financial Intelligence Units" at 4; and IMF, above n27, at 67-68. 
36
  IMF, above n27, at 67-68. 
37
  The Egmont Group (2011), above n31. 
38
  ASEAN Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters  (200429 November 2004. 
39
  United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 20 
December 1988, 1582 UNTS 95, entered into force 11 November 1990, article 7; Palermo Convention, 
above n11, article 7(1)(b), article 7(4), articles 18, 21, 26 and 27; and UNCAC, above n11, article 14(1)(b), 
article 14(5), articles 46, 47 and 48. 
40
  1988 Vienna Convention, above n39, article 7(1); Palermo Convention, above n11, article 18(1); UNCAC, 





 providing originals or certified copies of relevant documents and records, including 
government, bank, corporate or business records; and identifying or tracing the proceeds of 
crime, property, instrumentalities or other things for evidentiary purpose.  
Bilateral treaties are a common and effective legal basis for MLA in the fight against 
money laundering, especially between those States which share land borders or have close 
relations. For example, a well-known bilateral treaty on MLA in criminal matters was 
concluded by the US and the Swiss Confederation in 1973 and entered into force in 1977.
42
 It 
was the first bilateral treaty on MLA in criminal matters reached between a common law 
State and a civil law State.
43
 This treaty has become a successful model for later treaties on 
MLA in criminal matters especially regarding cooperation in freezing or seizing of assets and 
taking evidence from a foreign country possessing strict banking secrecy, the strong tradition 
of legality and the prickly sense of national sovereignty.
44
 Nowadays, several bilateral treaties 
have extensive provisions that detail obligations in regard to MLA in tracing, freezing or 
seizing, and confiscating the proceeds of crime. It can be seen that by negotiating bilaterally, 
States can shape an agreement applicable to their particular legal systems and purposes. 
Bilateral treaties are able to resolve legal obstructions between the States with different legal 




Besides treaties, most States have their own laws on MLA that usually specify the 
conditions and procedures for making, transferring and executing incoming and outgoing 
MLA requests. These laws are often made in conformity with the international norms and 
principles derived from the relevant treaties. In most instances, such laws create a necessary 
domestic legal framework to allow the State to give effect to its obligations under these 
treaties. Other States have passed legislation on MLA without becoming party to a related 
treaty. This legislation, however, may be sufficient to execute a request for MLA when the 
customary principle of reciprocity is applied. For instance, Thailand’s Act on Mutual 
Assistance in Criminal Matters provides that assistance may be given even if no mutual legal 
                                                          
41
  1988 Vienna Convention, above n39, article 7(2); Palermo Convention, above n11, article 18(3); and 
UNCAC, above n11, article 46(3). 
42
  Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters  (United States - Switzerland ) 27 U.S.T 2019, T.I.A.S. No 
8302, 1973. 
43
  Lionel Frei and Stefan Trechsel, “Origins and Applications of the United States-Switzerland Treaty on 
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters” (1990) 31(1) Harvard International  Law Journal 77 at 77-78. 
44
  Ibid, at 90-95. 
45
  UNODC (2006), "Legislative Guide for the Implementation of the United Nations Convention against 
Corruption" at 197. 
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assistance treaty exists between Thailand and the requesting State, provided that that State 




Types of MLA 
The suppression conventions, regional treaties and bilateral treaties on MLA normally 
provide for a broad range of types of MLA for general criminal matters.
47
 For example, 
article 1(2) of the ASEAN Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters provides a 
full range of normal types of MLA: 
 
(a) Taking of evidence or obtaining voluntary statements from persons;  
(b) Making arrangements for persons to give evidence or to assist in criminal matters;  
(c) Effecting service of judicial documents;  
(d) Executing searches and seizures;  
(e) Examining objects and sites;  
(f) Providing original or certified copies of relevant documents, records and items of evidence;  
(g) Identifying or tracing property derived from the commission of an offence and instrumentalities of 
crime;  
(h) The restraining of dealings in property or the freezing of property derived from the commission of an 
offence that may be recovered, forfeited or confiscated;  
(i) The recovery, forfeiture or confiscation of property derived from the commission of an offence;  
(j) Locating and identifying witnesses and suspects; and  
(k) The provision of such other assistance as may be agreed and which is consistent with the objects of 
this Treaty and the laws of the Requested Party. 
 
It can be seen that, in general, there are two categories of assistance: i) assistance in 
gathering evidence of crime; and ii) assistance for purposes of confiscation of criminal assets 
and asset recovery. For the purposes of collating evidence in money laundering cases, the 
assistance in seizure of property or freezing financial transactions and in providing financial 
records would be most important. The second category will be examined further in a later 





                                                          
46
  The Act on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters 1992  (Thailand) B.E.2535, section 9. 
47
  Palermo Convention, above n11, article 18(3); and UNCAC, above n11, article 46(3). 
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7.4.2 Primary Conditions and Principles  
 
The condition of dual/double criminality 
The question of double criminality as a condition of MLA (and extradition) relates to 
whether the act is punishable under the law of State in which the act is brought (lex fori). For 
instance, when State A makes a request for legal assistance (or extradition) from State B, the 
relevant authorities of State B would ordinarily assume that the act in relation to which the 
legal assistance (or extradition) is required is punishable under the law of State A. The 
authorities of State B would, however, focus on the question whether the act is punishable 
under its domestic criminal law. 
Dual/double criminality is a common requirement in the treaty-based MLA context, but 
not a mandatory condition. In some international conventions, the absence of double 
criminality may be considered as one of the grounds consistently relied on to refuse MLA.
48
 
Nonetheless, the terms of these conventions do not prohibit their State Parties from assisting 
in the absence of double criminality; the requested State may still provide assistance if 
permitted by its domestic law. In respect of MLA in money laundering cases, the FATF 
recommends that “countries should render MLA, notwithstanding the absence of dual 
criminality, if the assistance does not involve coercive actions”.
49
 The coercive actions herein 
may be search, seizure or freezing of criminal assets; or other measures which may violate an 
individual’s rights, such as surveillance of persons or intercepting communication. In 
practice, many countries have adopted this recommendation to make MLA in criminal 
matters more flexible and realistic.
50
 Under Philippines’s laws, for example, MLA requests 
involving search and seizure only have to meet the “probable cause” requirement. “Probable 
cause” is defined in the Philippines as “such facts and circumstances which would lead a 
reasonable discreet and prudent man to believe that an offence has been committed, and that 
the objects sought in connection with the offence are in the place sought to be searched”.
51
 
The FATF also recommends that “where dual criminality is required for MLA, that 
requirement should be deemed to be satisfied regardless of whether both countries place the 
                                                          
48
  Palermo Convention, above n11, article 18(9); and UNCAC, above n11, article 46(9). 
49
  FATF, above n1, R37. 
50
  Most the countries of G20 do not require dual criminality when executing MLA requests in criminal matters, 
except for the request involved in coercive actions. See G20 Anti-Corruption Working Group, “Requesting 
Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters from G20 Countries: A Step-by-step Guide 2012”, available at: 
http://www.g20.org/ (accessed 3 August 2013). 
51
  See Burgos, Sr., vs. Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, 133 Supreme Court Reports 
Annotated [SCRA] 800. 
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offence within the same category of offence, or denominate the offence by the same 
terminology, provided that both countries criminalize the conduct underlying the offence”.
52
 
It means that if dual criminality is required, that requirement should be in abstracto. In 
practice, however, depending on specific legal assistance requests, the requirement of dual 
criminality will be justified either in abstracto or in concreto. For instance, as long as an 
alleged criminal is still being investigated, it will be difficult to require the condition of dual 
criminality in concreto; hence, dual criminality in abstracto suffices for investigatory 
measures. It is often required that the conduct in question be criminalized under the criminal 
laws of both States. In contrast, with regard to a request for conviction-based confiscation in 
form of “transferring the request for confiscation”,
53
 it is essential to ensure that the offence is 
liable to punishment in the requested State, and the possible grounds for exclusion of criminal 
liability shall be taken into account. Thus the condition of dual criminality should be applied 
in concreto.  
Dual criminality can be problematic in processing MLA requests when it is applied to a 
legal person, especially in cases of alleged corporate criminal liability. A number of States 
have not yet recognized corporate criminal liability, and thus may refuse a request for legal 
assistance regarding the execution of investigatory measures, provisional measures or 
confiscation of the proceeds of corporate crime.  
 
Principle of ne bis in idem 
In the context of the enforcement of foreign criminal judgments including confiscation 
orders, the transnational ne bis in idem principle can have three crucial functions: i) it can 
serve as a ground for refusal of MLA when the requested State or a third State has already 
undertaken action with respect to the same offence;
54
 ii) it can serve as a bar to further action 
taken by the requested State (e.g., in case the foreign confiscation order is recognized, this 
order will have the same res judicata effect as the domestic confiscation order); and iii) it can 
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  FATF, above n1, R37. 
53
  There are two forms of requests for confiscation, viz. “transferring the request for confiscation” and 
“execution of the confiscation order” which are described in the next section. 
54
  For example, article 18(21)(c) of the Palermo Convention, above n11, provides that MLA may be refused “if 
the authorities of the requested State Party would be prohibited by its domestic law from carrying out the 
action requested with regard to any similar offence, had it been subject to investigation, prosecution or 
judicial proceedings under their own jurisdiction”. 
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serve to prevent the requesting State from enforcing a criminal judgment after it has 
transferred its enforcement to another State.
55
   
The main concern here is the transnational application of the ne bis in idem principle in the 
context of executing a foreign confiscation order. The unilateral enforcement of 
extraterritorial confiscation may give rise to “double confiscation” when more than one State 
may want to confiscate the same proceeds from the same offence. This situation creates a 
positive concurrent jurisdiction to enforce. Effective operation of the transnational ne bis in 
idem principle can bar double confiscation. The States involved should consult each other to 
determine which State would ultimately enforce the confiscation order successfully.   
 
7.5 Legal Assistance for Purposes of Confiscation of Criminal Assets, Sharing of 
Confiscated Assets and Returning Assets 
 
7.5.1 Legal Assistance for Confiscation of Criminal Assets 
 
When a State wishes to enforce its confiscation order against criminal assets located 
abroad, it can request assistance from other States involved regarding the identification, 
freezing or seizure, and eventually confiscation of those assets. International cooperation in 
identifying, tracing, seizing, and eventually confiscating criminal assets located abroad is 
provided for in the primary international instruments: the 1988 Vienna Convention (article 
5(4)), the Palermo Convention (article 13), the UNCAC (article 55) and the FATF 
Recommendations (Interpretative Note to R4 (INR 4) of the 2012 Recommendations).  
Because of the different approaches to confiscation of criminal assets adopted by various 
States and “given the unparalleled ambition and intrusiveness” of cooperation in confiscation 
of criminal assets, this type of international cooperation will cause lots of difficulties in 
practice. Therefore, the suppression conventions cautiously provide that a State Party, after 
receiving a cooperation request, “to the greatest extent possible within its legal system” to 
execute the request.
56
 The term “to the greatest extent possible within its domestic legal 
system” is intended to reflect the variations in the way that different State Parties carry out 
the obligations of cooperation in confiscation of criminal assets. In practice, due to diverse 
national legal principles, the application by States of the international standards on retrieving 
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  Guy Stessens, Money Laundering: A New International Law Enforcement Model (Cambridge University 
Press, 2000) at 409-410. 
56
  See, for example, Palermo Convention, above n11, article 13(1). 
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criminal assets differs in scope and in the kind of procedures used. As a result, this 
cooperation is primarily executed based on MLA treaties which comply with the main 
provisions of the suppression conventions set out below.  
Article 5(4)(b) of the Vienna Convention, article 13(2) of the Palermo Convention and 
article 55(2) of the UNCAC deal with the response to a request from another State concerned 
with the provisional measures of identifying, tracing, and freezing or seizing the various 
types of criminal assets. These measures are seen as the essential early steps leading towards 
confiscation. They prevent any criminal asset subject to confiscation from being removed or 
disposed of. The suppression conventions merely impose the obligation on the requested 
States to take provisional measures in response to a request from the requesting State. This 
obligation is, of course, subject to the safeguard clause “in accordance with and subject to the 
provisions of its domestic law”, embodied in article 5(4)(c) of the Vienna Convention and 
article 13(4) of the Palermo Convention. There is no provision for the procedure for taking of 
the provisional measures in the requested State. In practice, the procedure must satisfy the 
legal restrictions of the State that is enforcing it and the legal requirements of the State 
making the request in order for the process to be defensible in that State.
57
 In general, it could 
be similar to the procedure for undertaking a confiscation order set out below.
58
 
Article 5(4)(a) of the Vienna Convention and article 13(1) of the Palermo Convention 
address the assistance provided for by one State Party to another in the context of 
confiscation. After receiving a request for confiscation from the requesting State, if assistance 
is given, the requested State submits the request to its competent authorities which will have 
two options.
59
 The first option - “transferring the request for confiscation”, is set out in article 
5(4)(a)(i) of the Vienna Convention and article 13(1)(a) of the Palermo Convention. This 
procedure operates in a situation where no confiscation order is issued in the requesting State. 
                                                          
57
  Several complicated issues arises where the requesting State and requested State have different approaches 
to the confiscation order, for example, where one State applies conviction-based confiscation and the other 
employs non-conviction based conviction. In this situation, the procedures for imposing the provisional 
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  United Nations (1998), "Commentary on the United Nations Convention Agaist Illicit Traffic in Narcotic 
Drugs and Psychotrophic Sustances 1988" at par. 5.24, available at: 
http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/organized_crime/Drug%20Convention/Commentary_on_the_unite
d_nations_convention_1988_E.pdf (accessed 28 April 2013).  
59
  Stessens, above n55, at 385-390. 
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In this situation, the request for confiscation is made for the first time in the requested State 
and in accordance with its domestic legislation. The competent authority of the requested 
State, usually its judicial authority, has the discretion to grant or decline an order of 
confiscation upon the provision of sufficient documentary support by the requesting State. 
This procedure is a type of transfer of criminal proceedings. The second option - “execution 
of the confiscation order”, provided for in article 5(4)(a)(ii) of the Vienna Convention and 
article 13(1)(b) of the Palermo Convention, deals with the situation in which the confiscation 
order has already been issued in the requesting State and its enforcement is sought in the 
requested State. The requested State will submit this confiscation order to its competent 
authorities. If the enforcement of this confiscation order is given effect, it will be executed 
according to the requested State’s legislation. This option clearly requires the recognition of 
the foreign confiscation order from the requested State, which is a form of enforcement of 
foreign criminal judgment. This option appears to be faster and more efficient, and has thus 
become the preference of many States.
60
  
Whichever option is chosen, however, it must comply with the legislation of the requested 
State, the related bilateral or multilateral treaties, and other agreements or arrangements.
61
 
States may refuse to co-operate in confiscation on a number of grounds provided for in the 
suppression conventions.
62
 Cooperation may be refused, for example, if the execution of the 
confiscation request would be contrary to the fundamental legality principles, such as the 
condition of double criminality if required and the non bis in idem principle.
63
 A request for 
confiscation also may be refused if it “is likely to prejudice the sovereignty, security, ordre 
public or other essential interest” of the requested States.
64
 In addition, many States do not 
recognize in rem confiscation, thus will refuse the enforcement of a foreign in rem 
confiscation order and the related provisional measures.
65
 However, the FATF recommends 
that countries should not refuse MLA on the grounds of fiscal matters, secrecy or 
confidentiality;
66
 and that countries should include being able to respond to non-conviction-
based confiscation proceedings and the related provisional measures, unless this is 
inconsistent with fundamental principles of their domestic law.
67
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  United Nations, above n58, par. 5.79. 
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  1988 Vienna Convention, above n39, article 5(4) (c). 
62
  Ibid, article 7(15); Palermo Convention, above n11, article 18(21); and UNCAC, above n11, article 46(21). 
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  See Palermo Convention, above n11, article 18(21)(c) 
64
  See ibid, article 18(21)(b). 
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  Ibid, article 18(21)(d). 
66
  FATF, above n1, R37(c) and (d). 
67
  Ibid, R38. 
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Article 5(4) (d) of the Vienna Convention and article 13(3) of the Palermo Convention are 
concerned with the detailed information included in a confiscation request. According to 
these provisions, in addition to the general information required in an ordinary MLA 
request,
68
 other supplementary information must be contained in a confiscation request. The 
provisions have been also incorporated in other articles that govern MLA in general, for 
example, article 7 (paragraphs 6 to 19) of the 1988 Vienna Convention and article 18 of the 
Palermo Convention.  
 
7.5.2 Sharing of and Returning Confiscated Assets  
 
How do States (the requested State and requesting State) address the situation when both 
of them have an interest in the confiscated assets? Both States may claim a share in the 
confiscated assets, and they have justification for doing so. The States have enforced their 
laws and may have suffered from the consequences of the crime related to the assets. They 
both deserve recompense for their efforts or to make it possible to provide victim 
compensation.
69
 Sharing of confiscated assets may also give financial incentives for States to 
provide cooperation in confiscation of criminal assets. In this situation, the suppression 
conventions suggest that the requested State consider “sharing with other States Parties, on a 
regular or case-by-case basis, such proceeds of crime or property, or funds derived from the 
sale of such proceeds of crime or property, in accordance with its domestic law or 
administrative procedures”.
70
 The FATF also recommends the sharing of confiscated assets.
71
 
Some States (e.g., the UK), when signing bilateral treaties on MLA in criminal matters, 
vigorously negotiate for the inclusion of the sharing of assets in the scope of MLA.
72
 
The requested State is required to return the confiscated assets to the requesting State in 
certain circumstances provided for in article 57(3) of UNCAC, which refer to: i) the case of 
embezzlement of public funds or of laundering of embezzled public funds;
73
 and ii) if the 
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  The general information of a MLA request is specified in, for example, Palermo Convention, above n11, 
article 18(15). 
69
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  1988 Vienna Convention, above n39, article 5(5)(a)(ii); and Palermo Convention, above n11, article 
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  See Treaty between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the 
Socialist Republic of Vietnam on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Vietnam No. 1 (2009), signed 
in Hanoi on 13 January 2009, article 1(3)(i). 
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assets are not these funds, when the requesting State reasonably establishes its prior 
ownership of such assets or when the requested State Party recognizes damage to the 
requesting State as a basis for returning the assets.
74
 In other cases, the requested State must 
prioritize the return of the assets to the requesting States or to their prior legitimate owners, or 




7.6 Interim Conclusion 
 
In summary, due to the growing gravity of transnational money laundering, the scope of 
MLA in combating money laundering has been considerably widened. It now encompasses 
almost every stage of criminal proceedings. MLA may occur outside formal criminal 
proceedings, such as the administrative exchange of information about STRs, or the 
enforcement of criminal judgments over money laundering offenders. MLA can be processed 
through channels of information exchange between the interstate competent authorities, for 
example FIUs, or through more formal treaty-based mechanism. The FIU network plays an 
important role in exchanging the AML information internationally, because it is based on 
flexible legal instruments, such as MOUs. MLA, especially treaty-based MLA, is normally 
subject to the traditional recognized condition/principles and the applicable professional 
regulations (for instance, in respect to banking secrecy, professional privilege or financial 
privacy). However, these conditions/principles and regulations may be relaxed when applied 
to AML. For example, requests for MLA should not be refused on the ground that domestic 
laws require financial institutions to maintain secrecy or confidentiality. 
Among all types of legal assistance, MLA in the execution of foreign provisional 
measures and confiscation of the proceeds of crime is undeniably crucial for combating 
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  Ibid, article 57(3)(b). 
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7.7 Provision of Mutual Legal Assistance by Vietnam 
 
7.7.1 The Exchange of AML Information by the Police and FIU 
 
The State Bank of Vietnam (SBV) and the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) are the 
primary State agencies which are vested with authority to process MLA in AML.
76
 This 
section deals with the responsibilities and practices of these agencies. 
“Police-to-police” or police-to-other law enforcement authorities assistance must be 
conducted in adherence to relevant bilateral agreements and MOUs signed by the MPS (such 
as with the Ministry of Internal Affairs of China in 1993 and Ministry of Internal Affairs of 
Cambodia in 2001).
77
 In 2006, the MPS and the US Drug Enforcement Administration 
(DEA) signed an MOU which aims to enhance information exchange and cooperation 
between the two interstate agencies on combating transnational drug-related crime including 
money laundering.
78
 In 2010, the Vietnam-Australia Joint Transnational Crime Centre 
(JTCC) was established in Ho Chi Minh City to improve the cooperation in combating 
transnational crime between the Vietnamese and Australian police forces (Australian Federal 
Police (AFP)).
79
 The JTCC collects, analyses and shares information relevant to transnational 
crime, including money laundering.   
ASEANAPOL, of which Vietnam is a member, has also developed the electronic 
ASEANAPOL Database System (e-ADS).
80
 In 2007, ASEANPOL reached a historic 
information-sharing agreement with the Lyon-based INTERPOL, which enables officers of 
INTERPOL National Central Bureaus (NCBs) around the world to access the criminal 
information stored in the e-ADS.
81
 The police of ASEAN member States can also access the 
INTERPOOL criminal database system. The ASEANAPOL Secretariat, which began its 
operations in 2010, facilitates intelligence and information sharing/exchange, coordinates 
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joint operations involving criminal investigation, maintains the e-ADS, and works to enhance 
the AML capacities of the region.
82
  
The Vietnamese police joined INTERPOL in 1991 and ASEANPOL in 1996.
83
 From 
1991-2011, through the channels of INTERPOL and ASEANPOL, Interpol Vietnam received 
and processed around 12,700 requests for the exchange of information in relation to 
transnational crime, including financial crimes (e.g., smuggling, economic frauds and money 
laundering
84
), drug trafficking, cyber-crimes, environmental crimes and terrorism.
85
 The 
Transnational Crime Information Database of Vietnam established by the Interpol Vietnam 
has been connected with INTERPOL’s I-24/7 network and the e-ADS.
86
 
The Vietnam’s Anti-Money Laundering Department (AMLD), which is attached to the 
SBV, functions as an administrative FIU model. It is an independent and centralized 
administrative authority responsible for receiving and processing information concerning 
money laundering reported by financial institutions and professions.
87
 Currently, the AMLD, 
with 26 staff members, has a limited capacity to engage in international cooperation in 
AML.
88
 The AMLD has not applied to become a member of the Egmont Group of FIUs. As 
of June 2014, the AMLD has signed MOUs with the FIU of Malaysia, Indonesia, Laos, 
Cambodia, South Korea, Thailand and Japan to facilitate the transnational exchange of 
information in AML between the AMLD and the FIUs of these States.
89
 In practice, the 
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NHNN, 14 July 2009  
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  In an interview with the Deputy Director of the AMLD on 12 June 2014. 
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  VOV (Voice of Vietnam) (2009), “Ky Ket Trao Doi Thong Tin Lien Quan Den Phong, Chong Rua Tien 
[Signing an Agreement on Exchanging Information Related to Anti-Money Laundering]”, available at: 
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AMLD has received and processed a number of requests for providing information related to 
money laundering from different States.
90
   
 
7.7.2 Treaty-based Mutual Legal Assistance 
 
Vietnam processes MLA in criminal matters, including in AML, on the basis of 
multilateral and bilateral treaties and its relevant domestic laws. This section examines the 
legal basis, procedure and conditions/principles for assistance in criminal matters provided by 
Vietnam. This section also discusses briefly Vietnam’s practice. 
 
Multilateral and bilateral treaties  
Vietnam is a Party to the ASEAN treaty on MLA in criminal matters,
91
 the 1988 Vienna 
Convention, the Palermo Convention and the UNCAC. As of September 2012, Vietnam has 
also signed  bilateral treaties on MLA in criminal matters with 16 States (the Czech Republic 
(1982), Cuba (1984), Hungary (1985), Bulgaria (1986), Poland (1993), Laos (1998), Russia 
(1998), China (1998), Ukraine (2000), Mongolia (2000), and Belarus (2000), the Democratic 
People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) (2002), the Republic of Korea (South Korea) 
(2003), India (2007), the UK (2009) and Algeria (2010).
92
  
It should be noted that the majority of the bilateral treaties were signed between Vietnam 
and former communist States. All the bilateral treaties prior to 2000 focus on assistance in 
gathering evidence and exclude MLA in retrieving criminal assets. Only recent treaties, with 
the Republic of Korea, India, the UK and Algeria, include this type of MLA.  
All the multilateral treaties oblige Vietnam to implement a wide range of types of MLA, 
including assistance in confiscation of criminal assets, sharing confiscated assets and 
returning assets. We will see below whether and how Vietnam has implemented these 
obligations in its national law. 
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  ASEAN Treaty on MLA in Criminal Matters, above n29.  
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  Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam (2012), “Danh Muc Hiep Dinh Tuong Tro Tu Phap Giua Viet Nam 
va Cac Nuoc [List of Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties between Vietnam and other States]”, available at: 
http://lanhsuvietnam.gov.vn/Lists/BaiViet/B%C3%A0i%20vi%E1%BA%BFt/DispForm.aspx?List=dc7c7d7
5-6a32-4215-afeb-47d4bee70eee&ID=414 (accessed 4 August 2013). 
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Domestic legal framework 
In Vietnam, prior to 2007, the most important legal provisions on MLA in criminal 
matters were articles 341, 342, 345 and 346 of the 2003 Criminal Procedure Code (CPC), 
which read as follows: 
 
Article 341: Providing Legal Assistance 
When providing legal assistance, the competent agencies and persons of the Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam who conduct criminal proceedings, shall apply the provisions of relevant international treaties 
which the Socialist Republic of Vietnam has signed or acceded to, and the provisions of this Code. 
 
Article 342: Refusal of Legal Assistance Requests 
The competent agencies of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam who conduct criminal proceedings may 
refuse legal assistance requests in criminal proceedings under one of the following cases: 
1. The Legal assistance requests fail to comply with the international treaties, which the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam has signed or acceded to, and the laws of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam; 
2. The provision of legal assistance would be detrimental to the national sovereignty, security or other 
important interests of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. 
 
Article 346: Receipt and Transfer of Documents, Objects and Money Related to Criminal Cases 
1. The receipt of documents related to criminal cases shall comply with the international treaties which 
the Socialist Republic of Vietnam has signed or acceded to, and the provisions of this Code. 
2. The transfer of objects and money related to criminal cases out of the territory of the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam shall comply with the laws of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. 
 
We can see that legal assistance provided by Vietnam heavily relies on treaties to which 
Vietnam is a Party. Article 341 makes clear that the provisions governing legal assistance are 
those contained in the treaties listed above. Article 342 sets out the grounds for refusal which 
are: i) failure to comply with the provisions in those international treaties. It is assumed that 
this includes all of the conditions for refusal in those treaties; and ii) a more general ground 
preserving national sovereignty, security and the rather vague catch all “other important 
interests”. Under article 346, the receipt of documents from other States must be compliant 
with the provisions in the treaties, but if objects or money is to be transferred out of Vietnam 
it must comply with Vietnamese law. The MLA provisions in the CPC are fairly vague. The 
general approach appears to be to protect Vietnamese sovereignty over processes that matter 
to it.  
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In 2007, Vietnam enacted a comprehensive law on Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA) in 
both criminal and civil matters.
93
 It is the primary legislation for formal MLA in criminal 
matters but does not replace the aforementioned provisions of the CPC. Article 4 of the Law 
on MLA reads: 
 
1. Mutual legal assistance shall be carried out on the principle of respect for each other’s independence, 
sovereignty and national territorial integrity, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and 
mutual benefit in accordance with the Constitution and law of Vietnam and international treaties to 
which Vietnam is a Party. 
2. In case Vietnam and the foreign country has not yet signed or acceded to any international treaty 
concerning mutual legal assistance, legal assistance shall be performed on the principle of reciprocity, 
provided that this does not contradict Vietnamese laws and in compliance with international law and 
practice. 
 
This article restates the fundamental principle that MLA is to be carried out by references 
to the contents of Vietnam’s international treaty obligations (or where no treaty relations are 
in existence on the basis of reciprocity), but again the preservation of Vietnamese sovereignty 
over these processes is paramount. 
 
Kinds of assistance 
Article 17 of the Law on MLA provides for the types of legal assistance as following: 
 
a) Service of documents and other records related to a criminal case; 
b) Summons of witnesses, experts and persons who have rights and obligations in the case; 
c) Collection and provision of evidence; 
d) Criminal prosecution; 
e) Exchange of information; and 
f) Other forms of mutual legal assistance in criminal matters. 
 
It can be seen that both the CPC and the Law on MLA focus on the provisions of 
assistance in collating evidence. It is not clear what article 17(f) of the Law on MLA is 
referring to when it speaks of “other forms of MLA”. MLA for the purposes of taking of 
preliminary measures and confiscation of criminal assets, sharing of the confiscated assets 
and returning such assets has not been specified in the CPC and the Law on MLA, but may 
                                                          
93
  Luat Tuong Tro Tu Phap [Law on Mutual Legal Assistance] (Vietnam) Law No. 08/2007/QH12, 21 
November 2007, entered into force 1 July 2008. 
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come under article 17(f). Nonetheless, legal assistance for these purposes is provided for in 
the suppression conventions, the ASEAN Treaty on MLA in Criminal Matters, the treaties on 
MLA in criminal matters between Vietnam and India (2007)
94
 and the UK.
95
 It is worth 
noting that the Law on MLA was adopted after Vietnam ratified the 1988 Vienna Convention 
and the ASEAN Treaty on MLA in Criminal Matters. Under article 1(3) of the treaty between 
the UK and Vietnam, MLA in criminal matters includes, for example: 
 
a) Taking the testimony or statements of persons including by videoconference or television;  
b) Providing documents, records, and other evidentiary material;  
c) Serving documents;  
d) Locating or identifying persons where required as part of a wider request for evidence;  
e) Transferring persons in custody according to article 12 (Transfer of Persons in Custody);  
f) Executing requests for search and seizure;  
g) Identifying, tracing, restraining, seizing, confiscating and disposal of proceeds of crime and assistance 
in related proceedings;  
h) Return of assets;  
i) Sharing of assets in accordance with Chapter II;  
j) Such other assistance as may be agreed between the Central Authorities. 
 
It appears from these obligations read as a whole that the international treaties are much 
more specific, while the domestic provisions tend to be broader and open-ended. The clause 
of “other forms of mutual legal assistance in criminal matters” will safeguard Vietnam 
against the international obligations, as it can be interpreted flexibly to include any type of 
MLA. It also implies that Vietnam is willing in principle to provide a broad range of 
assistance. However, the problem is that if the specific form of MLA is mentioned in an 
international instrument but not mentioned in a domestic law, the Vietnamese authorities may 
be reluctant in dealing with such form of MLA, because they are unsure whether it is 
included in “other forms”. As a result, Vietnam can show that it has adequate “law in the 
books”, but the quality of actual implementation would be poor.  
In a more specific provision of types of MLA, article 47 of the Law on Prevention and 
Suppression of Money Laundering (Law on PSML) set out the categories of international 
cooperation in AML as follows:
96
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1. Exchanging information and documents related to anti-money laundering. 
2. Identification and seizure of the property of persons who have committed money laundering crimes. 
3. Mutual legal assistance and cooperation in the extradition of money laundering offenders. 
4. Other forms of cooperation in anti-money laundering. 
 
The adoption of this article reflects a progress of Vietnam in transforming international 
AMLSs into its domestic laws. Nevertheless, again this article is vague and an open-ended 
clause is added at the end of the article. Legal assistance in retrieving criminal assets is 
provided for in this article but is confined to only provisional measures imposed on the assets 
of money laundering criminals. The use of “other forms” (in clause (4)) suggests that 
Vietnamese authorities may have not been familiar with, or even unknown, some forms of 
MLA (rather than what are listed in clause (1), (2) and (3)), such as confiscation of criminal 
assets or sharing confiscated criminal assets.   
 
Procedure  
Article 23 of the Law on MLA provides that: 
 
1. Within 15 days of receipt of a request for legal assistance in criminal matters from a foreign competent 
authority, the Supreme People’s Procuracy shall record it in the Register of Requests for legal assistance 
in criminal matters, check its validity and transmit it to the competent agency conducting criminal 
proceedings in Vietnam for execution. If the request is not valid, the Supreme People’s Procuracy shall 
return it to the competent authority of the requesting State and shall specify reasons therefore. 
2. Within 5 working days of receipt of the document informing the results of request’s execution sent by 
the agency conducting criminal proceedings of Vietnam, the Supreme People’s Procuracy shall send it to 
the competent authority of the requesting State according to the international treaty to which Vietnam 
and that foreign State are Parties, or through the diplomatic channels. 
3. If the request for legal assistance in criminal matters cannot be executed or cannot be executed within 
the time limit required by the foreign competent authority, or cannot be executed without additional 
conditions, the competent agency conducting criminal proceedings of Vietnam shall inform in writing the 
Supreme People’s Procuracy of the reasons therefore so that it may notify the competent authority of the 
requesting State. 
 
The Supreme People’s Procuracy (SPP) is the Central Authority of Vietnam for making 
and receiving MLA requests in criminal matters. After receiving a request, the SPP will 
examine such request for approval before it is executed on a substantive level by the 
competent executing agency. The SPP chooses the “enforcing judgments” approach. In order 
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for the initial approval, the SPP requires the requesting State to provide its judgment, such as 
a confiscation order and its provisional measures (e.g., search, seizure and freezing), and the 
supporting documents.
97
 The competent executing agency is normally the police force. 
Interestingly, although legal assistance in executing provisional measures and confiscation of 
criminal assets is not specified in article 17 of the Law on MLA, its procedure is provided for 
in article 19 of the law. However, the procedure and circumstances for the sharing of and 
returning of confiscated assets are not mentioned in any article of this law. 
Most bilateral MLA treaties signed by Vietnam provide that the Central Authorities shall 
normally communicate directly with one another, but may, if they choose, communicate 
through the diplomatic channel.
98
 The treaty between the UK and Vietnam (article 3(2)) 
requires the Central Authorities to communicate directly with one another. Furthermore, this 
treaty allows, in cases of urgency, MLA requests to be transmitted via INTERPOL.
99
 
When there is no treaty on MLA between Vietnam and the requested State, the diplomatic 
channels are used. Accordingly, the competent authorities of the two States send the results of 
request’s execution directly to one another, upon the principle of reciprocity. 
Article 21(1) and (2) of the Law on MLA provides for grounds for refusal or 
postponement of the execution of a foreign legal assistance request: 
 
1. A foreign request for legal assistance in criminal matters shall be refused in one of the following 
circumstances: 
a) It is not in conformity with the obligations of Vietnam under the international treaties to which 
Vietnam is a party and Vietnamese laws; 
b) The execution of the request may jeopardize the sovereignty or national security of Vietnam; 
c) The request relates to the prosecution of a person for a criminal conduct for which that person has 
been convicted, acquitted or granted a reprieve in Vietnam; 
d) The request relates to a criminal conduct for which the statute of limitations has elapsed according to 
the Penal Code of Vietnam; 
e) The request relates to a criminal conduct which does not constitute a crime under the Penal Code of 
Vietnam. 
2. The execution of a foreign request for legal assistance in criminal matters may be postponed if the 
execution of that request would cause an obstacle to the investigation, prosecution, trial, or the 
enforcement of a judgment in Vietnam. 
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  Law on Mutual Legal Assistance, above n93, article 19. 
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  For example, see Treaty between the Republic of Korea and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam on Mutual 
Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, signed at Seoul 15 September 2003, entered into force 19 April 2005, 
article 3(4); or India - Vietnam Treaty on MLA in Criminal Matters, above n94, article 3(4). 
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  Treaty between the UK and Vietnam on MLA in Criminal Matters, above n95, article 3(4). 
194 
 
Article 21(1)(a) of the Law on MLA implies that Vietnam will not provide more than it 
has already agreed to in a treaty. If the requesting State has not signed a treaty with Vietnam, 
the execution of the request depends on reciprocity subject to article 4(2) of the Law on 
MLA. The grounds for the refusal of MLA provided for in article 21(1)(b) and article 21(2) 
are similar to those in the suppression convention (e.g., in article 18(21)(b) and 18(25) of the 
Palermo Convention). As whether an MLA request jeopardises the sovereignty or other 
interests of Vietnam depends on Vietnam’s interpretation of those interests, article 21(1)(b) 
could be serve as a “reasonable” reason for the refusal of MLA if Vietnam is not comfortable, 
for example, because of political or economic matters. Article 21(2) may also be used to 
simply delay provision of MLA by opening an investigation and never closing it.  
 
Conditions/principles 
Article 21(1)(c) of the Law on MLA indicates that Vietnam applies, inter alia, the 
principle of ne bis in idem to MLA requests related to the prosecution of a person. It is 
assumed that Vietnam will apply this condition to the request for confiscation of criminal 
proceeds. 
According to article 21(1)(d) and (e) of the Law on MLA, Vietnam applies a strict 
condition of double criminality when granting all types of MLA in criminal matters. This 
application does not follow the international tendency whereby double criminality should not 
be required if the request does not involve coercive actions. Nevertheless, this condition is 
made optional and more relaxed in bilateral MLA treaties between Vietnam and other States. 
For example, under the MLA treaty between Vietnam and South Korea, Vietnam may refuse 
an MLA request if such request relates to the prosecution or punishment of a person for an 
offence for which the person could no longer be prosecuted by reason of the lapse of time; or 
for conduct that would not have constituted a crime in Vietnam.
100
 It should be recalled here 
that when it comes to regulations on the same matter, if there is a difference between the 
relevant domestic legal documents and related treaty provisions to which Vietnam is a Party, 
the treaty provisions shall prevail. Despite that, as the double criminality condition is optional 
in both bilateral and multilateral treaties, it is likely that Vietnam will adopt this condition 
rigidly.   
Vietnam does not bar requests for legal assistance in regard to tax evasion. Tax evasion 
constitutes a crime provided for in article 161 of the 1999 Penal Code if the offender evades 
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  Vietnam - South Korea Treaty on MLA in Criminal Matters, above n98, article 5(2). 
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tax in the amount of over fifty million VND (about 2,500 US$). Therefore, legal assistance 
related to a fiscal matter may be provided. 
 
The law in action 
In the period from July 2008, when the Law on Mutual Legal Assistance came into force, 
to June 2010, the Supreme People’s Procuracy of Vietnam made and sent 12 formal legal 
assistance requests to foreign authorities under the procedure provided for in the Law on 
MLA.
101
 The majority requested assistance in evidence collection and investigation of 
Vietnamese citizens or foreigners who have committed crimes within Vietnam. In this time, 
the Supreme People’s Procuracy of Vietnam received 156 requests for MLA in criminal 
matters from abroad, mainly from the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary and China;
102
 of 
which only one request was refused based on the ground provided for in article 21(1)(c) of 
the Law on Mutual Legal Assistance (ne bis in idem). Thirty six requests were executed and 
107 requests were being considering for execution.
103
 All these outgoing and incoming 
requests are made based on the relevant bilateral MLA treaties. Vietnam has not yet made or 
received any formal MLA request to or from an ASEAN MLA Treaty Party under such 
treaty.
104
 The Supreme People’s Procuracy of Vietnam has received a number of requests for 
freezing, seizing and confiscation of criminal proceeds located in Vietnam, but as yet not one 
of these requests has been executed. This is because there has not yet been specific legal 
provision of procedure made for MLA requests for confiscation of the criminal proceeds 
other than material evidence in Vietnamese laws.
105
 As noted in chapter 6, Vietnamese 
authorities are allowed to impose some provisional measures for purposes of collating 
material evidence which can be the proceeds of crime in form of tangible things. However, 
these measures cannot be used for other criminal assets. 
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  Interpol Vietnam (2011), "Report on Result of International Cooperation in the Prevention and Suppression 
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Assistance for Confiscation of the Criminal Property Located Abroad]” (2013), available at: 
http://duthaoonline.quochoi.vn/DuThao/Lists/TT_TINLAPPHAP/View_Detail.aspx?ItemID=656 (accessed 
11 July 2013). 
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7.7.3 Comments and Suggestions 
 
Vietnam has joined the network of “police-to-police” assistance in AML and has 
established its own FIU-style department - the AMLD. Given the available institutions and 
legal framework, Vietnam appears to be compliant with the international standards on 
exchanging AML information through the less formal channels of “police-to-police” 
assistance and of the FIU network. 
Vietnam has transformed the international standards on treaty-based MLA into the Law on 
MLA and Law on PSML, but insufficiently. The important provisions for MLA in the CPC, 
despite the deficiencies, have not been amended thus far. However, in general, the provisions 
for MLA made by the different laws (the CPC, the Law on MLA and the Law on PSML) 
cover most types of legal assistance in AML. These provisions, if being interpreted broadly, 
largely comply with the international standards on MLA in AML.  
The significant loophole in the MLA legal framework of Vietnam is the lack of specific 
provisions for assistance in retrieving criminal assets. Although article 346 of the CPC can be 
applied to these types of MLA, it is necessary to have more specific provisions to enable 
Vietnam to succeed in claiming a share of the confiscated assets. 
In addition, by requiring double criminality in all MLA requests, Vietnam does not follow 
either the FATF Recommendations
106
 or the tendency of other States in MLA. Germany, for 
example, only requires strict double criminality for extradition. In regard to other forms of 
legal assistance, for instance in supporting other countries in investigation proceedings or the 
transnational execution of imposition of fines and confiscations, German law does not 
generally require double criminality. In principle, the existence of criminal proceedings in the 
requesting country is sufficient. The requirement of dual criminality is only expressly 
required for the seizure and surrender of property under sections 66 and 67 of the Act on 
International Cooperation in Criminal Matters
107
 and some other prescribed circumstances.
108
 
In order to remedy the current situation of Vietnam, this thesis suggests that:  
i) Vietnam should dispense with the requirement of double criminality in all types of 
MLA. Article 21(1)(d) and (e) of the Law on MLA should be converted into optional grounds 
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  FATF, above n1, R37. 
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  Act on International Cooperation in Criminal Matters (Germany), as amended by 18 October 2010 (AICCM 
- Translated by by Prof. Dr. Michael Bohlander and Prof. Wolfgang Schomburg).  
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  FATF (2010), “Mutual Evaluation Report: Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of 
Terrorism (Germany)”, available at: http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer/MER%20Germany%20full.pdf (accessed 19 August 2013).  
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for the refusal of MLA only; and should specify the circumstances whereby double 
criminality can be relaxed, such as requests for bank records, business records or 
identification of the property. In regard to requests for seizure or freezing of the proceeds of 
crime, Vietnam should apply in abstracto double criminality (if double criminality is 
required). These changes will eliminate the differences between the Vietnam’s laws on MLA 
and the MLA treaties to which Vietnam is a Party. MLA in anti-money laundering will be 
also enhanced. 
ii) Article 17 of the Law on MLA, which provides for the scope of assistance, should be 
amended to specify all the types of MLA prescribed in article 1(2) of the ASEAN Treaty on 
MLA or article 1(3) of treaty on MLA between Vietnam and the UK, which includes the 
assistance in recovery of criminal assets. This amendment will make Vietnam’s domestic 
laws consistent with the treaties to which Vietnam is a Party.  
iii) The kinds of confiscated assets that Vietnam is prepared to share or return to foreign 
countries, and the procedure for that sharing or return should be specified in the Law on 
MLA. The confiscated assets should be returned to the requesting State in certain 
circumstances provided for in article 57(3) of the UNCAC, as pointed out earlier. 
And iv) the AMLD should extend its cooperation with FIUs of other countries and 
consider becoming a member of the Egmont Group of FIUs. Being a member of the Egmont 
Group will enable the AMLD to exchange information related to money laundering to other 
foreign FIUs promptly. Furthermore, the AMLD can receive the training and sharing of 




MLA in criminal matters was traditionally sought through the diplomatic channel for the 
purposes of collating extraterritorial evidence in the investigation of a criminal case. The 
emergence of transnational crime has necessitated more types and diverse mechanisms of 
MLA. Legal assistance now includes the administrative exchange of information, the 
gathering of evidence and the recovery of assets extraterritorially. It can be processed through 
formal mechanism upon diplomatic customs or treaty-based MLA; or less formally based on 
the direct communication between interstate agencies. The interstate agencies assistance, of 
which “police-to-police” assistance is dominant, is likely to be more practical and efficient 




In AML, the exchange of information through the FIU network is a “new” aspect of MLA, 
and the international coordination in confiscating criminal assets is a crucial type of MLA. 
The conditions/principles and basic procedure for the assistance in confiscation are provided 
for in the suppression conventions and the FATF Recommendations. The FATF recommends 
that States should render MLA in the absence of double criminality; and that if double 
criminality is required, it should be in abstracto. The transnational application of ne bis in 
idem can bar “double confiscation”. The cooperation in confiscation of the criminal proceeds 
or instrumentalities is normally based on bilateral or multilateral treaties. The procedures for 
this cooperation can be either by “transferring a request for confiscation” or by “execution of 
confiscation order”.  
Vietnam has the fundamental institutional and legal framework for MLA in AML. The 
legal framework includes national laws, MOUs, bilateral and multilateral treaties. As set out 
in the national laws (the CPC, the Law on MLA and the Law on PSML), Vietnam can 
provide a wide coverage of legal assistance in AML, but it must comply with the 
international treaties and must preserve the national sovereign and interests. At first glance, 
the wording of the laws can make them as a whole compliant with international standards. 
However, the vague provisions of the laws will challenge Vietnamese law enforcement 
agencies in dealing with legal assistance requests in AML. For example, an unspecified 
provision of assistance in retrieving criminal assets, a crucial aspect of international 
cooperation in AML, has prevented Vietnamese authorities from processing a request for this 
purpose. It means that while the “paper” implementation of the international standards 
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Extradition has been recognized as a crucial pillar of international cooperation in 
combating transnational criminals, including transnational money launderers, who often try to 
escape from justice by crossing national borders.
1
 Extradition serves two primary objectives: 
i) ensuring that criminals are not able to seek refuge in foreign States; and ii) at the same 
time, providing for due process and protection of certain State interests and individual rights.
2
 
In response to transnational money laundering, Vietnam may have to request the extradition 
of individuals who allegedly launder money in Vietnam and then flee abroad and of those 
who launder money from outside of Vietnam into or through Vietnam. Equally Vietnam must 
                                                          
1
 The High Court of Australia recently commented that “[i]n a world of increased mobility, interactive 
technology and new forms of criminality, extradition represents an essential response to the characteristics of 
contemporary crime”. See Foster v Minister for Customs & Justice (2000), 200 CLR 442, 474. 
2
  In United States of America v Ferras, the Canadian Supreme Court noted that extradition under a fair 
process will protect the comity between States and protect the individual rights of person to be extradited. 
See United States v Ferras, 2006 SCC 33, pars. 20, 21. 
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be prepared to respond to extradition requests from other States for alleged money launderers 
who have sought refuge in Vietnam. 
This chapter will first examine the international standards on extradition in general, 
including the legal basis, conditions, exceptions and procedure, with a focus on extradition 
for transnational crime. This will be followed by the discussion of extradition for money 
laundering offences. Finally, the chapter will examine the Vietnamese legislation on 
extradition and its application to money laundering crimes and assess whether Vietnam is 
compliant with the international standards. Based on that examination and assessment, 
suggestions for law reform will be given. 
 
8.2 Extradition in General 
 
8.2.1 The Legal Basis 
 
The practice of extradition has a long history of development. It originated in ancient 
civilization as a matter of courtesy and goodwill between States.
3
 Although different 
definitions for extradition have been given throughout its history,
4
 it is generally understood 
as a formal process whereby the requested State surrenders to the requesting State a person 
present in the requested State accused of or convicted of an offence within the jurisdiction of 
the requesting State. The United Nations, in its Model Law on Extradition (2004), defines 
extradition as “the surrender of any person who is sought by the requesting State for criminal 
prosecution for an extraditable offence or for the imposition or enforcement of a sentence in 
respect of such an offence”.
5
 
International law is silent on a general legal obligation to extradite. The primary legal 
bases for extradition include bilateral
6
 or multilateral extradition treaties,
7
 extradition 
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  M Cherif Bassiouni, International Extradition and World Public Order (AW Sijthoff, 1974) at 1. 
4
  Different definitions of extraditions were provided in I. A. Shearer, Extradition in International Law 
(Manchester University Press, 1971) at 21; ibid; and Clive Nicholls, et al., Nicholls, Montgomery, and 
Knowles on The Law of Extradition and Mutual Assistance (3
rd
 ed, Oxford University Press, 2013) at 3. 
5
  Model Law on Extradition 2004, UNODC, section 1. 
6
  Most States have at least one bilateral extradition treaty. Especially, the US has more than 100 bilateral 
extradition treaties. 
7
  For example, European Convention on Extradition, 13 December 1957, ETS 24, entered into force 18 April 






 and national laws. In addition, as discussed further below, the suppression 
conventions (the Vienna Convention,
9
 the Palermo Convention
10
 and the UNCAC
11
) can 
become legal bases for extradition. In practice, bilateral treaty-based extradition has a long 
tradition and seems to be one of the most common bases for extradition. Some States, such as 
the US, require an applicable extradition treaty in force before extradition can take place.
12
 A 
bilateral extradition treaty and domestic extradition law normally in combination provide the 
details in regard to extradition matters, such as the conditions, exceptions and procedure. 
Where no treaty exists, it is optional in certain States to extradite on the basis of their 
domestic laws and the principle of reciprocity for the sake of combating crime.
13
 Extradition 
based solely on domestic law is also possible in certain States and may be the most popular 
way of carrying out this procedure in the future as States realize they cannot continually 
update extradition treaties. 
In 1990, the UN recognized “the importance of a model treaty on extradition as an 
effective way of dealing with the complex aspects and serious consequences of crime, 
especially in its new forms and dimensions”; and the adoption of such a treaty serves as a 
guide to States in shaping their extradition relations.
14
 Extradition provisions have also 
become an indispensable part of numerous UN suppression conventions, such as the 1988 
Vienna Convention, the Palermo Convention and the UNCAC. These conventions all provide 
                                                          
8
  For example, the London Scheme for Extradition within the Commonwealth governs the extradition of a 
person from one Commonwealth country, in which the person is found, to another Commonwealth country, 
in which the person is accused of an offence. See “The London Scheme for Extradition within the 
Commonwealth (incorporating the amendments agreed at Kingstown in November 2002)”, available at: 
http://www.thecommonwealth.org/shared_asp_files/uploadedfiles/%7B56F55E5D-1882-4421-9CC1-
71634DF17331%7D_London_Scheme.pdf (accessed 12 July 2013), article 1(1). 
9
  United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 20 
December 1988, 1582 UNTS 95, entered into force 11 November 1990, article 6. 
10
  United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime, 15 November 2000, 2225 UNTS 209, 
entered into force 29 September 2003, article 16. 
11
  United Nations Convention against Corruption, 31 October 2003, 2349 UNTS 41, entered into force 14 
December 2005, article 44. 
12
  With few exceptions provided for in 18 USC § 3181(b), the US only grants an extradition request to a 
foreign country under an existing extradition treaty or convention between them. See 18 USC § 3181(a) and 
3184 (2012). 
13
  Some States, for instance Australia and the UK, can extradite a person in the absence of treaty and do not 
strictly require reciprocity (see E P Aughterson, Extradition: Australian Law and Procedure (The Law Book 
Company Limited, 1995) at 7-8). Others, for example Germany, may execute extradition without an existing 
treaty, however extradition is not permissible if reciprocity is not guaranteed. See Act on International 
Cooperation in Criminal Matters (Germany), as amended by 18 October 2010 (AICCM - Translated by by 
Prof. Dr. Michael Bohlander and Prof. Wolfgang Schomburg), section 5. 
14
  See Preamble of Model Treaty on Extradition [Model Treaty on Extradition (1990)] (United Nations) 
A/RES/45/116, 14 December 1990. 
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that “if a State Party that makes extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty receives a 
request for extradition from another State Party with which it has no extradition treaty, it may 
consider this convention the legal basis for extradition in respect of any offence to which this 
article applies”.
15
 In addition, article 16(5)(a) of the Palermo Convention and article 44(6)(a) 
of the UNCAC oblige their State Parties to inform, at the time of ratification, acceptance or 
approval or accession, the UN Secretary General whether they will take the convention as the 
legal basis for granting extradition to other States Parties. Some States, such as India and 
Mexico, have declared that they shall apply the Palermo Convention as a legal basis for 
extradition cooperation with other State Parties, with which there is no extradition treaty.
16
 
Moreover in practice, some States have granted an extradition request solely upon the legal 
basis of the Palermo Convention.
17
 Other states, for instance Malaysia, Laos and importantly 
for the purposes of this chapter, Vietnam, have declared that they shall not take this 
convention as the direct legal basis for extradition.
18
 These States may be sceptical about 
extradition relations, especially with other States which have different legal and political 
traditions. Hence, extradition based on a bilateral treaty or reciprocity seems to be preferred. 
Relying upon various justifications, treaties and national laws impose conditions for 
extradition and exceptions for refusal. Individual and State’s interests can be protected by 
these conditions and exceptions. Each State usually applies the conditions and exceptions 
which serve its interests. The inclusion of the conditions and exceptions in an extradition 
treaty is a matter of negotiation and agreement between its State Parties. Thus, not all of these 
conditions and exceptions will be insisted upon by every State or found in every extradition 
                                                          
15
  1988 Vienna Convention, above n9, article 6(3); Palermo Convention, above n10, article 16(4); and UNCAC, 
above n11, article 44(5). 
16
  United Nations, “Status of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (as at 15 
July 2013)”, available at: 
http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20II/Chapter%20XVIII/XVIII-12.en.pdf (accessed 
15 July 2013). 
17
  For example, in 2009, the United Arab Emirates had extradited successfully a Serbian national, who was 
suspected of being involved in an armed robbery, from the Netherlands. See Conference of the Parties to the 
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (Fifth Session), "Catalogue of cases 
involving extradition, mutual legal assistance and other forms of international legal cooperation requested 
on the basis of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 
CTOC/COP/2010/CRP.5" (22 September 2010) at 15, available at: 
http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/organized_crime/COP5/CTOC_COP_2010_CRP5/CTOC_COP_2
010_CRP5_E.pdf (accessed 15 July 2013).   
18
  United Nations, above n16. 
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treaty. This is why the suppression conventions subject extradition to the conditions provided 




8.2.2  The Conditions  
 
Extraditable offences  
As the extradition process is cumbersome and costly, not all criminal offenders should be 
subject to extradition. States normally agree on a category of offences which are sufficiently 
serious to warrant extradition. These offences, known as “extraditable offences”, are usually 
provided for in extradition treaties and national law.  
Early extradition treaties and domestic extradition laws use the enumerative (or listing) 
approach to designate extraditable offences (e.g., Thailand-United Kingdom Extradition 
Treaty
20
). This approach has drawbacks, as the treaties and domestic laws are required to 
update emerging extraditable offences. The process of making supplementary treaties and 
municipal law amendments is often time-consuming. Additionally, this approach requires the 
application of double criminality in concreto. 
Recent extradition treaties and municipal extradition laws employ the eliminative (or 
penalty-based) approach. Accordingly, extraditable offences are usually designated upon an 
applicable threshold term of imprisonment.
21
 This approach still has its flaws. For example, 
countries may have significant disparities in their penalty policies and thus offences 
extraditable in one may not be extraditable in another. 
By entering a suppression convention, the State Parties recognize the offences covered by 
that convention as extraditable offences. As a result, the State Parties are obliged to 
automatically update the scope of the extraditable offences in all existing extradition treaties 
between them to include the offences in that suppression convention.
22
 It is noticeable that 
the Palermo Convention, the UNCAC and the FATF Recommendations do not provide a 
specific approach to the definition of extraditable offences. State Parties to the conventions 
                                                          
19
  See article 6(5) of the Vienna Convention, article 16(7) of the Palermo Convention and article 44(8) of the 
UNCAC. 
20
  Treaty between the United Kingdom and Siam Respecting the extradition of Fugitive Criminals Sign at 
Bangkok 4 March 1911, ratifications exchanged at London 11 August 1911, article 2. 
21
  For example, under article 2(1) of the Treaty on Extradition between the Republic of Korea and the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam, signed at Seoul 15 September 2003, entered into force 19 April 2005, the threshold is 
one year in prison. While under section 2(2) of the London Scheme for Extradition, the threshold is two 
years.  
22
  See, for example, article 16(3) of the Palermo Convention. 
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and member countries of the FATF are left to choose their approach to the designation of 
extraditable offences. However, since the Palermo Convention applies the eliminative 
approach while the Vienna Convention and the UNCAC adopt the enumerative approach to 




The double criminality condition, which is often found in treaties and national law on 
extradition, is perhaps the most fundamental condition for extradition. It requires that the 
offence for which extradition is sought must be a criminal offence in the domestic law of both 
the requesting and requested States. This condition should be satisfied at the time the offence 
was committed.
23
 Double criminality preserves the legality principle, particularly to ensure 
reciprocal maintenance of the maxim nullum crimen sine lege (“no punishment without law”) 
in the context of extradition - “no one should be subject to a criminal process for something 
that is not a crime in the State they are in”.
24
 However, as noted in chapter 5, this condition is 
not binding on States unless it is created in the applicable treaties or domestic laws. Thus, the 
condition cannot be employed as a bar to extradition if the applicable treaty or national law 
excludes it.
25
 In some US extradition treaties, double criminality is not required for the return 
of a national of the requesting State.
26
  
Article 16(1) of the Palermo Convention obliges its State Parties to grant extradition for 
the offences covered by the convention “provided that the offence for which extradition is 
sought is punishable under the domestic law of both the requesting State Party and the 
requested State Party”. In fact, States tend to apply double criminality in abstracto in granting 
extradition.
27
 The UN Model Law on Extradition (2004) states that double criminality is 
satisfied regardless of differences in denomination, categorization and the constituent 
elements of the compared offences.
28
 In a similar vein, the UNCAC and FATF also call for 
                                                          
23
  See S. Z Feller, “Significance of the Requirement of Double Criminality in the Law of Extradition ” (1975) 
10 Israel Law Review 51 at 70; and R. v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate Ex p. Pinochet 
Ugarte (No.3) 1999 WL 250052. 
24
  Neil Boister, An Introduction to Transnational Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 2012) at 218. 
25
  In Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276 (1933) 286-287, the Supreme Court of the US held that the double 
criminality condition is based not on international law but on treaty. 
26
  For example, see article of 1(2)(b) of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Federal 
Republic of Germany Concerning Extradition, signed 20 June 1978, entered into force 29 August 1980. 
27
  See U.S. v. Saccoccia, 58 F.3d 754 (1st Cir. 1995) 779-780; U.S. v. Moss, 344 F.Supp.2d 1142 (W.D.Tenn. 
2004). 
28
  Model Law on Extradition, above n5, section 3(3). 
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The increased incidence of cross-border crimes has resulted in the application of double 
criminality becoming more complicated in many cases. For example, when a crime for which 
extradition is sought was committed outside the territory of the requesting State, the situation 
is especially complicated by what is sometimes called “jurisdictional double criminality”.
30
 In 
such a situation, the requesting State has asserted extraterritorial jurisdiction over the crime to 
make the extradition request. If the requested State requires double criminality, it has to 
consider whether it has also established extraterritorial jurisdiction over a crime committed in 
similar circumstances in relation to it. Although the jurisdictional aspect of double criminality 
is not mentioned in extradition treaties and the suppression conventions, it is taken into 
account in practice. Therefore, as mentioned in chapter 5, the jurisdictional aspect should be 
included in the topic of double criminality in abstracto. 
 
Evidence 
In the extradition process, the requested State, depending on the principles of its legal 
system, decides whether evidence for justification of extradition must be adduced by the 
requesting State, and if so, how much evidence is necessary. 
Most civil law States regard extradition as a form of international assistance rather than a 
criminal process, thus they do not require any evidence be provided.
31
 What these States 
require is that the requesting State has examined evidence appropriate under its law to lay a 
charge against the person sought and has issued an arrest warrant (in case of extradition for 
criminal prosecution). The requested State trusts that the requesting State has complied with 
the principles of due process of law.
32
 It only needs a request accompanied with supporting 
documents.
33
 Based on these documents, the requested State verifies whether the conditions 
for extradition have been met.
34
 
                                                          
29
  UNCAC, above n11, article 43(2); and FATF (2012), “International Standards on Combating Money 
Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation - the FATF Recommendations”, available at: 
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF_Recommendations.pdf 
(accessed 22 May 2014), R39. 
30
  See United States of America v Wong [2001] 2NZLR 472. 
31
  Boister, above n24, at 221. 
32
  See, for example, the case of extradition of Yemeni citizens described in Matthias Hartwig, “The German 
Federal Constitutional Court and the Extradition of Alledged Terrorists to the United States ” (2004) 5(3) 
German Law Journal 185 at 194. 
33
  For example, see section 10 of the German AICCM, above n13. 
34
  Ibid, section 11. 
206 
 
Unlike civil law States, common law States consider extradition proceedings as quasi-
criminal.
35
 They require that some evidence implicating the alleged offender in the offence 
for which the extradition is requested be provided, to determine if it is sufficient to proceed 
with extradition. Traditionally, the standard of sufficiency in many common law States is that 
of a prima facie case.
36
 Nevertheless, recently the UK has adopted the civil law standard of 
“no-evidence” for extradition cases with continental European States in compliance with the 
European Convention on Extradition. The UK only asks the requesting State to provide the 
warrant of arrest and relevant case summary.
37
  
The US does not apply the prima facie case standard. The US requires a lower standard of 
evidence of “probable cause", which is the same as evidence applicable to the issuance of a 
search warrant.
38
 One of the purposes of extradition hearing is to determine whether 
“probable cause” exists to believe that the person sought committed an offence covered by 





1. There exists a valid extradition treaty between the United States and the requesting state; 
2. The relator is the person sought; 
3. The offense charged is extraditable; 
4. The offense charged satisfies the requirement of double criminality; 
5. There is “probable cause” to believe the relator committed the offense charged; 
6. The documents required are presented in accordance with United States law, subject to any specific 
treaty requirements, translated and duly authenticated ... ; and 
7. Other treaty requirements and statutory procedures are followed. 
The suppression conventions oblige their State Parties, subject to their domestic law, to 







                                                          
35
  Boister, above n24, at 221. 
36
  See The London Scheme for Extradition within the Commonwealth (incorporating the amendments agreed 
at Kingstown in November 2002), above n8, paragraph 5(4)(a). 
37
  See Extradition Act 2003  (The UK), section 2(6). 
38
  Michael John Garcia and Charles Doyle, "Extradition To and From the United States: Overview of the Law 
and Recent Treaties" Congressional Research Service, 2010, at 21. 
39
  Ibid, at 21. 
40
  For example, article 16(8) of the Palermo Convention. 
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Rule of specialty 
The rule of specialty ensures that the requesting State does not prosecute and punish the 
person surrendered in a manner inconsistent with the terms on which extradition was granted. 
As extradition is subject to certain conditions and is granted on the specific extraditable 
offence for which the extradition is requested, the person sought should not be prosecuted for 
other non-extradition offences. This is the objective of the rule of specialty. In the United 




A person who has been brought within the jurisdiction of the court by virtue of the proceedings under an 
extradition treaty, can only be tried for those offences described in that treaty, and for the offence with 
which he is charged in the proceedings of his extradition, unless a reasonable time has been given him, 
after his release or trial upon such charge, to return to the country from whose asylum he has been 
forcibly taken under those proceedings. 
 
Specialty can also be breached if a person extradited is re-extradited to a third State for an 
offence committed prior to his extradition without the requested party’s consent.
42
 
It should be noted that the rule is not a right of accused, but is, rather, a privilege of the 
asylum State by which its interests are protected.
43
 The requested State has an interest in 
ensuring that its extradition proceedings are not abused by the requesting State for an ulterior 
purpose. The rights and interests of the fugitive in relation to speciality are derivative in 




It is also noteworthy that the application of the rule tends to be flexible. For example, the 
UN Model Treaty on Extradition suggests that “the rule of speciality is not applicable to 
extraditable offences provable on the same facts and carrying the same or a lesser penalty as 
the original offence for which extradition was requested”.
45
 National courts have been 
relaxed about applying specialty.
46
 Accordingly, the rule of specialty does not require that 
defendant is prosecuted only under the precise indictment that prompted his extradition, or 
                                                          
41
  United States v. Rauscher, 119 US 407 (1886), 430. 
42
  See, for example, article 15 of European Convention on Extradition, above n7. 
43
  Berenguer v. Vance, 473 F.Supp. 1195 (D.C.D.C. 1979). 
44
  U.S. v. Valencia-Trujillo, 573 F.3d 1171 (11th Cir. 2009) 1181. 
45
  UN Doc A/RES/52/88 (1998) ad to article 14 of Model Treaty on Extradition (1990), above n 
46
  In Truong v. Qeen, 205 ALR 72, the Australian High Court held that specialty had not been violated when 
the accused extradited for conspiracy to kidnap and conspiracy to murder was actually convicted of murder 
and kidnapping.  
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that the prosecution always is limited to the specific offences enumerated in the requested 
State’s extradition order.    
 
8.2.3 The Exceptions  
 
As noted earlier, some exceptions to extradition are found in most legal instruments 
related to extradition while others will vary in provision depending on particular extradition 
relations and national law. Further, not all grounds for the refusal of extradition have the 
same effect, some are mandatory whereas others are discretionary.  
 
Nationality exception 
While most civil law States refuse to extradite their nationals,
47
 this is not the case in most 
common law States. Several extradition treaties provide an optional exception to extradition 
upon nationality.
48
 The primary rationale behind the nationality exception to extradition has 
been believed to include that:
49
 i) a person ought not to be withdrawn from his natural judges; 
and ii) a State owes its citizens the protection of its laws. The underlying justification appears 
to be a combination between a broad concept of national sovereignty and a concern in regard 
to the nature of the foreign trial that a national may face. Nevertheless, transnational 
criminals may abuse this exception to escape from the justice. Nationals of those States 
which apply the exception can commit crimes abroad with impunity if they either never leave 
their State of nationality or return to it before being arrested. 
Because of the emergence of transnational crime, the international community and many 
States have taken steps to remove the strict application of nationality exception, or to prevent 
the impunity which may be created by this exception. The extradition treaty between the US 
and Italy (a civil law State) expressly states that extradition shall not be refused on the basis 
of nationality.
50
 Article 16(2) of the Basic Law of German enables the extradition of Germans 
to another member State of the EU or to an international criminal court, provided that the rule 
of law is upheld. To prevent the impunity that the exception may bring to a fugitive, the 
suppression conventions bind their State Parties to apply the principle of aut dedere aut 
                                                          
47
  For example, the extradition of German nationals is prohibited under article 16(2) of the Basic Law (2010). 
48
  For example, article 6(1)(a) of the European Convention on Extradition, above n7; and article 4(a) of Model 
Treaty on Extradition (1990), above n5. 
49
  Shearer, above n4, at 118. 
50
  See article IV of the Treaty on Extradition between the United States of America and Italy, signed 13 
October 13 1983, entered into force 24 September 1984. 
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judicare (extradite or prosecute).
51
 According to, for example article 16(10) of the Palermo 
Convention, the requested State Party that declines extradition upon the ground of nationality 
shall, at the request of the requesting State Party, submit the case immediately to its 
competent authorities for prosecution. The decision to prosecute and the prosecution must be 
conducted seriously. The State Parties concerned must cooperate with each other to ensure 
the efficiency of the prosecution.  
In addition, the rationale of the exception can be still preserved by the alternative that the 
requested State allows extradition of its nationals upon the condition that they will be 
returned to it to serve their sentence. This alternative has been already provided for in the 
suppression conventions.
52
 In a similar approach, in order to prevent the fugitive being 
immune from the punishment already imposed by the requesting State, the suppression 
conventions urge the requested State, if it refuses extradition upon nationality grounds, to 




Ne bis in idem 
As explained in chapter 5, ne bis in idem (or the prohibition of double jeopardy), a crucial 
principle in the exercise of jurisdiction over transnational crime, functions as a bar to new 
prosecution or enforcement of penalties for the same offender in both the national and 
transnational context. This principle is also reflected in extradition treaties and national 
laws,
54
 which allows a State to refuse extradition if the person sought has been previously 
tried and convicted or acquitted in such State or in another State. Again, States vary in the 
interpretation and the application of this principle to extradition depending on specific treaty 
and domestic law. The principle can be applied narrowly to not only the same act but also to 
the same offence,
55
 or more broadly to the same act or facts.
56




                                                          
51
  How this principle works is explained in chapter 5. 
52
  See for example, article 16(11) of the Palermo Convention. 
53
  For example, article 16(12) of the Palermo Convention. 
54
  See European Convention on Extradition, above n7, article 9. 
55
  See article 8 of Treaty between the United States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany 
Concerning Extradition, signed 20 June 1978, entered into force 29 August 1980; and Elcock v. U.S., 80 
F.Supp.2d 70 (E.D.N.Y. 2000). 
56
  See Treaty on Extradition between the United States of America and Italy, above n50, article 6; and In re 




An extradition request may be refused if the requested State has reasonable grounds for 
believing that the reques has been made for the purposes of prosecuting or punishing the 
person sought on account of his race, religion, nationality or political opinions or that that 
person’s position may be prejudiced for any of those reasons.
57
 Discrimination is a 





Extradition may be declined based on general humanitarian considerations of the 
circumstances of the fugitive. Under the London Scheme for Extradition, extradition may be 
refused if it would be unjust or oppressive or too severe a punishment to return the fugitive.
59
 
Some considerations can be the age or health of the person sought, or whether the punishment 
he would receive is disproportionate to the nature of the offence. 
 
General human rights exception 
As noted in the specialty rule, fugitive’s rights are mainly derived from the conditions and 
exceptions which are actually rights held by States. Thus, traditionally, fugitives were not 
eligible for challenging violations of extradition treaties, particularly the potential breach of 
their rights in the requesting State. However, several recent treaties have asserted the 
protection of human right as an independent condition in the extradition process and at trial in 
the requesting State.
60
 The bar to extradition on the basis of general human rights ground has 
also been incorporated in domestic extradition laws.
61
 These grounds can relate to various 
issues, such as the potential for facing an unfair trial, the possibility of torture, or inhuman or 




Statute of limitations 
A less frequently recurring issue, arising by the requirement that the fugitive's act be 
considered criminal at the time extradition is requested, involves the statute of limitations of 
                                                          
57
  See European Convention on Extradition, above n7, article 3(2). 
58
  For example, see article 16(14) of the Palermo Convention. 
59
  See article 15(2)(b) of The London Scheme for Extradition within the Commonwealth (incorporating the 
amendments agreed at Kingstown in November 2002), above n8. 
60
  See, for example, article 16(13) of the Palermo Convention. 
61
  See, for example, section 21 of the UK Extradition Act 2003. 
62
  See article 3 of the European Convention on Human Right, 4 November 1950. 
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the requesting or requested State. Several extradition treaties of continental States require 
adherence to the statute of limitations in deciding whether extradition is granted. The statute 
of limitation may be examined under only the law of requested State
63
 or the requesting 
State,
64




Fiscal offence exception 
It is noteworthy that there is a trend towards the relaxation of exceptions in various aspects 
of extradition for the aim of combating transnational crime. Historically, extradition treaties 
excluded those offences relating to taxation and fiscal matters from the category of 
extraditable offences, because the legislation of taxation is considered as an aspect of State 
sovereignty.
66
 Nevertheless, in the era of globalization, tax-related offences and other 
financial offences, such as securities fraud or market manipulation, have had enormously 
detrimental effects on national and international economies.
67
 Many States have criminalized 
some forms of serious infringement of tax law. Thus, there is no reason why States should not 
cooperate in the fight against fiscal-related offences as well as the fight against the laundering 
of their proceeds. The “fiscal offence” exception has been relaxed in a number of recent 
treaties on extradition. These offences are included in the scope of extraditable offences. For 
example, the Australia – Mexico treaty on extradition states that “extradition shall be granted 
for offences against laws relating to taxation, customs duties, foreign exchange control or 
other revenue matters where the acts or omissions constitute an extraditable offence against 
the laws of both Parties”.
68
 Article 3(10) of the 1988 Vienna Convention, article 16(15) of the 
Palermo Convention and article 44(16) of the UNCAC also provides that State Parties may 
not refuse a request for extradition on the sole ground that the offence is considered to 
involve fiscal matters. 
 
Death penalty exception 
                                                          
63
  Article 8 of the Extradition Treaty between the United States and France, signed 6 January 1909, entered 
into force 27 June 1911; and see President of the U.S. ex rel. Caputo v. Kelly, 96 F.2d 787 (2nd Cir. 1938). 
64
  Article 9 of the The United States - Germany Treaty on Extradition, above n55. 
65
  Article 6(3) of the Convention on Extradition between the Government of the United States of America and 
the Government of the State of Israel, signed 10 December 1962, entered into force 5 December 1963. 
66
  Gavan Griffith and Claire Harris, “Recent Developments in the Law of Extradition” (2005) 6(33) Melbourne 
Journal of International Law 33 at 35-36 
67
  Ibid, at 35. 
68
  Treaty on Extradition between Australia and the United Mexican States 1991, article 4. 
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Pursuant to article 11 of the European Convention on Extradition, if the offence for which 
extradition is requested is punishable by death under the law of the requesting State, and if 
regarding such offence the death penalty is not provided for in the requested State or not 
normally carried out, extradition may be refused unless the requesting State can guarantee 
that the death penalty will not be carried out. This exception protects an aspect of human 
rights - the right to life.
69
 Since the death penalty still exists in several States and is 
potentially imposed on some precursor transnational crimes to money laundering, such as 
drug trafficking or corruption, it could be a hindrance to extradition for such crimes and for 
money laundering itself. What is more, granting extradition on the condition that the 
requesting State will not impose the death penalty on the fugitive seems unfair in that the 
penalty imposed in the requesting State then depends on where the criminal was 
apprehended.    
 
Other grounds for refusal can be that the offence for which the extradition is requested is a 
political offence
70
 or military offence.
71 
The details of these grounds are beyond the scope of 
this chapter which focuses mainly on extradition for money laundering offences.   
 
8.2.4 The Procedure and Obstacles 
 
Procedure 
The extradition process is initiated by a demand from law enforcement agencies in the 
requesting State for the extradition of a specified person who was charged with or convicted 
of a specified criminal offence. It normally goes through both the informal and formal phase, 
which may involve both the executive and judicial branches of government.  
At the informal stage, the law enforcement agencies of the requesting State (e.g., police 
force) make contact with their counterparts in the requested State to seek the assistance in 
                                                          
69
  See the United Nations (1948), "The Universal Declaration of Human Rights ", article 3. 
70
  In 2006, the High Court of South Korea rejected a request for the extradition of Chanh Huu Nguyen, a 
Vietnamese dissident, upon the principle of non-extradition of political offence. Prior to the hearing, Chanh 
was arrested in Seoul at the request of Vietnam, which had accused him of attempting to bomb the 
Vietnamese Embassy in Bangkok (Thailand) and a statue of a national hero, Ho Chi Minh, in Vietnam. 
However, the court of South Korea has regarded him as a political dissident, not a terrorist, which is what he 
was being accused of by Vietnam.  See “Seoul refuses to extradite political dissident to Vietnam” (2007), 
available at: http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Seoul-refuses-to-extradite-political-dissident-to-Vietnam-
6819.html (accessed 18 July 2013). 
71
  See Treaty between Australia and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam on Extradition, signed at Canberra on 10 
April 2012, entered into force 7 April 2014, article 3(2)(a) and (b). 
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gathering more information about the person sought. INTERPOL can play a significant role 
in dealing with requests for information and assistance from police forces that have no 
established mechanisms for making contact. For example, INTERPOL’s “Red Notices”,
72
 
which contain details of the arrest warrant, a description of the fugitive and the offence 
committed, are used to identify and locate the fugitives. If a police force finds the fugitives, it 
will be asked to provisionally arrest them prior to receipt of a formal extradition request. 
These notices are circulated among all national INTERPOL agencies. The Secretary General 
of INTERPOL will deny a request for circulation if there are grounds to believe that the 
fugitive is wanted for political, military, racial or religious purposes.
73
 They also assure that 
arrest will be followed by a formal request of extradition.    
The formal stage, usually set out by the extradition treaty between the States involved,
74
 
begins by the submission of an extradition request in writing from a law enforcement agency 
in the requesting State through the diplomatic channel (or other means of communication 
arranged between two or more States
75
). Such a request will be accompanied by sufficient 
evidence (or supporting documents) to convince the competent authority
76
 and court of the 
requested State that it is rational to arrest the fugitive offender and hold an extradition hearing 
(if required). In case of urgency, the competent authority of the requested State may request 
the provisional arrest of the person sought pending the presentation of the extradition 
request.
77
 Then, the competent authority and court of the requested State considers whether 
the request meets the conditions for extradition.
78
 If the court agrees that extradition can take 
place, it is left to the executive to make its own decision on whether to confirm or refuse 
extradition. It should be noted that the status of the court and the precise procedure may be 
designated differently under domestic law, and the decision of extradition depends much on 
political willingness.  
Some countries have agreed to simplify the extradition process in certain circumstances. 
For instance, article 10 of the Korea-Vietnam Extradition Treaty provides that “when a 
                                                          
72
  Interpol, “Notices”, available at: http://www.interpol.int/INTERPOL-expertise/Notices (accessed 15 July 
2013). 
73
  See article 3 of the INTERPOL’s Constitution (1956). 
74
  See for example, European Convention on Extradition, above n7, articles 12 and 13. 
75
  Ibid, article 12(1). 
76
  For example, in the UK, under the Extradition Act 1989 (s7), the Secretary of State will decide whether to 
allow proceedings on a formal extradition request to commence. However, under the Extradition Act 2003, 
the Secretary of State’s authority is limited at the beginning of the extradition process.  
77
  South Korea-Vietnam Extradition Treaty, above n27, article 9. 
78
  In most States, it is an appropriate court which will hold extradition hearing to determine the fugitive’s 
susceptibility to surrender.  
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person sought advises a court or other competent authorities of the Requested Party that the 
person consents to an order for extradition being made, the Requested Party shall take all 
necessary measures to expedite the extradition to the extent permitted under its laws”. The 
FATF also recommends that “consistent with fundamental principles of domestic law, 
countries should have simplified extradition mechanisms, such as allowing direct 
transmission of requests for provisional arrests between appropriate authorities, extraditing 
persons based only on warrants of arrests or judgments, or introducing a simplified 





In practice, numerous common problems have hindered the effectiveness of extradition. 
They include:
80
 weak/outdated extradition laws and treaties; different conditions and 
procedures for granting extradition; length, complexity, cost and uncertainty of extradition 
process; lack of awareness of national/ international extradition law and practice; language 
barriers; prejudice to an extradition request arising from premature arrest; burdensome 
evidentiary requirements of the requested State that are not familiar to or well understood by 
the requesting State; different approaches to exceptions; lack of trust among States about the 
integrity of each other’s justice systems; delaying tactics, such as frivolous or irrelevant 
defence requests for further information; privileges and immunities, such as diplomatic 
immunity or asylum; partial, repeated or uncoordinated appeals throughout the extradition 
process; and problems arising in transit States.  
The difficulties of extradition may lead national law enforcement authorities to employ 
various forms of irregular rendition to secure the return of a person to face prosecution or 







                                                          
79
  FATF, above n29, R39. 
80
  UNODC (2004), "Informal Expert Working Group on Effective Extradition Casework Practice" at 6-7. 
81
  See US v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 US 655 (1992). In this case, the fugitive is a Mexican national who had 
been forcibly kidnapped from his home in Mexico and brought to the US to stand trial for crimes in 
connection with the kidnapping and murder of a US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent and his 
pilot. A majority of the US Supreme Court held that the forcible abduction of the fugitive does not prohibit 
his trial in a US court for violations of the country’s criminal laws, regardless of the existing extradition 
treaty between the US and Mexico, and the strong protests of the Mexican government. 
82
  In R. v Secretary of State for the Home Department Ex p. Schmidt, a German national living in Ireland 
accused of drug offences by the German prosecuting authority, who requested his return, was tricked by an 
officer of the Metropolitan Police extradition squad coming to London. Once in England, he was arrested 
and committed to custody pending his extradition. See [1994] 3 WLR 228. 
83
  In Mohamed and Another v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others, 2001 (3) SA 893 (CC), 
under the collaboration between the South African and US officials, the appellant was deported from the 
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However, these forms of rendition may lack legitimacy and even violate the sovereignty, 
integrity of the asylum State or human rights. The courts of some States do not accept these 
forms of rendition. For instance, in R v Horseferry Road Magistrates' Court, ex parte 
Bennett, the House of Lords held that “where a defendant in a criminal matter had been 
brought back to the UK in disregard of available extradition process and in breach of 
international law and the laws of the State where the defendant had been found, the courts in 




8.3 Extradition for Money Laundering Offences 
 
At the international level, money laundering offences were initially categorized as 
extraditable offences in the 1988 Vienna Convention.
85
 Then, in 1996, the FATF 
recommended that each member country should recognize money laundering offences as 
extraditable offences, and should constructively and effectively execute extradition requests 
in relation to money laundering.
86
 The 2012 FATF Recommendations set out a 
comprehensive recommendation about extradition in relation to money laundering and 
terrorist financing offences.
87
 The FATF recommends that countries should ensure money 
laundering offences are extraditable offences and apply certain conditions, principles and 
procedures for extradition related to money laundering offences. These issues are almost the 
same as for other extraditable offences, such as extradition of nationals, the condition of dual 
criminality, and the simplification of extradition mechanisms.
88
 At the national level, many 
States are working to ensure that money laundering offences are extraditable offences in their 
national laws and bilateral treaties on extradition. The Anti-Money Laundering Act 2001 of 
Philippines, for example, stipulates that “the Philippines shall negotiate for the inclusion of 




                                                                                                                                                                                    
South Africa to the US to face terrorism charges. See more Bembenek v. Canada (Minister of Employment & 
Immigration) (1991), 69 C.C.C. (3d) 34. 
84
  R v Horseferry Road Magistrates' Court, ex parte Bennett [1994] 1 A.C. 42, 42. 
85
  1988 Vienna Convention, above n9, article 6 (2). 
86
  FATF (1996), “The Forty Recommendations”, available at: http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF%20Recommendations%201996.pdf (accessed 
24 May 2013), R40. 
87
  FATF, above n29, R39. 
88
  Ibid. 
89
  See section 13(g) of An Act Defining the Crime of Money Laundering, Providing Penalties therefor and for 
other Purposes  (Philippines) Republic Act No. 9160, 2001  
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Apart from the general obstacles to extradition of transnational criminals identified 
previously, further problems may occur in case of cross-border money laundering. The 
distinction between national categories of extraditable predicate offences may cause 
controversies when the double criminality condition is applied. Let us assume, for example, 
that after committing a money laundering offence in State A, Mr X moved to reside in State 
B. State A seeks extradition of Mr X from State B for trial in State A for money laundering 
relying upon their bilateral extradition treaty. Some problems may arise in this case. For 
example, whether there is a violation of the double criminality condition if, for example, 
State A criminalizes money laundering from a specified predicate offence but State B does 
not criminalize money laundering from that predicate offence.
90
 Moreover, will there be a 
violation of the double criminality condition in the jurisdictional sense if State A criminalizes 
money laundering from predicate offences that occur abroad when State B does not? With 
regard to extradition for money laundering offences, as recommended by the FATF,
91
 double 
criminality of the money laundering offence, if required, should be in abstracto, provided that 
double criminality in abstracto (including the jurisdictional dimension) of the predicate crime 
is met. Further, although the FATF does not recommend this, the requesting State can 
prosecute the predicate crime as a non-extraditable crime in addition to the prosecution for 
the money laundering offence, if the applicable treaty allows it to do so. 
Speciality may also cause a problem. The question may arise, for example of whether 
there is a violation of the specialty rule if State B grants extradition for money laundering 
offence to State A, and then State A prosecutes Mr X for both the money laundering offence 
on the grounds of which the extradition was granted and for its predicate offence (which was 
not an extraditable offence).
92
 It is also an open question whether the principle of specialty is 
violated when the offender is subject to a criminal confiscation order in State A even if State 
                                                          
90
  See U.S. v. Anderson, 472 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 2006). At the time of proceedings, under law of Costa Rica, 
money laundering was criminal offence only if the laundered money was derived from drug trafficking, thus 
double criminality did not exist for money laundering offences. The US request of extradition related to 
money laundering charges was refused.  
91
  R39 of FATF, above n29. 
92
  In U.S. v. Saccoccia, above n27, the court ruled that an offence which itself is not extraditable can serve as a 
predicate act in connection with another extraditable offences, and that prosecution for offences other than 
the extradition offence does not violate the rule of specialty. Since the rule is grounded in international 
comity rather than in some right of the fugitive, specialty may be waived by the asylum State. The rule of 
specialty does not impose any limitation on the particular charges laid by the requesting State 
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B does not issue criminal confiscation order under comparable circumstances.
93
 As noted 
earlier, the specialty rule, like the double criminality condition, is not supposed to be a 
hidebound dogma, but should be applied in a practical fashion. Specialty is not violated if the 
requesting State imposes a criminal confiscation order while it is not applicable to an 
equivalent situation in the requested State. 
The other general exceptions to extradition, which are described above, are applied 
equally to money laundering offences.   
 
8.4 The Vietnamese Law on Extradition 
 
The chapter now turns to the examination of Vietnamese law on extradition in general and 
extradition of offenders for money laundering in particular. Suggestions are then made for 
law reform in order to obtain greater compliance with the international AMLSs with regard to 
extradition matters.  
 
8.4.1 General Legal Framework 
 
International treaties 









 of which the treaties with South Korea, India and 
Australia have taken effect. In addition, an extradition provision is embodied in mutual legal 







                                                          
93
  In ibid, the court held that the offender was properly subject to a forfeiture order even if he was not 
extradited on forfeiture charges and even if Swiss law did not provide criminal confiscation order under 
comparable circumstances. 
94
  South Korea-Vietnam Extradition Treaty, above n21. 
95
  Treaty between the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam on 
Extradition, signed 14 April 2010. 
96
  Treaty between the Republic of India and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam on Extradition, signed 13 
October 2011, entered into force 12 August 2013. 
97
  Australia - Vietnam Extradition Treaty, above n71. 
98
 Treaty between the Czechoslovakia Republic and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam on Mutual Legal 
Assistance in Civil and Criminal Matters, signed 12 October 1982, entered into force 16 April 1984 
99
 Treaty between the Republic of Cuba and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam on Mutual Legal Assistance Civil, 
Family, Labour and Criminal Matters, signed 30 November 1984. 
100
  Treaty between Hungary and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam on Mutual Legal Assistance Civil, Family 

















 Vietnam is 
a Party to the 1988 Vienna Convention, the Palermo Convention, the UNCAC and the 
ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism.
108
 It is important to note that money laundering 
and the main predicate offences (drug crimes, corruption and organized crimes) are 
extraditable under these conventions. 
However, under the Vietnamese legal system, after Vietnam has ratified an international 
treaty, that treaty is not automatically incorporated wholesale into domestic law.
109
 Further, 
Vietnam has expressed a reservation to article 6 of the 1988 Vienna Convention which 
regulates numerous aspects of extradition for drug-related crimes, and has made a declaration 
to the effect that it does not take article 16 of the Palermo Convention as a direct legal basis 
for extradition. It appears that Vietnam is generally wary of extradition, so bilateral treaty-
based extradition would be Vietnam’s preference. As noted earlier, the practice of extradition 
depends heavily on goodwill in State relations. By negotiating bilaterally, Vietnam is able to 







                                                          
101
  Treaty between Bulgaria and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam on Mutual Legal Assistance in Civil, Family 
and Criminal Matters, signed 3 October 1986. 
102
  Treaty between Poland and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam on Mutual Legal Assistance in Civil, Family 
and Criminal Matters, signed 22 March 1993, entered into force 18 January 1995. 
103
 Treaty between the Lao People's Democratic Republic and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam on Mutual 
Legal Assistance in Civil and Criminal Matters, signed 6 July 1998, entered into force 19 February 2000. 
104
  Treaty between the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the Russian Federation on Mutual Legal Assistance in 
Civil and Criminal Matters, signed 25 August 1998, entered into force 27 August 2012. 
105
 Treaty between the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and Ukraine on Mutual Legal Assistance in Civil and 
Criminal Matters, signed 6 April 2000, entered into force 19 August 2002. 
106
  Treaty between the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and Mongolia on Mutual Legal Assistance in Civil, Family 
and Criminal Matters, signed 17 April 2000, entered into force 13 June 2002. 
107
  Treaty between the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the Republic of Belarus on Mutual Legal Assistance in 
Civil, Family, Labour and Criminal Matters, signed 14 September 2000, entered into force 18 October 2001. 
108
  2007 ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism, adopted by the Heads of State/Government of ASEAN 
member States at the 12th ASEAN Summit in Cebu, Philippines on 13 January 2007. Vietnam ratified this 
convention in 2010. The convention has come into force since 27 May 2011, 30 days after six out of ten 
member States had ratified (according to article XXI). The extradition provision for terrorism-related 
offences is provided in article VIII. 
109
  The status of treaties in Vietnamese legal system was illustrated in chapter 3. 
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National extradition laws 
The national law on extradition of Vietnam was first codified in articles 343 and 344 of 
the Criminal Procedure Code (2003).
110
 Article 343 of the Criminal Procedure Code (2003) 
provides that: 
 
Article 343:     Extradition for prosecution or enforcing a criminal judgment  
Pursuant to international treaties to which the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam is a State Party or to the 
principle of reciprocity, the Vietnamese authorized bodies in criminal proceedings can: 
1. Lodge a request to their foreign counterparts for extraditing a person who committed an offence or was 
convicted with an enforceable criminal judgment to the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam for prosecution 
or enforcing punishment; 
2. Extradite a foreigner who committed an offence or was convicted with an enforceable criminal 
judgment in the territory of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam to the requesting State for prosecution or 
enforcing punishment. 
 
Article 344: Refusal of extradition 
1.         The Vietnamese authorized bodies in criminal proceedings shall refuse extradition in one of the 
following circumstances: 
a)         The sought person is a citizen of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam; 
b)         According to the law of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, the sought person has become 
immune from prosecution or punishment by reason of lapse of time or other legal reasons; 
c)         The sought person has been convicted by a court of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam with an 
enforceable judgment of the offence for which extradition is requested, or if the case is suspended as 
provided for in this Code; 
d)         The sought person is residing in Viet Nam by the reason of possible persecution by the requesting 
State due to discrimination on the ground of race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin, social class and 
political opinion. 
2.         The extradition request may be refused in one of the following circumstances: 
a)         According to the criminal law of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, the offence for which the 
extradition is requested is not criminalized; 
b)         The sought person is being prosecuted in Viet Nam for the offence for which the extradition is 
requested. 
3.         The authorized body in criminal proceedings of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam that has 
refused extradition according to paragraph (1), (2) of this article shall notify their foreign counterparts of 
the decision on extradition refusal. 
 
                                                          
110
  Bo Luat To Tung Hinh Su [Criminal Procedure Code] (Vietnam) Law No. 19/2003/QH11, 26 Novemeber 
2003, entered into force 1 July 2004. 
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We can see that article 343 provides simply the power to make extradition requests for any 
alleged offender no matter what nationality, and to receive extradition requests for non-
Vietnamese nationals. Article 343 stipulates the grounds on which Vietnam shall or may 
refuse an extradition request (those grounds will be discussed in detail later). Nevertheless, 
these articles do not provide the procedural aspects of extradition (these are discussed further 
below). In 2007, the legal framework for extradition was supplemented by articles 32 to 48 of 
the Law on Mutual Legal Assistance (2007).
111
 In 2013, extradition of money laundering 
offenders was provided for in the Law on Prevention and Suppression of Money Laundering 
as one aspect of international cooperation in AML.
112
  
Together, these national laws and Vietnam’s bilateral extradition treaties (or MLA treaties 
which include extradition provision) are the primary legal basis for extradition. In fact, 
Vietnam relies on treaties or reciprocity to proceed with extradition.  
 
8.4.2 The Conditions 
 
Extraditable crimes and the double criminality condition 
Article 33(1) of the Law on Mutual Legal Assistance (Law on MLA) defines extraditable 
crimes as crimes punishable under the criminal laws of both Vietnam and the requesting State 
by imprisonment for a period of at least one year, for life imprisonment, or for the death 
penalty. In addition, those who have been sentenced by the court of the requesting State to 
imprisonment and the remaining term of imprisonment to be served is at least six months 
may also be subject to extradition.
113
 Vietnam adopts the eliminative approach to 
categorizing extraditable crimes in all its bilateral treaties on extradition listed above. The 
punishment threshold applied to extraditable offences in the treaties is one year of 
imprisonment. Under article 251 of the Amendment to the 1999 Penal Code where the 
criminalization of money laundering is provided for,
114
 the money laundering crime is a 
crime punishable by at least one year imprisonment, thus it is an extraditable crime. Thus, 
                                                          
111
  Luat Tuong Tro Tu Phap [Law on Mutual Legal Assistance] (Vietnam) Law No. 08/2007/QH12, 21 
November 2007, entered into force 1 July 2008. 
112
  Luat Phong, Chong Rua Tien [Law on Prevention and Suppression of Money Laundering] (Vietnam) Law 
No. 07/2012/QH13, 18 June 2012, entered into force 1 January 2013, article 47(3). 
113
  Law on Mutual Legal Assistance, above n111, article 33(1). 
114
  Luat Sua Doi, Bo Sung Mot So Dieu Cua Bo Luat Hinh Su [Law Amending and Supplementing to a Number 
of Articles of the Penal Code] (Vietnam) Law No. 37/2009/QH12, 19 June 2009, entered into force 1 
January 2010, article 251.  
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after the criminalization, money laundering crimes are included automatically in Vietnam’s 
existing bilateral treaties on extradition. 
Under article 33(1) and (2) of the Law on MLA and all the bilateral extradition treaties of 
Vietnam, double criminality is rigidly required and it is applied in abstracto. This complies 
with the international provisions. Interestingly, article 2(1) of the Vietnam - South Korea 
extradition treaty requires double criminality at the time of the request. Article 33(2) of the 
Law on MLA states that it shall not matter whether the laws of both Vietnam and the 
requesting State place the conduct, for which the extradition is requested, within the same 
category of crime or denominate the crime by the same terminology.
115
 Finally, while article 
6(b) of the Vietnam - Australia extradition treaty requires that the conduct of which 
extradition is sought constituted an offence in the requesting State at the time it occurred, and 
the conduct would have constituted an offence in the requested State at the time of the 
request.  
Article 33(3) of the Law on MLA and some bilateral treaties do specify the jurisdictional 
dimension of extraditable offences when providing that conduct committed outside the 
territory of the requesting State can be deemed extraditable if that conduct constitutes a crime 
under the Penal Code of Vietnam. If such conduct is not punished under the law of Vietnam, 
Vietnam, in its discretion, may grant extradition.
116
  
As noted in chapter 5, Vietnam does not state clearly whether the predicate crimes for 
money laundering include crimes committed abroad. Furthermore, Vietnam’s authorities 
appear to be hesitant to claim and execute extraterritorial jurisdiction, especially in case of 
transnational money laundering, because of lack of both the legal basis and resources. This 
may serve as a basis for Vietnam to refuse extradition for money laundering crimes which 
results from predicate crimes that occur abroad.   
 
Rule of specialty 
Article 34 of the Law on MLA sets out the rule of specialty for extradition to and from 
Vietnam. It provides that a person extradited to Vietnam shall not be prosecuted for any 
crime committed before the extradition which is not described in the extradition request, and 
that such person shall not be extradited to a third State. Additionally, Vietnam will proceed 
with the extradition process on the condition that the requested State assures that the person 
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  Law on Mutual Legal Assistance, above n111, article 33(2). 
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sought will not be prosecuted for any crime other than crimes for which extradition is 
requested, unless there is a written consent of Vietnam. However, article 15(1) of the 
Vietnam - South Korea extradition treaty enables the requesting State to detain, try or punish 
a person extradited for a differently denominated offence based on the same facts on which 
extradition was granted, provided that such offence is extraditable or is a lesser included 
offence. Article 15(2) of this treaty also allows extradition to a third State if the requested 
State consents. It means that in its bilateral treaties on extradition, Vietnam does not apply the 
specialty rule in a narrow sense. This is in line with the international tendency.  
According to the extradition treaties signed by Vietnam, it is likely that Vietnam will not 
prosecute a returned fugitive for both money laundering and its predicate crime, unless these 
crimes are based on the same facts and the predicate crime is also extraditable or carries a 
lesser penalty.  
 
8.4.3 The Exceptions 
 
Nationality ground 
Article 344(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) and article 35(1) of the Law on 
MLA provide that Vietnam shall refuse extradition if the person sought is its citizen. This 
provision has also been incorporated in all bilateral extradition treaties of Vietnam. However, 
only the recent treaties, such as with South Korea or Australia, stipulate that if extradition is 
declined solely on the nationality basis, the requested State must, at the request of the 
requesting State submit the case to its authorities for prosecution.
117
 Neither the older treaties 
nor national law of Vietnam provide the principle of aut dedere aut judicare. Therefore, 
Vietnam may prosecute its nationals for money laundering committed in South Korea or in 
Australia if it refuses their extraditions, but it is unlikely to do so when the money laundering 
crime occurred in other countries, which must be considered a loophole. Other alternatives 
provided for by the suppression conventions, such as extraditing on condition of return for 
sentence are not also referred to in the Vietnamese laws.   
 
Ne bis in idem 
Under the article 344(1)(c) of the CPC and article 35(1)(c) of the Law on MLA, Vietnam 
shall refuse extradition if the person sought has been convicted or acquitted by the final 
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  See South Korea-Vietnam Extradition Treaty, above n21, article 6(2). 
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judgment of a Vietnamese court of the crime for which the extradition is requested. The ne 
bis in idem exception has been embedded in all of Vietnam’s bilateral extradition treaties. 
Vietnam applies this exception broadly to the same actions. In addition, Vietnam may refuse 
extradition if the fugitive is subject to ongoing criminal proceedings in Vietnam for the crime 




Statute of limitation 
The lapse of time is provided for as a mandatory refusal of extradition in national laws and 
bilateral treaties of Vietnam. The lapse of time is tested under the law of the requested 
State
119
 or the requesting State.
120
 Under article 23(c) of the Penal Code of Vietnam, the 
statue of limitation for very serious crimes (“toi rat nghiem trong”), among them are money 
laundering crimes, is 15 years. 
 
Humanitarian grounds 
Humanitarian grounds for the refusal of extradition are not reflected in national law and in 
many extradition treaties of Vietnam. They are only stated in the recent bilateral extradition 
treaties. For example, article 4(3) of the South Korea - Vietnam extradition treaty provides 
that extradition may be refused if “the Requested Party while also taking into account the 
seriousness of the offence and the interests of the Requesting Party deems that, because of the 
personal circumstances of the person sought, the extradition would be incompatible with 
humanitarian considerations”.  
 
General human rights exception 
Neither national law nor the older extradition treaties provide that general human rights 
may serve as grounds for the refusal of extradition. However, the Vietnam - Australia 
extradition treaty stipulates that extradition shall be refused if the requested State has 
substantial grounds for believing that “a request for extradition for an ordinary criminal 
offence has been made for purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person on account of that 
person's race, ethnic origin, gender, language, religion, nationality, political opinion or other 
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  Criminal Procedure Code, above n110, article 344(2); and Law on Mutual Legal Assistance, above n111, 
article 35(2). 
119
 South Korea-Vietnam Extradition Treaty, above n21, article 3(1)(c). 
120
  Australia - Vietnam Extradition Treaty, above n97, article 3(1)(c). 
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status, or that that person's position may be prejudiced for any of those reasons”; or that “the 
person whose extradition is sought would be subjected in the requesting State to torture”.
121
 
It is worth noting that Vietnam has signed but not ratified the Convention against Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.
122
 Vietnam has ratified the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
123
 and the International Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
124
 however, a number of significant 
deficiencies in the implementation of these conventions have been revealed.
125
 The concerns 
include the right to a fair trial, the right to freedom of expression and discrimination.
126
 This 
may be a disadvantage to Vietnam’s extradition relations in general and to Vietnam’s 
requests for extradition of money launderers in particular.    
 
Fiscal offences 
The fiscal offences exception is not stipulated in national law and in some of the older 
bilateral treaties of Vietnam. This suggests that, subject to article 33(1) of Law on MLA, 
these offences can be extraditable offences if they are punishable by at least one year of 
imprisonment under the criminal laws of both Vietnam and the requesting State. Following 
the international tendency, the recent extradition treaties of Vietnam have specified the 
relaxation of the exception. For example, article 2(4) of the extradition treaty with South 
Korea provides that “where extradition of a person is sought for an offence against a law 
relating to taxation, customs duties, foreign exchange control or other revenue matters, 
extradition may not be refused on the ground that the law of the Requested Party does not 
impose the same kind of tax or duty or does not contain a tax, duty, customs, or exchange 
regulation of the same kind as the law of the Requesting Party”.
127
 So, in general, Vietnam 
complies with the international standards on this exception. 
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  Ibid, article 3(1)(a) and (e). 
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 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 10 
December 1984, 1465 UNTS 85, entered into force 26 June 1987. Vietnam signed this convention in 
November 2013. 
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 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171, entry into force 23 
March 1976. Vietnam ratified this convention in September 1982. 
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 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 7 March 1966, 660 
UNTS 195, entered into force January 1969. Vietnam ratified this convention in June 1982. 
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 See UN Human Right Council (2013), "Universal Periodic Review of Vietnam" at 1-13, available at: 




  For example, article 2(4) of South Korea-Vietnam Extradition Treaty, above n21. 
225 
 
Death penalty exception 
Although the death penalty exception is not provided for in Vietnam’s national law, it has 
been referred to as a mandatory basis for the refusal of extradition in a number of bilateral 
treaties, such as in article 51(6) of the Vietnam – Ukraine treaty on MLA and article 3(d) of 
the Vietnam – Australia extradition treaty. In Vietnam, the death penalty can be imposed on a 
range of crimes, including some transnational crimes, such as drug trafficking and corruption, 
but death is not imposed for money laundering crimes. This exception is obviously a barrier 
to extradition requested by Vietnam for some transnational crimes from certain States, for 
example, from Ukraine or Australia. It also prevents Vietnam from prosecuting a fugitive, 
who was extradited to Vietnam on a money laundering crime, for the predicate crime which 
carries the death penalty. In order to be successful in requesting extradition for money 
laundering, Vietnam needs to reassure States which have abolished the death penalty that 
Vietnam will apply the speciality rule rigidly and not prosecute someone who has been 
extradited for money laundering for a predicate offence that carries the death penalty. 
 
8.4.4 Evidence and Procedure 
 
In respect of the evidence standard for granting extradition, Vietnam does not apply the 
standard of a prima facie case. Vietnam appears to follow the civil law States’ approach to 
evidentiary requirement. It requires the requesting State to provide the extradition file which 
consists of the written extradition request and the relevant documents. The relevant 
documents include, for example, the identity of the person sought, a summary of the criminal 
case in which the person sought was convicted, and the punishment for the crime of which 
the person sought was convicted.
128
 The Ministry of Public Security (MPS) is in charge of 
receiving and examining the extradition file. If the documents of the extradition file are 
sufficient (the requesting State may be asked to provide additional information to satisfy the 
requirement of the MPS), the file will be sent to the court for an extradition hearing. The 
court will decide whether to grant extradition.
129
 This procedure follows the traditional 
model. Apart from that, Vietnam has not implemented the simplification of extradition 
recommended by the FATF, such as allowing direct transmission of requests for provisional 
arrests between appropriate authorities or extraditing persons based only on warrants of 
arrests or judgments. 
                                                          
128
  Law on Mutual Legal Assistance, above n111, article 37. 
129
  Ibid, article 40. 
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It is worth mentioning that since the time when the Law on MLA came into force, there 
has been neither an outgoing nor incoming extradition request processed in accordance with 
the procedure prescribed in this law.
130
 Prior to the adoption of this law, there were a few 
successful extradition cases processed formally in line with the domestic law and bilateral 
treaties.
131
 It appears that the procedure is complicated and time-consuming, thus Vietnam’s 
authorities (courts, procuracy and police) and their foreign counterparts do not want to 
proceed with extradition requests following such procedure. The delivery of a fugitive to or 
from foreign countries was mainly conducted through the use of “deportation” as a form of 
irregular rendition.
132
 “Deportation”, which was actually arranged by the Vietnamese police 
and the foreign authorities, resulted in the return of a person to a State for arrest and 
prosecution or serving a sentence.
133
 Under article 17(3) of the Government Decree 
21/2001/ND-CP,
134
 a deportation order is issued by the minister of the MPS, usually based on 
the grounds that the deportation of the person is necessary to protect the State security and the 
social order. It is likely that Vietnam will also prefer to use “deportation” as a substitute for 
extraditing foreign money launderers out of Vietnam. 
 
    
 
                                                          
130
  According to Ministry of Justice of Vietnam (2010), "Report No. 230/BC-BCT on Mutual Legal Assitance in 
the Period of 01 July 2008 to 30 June 2010" and the author’s examination. 
131
  In 2005, Le Quoc Thuy, who was alleged to have committed crimes of “abusing positions and/or powers to 
appropriate property” and “appropriating property through swindling” in Vietnam, was, through Interpol 
Vietnam, extradited successfully from Bulgaria to face prosecution in Vietnam. Before being extradited, Le 
Quoc Thuy had been arrested by the Bulgarian police under the “Red Notice” of INTERPOL. See VTV 
(2006) "Interpol Vietnam Dan Do Le Quoc Thuy Ve Nuoc [Interpol Vietnam Extradited Le Quoc Thuy]", 
Thanh Nien, 3 September 2006, available at: http://www.thanhnien.com.vn/news/pages/200635/161107.aspx 
(accessed 20 July 2013). 
132
 In an interview with a Deputy Director of Interpol Vietnam in June 2013. 
133
  For example, on 29 September 2010, Vietnamese police “deported” Han Ki Bong and Cha Je Kiy, two South 
Korean nationals accused of “illegally appropriating property” by South Korea, to South Korea for the 
prosecution. These persons fled to Vietnam after committing the crime, and then were wanted by the Korean 
police. The “wanted notice” was circulated to the Vietnamese police. After examining the information 
provided for by the Korean police about the fugitives and their crime, the double criminality condition was 
satisfied. Vietnamese police had traced and arrested them before arranging with the Korean police the 
“deportation”. See Phong Anh ("Dan Do Hai Doi Tuong Pham Toi Nguoi Han Quoc ["Extradition" of two 
Korean Criminals"]", Dat Viet, 30 September 2010, available at: http://www.baomoi.com/Dan-do-hai-toi-
pham-nguoi-Han-Quoc/104/4939009.epi (accessed 22 July 2013). 
134
 Chinh Phu, “Nghi Dinh Quy Dinh Chi Tiet Thi Hanh Phap Lenh Nhap Canh, Xuat Canh, Cu Tru Cua Nguoi 
Nuoc Ngoai Tai Viet Nam " [Government, Decree on Guiding the Implementation of the Ordiance on Entry, 




8.4.5 Comments and Suggestions for Law Reform 
 
It can be seen that overall, although the domestic law on extradition of Vietnam is 
competent to deal with extradition requests, Vietnam has not implemented a number of 
international AMLSs on extradition, especially in regard to the specialty rule and the 
exceptions to extradition. Vietnam has only a few bilateral extradition treaties which cover 
comprehensively the extradition matters. Moreover, the practice, especially of extradition of 
transnational criminals, has been precluded by numerous factors. Most of the common 
obstacles to extradition apply equally to Vietnam. In addition, there are a number of key 
factors which are of particular relevance to the laws and the practice of extradition of 
Vietnam with regard to transnational money launderers. This thesis identifies these factors 
and makes suggestions as follows:  
i) Extradition for money laundering crimes is a novel legal process for Vietnam. Money 
laundering is a new crime provided for in the Penal Code of Vietnam. As noted in chapter 3, 
Vietnamese authorities, including investigators, prosecutors and judges, have not been 
familiar with the investigation, prosecution, trial and, of course, with extradition for such 
crimes. These authorities need to be trained especially in how to apply the extradition 
procedure provided for by the Law on MLA. Furthermore, in certain circumstances, the 
procedure could be simplified as recommended by the FATF. 
ii) Vietnam makes a reservation to article 6 (about extradition) of the 1988 Vienna 
Convention. As a result, the crimes criminalized in the convention may be not included as 
extraditable crimes in some bilateral extradition treaties of Vietnam. This reservation may 
preclude Vietnam from extraditing many fugitives who have committed drug trafficking or 
laundering the proceeds of drug trafficking in Vietnam. Hence, Vietnam should consider the 
withdrawal of the reservations to article 6 of the Vienna Convention. 
iii) The concept of evidence in criminal proceedings is unique and different from that of 
many countries.
135
 This difference is one of the primary challenges to an extradition process 
subject to the Law on MLA. For example, digital evidence, which may be used in cyber-
money laundering cases, is not “material evidence” under Vietnamese criminal law, thus has 
not been recognized by Vietnamese authorities. This implies that Vietnam should reform its 
law on evidence. 
                                                          
135
 The concept of evidence was illustrated in chapter 6. 
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iv) The application of the death penalty and the certain deficiencies in basic human rights 
in Vietnam can be barriers to its extradition practices. The death penalty will be a bar to 
extradition of certain predicate crimes to money laundering from those States that have 
abolished capital punishment. Foreign States may also abuse the human rights exception to 
refuse extradition requests from Vietnam. So, Vietnam should ensure that the human rights of 
all matters subject to extradition will be respected. 
And v) Vietnam refuses to extradite its nationals, but the national law is silent on the 
alternatives. Vietnam should provide clearly the aut dedere aut judicare principle and the 
procedure for prosecution when refusing extradition in the Law on MLA. Alternatively it 
could consider extraditing its nationals on condition of return for sentence. If extradition for 
purposes of enforcing sentence is rejected upon the nationality ground, Vietnam should 




In a nutshell, extradition of transnational criminals is a crucial component of the 
international regime against transnational crime. Extradition is normally only obligatory if 
required by bilateral treaty. Nonetheless, even given the existence of a bilateral treaty, the 
States are still not willing to grant extradition because of the various barriers, for example, 
obstacles generated from the conditions, principles and standard of evidence in extradition. 
These legal obstacles may be exacerbated in case of extradition for transnational money 
laundering offences which are associated with predicate offences that have occurred abroad. 
Difference in categories of the predicate offence between States often leads to controversies 
when the double criminality condition and the specialty rule with regard to the predicate 
offence are required.   
The international AML legal instruments call for States to recognize money laundering 
offences as extraditable offences, and apply the international standards regarding 
conditions/principles and procedure for the extradition of money laundering offenders. 
Common standards of extradition would eliminate the obstacles. It appears that State Parties 
to the suppression conventions and member countries of the FATF are striving for a greater 
harmonization of national laws on extradition. The application of the double criminality 
condition, specialty rule and sufficiency of evidence approach to extradition for transnational 
money laundering offences is now more elastic in many countries. The procedure for 
extradition can be simplified in certain circumstances.  
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In the context of Vietnam, the implementation of international standards on extradition in 
general and for money laundering in particular remains inadequate. The practice of 
extradition is very limited. This thesis has identified the main reasons and has suggested 
certain legal changes. These changes can be made, at least on paper, without much 
consideration. Then Vietnam can satisfy a paper-based assessment conducted by the FATF. 
Nevertheless, Vietnam needs much more time and resources to implement the new laws in 
practice, especially to fund and train its authorities in investigating, prosecuting, trying and 
extraditing for money laundering crimes. Therefore, in the near future, the law reforms seem 
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A set of preventive measures, which mainly aims at uncovering opportunities offered by 
the legitimate environment to facilitate money laundering, is an important and indispensable 
part of the international AMLSs. A wide range of money laundering preventive measures 
have been imposed mainly on the financial institutions, and on designated non-financial 




 which are the most vulnerable to money laundering 
operations. The key measures include Customer Due Diligence (CDD), record keeping, and 
reporting of suspicious transactions. These measures have the aims of deterring and detecting 
criminals from using the financial institutions and DNFBPs for laundering the proceeds of 
crime. These entities are obliged to launch these measures because: i) criminals often make 
use of them as the main intermediaries for money laundering operations (the mechanism and 
typologies of money laundering which were set out in chapter 2 indicate this); ii) the 
interaction with the legitimate environment is seen as a “weak point” in the stages of money 
laundering, at which law enforcement agencies can intervene for deterring and detecting 
money launderers; iii) the integrity of financial service providers and professions, which 
contributes significantly to public confidence, must be protected from money laundering 
involvement; and iv) nobody in the legitimate environment should profit from criminals. 
The key preventive measures, namely CDD, record keeping and the reporting of 
suspicious transactions are provided for in both “hard law” (article 7 of the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (the Palermo Convention)
2
 and article 14 
of the United Convention against Corruption (the UNCAC)
3
) and “soft law” (the FATF 
Recommendations and initiatives of other interational organizations). It should be noted that 
the provisions of the “hard law” are drafted in a general manner since they build on ongoing 
international initiatives to combating money laundering,
4
 and "States Parties are called upon 
                                                          
1
  FATF, "The FATF Recommendations - Glossary" at 113, available at: http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF_Recommendations.pdf (accessed 21 July 
2013). 
2
  United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime, 15 November 2000, 2225 UNTS 209, 
entered into force 29 September 2003, article 12. 
3
  United Nations Convention against Corruption, 31 October 2003, 2349 UNTS 41, entered into force 14 
December 2005, article 31. 
4
  See UNODC, "Legislative Guides for the Implementation of the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols thereto" (2004) at 50, available at: 




to use as a guideline the relevant initiatives of regional, interregional and multilateral 
organizations against money-laundering”.
5
 According to the interpretaive notes of the 
negociation of Palermo Convention, the relevant initiatives of regional, interregional and 
multilateral organizations refer in particular to the FATF Recommendations and initiatives of 
other international organizations.
6
 In fact, the FATF, in its Recommendations and their 
revisions, has detailed and developed extensively the preventive measures. Because of that, 
this chapter focuses on examining the preventive measures provided for in the FATF 
Recommendation. 
This chapter begins by setting out the principal preventive measures imposed on financial 
service providers and professions. The interaction between the preventive measures and the 
right to privacy, which is one of the most contentious issues arising from the implementation 
of preventive measures, is then discussed. Finally, the implementation of preventive measures 
in Vietnam is examined and suggestions are made for reform. 
 
9.2 Concepts of Customer Due Diligence and Know Your Customer 
 
It appears that the use of terms “Customer Due Diligence” and “Know Your Customer” 
(KYC) is sometimes confusing. It is necessary to clarify the meaning of these terms through 
examining the history and the development of these concepts. 
The term “due diligence” has its origins in Anglo-American law, particularly in the 
statutory regulations controlling the capital market in the US.
7
 Originally the due diligence 
concept appeared in security laws designed to protect investors; it has evolved into the 
systematic and professional investigation of business opportunities and risks during on-going 
sale negotiations.
8
 It may entail financial, marketing, human resources, legal and tax, 
environmental and organizational/IT due diligence.
9
 In other words, the object of the due 
diligence process is to obtain information on and engage in evaluation of the background of a 
target company including its structure, the capabilities of its employees, its market 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
5
   See the Palermo Convention, article 7, para. 3; and the UNCAC, article 14, para. 4. 
6
  See Interpretative notes for the official records (travaux préparatoires) of the negotiation of the United 
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols thereto, 3 November 2000, 
A/55/383/Add.1. 
7
  Gernard Picot, Handbook of International Mergers and Acquisitions: Preparation, Implementation, and 
Integration (Palgrave Macmillan, 2002) at 154. 
8
  Ibid, at 154-155. 
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 With regard to CDD, it normally refers to the investigation 
procedure of a new customer’s background conducted by the financial institutions prior to 
doing business with the new customer.  
The term “Know Your Customer” and the “KYC guidelines” originated in a legislative 
report on the US Bank Secrecy Act, but they were not defined in that report and no examples 
were given to illustrate what KYC means.
11
 Since 1970, the US government has deployed US 
banks as the principal agencies to track down the proceeds of crime by imposing an 
obligation to know their customers and to report suspicious transactions.
12
 As a result of this, 
KYC principles and KYC guidelines have evolved and become ingrained in the US AML 
regime as tools for banks to: i) prevent criminals from presenting as their legitimate 
customers; and ii) reveal the illicit nature of a customer’s business.
13
  
The FATF and other international institutions (e.g., the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision) have worked intensively on the KYC issue which “is most closely associated 
with the fight against money laundering”.
14
 In 1988, the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision issued the Statement on Prevention of Criminal Use of the Banking System for 
the Purpose of Money Laundering including the principle of “Customer Identification”. It 
called for reasonable effort by the international banking community to determine the true 
identity of all customers requesting their services.
15
 In 1990, the first version of the 40 FATF 
Recommendations provided an initiative to combat the misuse of the financial system for 
laundering the proceeds of drug-related crimes.
16
 This version and the later revised ones (in 
1996, 2003 and 2012) recommend various measures to prevent financial institutions and 
certain other businesses and professions from involving money laundering. The FATF uses 
the term “Customer Due Diligence” or “Identification of Customer” instead of “Know Your 
Customer” to refer to the preventive measures. In 2001, after identifying the deficiencies in a 
                                                          
10
  Ibid, at 178. 
11
  Daniel Mulligan, “Know Your Customer Regulations and the International Banking System: Towards a 
General Self-Regulatory Regime” (1998) 22 Fordham International Law Journal 2324 at 2358. 
12
  Thomas D. Grant, “Toward a Swiss Solution for an American Problem: An Alternative Approach for Banks 
in the War on Drugs” (1995) 14 Annual Review of Banking Law 225 at 227. 
13
  Mulligan, above n11. 
14
  Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2001), "Customer Due Diligence for Banks" at 2, available at: 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs85.pdf (accessed 22 May 2014). 
15
  Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, "Prevention of Criminal Use of the Banking System for the 
Purpose of Money Laundering " at 3, available at: http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc137.pdf (accessed 22 July 
2013). 
16
  FATF (1990), “The Forty Recommendations of the FATF”, available at: http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF%20Recommendations%201990.pdf (accessed 
24 May 2013). 
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large number of countries’ KYC principles for banks,
17
 the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision revised the KYC principles to make them more applicable to all countries. In the 
CDD for Banks, the scope of the Basel Committee’s approach to KYC has been expanded 
with a view to serving not only AML but also the effective management of banking risks. 
KYC involves more extensive due diligence for higher risk accounts, and includes proactive 
account monitoring for suspicious activities.
18
 In short, KYC and CDD have been introduced 
as evolving concepts designed to be adaptable and effective for use in both banks and other 
financial institutions. These terms do not have a fixed content, and they frequently appear to 
be used interchangeably. However, CDD is often used to refer to a standard that is broader 
than KYC.
19
 KYC could be conceived of as the specific CDD standard that imposes on banks 
and other financial institutions the duty to identify their customers.  
 
9.3 International Standards of CDD and Record Keeping  
 
9.3.1 The FATF Recommendations 
 
The leading standards of CDD for the purposes of fighting money laundering and terrorist 
financing have been set out by the FATF. The FATF has amended its recommendations 
together with a glossary and interpretative notes that define and clarify comprehensively the 
CDD standards applied to financial institutions and DNFBPs.  
According to the FATF Recommendations, a financial institution should be required to 




1) Establishing business relations;  
2) Carrying out occasional transactions: (i) above the applicable designated threshold (US$/EUR 
15,000); or (ii) that are wire transfers in the circumstances covered by the Interpretative Note to 
Recommendation 16;  
3) There is a suspicion of money laundering or terrorist financing; or  
                                                          
17
  Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, above n14, at 1. 
18
  Ibid. 
19
  See more in Louis de Koker, “Money Laundering Control and Suppression of Financing of Terrorism: Some 
Thoughts on the Impact of Customer Due Diligence Measures on Financial Exclusion” (2006) 13(1) Journal 
of Financial Crime 26 at 28-29. 
20
  FATF (2012), “International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism & 
Proliferation - the FATF Recommendations”, available at: http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF_Recommendations.pdf (accessed 22 May 
2014), Recommendation (R)10(i), (ii), (iii), and (iv). 
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4) The financial institution has doubts about the veracity or adequacy of previously obtained customer 
identification data.  
 




a) Identifying the customer and verifying that customer’s identity using reliable, independent source 
documents, data or information. 
b) Identifying the beneficial owner, and taking reasonable measures to verify the identity of the 
beneficial owner such that the financial institution is satisfied that it knows who the beneficial owner is. 
For legal persons and arrangements this should include financial institutions understanding the ownership 
and control structure of the customer.  
c) Understanding and, as appropriate, obtaining information on the purpose and intended nature of the 
business relationship.  
d) Conducting ongoing due diligence on the business relationship and scrutiny of transactions undertaken 
throughout the course of that relationship to ensure that the transactions being conducted are consistent 
with the institution’s knowledge of the customer, their business and risk profile, including, where 
necessary, the source of funds. 
 
The 2012 FATF 40 Recommendations and their interpretative notes especially emphasize 
the use of CDD in regard to legal persons and arrangements. They recommend that financial 
institutions should verify and identify any person purporting to act on behalf of the customer, 
the beneficial owners and the trustee.
22
 Further, financial institutions should perform 
enhanced due diligence on higher risk categories of customers, such as Politically Exposed 
Persons (PEPs). But they also provide that simplified or reduced CDD measures may be 
applied to lower risk customers, such as financial institutions or public companies under 
rigorous regulation, government administration or enterprises.
23
  
The obligation of record keeping requires that financial institutions keep customer 
identification and records of financial transactions. The database of this information which 
can be accessible by law enforcement authorities when required is extremely helpful for the 
investigation and prosecution of money laundering offences. In their investigations, law 
enforcement bodies normally need to follow the trails of the movement of criminal proceeds, 
which can be revealed through the records kept by the financial service providers or 
professionals involved. Thus, record keeping can serve a repressive approach effectively. 
                                                          
21
  Ibid, R10(a), (b), (c), and (d). 
22
  Ibid, Interpretive Note to Recommendation (INR) 10, part (B), (C), and (D). 
23
  Ibid, INR 10, pars. 16-18. 
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R11 of the 2012 FATF Recommendations states that: 
 
Financial institutions should maintain, for at least five years, all necessary records on transactions, both 
domestic and international, to enable them to comply swiftly with information requests from the 
competent authorities. Such records must be sufficient to permit reconstruction of individual transactions 
(including the amounts and types of currency involved if any) so as to provide, if necessary, evidence for 
prosecution of criminal activity.  
Financial institutions should keep records on the identification data obtained through the customer due 
diligence process (e.g., copies or records of official identification documents like passports, identity 
cards, driving licenses or similar documents), account files and business correspondence, including the 
results of any analysis undertaken (e.g., inquiries to establish the background and purpose of complex, 
unusual large transactions), for at least five years after the business relationship is ended, or after the date 
of the occasional transaction.  
Financial institutions should be required by law to maintain records on transactions and information 
obtained through the CDD measures. 
The CDD information and the transaction records should be available to domestic competent authorities 
upon appropriate authority. 
 
R22 of the 2012 FATF Recommendations has extended the CDD and record keeping 
requirement to the non-financial businesses and professions which engage in the financial 




9.3.2 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
 
As one of the primary requirements in bank supervision, a comprehensive set of standards 
of CDD for banks has been developed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision that 
contains four basic elements:
25
  
(1) Customer acceptance policy: This requires banks to develop clear customer acceptance 
policies and procedures, including a description of the types of customers that are likely to 
pose a higher than average risk to a bank. Factors, such as customers’ background, country of 
origin, public or high profile position, linked accounts, business activities or other risk 
indicators should be considered in preparing this policy. More extensive CDD should be 
required for higher risk customers. 
                                                          
24
  Ibid, R22. 
25
  Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, above n14, at 6-14. 
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(2) Customer identification: Banks should obtain satisfactory information about the 
identity of a new customer and the purpose of the business relationship. The adequacy of 
information depends on the type of applicant and anticipated size of accounts. Special 
requirements of information are required when implementing CDD measures on PEPs and 
non-face-to-face customers. 
(3) On-going monitoring of high-risk accounts: Banks should have an understanding of 
normal and reasonable account activity of their customers so that they can recognize and 
report suspicious transactions to the competent authorities. This on-going monitoring mainly 
aims at higher risk accounts.  
(4) Risk management: The channels for reporting suspicious transactions should be 
clearly specified for effective communication. The roles of internal audit and employee-
training programmes should be emphasized for insuring effective risk management. Bank 
staff should have an adequate on-going training about CDD procedures. Audit functions 
should be staffed adequately because internal audit plays an important role in evaluating risk 
management. 
It is noticeable that the very broad definition of “customer” in “Customer Due Diligence 
for Banks” issued by the Basel Committee in 2001 includes: i) the person or entity that 
maintains an account with the bank or those on whose behalf an account is maintained (i.e. 
beneficial owners); ii) the beneficiaries of transactions conducted by professional 
intermediaries; and iii) any person or entity connected with a financial transaction who can 




Beside the Basel Committee which has focused on CDD standards for the banking system, 
other international associations of financial regulators have also specifically defined the CDD 
standards or the CDD process for banks and other kinds of financial institutions consistent 
with the FATF Recommendations.  
In 2000, the Wolfsberg Group published the Wolfsberg Anti-Money Laundering 
Principles for Private Banking (revised in 2002 and 2012) which contains the essential global 
AML guidelines for private banking.
27
 It sets out the core guidelines in terms of CDD 
                                                          
26
  Ibid, at 6. 
27
  The Wolfsberg Group, “Wolfsberg Anti-Money Laundering Principles for Private Banking (2012)”, 
available at: http://www.wolfsberg-principles.com/pdf/Wolfsberg-Private-Banking-Prinicples-May-2012.pdf 
(accessed 22 July 2013). 
238 
 
requirements for the client and the beneficial owner.
28
 Additional due diligence is required in 
some situations, such as business in relation to clients from high-risk countries (which have 
inadequate AML standards or where there is a high risk of crime and corruption) or business 
involving public officials. 
 In 2004, the International Organization of Securities Commission (IOSCO) introduced its 
Principles on Client Identification and Beneficial Ownership for the Securities Industry, 
which states that “the CDD process is a key component of securities regulatory requirements 
intended to achieve the principal objectives of securities regulation, the protection of 
investors; ensuring that markets are fair, efficient and transparent; and the prevention of the 
illegal use of the securities industry”.
29
 The CDD process should be applied by the authorized 
securities service providers (ASSPs) to: identify their clients and beneficial owners; obtain 
adequate information about their clients’ circumstances and investment objectives; and keep 
records of this information.
30
 Although the main objectives of this process are to prevent 
securities fraud and market abuse, the application of the CDD process in the securities 
industry also contributes to the prevention of the illegal use of the securities industry for the 
purposes of money laundering and the financing of terrorism.
31
 
The International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), in 2003, revised the 
Insurance Core Principles and Methodology by adding new principles addressing supervisory 
standards related to Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism 
(AML/CFT).
32
 In 2004, the IAIS issued the Guidance Paper on AML/CFT which contains a 
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  Ibid, at 2-3.  
29
  IOSCO (2004), "Principles on Client Identification and Beneficial Ownership for the Securities Industry " at 
2, available at: http://www.cnmv.es/publicaciones/IOSCO_seguridad.pdf (accessed 22 July 2013). 
30
  Ibid. 
31
  Ibid. 
32
  IAIS (2003), “Insurance Core Principle and Methodology”, ICP 28, available at: 
http://www.iaisweb.org/__temp/Insurance_core_principles_and_methodology.pdf (accessed 22 July 2013). 
This provision was then updated in IAIS (2012), “ Insurance Core Principles, Standards,. Guidance and 
Assessment Methodology (as amended 12 October 2012)”, ICP 22, available at: 
http://www.iaisweb.org/Insurance-Core-Principles-material-adopted-in-2011-795 (accessed 22 July 2013).  
33
  IAIS (2004), "Guidance Paper on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism" at 6-
15, available at: 
http://www.iaisweb.org/__temp/Guidance_paper_on_anti_money_laundering_and_combating_the_financing
_of_terrorism.pdf (accessed 22 July 2013). 
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9.4 Reporting Obligations 
 
The effectiveness of a national AML system is essentially dependent on whether the 
relevant competent authorities have adequate information on the funds and financial 
transactions in regard to which suspicions of money laundering arise. This information comes 
from three main sources:
34
 i) mandatory reports provided by persons and institutions covered 
by law; ii) databases available for access (computer databases for the most part); and iii) 
information exchanged with other AML authorities. Among these sources, mandatory 
reporting is a crucial prerequisite for an effective AML strategy for a range of reasons. First, 
money laundering itself is a crime without direct victims. The information provided by 
institutions and professions, who are commonly vulnerable to money laundering, is extremely 
critical to the prevention and investigation of money laundering. Second, money laundering is 
normally accompanied by the carrying out of financial transactions through financial 
institutions which maintain certain privacy standards. As a result, law enforcement authorities 
find it difficult to get information about these transactions. Thus, financial institutions and 
DNFBPs should be subject to the mandatory obligation of reporting suspicious funds or 
transactions. 
Under the reporting obligation, reporting entities are required to analyse the funds and 
financial transactions involved, then assess whether the funds or transactions raise suspicions. 
These funds or transactions deemed suspicious must then be reported to the competent 
authorities. R20 of the 2012 FATF Recommendations reads that “if a financial institution 
suspects or has reasonable grounds to suspect that funds are the proceeds of a criminal 
activity, or are related to terrorist financing, it should be required, directly by law or 
regulation, to report promptly its suspicions to the financial intelligence unit (FIU)”. 
R23 of the 2012 FATF Recommendations provides that: 
 
a) Lawyers, notaries, other independent legal professionals and accountants should be required to report 
suspicious transactions when, on behalf of or for a client, they engage in a financial transaction in 
relation to the activities described in paragraph d) of Recommendation 22. Countries are strongly 
encouraged to extend the reporting requirement to the rest of the professional activities of accountants, 
including auditing.  
                                                          
34
  J. F. Thony, “Processing Financial Information in Money Laundering Matters: The Financial Intelligence 
Units” (1996) 4 European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 257 at 258. 
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b) Dealers in precious metals and dealers in precious stones should be required to report suspicious 
transactions when they engage in any cash transaction with a customer equal to or above the applicable 
designated threshold.  
c) Trust and company service providers should be required to report suspicious transactions for a client 
when, on behalf of or for a client, they engage in a transaction in relation to the activities referred to 
Recommendation 22. 
 
The Wolfsberg Group, in their Wolfsberg AML Principles on Private Banking, refers to 




1) Account transactions or other activities which are not consistent with the due diligence file; 
2) Cash transactions over a certain amount; and 
3) Pass-through/in-and-out-transactions. 
 
It should be stressed that there is no international consensus on the criteria for identifying 
suspicious transactions. The international instruments leave room for States to set out their 
own criteria for identifying suspicious transactions.  
The onerous burden has been imposed on financial institutions or DNFBPs of judging 
whether the nature of transaction raises suspicions. However, there is a risk of missing certain 
suspicious money laundering transactions because financial institutions or DNFBPs may lack 
the capacity or expertise to analyse the suspicious funds or transactions.  
In fact, the determination of suspicious transactions can be based upon the customer 
profile obtained through the CDD process. It means the obligation of reporting suspicious 
transactions can be a part of the extended requirement of CDD in some situations.
36
 The 
obligation of applying an enhanced CDD process in certain circumstances takes precedence 





                                                          
35
  Wolfsberg Group, "Wolfsberg Anti-Money Laundering Principles for Private Banking (2012)" at 6, available 
at: http://www.wolfsberg-principles.com/pdf/Wolfsberg-Private-Banking-Prinicples-May-2012.pdf 
(accessed 22 May 2014). 
36
  Guy Stessens, Money Laundering: A New International Law Enforcement Model (Cambridge University 
Press, 2000) at 162. 
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9.5 The Impact of Preventive Measures on  Financial Privacy and The Right to 
Professional Secrecy 
 
The implementation of preventive measures on financial service providers and professions 
has raised controversial arguments about the risk of interference with financial privacy and 
the infringement on the fundamental right to professional secrecy recognized by most States 
under their constitutional law.
37
 The obligation of record keeping requires that the 
identification data and transaction records should be available to domestic competent 
authorities upon appropriate authority.
38
 The reporting obligation may also conflict with the 
desire for financial privacy and the right to professional secrecy, such as confidential 
communication between lawyers, notaries or accountants with their clients. The interactions 
between the obligations to take preventive measures and bank secrecy (a notable form of 
financial privacy), and between those obligations and professional secrecy will be addressed 
in detail below. 
 
9.5.1 Preventive Measures and Banking Secrecy  
 
Concept and justifications for banking secrecy 
Although banking secrecy appears to have a long historical development closely 
associated with the history of banking, modern banking secrecy actually evolved after World 
War I.
39
 It was not legally recognized in the form of banking secrecy law until the 1930s. The 
first banking secrecy law was enacted in Switzerland in 1934, but since then it has flourished 
in many other States around the world.
40
 Whilst the meaning of banking secrecy has been 
widely understood as the principle of confidentiality in financial transactions, there is no 
comprehensive concept or description of the term “banking secrecy” at the international 
level.
41
 In general, banking secrecy law protects a range of aspects of banker - customer 
relationships that are expressed in two main rules:
42
 i) the banker shall not disclose the 
                                                          
37
  Article 12 of the United Nations (1948), "The Universal Declaration of Human Rights " stipulates that “no 
one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence”. 
38
  FATF, above n20, R11.  
39
  Edouard Chambost, Bank Accounts: A World Guide to Confidentiality (John Wiley & Sons, 1983) at 3-8. 
40
  Ibid, at 5-6; and see Richard Gagnon, “International Banking Secrecy: Developments in Europe Prompt New 
Approaches” (1990) 23 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 653 at 659-660. 
41
  He Ping, “Banking Secrecy and Money Laundering” (2004) 7(4) Journal of Money Laundering Control 376 
at 376.  
42
  Ibid. 
242 
 
customer’s financial information to interested parties, leaving aside a number of exceptions; 
and ii) the customer’s financial information shall be protected legally from the intrusion of 
other parties. 
Most States recognize and adopt some forms of banking secrecy based on a number of 
justifications.
43
 The justifications vary from State to State, and thus, have resulted in a variety 
of legal bases for protecting banking secrecy at different levels of stringency.
44
 The 
justifications for banking secrecy derive from both the interest of the bank and its 
customers.
45
 It should be recognized that although in certain States, banking secrecy is 
reinforced by statute and even protected by criminal sanction, it is not a part of universally 
accepted civil liberties or human rights.
46
 According to English law, the banker-customer 
relationship is a contractual obligation, not an inalienable right.
47
 Similarly, under German 




Most individuals want to prevent their financial information from being accessible by 
other interested parties. The demand for financial secrecy arises from the personal, business, 
political, fiscal or criminal motivations.
49
 In a cashless society, where most financial 
transactions are conducted through banking services, banking records can directly reflect 
many aspects of a customer’s affairs that he/she wants to keep secret. For instance, the 
financial records of a person can reflect his lifestyle, financial situation, or even every 
physical movement. Thus, organized criminals or political tyrants consider banking secrecy 
as a shield to hide and secure their assets. Money launderers rely on banking secrecy as a 
crucial tool facilitating their criminal activities. In addition, people possessing substantial 
wealth are often targets for criminals. Hence, these people often seek the skilled banking 
systems that provide strict banking secrecy. In response to the customer’s demand for 
financial secrecy, divergent national and international bankers have offered banking secrecy 
                                                          
43
  See different national banking laws and their rationales in Chambost, above n39, at 91-259. 
44
  Ibid. 
45
  Ibid, at 9-26. 
46
  See George J. Moscarino, “Beating the Shell Game: Bank Secrecy Laws and Their Impact on Civil Recovery 
in International Fraud Actions” (1997) 18(6) Company Lawyer 177 at 183, and See Peter Maynard, 
“Bahamas: Civil Liberties and Privacy - The Question of Balance” (1997) 1(2) Journal of Money 
Laundering Control 177 at 177. 
47
  E.P. Ellinger, Eva Lomnicka and Richard Hooley, Ellinger's Modern banking law  (4th ed, Oxford 
University Press, 2006) at 117-121. 
48
  Valsamis Mitsilegas, Money Laundering Counter-Measures in the European Union: A New Paradigm of 
Security Governance Versus Fundamental Legal Principles (Kluwer Law International, 2003) at 127. 
49
  Ingo Walter, The Secret Money Market : Inside the Dark World of Tax Evasion, Financial Fraud, Insider 
Trading, Money Laundering, and Capital Flight (Harper & Row Ballinger Division, 1990) at 1-4. 
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as a kind of product. They compete with one another in terms of quality or cost of this type of 
product. Further, desirable banking systems are usually located in countries renowned for 
their political, social, economic and monetary stability. This explains why some countries 
(e.g., Switzerland, Luxembourg or Hong Kong) are known as “banking secrecy havens”.
50
  
A number of countries have enacted strict banking secrecy laws with the aim of supporting 
their banking industries as well as their economies. Stringent banking secrecy has been used 
to attract foreign funds and to profit from the management of these funds.
51
 Some of these 
countries are located in the Caribbean and South Atlantic close to unstable Latin American 
governments and drug producing countries. They include Antigua, the Bahamas, Bermuda, 
the Cayman Islands, Montserrat, the Netherlands Antilles, and Panama. Their geographical 
proximity and their stringent banking secrecy make them desirable destinations for capital 
flight and the proceeds of crime.
52
 In these countries, the banking secrecy law is an essential 
legal instrument of the banking industry which is a major contributor to their economies. 
However, these “banking secrecy havens” appear to make transnational money laundering 




The instruments of banking secrecy 
States choose different instruments to enforce banking secrecy. The most basic level of 
banking secrecy is achieved through a direct instrument, such as some type of deposit 
account:  a “classic named account”, “numbered account” or account under a false name.
54
  
A “classic named account” allows withdrawal over the counter. A customer who wants to 
open this type of account normally has to provide his/her personal details, such as name, 
address, and a sample signature for the bank. The sample signature allows the cashier to 
recognize the customer when withdrawing cash over the counter.  
A “numbered account” or account held under a false name is an account where the holder 
is denoted for general purposes by a number or code, or sometimes a pseudonym. The 
identity and other personal details of the customer are known only to a limited number of 
bank staff members who are responsible for the relationship with the customer, normally the 
                                                          
50
  Chambost, above n39, at 145-250. 
51
  Moscarino, above n46, at 184. 
52
  Walter, above n49, at 210-221. 
53
  In Mary Alice Young, Banking Secrecy and Offshore Financial Centers: Money Laundering and Offshore 
Banking (Routledge, 2013) at 161, the author has pointed out that “banking secrecy havens” undermine the 
effectiveness of confiscation of the proceeds of crime on a global level. 
54
  Chambost, above n39, at 39-67. 
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bank director and the account manager. Others, who process the transactions for the bank 
account, only know the number, code or pseudonym. A “numbered account” is a well-known 
direct instrument of banking secrecy protecting the customers from unauthorised disclosure. 
It was an essential banking secrecy instrument in the Swiss banking system from the 1950s.
55
 
Nonetheless, under pressure from the international community, in 2003 Switzerland 
introduced its new Money Laundering Law which forces Swiss banks to reveal the name of 
customers when transferring money abroad.
56
 Though the numbered account has not 
disappeared entirely, customers are no longer able to hide their identity when making 
transactions abroad. 
The indirect instruments of banking secrecy include “shell companies” or “offshore 
captive banks”.
57
 “Shell companies” or anonymous corporations are non-publicly traded 
corporations, limited liability companies and other business entities (e.g., trusts) that have no 
physical presence other than a mailing address and generate little or no independent 
economic value.
58
 A financial institution may provide financial services for these entities, 
such as internet banking or currency exchange.
59
 “Shell companies” may serve legitimate 
commercial purposes, such as: holding stock or intangible business assets, facilitating 
domestic and cross-border currency and asset transfers, and facilitating corporate mergers.
60
 
These companies are easy and inexpensive to set up and operate; beneficial ownership is 
securely anonymous, and transaction details can be concealed from regulatory and law 
enforcement agencies.
61
 Thus, this kind of company has been seen as a big business, and 
States compete at offering more secure anonymity along with other benefits in incorporation 
services. In the US, the UK and other States with lax incorporation requirements, “shell 
companies” are freely available to anyone with an internet connection and some money.
62
 
However, “shell companies” can aid criminals by providing the appearance of legitimacy and 
                                                          
55
  David Chaikin, “Policy and Fiscal Effect of Swiss Bank Secrecy” (2005) 15(1) Revenue Law Journal 90 at 
101-102 
56
  Ibid. 
57
  Walter, above n49, at 41-44; and Chambost, above n39, at 58-75. 
58
  “Money Laundering Through Shell Companies, LLCs, and Trusts”,  (2006)(493) ABA Trust Letter at 6. 
59
  See ibid; and J. C. Sharman, “Shopping for Anonymous Shell Companies: An Audit Study of Anonymity 
and Crime in the International Financial System” (2010) 24(4) Journal of Economic Perspectives 127 at 130-
132. 
60
  See Money Laundering Through Shell Companies, LLCs, and Trusts, above n58; and Ioannis V. Floros and 
Travis R.A. Sapp, “Shell games: On the value of shell companies” (2011) 17(4) Journal of Corporate 
Finance 850 at 851-852. 
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  Money Laundering Through Shell Companies, LLCs, and Trusts, above n58. 
62
  Sharman, above n59. 
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access to the national and international financial system through their bank accounts.
63
 “Shell 
companies” may be formed and then open corporate bank accounts for illegal purposes. The 
transactions processed through the corporate accounts of such a “shell company” are 
effectively untraceable and are thus very useful for the purpose of concealing criminal 
proceeds.
64
 There are numerous cases of abuse of shell corporations for transnational 
financial crimes.
65
 In 2000, almost all large-scale money laundering operations in Britain 
involved “shell companies”.
66
 The US has recently paid more attention to the problems of 
“shell companies” as part of their ongoing AML and combating terrorist financing initiatives. 
In 2006, FinCEN (Financial Crimes Enforcement Network), which is the Financial 
Intelligence Unit (FIU) of the US, stated that “lack of transparency in the formation and 
operation of shell companies may be a desired characteristic for certain legitimate business 
activity, but it is also a vulnerability that allows these companies to disguise their ownership 
and purpose”.
67
 Furthermore, the problems of “shell companies” have been widely identified 
in various reports and research projects on combating some transnational crimes, such as: 
drug trafficking-related crimes, terrorism, money laundering, corruption, or tax evasion.
68
 As 
a result, a number of international legal instruments have obliged financial institutions that 
the beneficial ownership of legal persons and legal arrangement must be ascertained.
69
 
Another indirect instrument of banking secrecy is “captive bank”, which is a bank that 
exists purely for the benefit of one natural or legal person or a group of people.
70
 
Traditionally, it is the wholly of partially owned subsidiary of a company. For example, A, B 
and C are companies that belong to Mr X who also controls captive bank D. Bank D is 
established primarily to fulfil the financial requirements of Mr X’s companies. It generally 
offers all basic banking services (e.g., safe-keeping of deposits). In some cases, it may 
provide additional services, for example merchant banking. To maximize profits, captive 
banks are usually offshore banks located in “tax havens”. An offshore “captive bank”, which 
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  Money Laundering Through Shell Companies, LLCs, and Trusts, above n58. 
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Economist, 24 October 2002, available at: http://www.economist.com/node/1408104 (accessed 8 January 
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is resident in a “tax haven”, may enjoy various benefits,
71
 such as lax tax liability and greater 
privacy resulting from the stringent banking secrecy laws in the country of location. This 
kind of bank obviously provides a useful tool for money launderers. 
 
Preventive measures challenging banking secrecy  
Because banking secrecy has been exploited as an effective tool to secure the proceeds of 
crime, in most jurisdictions there are certain compulsory circumstances in which banking 
secrecy is lifted or relaxed to serve the fight against crime. The information disclosed by the 
banks and used by competent authorities is very important in protecting the bankers as well 
as in AML. Lifting banking secrecy under certain circumstances has also been embodied in a 




Under the international AML regime, national banking systems cultivating a tradition of 
stringent banking secrecy now have to harmonize with the new international standard of 
banking secrecy. The preventive measures, especially the reporting obligation, raise 
controversial questions whether there are conflicts between this obligation and the demand of 
banking secrecy, and whether this obligation has negative effects on the commercial interests 
of bankers.
73
 The answers to these questions will depend on what the reported information is 
about, who it concerns, and what it will be used for. 
It is noteworthy that the objectives of the preventive measures taken by banking systems 
not only serve the AML initiatives but also protect banking from reputational damage, loss of 
public confidence or other damages resulting from being used for criminal purposes.
74
 Thus, 
banking systems should implement the preventive measures in compliance with international 
standards in order to protect themselves from the harms of money laundering. Further, the 
adequate implementation of the preventive measures has been seen as a market tool to 
guarantee the stability and health of banks in the global financial market.
75
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However, bankers should not have to lift banking secrecy in unreasonable situations. For 
example, the lack of the appropriate standards of suspicious transactions may result in 
unreasonable reports being made to law enforcement agencies. These reports may affect the 
interests of the banker and its customers because of the financial information disclosed. The 
extent to which banking secrecy is relaxed depends on the balance between the interests of 
law enforcement and bankers. For instance, absolute banking secrecy should not exist when 
there is a criminal threat to the banking system; or when the higher interest of the public or 
State such as in case of fighting against crime is involved. Nevertheless, in practice, it is 




9.5.2 Preventive Measures and Professional Secrecy 
 
Professional secrecy is a duty incumbent upon numerous professions, especially the 
religious, legal and medical professions. It is defined as a special moral duty upon members 
of the several professions, whereby they are obligated to maintain a virtuous or discreet 
silence in respect of confidential information they received in the course of duty.
77
 In varying 
degrees, States have taken into account and made certain legal provisions about the duty of 
professional secrecy. 
In common law States, confidential communication between lawyers or other legal 
professionals and their clients is protected by one of the oldest privileges in the history of 
common law - the legal professional privilege.
78
 The legal professional privilege is defined as 
“the right whereby communications between client and legal adviser may not generally be 
given in evidence without the client’s consent if made in relation to contemplated or pending 
litigation, or made to enable the adviser to give, or the client to receive, legal advice”.
79
 This 
includes the duty of a lawyer not to disclose professional communications with his client, the 
power of the client to stop the lawyer from making such disclosure, and the right of the client 
not to disclose the same.
80
 This privilege is today treated as “absolute” in most common law 
jurisdictions and perceived as a fundamental human right.
81
 In civil law States, for example in 
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Germany, protection of the confidentiality of the lawyer-client relationship is also afforded 
by constitutional principles.
82
 In France, lawyers and notaries enjoy the privilege of non-




The imposition of the preventive measures on professionals, like lawyers, notaries, 
accountants, tax advisers and other independent professionals, results in risks of: i) damaging 
the confidentiality of communication between professionals and their clients, or interfering in 
the individual right of privacy (in case of reporting obligations); and ii) subjecting them to 
criminal liability for their connection with money laundering operations, in particular as an 
accessory or accomplice to the money laundering offence. In fact, professionals may become 
involved unknowingly in money laundering operations, especially when they lack capacity 
and sufficient means to identify money laundering operations or suspicious transactions.
84
 If 
they do become involved unknowingly, they may be prosecuted for committing the money 
laundering offence by negligence (the case, for example, in Germany
85
).  
In order to prevent the risks and protect legal professional privilege and professional 
secrecy, a number of States and regional organisations have provided that certain cases 
should be exempted from reporting obligations. In the EU, for example, the EU Directive 
2005/60/EC provides that States shall not be obliged to apply the reporting obligation to 
notaries, independent legal professionals, auditors, external accountants and tax advisors with 
regard to certain types of information.

 This exemption aims to support the traditional role of 
legal advisers and representatives in legal proceedings on behalf of clients, such as 
undertaking advocacy for defendants or participating in lawsuits as a lawyer. However, 
notaries and other independent legal professionals shall be obliged to apply the reporting 
obligation when they participate, whether acting on behalf of and for their clients in any 
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financial transaction, or when assisting in the planning or execution of transaction for their 
clients.

 Hence, whether the professionals shall be obliged to apply the preventive measures 
should depend on the nature of their activities. 
 
9.6 Risk-based Approach (RBA), Financial Inclusion and Preventive Measures 
 
9.6.1 Risk-based Approach  
 
As noted in chapter 3, since 2007, the FATF in collaboration with many private sector 
actors has worked extensively on the application of the RBA to AML/CFT.
88
 In its 2012 
revised Recommendations, the FATF introduced the RBA to its member countries as a 
central approach to adopting AML measures in general and the preventive measures in 
particular.
89
 The general principle of the RBA is that the AML measures of a country should 
correspond to the risk level assessed, and that the intensity of AML measures (enhanced or 
simplified) depends on the level of the risks identified (higher or lower).
90
 Where there are 
higher risks, countries should (obligatory for countries) require financial institutions and 
DNFBPs to take enhanced measures to manage and mitigate those risks; and where there are 
lower risks, simplified measures may (optional for countries) be allowed.
91
 At the 
institutional level, financial institutions and DNFBPs should also be required to conduct 
money laundering risks assessment. The preventive measures, especially the CDD measures 
imposed on financial institutions and DNFBPs, should be enhanced or may be simplified 
when the level of the risks identified is respectively higher or lower.
92
 The RBA is believed 
to enable countries as well as financial institutions and DNFBPs: i) to allocate their resources 
in the most efficient ways for AML; ii) to design and develop the FATF measures 
domestically commensurate with the nature of risks; and iii) to minimize the regulatory 
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burden on financial institutions and DNFBPs and on their customers as well.
93
 So, the RBA 
can be very helpful in implementing the AML measures. 
Nevertheless, the RBA requires a reasonable risk judgement which is challenging to both 
the public and private sectors.
94
 Implementing the RBA requires countries and financial 
institutions and DNFBPs within the countries to have a good understanding of money 
laundering risks and be able to make sound assessments. Over-estimating risk could result in 
wasteful use of resources and under-estimating risk may create vulnerabilities.
95
 It is difficult 
for countries and their financial institutions to make appropriate risk assessments and 
determine correctly the extent to which the RBA could be implemented.
96
 Furthermore, 
unfortunately there is no universal methodology for assessing money laundering risks.
97
 The 
FATF only attempts to offer a general guidance on assessing money laundering risks at the 
national level.
98
 Countries should by themselves design a matrix of indicating factors to 
identify and assess the risks of money laundering.
99
 In the same vein, the FATF has 
collaborated with different parts of the private sector to produce general guidance papers on 
the implementation of a RBA for them.
100
 According to these papers, at an institutional level, 
an overall assessment of money laundering risks is basically based on the determination of 
risks posed by various categories. The most commonly used risks categories are: customer 
risk; country/geographic risk; and products/services/ transactions risk.      
 
9.6.2 Financial inclusion 
 
In general terms, financial inclusion involves providing access to adequate, transparent 
and affordable financial services to disadvantaged and other vulnerable groups who have 
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been “underserved” or excluded from the formal financial sector.
101
 Disadvantaged and other 
vulnerable groups are, for example, low income households, rural persons and undocumented 
migrants.
102
 The “underserved” persons are those who have access to some financial services, 
but in a very limited manner. For example, they may have access to a money transfer service, 
but not from banks, or they may technically have access but are not using the services 
because of some obstacles, such as strict documentary requirements, habit, limited knowledge 
or high cost.
103
 It has been shown that most of those people in the world who lack access to 
banks and other formal financial institutions are living in developing countries, and that 
alternative remittance systems (ARSs) are being used to transfer a significant amount of 
money to developing countries.
104
  
Financial inclusion and effective AML measures can be mutually supportive. Some 
studies point out that more access to formal financial services result in an increase of 
effectiveness of the AML measures. And the imposition of inappropriate AML measures, 
especially the preventive measures, can negatively affect access to and use of formal financial 
services.
105
 Thus, promoting formal financial services access and the appropriateness of AML 
measures are the central initiatives to an effective AML regime. The preventive measures 
should have a flexibility that enables countries and financial institutions to craft the most 
efficient implementation.  
The FATF has recently taken a strong interest in the issue of financial inclusion.
106
 FATF 
Ministers stated that financial exclusion poses a real threat to effective implementation of the 
FATF Recommendations.
107
 The FATF has worked with the Asia Pacific Group (APG) and 
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  Hennie Bester, et al., "Implementing FATF Standards in Developing Countries and Financial Inclusion: 
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and-Integrity-Aug-2009.pdf (accessed 24 July 2013). 
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of the FATF Plenary meeting, Amsterdam, 23-25 June 2010”, available at: http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/pages/aboutus/outcomesofmeetings/. 
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  FATF (2013), above n101, par. 2. 
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the World Bank (WB) to produce a guidance paper on action to support financial inclusion,
108
 
especially in emerging economies, developing countries and Low Capacity Countries.
109
 The 
guidance paper provides a general framework to assist countries in implementing the AML 
measures (CDD, record-keeping and STRs obligations, and other measures) consistent with 
the purposes of financial inclusion.
110
 It also clarifies the flexibility offered by the FATF, in 
particular through the RBA, when promoting financial inclusion. For example, countries are 
exempt from applying some of the FATF measures to financial institutions when:
111
 i) there 
is a proven low risk of money laundering and terrorist financing in strictly limited and 
justified circumstances; and ii) a financial activity (other than the transferring of money or 
value) is carried out by a natural or legal person on an occasional or very limited basis with 
low risks of money laundering and terrorist financing. Nevertheless, these provisions are 
vague. Countries are free to justify and interpret the circumstances and financial activities 
which have a low risk of money laundering.    
 
9.7 Interim Conclusion 
 
In brief, ensuring the adequate implementation of the preventive measures is highly 
important for financial institutions and DNFBPs to be secure from money laundering. 
Nonetheless, the enforcement of these measures is becoming much more intrusive into 
financial privacy, professional secrecy and privilege, which are themselves strongly justified 
by legitimate and undisputed rationales. This leads to tension and potential conflicts of 
interests between law enforcement authorities and financial service providers or 
professionals, between the protection of privacy rights and the objectives of the preventive 
measures. In practice, financial privacy, professional secrecy and privilege should be 
weighted fairly against the objectives of preventive measures in AML. In addition, financial 
institutions and DNFBPs should be equipped with sufficient means and capacity for effective 
                                                          
108
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customer identification to prevent the risk of becoming involved unknowingly in money 
laundering. 
The RBA obviously has various laudable aims. Nevertheless, its implementation in fact 
could be challenging to countries and institutions because of the difficulties in money 
laundering risks assessment. It is unlikely to offer universally accepted detailed guidelines or 
methodologies to all countries and institutions for assessing correctly money laundering risks. 
In addition, countries and institutions may lack of resources in evaluating money laundering 
risks. Thus, they are wary of undertaking the risk assessment.  
The chapter now turns to examine the implementation of the preventive measures in 
Vietnam. It begins with an overview of the principal financial institutions, and designated 
non-financial businesses and professions.  
 
9.8 Overview of Vietnamese Financial Institutions, Designated Non-Financial 
Businesses and Professions 
 
9.8.1 Financial Institutions 
 
Banks 
Vietnam’s banking sector has expanded substantially in recent years. As part of the 
country’s move towards a more open and market-oriented economy, the Vietnamese 
government has vigorously undertaken various reforms to strengthen and modernize the 
banking sector in compliance with international standards. These reforms have also been 
motivated by Vietnam’s growing participation in international trade and international 
agreements. Key reforms include a restructuring of the banking system, a gradual opening to 




The Vietnamese banking system currently consists of the State Bank of Vietnam (SBV), 
five State-Owned Commercial Banks (SOCBs), 34 Joint Stock Commercial Banks (JSCBs), 
four Joint Venture Banks (JVBs) and five wholly foreign-owned banks.
113
 Similarly to 
central banks in other States, the SBV is vested with authority to make monetary policy and 
                                                          
112
 Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco (2011), “Banking Reform in Vietnam”, available at: 
http://www.frbsf.org/banking-supervision/publications/asia-focus/2011/june/banking-reform-vietnam/june-
banking-reform-in-vietnam.pdf (accessed 22 July 2013). 
113
 SBV (30 June 2013), “He Thong To Chuc Tin Dung [Credit Institution System]”, available at: 
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govern the banking system. SOCBs are government-owned banks that primarily fulfill 
specialized policy lending functions. These banks dominate the banking sector in Vietnam 
with their branches across the country. JSCBs have diverse shareholding structures, ranging 
from purely private organizations to being jointly owned by State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), 
private groups and individuals. JVBs are established with capital contributed by a 
Vietnamese bank and one or more foreign banks under a joint venture contract. In addition, 
recently an increasing number of wholly foreign-owned banks have been licensed and 
allowed to provide the same range of banking services as domestic banks in Vietnam. These 
banks are perceived as having a comparative advantage over domestic banks, such as high 
quality retail banking services and wealth management services. 
Almost all commercial banks now offer a full range of banking products and services to 
satisfy the increasing demands of corporate and retail clients. Beside the traditional products, 
such as personal loans and mortgages, other products have become available, for example, 
credit/debit cards, Automated Teller Machines (ATMs), remittances and electronic payments. 
However, the Vietnamese banking system is perceived as still weak and inefficient by 





By the end of 2012, there were 106 securities companies, mostly private, although there 
were some State-Owned Bank-affiliated institutions.
115
 In order to trade on Vietnam’s stock 
market, investors must have a custodian account in Vietnam. Foreigners are allowed to hold 
such accounts. New clients of securities companies are required to open a bank account with 
an affiliated bank.  
The State Securities Commission (SCC), a governmental agency, is responsible for 
enforcing the Law on Securities and regulating Vietnam’s securities market.
116
 The 
Vietnamese Securities Depository is a centralized share registry for all publicly listed 
companies.
117
 Buying and selling of securities is conducted through the securities companies 
licensed by the SCC.
118
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As of January 2013, in Vietnam, there were 29 non-life insurance providers and 14 life 
insurance providers.
119
 Foreign insurers can participate in the Vietnam’s insurance market in 
the following ways: establishing a wholly-owned subsidiary in Vietnam; entering into a joint 
venture with Vietnamese insurers; acquiring stakes in joint stock insurance companies; 
establishing a branch of a foreign insurance company in Vietnam; or providing cross-border 
insurance services into Vietnam.
120
 Several international insurers have established 
representative offices in Vietnam, including Taiwan, Japanese, the US, Swiss, South Korean 
or Italian-owned insurers. Insurance companies are regulated by the Ministry of Finance 




Other financial institutions 
There is a system of People’s Credit Funds (“Quy tin dung nhan dan”) which is a form of 
cooperative micro finance at the community level. These funds collect deposits from both 
members and non-members. Their operations are subject to the Law on Credit Institutions
122
 
and regulated by the SBV. 
Currency exchange units, including banks and other financial institutions, are authorized 
to conduct currency exchange activities. The currency changers operate under the SBV’s 
supervision and the Ordinance on Foreign Exchange.
123
 Additionally, there are a large 
number of unlicensed money changers, known as “black market operators”, in Vietnam. 
Many of them are gold retail shops.  
In Vietnam, the legal system of money or value transfer mainly consists of commercial 
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9.8.2 Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions 
 
Casinos 
Gambling has long been considered a “social evil” by Vietnamese authorities. 
Nevertheless, the government has given special dispensation to a number of high standard 
hotels (4 – 5 stars) to open slot machines, electronic games operations and table games room 
for foreigners only.
124
 Some small-size casinos are open solely to holders of foreign 
passports.
125
 The market is targeted at foreigners, primarily those working in or visiting 
Vietnam. There are no legal internet casinos operating in Vietnam. Nevertheless, illegal and 
unregulated gambling, such as internet gambling on European football matches organized by 
underground gambling syndicates, is popular in big cities. 
In recent years, the government appears to have loosened its straight-laced attitude to 
gambling. A proper policy and legal framework for the gambling market has been 
considered.
126
 The supervision of casino operations is multi-faceted.
127
 The People’s 
Committee in the Provinces where casinos are located comprehensively oversees the 
activities of licensed casinos. The Ministry of Planning and Investment is responsible for 
ensuring compliance with business registration requirements. The SBV supervises foreign 
exchange and money transfer activities.  
 
Real estate agents 
One of the weaknesses of the real estate market of Vietnam is the lack of professionalism 
and legal framework for brokerage agencies’ activities. The Law on Real Estate Business 
(2006) directly regulates real estate brokers and agents in Vietnam, which requires brokers to 
be licensed by obtaining a practice certificate.
128
 In fact, with regard to the residential 
property market, the number of trained licensed individuals and legal entities is relatively 
                                                          
124
 MGM Resorts International and Asian Coast Development Limited have been licensed to develop the MGM 
Grand Ho Tram Beach - Viet Nam's first large-scale of the US$4.2 billion casino resort.  The five-star MGM 
Grand Ho Tram was open in 2013, offering a gaming area consisting of 90 live table games and more than 
600 electronic games. See Asian Coast Development Ltd. (2013), available at: 
http://www.asiancoastdevelopment.com/mgm-grand-ho-tram.php (accessed 8 March 2013). 
125
  For example, Do Son Casino in Hai Phong Province. 
126
 In Chinh Phu, “Du Thao Nghi Dinh Ve Hoat Dong Kinh Doanh Casino " [Government, Draft on 
Government Decree on Managing Casino Operations]  (Vietnam), 2012, casino players include Vietnamese 
people.  
127
  See ibid, chapter VI. 
128
  Luat Kinh Doanh Bat Dong San [Law on Real Estate Business ] (Vietnam) Law No. 63/2006/QH11, 29 June 
2006, entered into force 01 January 2007, article 8. 
257 
 
small. A large number of freelance brokers are self-appointed agents, who use word-of-mouth 
and personal contacts to try to locate potential land or houses for buyers or renters. They may 
or may not be the sole representative of the landlord or owner, and they receive their 
commission from the landlord or owner. Real estate agents are normally not involved in 
accepting payments. Payment is often conducted directly between sellers and buyers. 
Vietnam Dong (VND), gold and US$ are preferable in payments between individuals. Land 
or house transaction documentation must be signed and notarized by a notary. Tax on the 
transaction must be paid at the tax department after the deeds are signed and notarized. 
 
Lawyers, notaries and accountants 
As of October 2013, Vietnam had about 8,000 lawyers.
129
 The number of lawyers per 
capita in Vietnam, the number of legal consultant companies and the demand for legal aid is 
very low, especially in rural areas. The role of lawyers in Vietnamese society has only been 
promoted in recent decades. The practice of lawyers in Vietnam is governed by the Law on 
Lawyers of 2006
130
 and a number of Decrees and Regulations.  
The Vietnam Bar Federation (VBF), established in 2009, is the nationwide socio-
professional organization of Vietnamese lawyers. VBF represents and protects the legitimate 
rights and interests of its members; sets up and promotes professional standards, ethics and 
competence of the lawyers. In 2011, the VBF promulgated the Code of Ethics and 
Professional Conduct.
131
 Lawyers are required to be a member of the Bar Associations and be 
qualified based on a national examination. Nevertheless, the professional level and legal 
knowledge of lawyers in numerous areas is limited. 
Regarding notarial practice, there are two forms of Notary Public organizations: State 
Notary Public’s chambers and Private Notary Public’s offices.
132
 The former, established by 
provincial People’s Committee’s decision, is a unit under the Ministry of Justice, and its 
members of staff are government officials. The latter is established by a notary or notaries in 
the form of a private company or collective enterprise respectively.  
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As far as accountants are concerned, the profession of accountants in public practice and 
internal accountants is regulated by the Law on Accountancy of 2003.
133
 It provides the 
professional and ethical requirements for an accountant. In addition, in order to practice as 
Certified Public Accountants, membership of the Vietnam Association of Certified Public 
Accountants (VACPA) is required.  
 
Dealers in precious metals and precious stones 
In Vietnam, gold serves a variety of crucial functions beyond jewelry fabrication and 
industrial applications. Gold has been used and continues to be used extensively as in-kind 
savings (including interest-bearing gold certificates of deposit) and monetary instrument for 
commercial transaction (e.g., in trading real properties). Legal gold businesses, including 
pressing gold bars, import and export of gold material, gold ore or grain, must be authorized 
by the SBV. Gold is categorized as a “foreign exchange” in current laws.
134
 As of December 





9.9 The Application of Preventive Measures on Vietnamese Financial Institutions, 
Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions 
 
9.9.1 Customer Due Diligence and Record Keeping 
 
Customer due diligence 
In 2008, the APG, in its mutual evaluation report, revealed substantial shortcomings 
regarding CDD in the first formal AML legal document of Vietnam – the Decree 
74/2005/ND-CP.
136
 However, the adoption of the Law on Prevention and Suppression Money 
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Laundering (Law on PSML)
137
 and the Decree 116/2013/ND-CP
138
 has addressed most of 
those shortcomings. 
Article 8(1) of the Law on PSML and articles 3 of the Decree 116/2013/ND-CP prescribe 
certain circumstances in which financial institutions must conduct customer identification. In 
comparison with the FATF standards, the de minimis thresholds for occasional customers 
conducting wire transfer is not provided for in Vietnamese law.
139
 However, this provision is 
optional under the FATF Recommendation, so Vietnam may not need to implement it.   
Furthermore, customer identification must be undertaken by other individuals and entities 
listed in article 8(2) of the Law on PSML, which are consistent with the FATF definitions of 
non-designated businesses and professions. Articles 6 and 7 of the Circular 148/2010/TT-
BTC refer to the details of customer identification in the sectors of insurance, securities and 
games of chance.
140
 Detailed CDD in the real estate business is provided for in the Circular 
12/2011/TT-BXD on Anti-Money Laundering in the Real Estate Sector.
141
 
The following CDD measures are provided for in articles 11(1) and (2) of the Law on 
PSML, which comply with the measures stated in R10(a) and (c) of the 2012 FATF 
Recommendations.  
  
1. The reporting entities shall use the following documents and data to verify customers’ identification: 
a) For customers being individuals: identity card, valid passport and other documents issued by the 
competent authorities; 
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b) For customers being organizations: the license or the establishment decision; the decision on the 
name change, division, merger; business registration certificate; and the decision of appointing 
Director, Chief Accountant; 
2. The reporting entities through other organizations and individuals which have had a relation with the 
customer, or through competent State agencies to collect information and compare with that provided 
for by the customer.  
 
It is noticeable that there is no national centralized identification system for natural 
persons and no centralized and publicly accessible database of registered enterprises in 
Vietnam. The identity card (“chung minh thu nhan dan”), which includes ID number, full 
name, place of origin, date of birth, place of residence, nationality, special marks, fingerprints 
of left and right thumbs, and the stamp of the local police authority, is the primary and most 
reliable means of identification. 
Ongoing due diligence is provided for in article 10 of the Law on PSML, which is in 
compliance with R10(d) of the 2012 FATF Recommendations. Nevertheless, because there is 
no centralized identification system and the identity card used as the primary document for 
customer identification carries no obligation to maintain up-to-date information (e.g., place of 
residence), it is difficult for financial institutions to engage in ongoing due diligence. 
Identification of the beneficial owner is provided for fully in article 9(2) of the Law on 
PSML as follows: 
 
2. Information on the beneficial owner: 
a) Reporting entities shall identify the beneficial owner and use the measures to identify and update the 
information on beneficial owner; 
b) For customer being a legal entity or upon the provision of authorization agreement service, the 
reporting entities shall gather information on ownership and control structure to determine the individual 
who has the control interest and govern the operation of that legal entity or authorization agreement. 
 
These provisions are consistent with R10(b) of the 2012 FATF Recommendations.  
 
Record keeping 
Article 9(1)(a) and (b) of SBV Decision 376/2003 concerning the Regulations on Storing 
Electronic Banking Documents states that:
142
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a. Electronic documents related directly to record-keeping in the institutions that provide payment 
services shall be stored up to twenty years from the end of accounting year or when completing 
capital accounting payment of such institutions; 
b. Electronic documents that are only used for managing, operating and controlling, crosschecking in 
capital payment activities of the institutions that provide payment services, and use indirectly in 
record-keeping shall be stored up to five years from the end of accounting year or when completing 
capital accounting payment of institutions that provide payment services; 
 
Article 40(5) of the Law on Accountancy provides that accounting records must be 




a) At least five years: accounting documents used for the accounting units’ management and 
administrative work, including accounting documents  not directly used for making accounting books 
and financial reports; 
b) At least ten years: accounting documents directly used for making entries in accounting books and 
financial statements; accounting books; and annual financial reports, unless otherwise provided for by 
law; 
c) Permanently: accounting documents which have the historical value; or the economic, security or 
defence importance. 
 
The retention of transaction records, account files and business correspondence has 




The reporting entities are required to archive for at least 05 years: the customer’s transaction records 
from the date of the transaction initiated; the records of customer identification, accounting documents, 
reports specified in article 21, 22 and 23 of this Law and other relevant documents, from the closing date 
of transaction or the date of closure of account or the reporting date. 
 
It can be seen that the current laws regulating the obligation of record keeping are 
consistent with the FATF Recommendations.  
Anecdotal information suggests that electronic banking documents and accounting records 
have been stored in full compliance with article 9(1)(a) and (b) of SBV Decision 376/2003 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
" [State Bank of Vietnam, Regulation on Storing Electronic Banking Documents] No. 376/2003/QĐ-NHNN 
(Vietnam), 22 April 2003, article 9(1). 
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and the Law on Accountancy respectively, but there is no way of knowing whether this is in 
fact the case.   
 
9.9.2 Reporting Obligation 
 
Article 21(1) of the Law on PSML and article 3 of the Decision 20/2013/QD-TTg requires 
reporting of large value transactions which have an equivalent value of three hundred million 
VND (around 15,000 US$).
145
 
In addition, the obligation of reporting suspicious transaction was first mentioned in the 
Decree 74/2005/ND-CP,
146
 and then specified in the Circular 148/2010/TT-BTC
147
 and the 
Circular 12/2011/TT-BXD.
148
 Article 22(1) of the Law on PSML stipulates STR obligations 
as follows: “the reporting entities are required to report to the State Bank of Vietnam when 
there are suspicions or reasonable grounds to suspect that the property in the transaction is the 
proceeds of a criminal activity or are related to money laundering”. Further, comprehensive 
categories of grounds to suspect transactions in the sectors of banking, securities, casino and 
games of chance, and real estate are also provided for in the PSML Law.
149
 
Article 28 of the Law on PSML exempts the responsibility of protecting banking secrecy 
in certain circumstances by providing that “agencies, organizations and individuals which 
discharge their obligation to report or provide information in accordance with this law shall 
be deemed not to have breached the legal provisions on confidentiality of deposited money, 
assets, account information and transaction information of customers”. Article 29 of the Law 
on PSML stipulates the prohibition against disclosure (tipping-off) of the fact indicating that 
a STR or the information related to that STR is being filed.  
In practice, since the launch of Decree 74/2005/ND-CP, the number of STRs received by 
the Anti-Money Laundering Department (AMLD) has increased steadily.
150
 Most STRs were 
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reported by the banking sector. There has been no STR reported from lawyers and 
accountants. An insignificant number of STRs received by the AMLD were then forwarded 
to the Ministry of Public Security for further investigation.
151
  
Sanctions may be imposed on individuals or organizations which violate the reporting 
obligation or inform the related parties about the content of the report.
152
 The sanction may be 
criminal liability, monetary fine or administrative penalties. However, in fact, these penalties 
have not been applied to any individual or organization. This may undermine the rule of law 
and hinder the implementation of the reporting obligation in fact. More importantly, from this 
fact, the political will to implement the AMLSs in practice is questionable.    
Another obligatory report to the Customs Office of Vietnam is imposed on individuals 
who entry into or exit from Vietnam carrying foreign currencies in cash of more than 




9.9.3 Financial Institution Privacy and  Confidentiality 
 
Instruments of banking secrecy 
It is worthy of note that anonymous accounts and numbered accounts are prohibited in 
Vietnam. The Decision 1284/2002/QD-NHHH on Opening and Use of Deposit Accounts at 
the State Bank of Vietnam and Credit Institutions requires the full name of the account holder 
to be provided for.
154
 “Shell companies” and “captive banks” likewise are not allowed to be 
established in Vietnam. It means that Vietnamese banks provide only “classic named 
account”. 
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Financial privacy and professional privilege  





1. Employees, managers, executives of credit institutions and foreign bank branches are prohibited from 
disclosing the confidential business of the credit institutions and foreign bank branches.  
2. Credit institutions and branches of foreign banks must ensure the confidentiality of information 
relating to accounts, deposited money or assets and customer’s transactions at the credit institutions 
and branches of foreign banks.  
3. Credit institutions and branches of foreign banks are prohibited from providing information related to 
accounts, deposited money or assets, customer’s transactions at credit institutions and branches of 
foreign banks to other organizations or individuals, unless otherwise required by competent state 
agencies under the provisions of law or the consent of the customer.  
 
Article 57 of the Law on Securities, which deals with confidentiality, states that a 
“securities Depository and its staff members shall ensure the confidentiality of information 
related to securities ownership; refuse investigation, freezing, withholding and transfer of 
customer’s assets without the customer’s consent”.
156
  
Nevertheless, the Law on Securities allows the “provision of information at the request of 
competent State authorities”.
157
 What is more, the Decree 70/2000/ND-CP allows financial 
institutions to provide customer account information “at the written request of State agencies 
in the course of inspection, investigation, prosecution, court trial or judgment execution 
which falls under their competence, as prescribed by law”.
158
 The Decree 64/2001/ND-CP on 
Payment through Service Providers stipulates that “service providers including banks and 
other organizations permitted to provide payment services are obliged to supply to the State 
Bank information related to payment activities at such organizations at the request of State 
Bank”.
159
 In addition, “organizations and individuals involved in foreign currency exchange 
activities are obliged to supply information and data at the request of the State Bank of 
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2001, article 24(4). 
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Vietnam or licensed credit institutions according to the time limits provided for in current 
laws regulating foreign currency exchange activities”.
160
 Article 17 (2) of the Decree 
116/2013/ND-CP expressly spells out that the AMLD is authorized to request the reporting 




Rule 12 of the Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct prohibits disclosing the 
communication between lawyers and their clients, unless the clients consent or the law 
requests disclosure in certain circumstances. 
It can be seen that although the laws on regulating financial services and the Code of 
Ethics contain provisions which prohibit the disclosure of customer information, these 
provisions are normally overridden byrequests submitted by competent authorities for certain 
purposes, including the purpose of AML. 
  
9.9.4 Risk-based Approach and Financial Inclusion 
 
As noted in chapter 2, although the Vietnamese authorities have been aware of the 
existence of actual money laundering in Vietnam, they have not yet conducted any 
comprehensive research to identify, assess and understand money laundering risks to 
Vietnam. Likewise, although article 12 of the Law on PSML provides the guidance for 
financial institutions and DNFBPs to categorise their clients based on the RBA, guidance on 
the methods of assessing the risk level of financial institutions and DNFBPs is not provided 
for. The CDD measures are enhanced in certain situations prescribed in articles 13-17 of the 
Law on PSML which are similar to the FATF’s provisions (R12 to R16). Nevertheless, the 
circumstances where the simplification or exemption of preventive measures application is 
allowed have not been specified. In addition, the lack of expertise in conducting risks 
assessment at both the national and institutional level is a major hindrance to adopting the 
RBA in Vietnam. 
With regard to financial inclusion, chapter 3 and the overview of Vietnamese financial 
institutions has shown that despite vigorous reforms, the number of people having a bank 
account is very limited and cash-transactions are dominant in Vietnam. Due to the poor 
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infrastructure of the financial system, most people living in rural areas do not have access to 
some financial products or services, such as trading securities or insurance products. 
However, the Vietnamese government and banks recently have taken actions to enhance 
financial inclusion with the focus on the “underserved” population. Especially, a number of 
Vietnamese banks and telecommunication companies have been licensed to provide various 
mobile money services for the “unbanked” and “underbanked”.
162
 Those persons without 
bank accounts can use a mobile phone to pay for a wide range of services and goods or to 
send and receive money via text-messages and a network of retail agents as cash in/cash out 
points.
163
 Undoubtedly, mobile money is a promising tool for facilitating financial inclusion 
in Vietnam. However, money laundering risks may stem from the underlying features of 
mobile money, such as anonymity (unknown or false identity of users), rapidity (quick and 
virtual transactions) and poor oversight (mobile money providers, e.g., telecommunication 
companies, may not be subject to certain AML regulations).
164
 In Vietnam, mobile money 
providers are classified as “financial institutions” defined by article 5(3) of the Law on 
PSML. Therefore, they are obliged to adopt the money laundering preventive measures. 
Nonetheless, Vietnam thus far has no specific guidance as to how they can adopt those 
measures appropriately. For example, because most mobile money transactions are domestic 
and low-value, so according to the FATF Recommendations, those service providers may 
simplify the CDD procedure or may be even exempt from certain AML obligations.   
 
9.9.5 Comments and Suggestions 
 
Generally speaking, almost all international AMLSs on the preventive measures have been 
transformed into Vietnamese laws which include the Law on PSML and other relevant legal 
documents. Nonetheless, the enforcement of these measures has been very limited in 
Vietnam. This is, as identified above, due to a number of problems including the following: 
large-scale use of cash for payment; the infancy of financial institutions and DNBPs; the lack 
of professionalism and regulation of estate agents’ activities; limitations in the national 
                                                          
162
 Mobile money services have attracted millions of customers in Vietnam. See, e.g., TeleGeograhy (15 July 
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identification infrastructure; and the inadequate capacity of financial supervisors to supervise 
and enforce preventive measures, as well as to impose sanctions against violators. In the 
meantime, the Vietnamese “reporting entities” may have doubts about the aptness of the 
preventive measures. Can those AML measures be applied effectively to the poor 
infrastructure of the Vietnamese financial system and the cash-based economy? As pointed 
out in chapter 3, lack of appropriateness of the norms will hamper the actual implementation 
of such norms, and that point is sustained here. 
Because of limited resources, Vietnam at this stage should utilize the FATF’s rules on 
simplification and exemption of AML measures as useful tools to alleviate the regulatory 
burden on financial institutions and DNBPs, but still can satisfy the FATF’s requirements for 
adopting the preventive measures. In order to do so, Vietnam should: 
i) First undertake its national money laundering risks assessment. The FATF’s guidance 
on assessing national money laundering risks should be taken into account. The national risk 
assessment should include the evaluation of threats, vulnerabilities and consequences caused 
by money laundering.
165
 However, the FATF notices that while it is challenging to evaluate 
the consequences of money laundering,
166
 countries may focus primarily on identifying their 
threats and vulnerabilities.
167
 The FATF also has recommended the open-ended lists of 
money laundering risk factors related to threats and vulnerabilities.
168
 Accordingly, an 
estimation of money laundering threats relies heavily on understanding the nature and extent 
of predicate offences. The money laundering vulnerabilities are derived mainly from 
political, economic, social, environmental and legislative factors.
169
  
ii) Then provide detailed guidelines on assessing the money laundering risks at a sectoral 
and institutional level. The sectors subject to a risk assessment can be classified according to 
the FATF’s guidance.
170
 The FATF has already provided general guidelines on money 
laundering risk assessment in the sectors of new payment products and services, life 
insurance, money services businesses, legal professionals, casinos, real estate agents, 
accountants, trust and company service providers, and dealers in precious metals and 
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 Vietnam can depend on these guidelines to design its own risk matrices in 
identifying risk factors and potential risk levels in different sectors and institutions.  
And iii) provide detailed guidelines on applying a RBA to implementing the preventive 
measures. Vietnam should set out the standards for the exemption from AML measures in 
compliance with the FATF’s exemption rules.
172
 While it may be challenging to interpret and 
apply the “proven low risk” exemption,
173
 Vietnam can opt to apply the deminimis 
exemption. Especially, Vietnam should interpret the specific circumstances in which the 
simplification or exemption of the preventive measures is allowed. Basing on the FATF’s 
general guidance on the RBA
174
 and particular guidance on adopting a RBA into different 
sectors,
175
 Vietnam should provide criteria for categorizing which customers, products and 
transactions can attract a simplified CDD procedure. The FATF has given examples of 






The money laundering preventive measures imposed on financial institutions and DNBPs 
have been set out and developed by a number of distinct international institutions. The 
foremost standard-setting institutions are the FATF Recommendations, the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision and the Wolfsberg AML Principles. Other bodies active in 
promulgating these preventive measures include the World Bank, the IMF, the Egmont 
Group, the International Organization of Security Commissioners, and the International 
Association of Insurance Supervisors. They have adopted the same core standards for the 
preventive measures and contain cross references to one another. These standards refer to the 
main measures: CDD, record keeping and reporting of suspicious transactions. The core 
obligation - CDD - is the requirement of customer identification and verification before 
financial services are provided for. Record keeping primarily aims to create customer profiles 
and prevent customers from acting anonymously for the purpose of money laundering. The 
reporting obligation mainly entails the duty of reporting unusual or suspicious transaction to 
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the designated authorities for detecting money laundering. Countries are encouraged to apply 
the RBA to implementing AML measures, especially the preventive measures. In addition, 
financial inclusion should be considered as one of the deciding factors in the success of the 
preventive measures.  
In recent years, especially after Vietnam’s accession to the WTO in 2007, it has 
vigorously reformed and developed its financial sector in line with international standards. 
The banking sector has experienced the proliferation of an ever increasing number of banks 
and its financial services. There has been a fast growing number of securities and insurance 
companies. Nevertheless, all these infant sectors are operating in a relatively poor 
infrastructure and being governing by a lax legal framework. 
Following the first AML legal document - the Decree 74/2005/ND-CP, Vietnam has 
issued and updated a number of other relevant legal instruments to prevent the criminal use of 
financial institutions and DNFBPs. The crucial provisions stipulate that these entities are 
subject to the CDD requirement, record keeping and reporting obligation. Under the APG’s 
pressure (through its on-site mutual evaluation) and the FATF’s “blacklisting” campaign, 
Vietnamese laws have been complemented constantly the provisions of the preventive 
measures in accordance with the FATF Recommendations. As examined above, Vietnam has 
implemented wholesale the international AMLSs on the preventive measures into its 
domestic law. As a result, this thesis argues that the new legal framework on the preventive 
measures of Vietnam has largely complied with the international standards, but just on paper. 
In fact, the enforcement of these measures is questionable. The actual implementation of 
preventive measures has been hindered by the lack of necessary resources and preconditions, 
such as the lack of a national centralized identification system and limited access to and use 















Within the confine of the aims, scope and methodologies set out in the Introduction, this 
thesis has critically analysed the key categories of international AML standards (AMLSs), 
explored the existing inadequacies of and obstacles to the implementation of these standards 
in Vietnam, and offered recommendations for legal reform and further development of 
Vietnam’s AML legal framework in compliance with the international AMLSs. This chapter 
will summarize the primary findings of the research and draw some general conclusions. 
 
10.1 The Phenomenon of Money Laundering 
 
The research reveals that money laundering has evolved over time. It has shifted from a 
purely intra-national to a transnational dimension and from conventional to more 
sophisticated and professional typologies. Money laundering has been assisted by economic 
globalization and the rapid development of technologies. The transitional economies, like 
Vietnam, are now among the attractive destinations for tainted funds. While some States, 
such as the US and the UK, are very concerned with money laundering, developing countries, 
including Vietnam, have paid scant attention to this phenomenon until relatively recently.  
This thesis holds that the actual and potential threat of money laundering in Vietnam is 
significant. However, Vietnam has yet to consider and respond appropriately to the harms 
and risks of harm caused by money laundering. Although money laundering has been proved 
to be harmful to both the public and private sectors, it appears to be difficult to specify and 
evaluate the extent of the harms. This is one of the reasons why money laundering has not 
been become a serious concern in Vietnam as well as in many other States. 
 
10.2 The Criminalization of Money Laundering 
 
The criminalization of money laundering is the backbone of the AML legal framework. 
Thus, the globalization of criminalization of money laundering is the foremost target of the 
international AL regime. This target, in fact, has been almost met. Most States have 
criminalized money laundering as a separate criminal offence in a quite similar way. 
Although States inevitably still vary in their criminalization of money laundering, for 
example in the categorization of the predicate offences or in mens rea elements, the 
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harmonization of national criminalization of money laundering is evident. Over time, this will 
reduce friction in international cooperation in investigation, prosecution and punishment for 
money laundering offences. Nevertheless, the globalization of criminalization of money 
laundering is challenging to some national criminal law systems which have their own unique 
concepts and procedures. Vietnam’s criminal law is one such case.  
Vietnam’s history of borrowing different foreign laws has resulted in a number of 
peculiarities in Vietnamese criminal law. It appears that Vietnam’s lawmakers have 
transformed wholesale the international provisions of the actus reus of money laundering 
offences into the model applied in Vietnam, without careful consideration of whether it is 
practical (e.g., the broad scope of predicate crimes) and whether it is consistent with the core 
principles of criminal law of Vietnam (e.g., the principle of “social danger”). This leads to the 
fact that while in the statute books, Vietnam’s criminalization of money laundering complies 
with the international standards, the application in practice may cause some problems. One 
such problem, for example, is the lack of willingness of Vietnamese law enforcement 
agencies to investigate and prosecute money laundering. The law enforcement agencies may 
ask themselves whether some concepts embodied in the international legal instruments are 
compatible with the existing relevant Vietnamese provisions (e.g., the concept of the 
proceeds of crime) or whether the implementation is compatible with domestic principles of 
criminal law. Therefore, along with law reform, Vietnam needs to have a high degree of 
consensus - at the very least among its lawmakers and law enforcement agencies - about the 
harms/“social danger” of money laundering, and it must decide to provide sufficient 
resources to investigate and prosecute money laundering offenders. 
 
10.3 Jurisdiction over Money Laundering Offences 
 
This thesis has pointed out that international law has settled on a number of standards for 
exercising criminal jurisdiction over transnational money laundering. There are certain 
internationally agreed grounds on which States will claim jurisdiction and deal with the 
situation of jurisdictional concurrence. As usual, States prioritize the principle of subjective 
territoriality in the consideration of establishing extraterritorial jurisdiction over money 
laundering. In practice, many States are cautious about claiming extraterritorial jurisdiction in 
general and over money laundering in particular. This is because exercising extraterritorial 
jurisdiction usually requires significant resources and may involve competing jurisdiction 
with other States, which is a burdensome process. There is no fixed formula for resolving 
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jurisdictional concurrence. However, it is normally based on negotiation, and the State which 
has a creditable legal basis and adequate resources often has an advantage. Some States, such 
as the US, are enthusiastic about imposing extraterritorial extradition over cross-border 
money laundering. Others, for example Vietnam, are reluctant to claim this jurisdiction, 
because they often lack adequate legal bases and resources.  
Competing or concurrent jurisdiction over transnational money laundering will occur more 
frequently in the future. Thus, given the limited resources of Vietnamese legal enforcement 
authorities which put it at a significant disadvantage in asserting its jurisdiction against that of 
other competitor States, Vietnam needs to, at least, provide a comprehensive legal framework 
for asserting extraterritorial jurisdiction. Otherwise, Vietnam will fail in claiming 
extraterritorial jurisdiction over cases in which it may have a strong interest.  
 
10.4 Provisional Measures and Confiscation of Criminal Assets 
 
Strengthening the measures of identifying, tracing, freezing or seizure and eventual 
confiscation of criminal assets contributes to the AML regime in many ways. For example, 
these measures not only aim to locate the proceeds of crime, alleged property laundered, its 
roots and predicate offences but also to prevent the transaction and other manipulation of 
funds. Therefore, the money laundering process may be prevented.  
The thesis has found that national legislation on confiscation still differs significantly, 
especially between common law States and civil law States. The substantial differences lie in 
the type of assets subject to confiscation and the procedures for confiscation. While several 
common law States apply both conviction-based and non-conviction based confiscation and 
some even accept reversal of the burden of proof in the confiscation process (requiring an 
offender to demonstrate the lawful origin of the property alleged to be subject to 
confiscation), most civil law States only adopt conviction-based confiscation and do not 
allow reversal of the burden of proof. These differences are among various insurmountable 
barriers to international cooperation in confiscation of criminal assets. 
The thesis has revealed that in current Vietnamese laws, there is no separate legal 
provision of interim measures for the purposes of confiscation of criminal proceeds. Some 
concepts and procedures are new to Vietnamese law enforcement agencies (e.g., the concept 
of “property” and the procedure of non-conviction based confiscation). The thesis has made 
suggestions for reforming the relevant legal provisions of Vietnam. It may be not difficult for 
Vietnam to revise the laws on paper, but it will be very challenging to implement the legal 
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changes in fact, as those concepts and procedures are absolutely unfamiliar to Vietnamese 
law enforcement agencies.  
 
10.5 Mutual Legal Assistance in Anti-Money Laundering 
 
Beyond the traditional scope of mutual legal assistance (MLA) in criminal matters, MLA 
in combating money laundering covers some nascent aspects, such as the international 
exchange of information related to money laundering (e.g., about suspicious transactions) 
through the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) network, the assistance in executing provisional 
measures and confiscation of criminal assets, and in sharing or returning the confiscated 
assets. 
Treaty-based MLA is the most formal mechanism of legal assistance in AML, which is 
usually subject to certain conditions/principles, such as double criminality and non bis in 
idem. In practice, some troublesome problems may arise from the interaction between the 
execution of MLA and professional regulations, for instance, in respect to banking secrecy 
and professional privilege. However, for the sake of combating money laundering, these 
regulations should give way to the execution of legal assistance requests for AML in 
reasonable circumstances.  
Although the emerging aspects of legal assistance in AML have not been provided for in 
national law, they have been updated in the recent bilateral treaties on MLA of Vietnam. 
Nevertheless, their implementation in fact is very challenging to Vietnam’s law enforcement 
agencies, because of the novelty of the practice and the legal inappropriateness (e.g., 
regarding legal assistance in confiscation of criminal assets).  
 
10.6 Extradition for Money Laundering Offences 
 
Responding to the international AML regime, most States have made money laundering 
offences extraditable offences. The suppression conventions and the FATF call for their State 
Parties and member countries to harmonize their national laws on extradition for money 
laundering offences. In fact, it is evident that the application of the double criminality 
condition, the specialty rule and the evidence standard to extradition for transnational money 
laundering offences has become more flexible in some countries. Nevertheless, extradition 
for money laundering offences still faces several obstacles. Some of them relate to the 
requirement of double criminality and the specialty rule with regard to predicate offences 
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(e.g., difference in the categories of predicate offences between States), especially when 
predicate offences occurred abroad. 
In the context of Vietnam, given the shortcomings of national laws on extradition and the 
shortage of bilateral extradition treaties, Vietnam should, at least, show its commitment to the 
international AMLSs by abolishing the reservations to article 6 of the Vienna Convention. 
Vietnam can make further legal changes to obtain a “paper” compliant implementation of the 
relevant international standards. However, extradition in general and especially for money 
laundering offences in particular is dependent very much on political factors, thus an actual 
implementation would be still weak. 
 
10.7 Imposing AML Preventive Measures on Financial Institutions, Designated Non-
Financial Businesses (DNFBPs) and Professions 
 
The money laundering preventive measures, viz. customer due diligence, record keeping 
and reporting obligations are designed to uncover the opportunities that facilitate the 
operation of money laundering. They are very important to a national AML strategy. 
However, these measures cannot be implemented effectively in a particular country unless 
they fit the facilities and capacity of the financial institutions and DNFBPs of that country. 
Fortunately, the FATF has foreseen this interaction. The FATF allows States, upon the risk-
based approach (RBA), to adjust the preventive measures to certain specific circumstances.  
Another factor, that influences whether the preventive measures really benefit a national 
AML strategy, is the issue of financial inclusion. The implementation of the preventive 
measures may be not effective and even have a reverse effect in a country whereby the 
majority of population do not have access to formal financial institutions.
177
 
Vietnamese laws generally have provided for preventive measures in compliance with the 
international standards. Nonetheless, because of numerous factors, especially the issue of 
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financial exclusion and insufficient resources, the implementation of those measures has been 
limited in practice.  
 
10.8 Final Remarks 
 
To sum up, the international AMLSs have been formulated and diffused in response to 
transnational money laundering. Similarly to other international standards and regimes 
against transnational crimes, the AMLSs tend to serve the interests of the dominant States. 
Moreover, and this is significant, many of these standards have been drawn from Western 
legal models and have been tailored to suit their legal systems.  
A vast array of AML standards, which originally only had a domestic effect, has been 
globalized and developed through both “hard law” (e.g., the suppression conventions) and 
“soft law” (e.g., the FATF Recommendations and codes of conducts of other 
intergovernmental organizations). The “soft law” normally reflects and consolidates the 
provisions of the “hard law”. Interestingly, in the diffusion of AMLSs, soft-law initiatives 
with non-binding rules seem to have more influence than hard-law obligations. The FATF 
has been successful in inducing both member and non-member countries to implement and 
comply with its Recommendations. The FATF, FATF-style regional bodies and some other 
international organizations (e.g., the IMF and WB) have collaborated to set up the 
mechanisms for diffusing international AMLSs. Coercion by “blacklisting” and State 
socialization are employed as the appropriate mechanisms. Indeed, they are being applied 
effectively in the context of Vietnam. As pointed out, despite the fact that several 
international AMLSs are not compatible with the background of Vietnam (e.g., the principles 
of criminal law and the infrastructure of the financial system), Vietnam has no choice but to 
implement and comply with the AMLSs. 
In recent years, Vietnam has shown the political commitment and taken several actions to 
implement the international AMLSs. Vietnam has achieved significant progress in 
developing its AML legislation, though certain deficiencies remain. Given the existing 
deficiencies as identified, Vietnam can undertake necessary law reforms and set up a 
comprehensive AML legal framework. Nevertheless, the successful AML system of a 
country requires more than adequate AML laws. Importantly, these laws should be enforced 
effectively in practice. Through the examination in the previous chapters, the thesis concludes 
with an argument that Vietnam could obtain a high degree of “paper” compliance with 
international AMLSs in the near future, but it has still a long way to go before reaching that 
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degree of actual compliance required by the international community. That is primarily 
because of inauthentic political will, legal inappropriateness and inadequate resources in 
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